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
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
IN THE NAME OF ISLAM

**INTERVIEWS WITH
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE POLISH DEFENCE
AND
THE CHIEF
OF THE GENERAL STAFF
OF THE TURKISH
ARMED FORCES**

**THE ARMY
OF THE FUTURE
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land military instrument must be capable of guaranteeing, within the Alliances, the security of the nation as well as the restoration and strengthening of peace.

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Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

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IN THE NAME OF ISLAM

by Maurizio Coccia *

It will never be stressed enough how much the West's perception of Islam is nourished and moulded by old pictures rooted in memory. As if these pictures had formed a landscape where the current events are systematically introduced.

The Islamic world is a very different thing. It is an extremely variegated reality that does not use the same language, does not pursue the same goals, is not inspired by the same historical reference points.



Two specifications help us to enter into this very complex subject. The first, not so trite as it may seem, according to which the characterizing context, which has Islam as common denominator, in order to be criticized should first be understood. The second refers to the terms Arab and Moslem which are not equivalent, neither geographically nor conceptually, the first being a geopolitical concept and the second a religious one.

THE HISTORY

From this preamble, relying on an excellent chronological history presented in 1995 by Cdr Renato Scarfi ("Islam" special issue of *Informazione Difesa* - n.6/1995), one can go back to the beginning of the VII century. In that historical period, two great communities are dominant and competing in the Near East: the Byzantine and the Sassanide Empires. The first, prevalently Christian with Orthodox and Copt variants, includes a part of Italy, the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Crete, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The bordering Sassanian empire, reaches from Iraq to Central Asia. The population has been professing Mazdaism, or Zoroastrianism, originated in Babylonia, since the III century.

In the Arab peninsula, heathen communities are extensively engaged in trade. The most important resides in present-day Yemen, on the shores of the Red Sea. It is here that in the VII century a new religious movement appears, which calls to submission to a single god. The message, spread in Arabic by Muhammad, is the regional variation of Judaism and Christianity, and originates a new religion, distinct from the two preceding ones.

Muhammad is born in Mecca around 570 AD. A caravan leader, he marries a rich widow, a tradeswoman, who entrusts him with the management of her properties. Economic prosperity allows him to devote himself to religious thought. As time passes he feels he is called upon to carry out the same mission that the Christian-Judaean prophets carried out for their respective peoples. Proselytism, under the banner of Islamism, as an all-including reality with a hegemonic

project, soon becomes war. When Muhammad dies, the entire Arab peninsula has been conquered in the name of Islam. He has been a statesman, a lawgiver, a conqueror, a monarch, but above all a prophet, a messenger from God. After his death, proselytism and expansionism continue thanks to his nephew (and son-in-law) Ali.

The Koran is not only a religion, but also the sole law, the perfect example of language and style, therefore not only the foundation of the Islamic religion and the Islamic State but also of the whole Arabian-Islamic culture. In the name of the new religion new armies are assembled, prevalently made up with inhabitants of the Arab peninsula. They lead one of the greatest conquering campaigns of history, founding a new empire: the Caliphate, which soon includes a large part of the Byzantine and Sassanian Empires, reaching from Central Asia to Spain.

The expansion from Spain towards the West stops because of the increasing resistance encountered. We mention the battle of Poitiers fought in 732 by Charles Martel.

From the VII to the X century Christians and Moslems are continuously at war.

Between the XI and the XV century the military expansion develops towards the East, leading to the annexation of Anatolia and India. In 1389, the attempt to move to the West from the East through the Balkans causes the mythical battle of Kosovo, which will turn into a massacre for the regional coalition led by the Serbs, and made up of Albanians, Bosnians, Rumanians and perhaps also Croatians. For the invaders the resistance encountered is only a significant warning. The sudden attack from Tamerlane, and his Mongolian horde from the North, is a real setback, which marks a long stalemate. Also because the Crusades have started, a concrete and organized reaction of Christendom against Islam, which can be credited with having definitively stopped its advance towards the West.

Between the XV and the XVI century the Islamic world is divided into three Empires: Ottoman, Safavid and

Moghul. All the Arab speaking territories, excluding part of Arabia, of Sudan and of Morocco, belong to the Ottoman Empire, with Istanbul as their capital.

In 1571, the Christian and Moslem fleets join battle at Lepanto for the control over the trade routes in the Mediterranean. The Ottoman Empire is defeated. Thus ends the period of maximum expansion, expression of Islamic universality. It is also the period in which the Arabian art of war reaches its apex: unity of command, military and religious discipline, strategic mobility resting on a network of fortresses seized from the Crusaders, on an effective information service and on advanced war machines.

In the XVIII century the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European States change, for the power of the latter has grown remarkably. Because of the scientific and technological gap, the Ottoman Empire finds itself threatened on most of its borders. The trade competition turns progressively to the Europeans' advantage.

In the XIX century Europe rules the world: the growth of the industrial production and the exploitation of the new means of communication lead to a further expansion of the European commerce, which in its turn increases military power. This is the beginning of colonization, also of the Arab countries: France starts by annexing Algeria. The first debates within the Arab countries concerning the suitability of following the West European model or of opposing it, date back to this period. Pros and cons are of little value vis-à-vis the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Tunisia and Egypt, respectively, fall under the French and English protectorates.

The First World War marks the definitive disappearance of the Ottoman Empire: The new independent state of Turkey is born. The support given by the British government to the idea of assigning a part of the territory of Palestine to the independent Jewish nucleus inflames the resentment of the neighbouring peoples against the occupants and causes the growth of



nationalistic feelings.

The second World War nourishes the hopes of resurrection and return to the old unity. We mention the Alexandria (1944) and Cairo (1945) Conferences, which lead to the constitution of the Arab League. The rest is today's history: many attempts, many potential leaders but, on the whole, a decadent history which hinders any kind of osmosis between the West and the Arab World and is at the root of the persisting fragmentation within the latter. Here we end the historical reconstruction.

With a view to this, the current

widespread opinion is that, in order to go back to the *umma*, to the idea of unity of the Arab countries, the only conceivable cement could again be Islam.

FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM

Islam is in any case a protagonist. Within the majority of the Moslem countries, having the latter renounced the original idea of lining up with the West's evolution, the debate is simply between those who would like the modernization of Islam and those who want the islamization of modernity. The main function of the European countries is that of bridging the gaps in



Genghis Khan's soldiers preparing a meal (from "History of the Mongols by Rashid-al-Din, Paris, National Library).

help to establish a better relationship. On the Arab side, history weighs heavily. The continuous decline is still hurting and the feeling of revenge and recovery of the past splendours is widespread. The recovery can only occur to the detriment of the natural counterpart, i. e. the West. The criminalized West identified, today like yesterday, with the enemy.

From this conceptual exasperation originates and draws its force the Islamic radicalism, which is something quite different from Islam. Its followers make no difference between internal and external enemy and therefore oppose with the same strength both the rules of the former colonial countries, their reference enemies, and those of the governments and kingdoms of their own countries.

This phenomenon is characterized by the constant presence of two lines of thought. The first is the diagnosis that the followers of radicalism make of the situation in the Islamic countries, believing religion in mortal danger, facing extinction not because of invasion or conquest, as in the past, but through the poisoning of the Western model of development, with its sequels of secularism, materialism, modernism, edonism and ensuing vices. The Western way of life is inconsistent with the Islamic rules.

On the basis of the diagnosis, the second line of thought discusses the merits of a possible cure: secession, even outside the State, in order to reconquer it, using all means, from the inside and from the outside, also through terror and destabilization, a precondition for its reconstruction according to Koranic rules.

Clearly, it is a mental deviation which should be treated as such, by isolating it, avoiding to acknowledge the authority of the supporting groups, excluding international cooperation, reestablishing the virtuous circle of development and economic takeoff in the countries where the phenomenon occurs and expands; promoting, among the models of our

the mutual knowledge, which are cultural rather than historical. All the developed countries are convinced in good faith of the necessity to extend the functional dialogue towards the countries of the area. First of all, because a behavioural castling worries them, reviving old ghosts. This is all the more true in that the model presents a good index of attraction. A significant attraction vis-à-vis a democratic free-market model pervaded by too many, preeminent, mercenary values. There is moreover the awareness of having to do with a declared enemy who, unlike the Europeans, has never implemented a defensive strategy, but rather the most

aggressive and expansionist, nourished by the religious spur. Finally, there remains, more or less on the surface, another negative stereotype which interferes with the construction of a partnership: the stereotype built during the colonial period. Lands of conquest, of exploitation, of increasing costs, of socio-cultural, economic and political reclamation which have successively freed themselves and now openly reveal a resentment against those who, to this day, believe to have hastened their development.

Concern and fear are not the best advisers in order to construct a cooperative dialogue: The common history does not

Western way of life, the values concerning human rights, tolerance, openness and international cooperation; restoring, above all, dignity and credibility to Islamism as religion and as civilization. For instance, getting ahead with the Arab-Israeli process of peace in the name of reason and not of factional interests, showing that tolerance and mediation can overcome even the most conflictual and lengthy form of a complex political, social, religious and military conflict.

A cure, such as the one outlined, entails a continuous availability of effective instruments, in order to support the countries that oppose the spreading of the disease, checking also the infiltrations into the European countries, monitoring the transfer-process of the tensions. Also the armed forces can find a role of intervention, if the need arises, in case of macroscopically deviated situations, as it could happen if a country were to be held as a hostage by pseudo-religious criminals.

The Islamic radicalism tends to exploit any favourable occasion which usually coincides with internal weaknesses or area vulnerabilities. It could be the case of Turkey, for example, if its European inclination were to be thwarted. The Algerian case is visible, the Egyptian one is latent. But also in Saudi Arabia there are seeds of disorder.

ROOTS AND BEHAVIOUR OF THE LOCAL ACTORS

Already in its roots, the Islamic world is not united.

There is a first, fundamental, distinction: that between the Arab, Iranian and Turkish areas.

The first, more substantial as regards both extension and political importance, is the reference area, because it is the birthplace of Islam and hosts its holy cities.

It shows remarkable differences: suffice it to mention the distinction between Maghreb (West) and Mashraq (East). The first, i.e. North Africa, excluding Egypt, has a double soul, the Arabian one, of the inhabitants of the cities and coasts, and the Berber one, in which the largest part of the population of the interior, which is the heir of the indigenous peoples of the region,

A couple before the Muftis.

recognizes itself. Mashraq, on the other side, which extends from Egypt to Iran, is the heart of Islam and of the Arab world. Apart from the Arab peninsula, its territories are inhabited by populations of Semitic origin, with the remarkable exception of Egypt, whose population is of Hamitic origin.

The Iranian area is not Arab; it has its own language, Arabic is the cultured's language. The history of the Persian empire represents largely the political antecedent of Islam. The historical-ideological heritage of Persia has therefore become a wealth common to the whole Arab-Islamic world.

The function of Iran, as Asia's intermediary towards Islam, appeared clearly in its time as regards the Turks, peoples coming from Eastern Asia. Thanks to Iran, these had their first contacts with the Islamic world and, starting from the year one thousand, they became its political guide, spreading Islam towards the East, to the regions of Central Asia and India, and to the West, to Anatolia and parts of Eastern Europe. Moreover, in the Islamic world there are wide differences that characterize behaviour.

The Maghreb states: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia, in the past have tried the Western way. Europe is still their reference model of development. The State is born in opposition to the colonial one, but does not enclose itself in the historical and religious niche. This provides a national identity that today is given for granted, and which has also permitted to set some distance between State and religion. This is perhaps the reason why the emigration to the North exceeds two million people. There are still problems of internal development, especially in Libya, Algeria and Morocco. There is no lack of contentions of a certain gravity, like the question of Western Sahara between Morocco and Algeria, the Algerian civil war in progress, and Libya's isolation, because of the sanctions of 1992, in a more or less general state of acquiescence of the neighbouring States.

The country in the best conditions, as




regards scenario and development, seems to be Morocco, because of the peculiar role of King Hassan II, who has made Islam, nationalism and national unity coincide with his person. Still, there remains the problem of succession.

Tunisia is developing, as far as possible, according to the European model, but feels the effect of two troubling neighbours: Libya and Algeria.

In Libya, that could be defined the France of North Africa, Ghadafi's numerous initiatives have more or less all failed. The future, which, hopefully, will improve, is bound to political change.

In Algeria, 130 years of French presence have left their mark. Although the National Liberation Front has ceased to be the ideological reference point, the techniques of power-keeping are more or less the same, as is shown by the action and reaction of the army in 1992 which has interrupted the emerging of the



Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). An enclosed internal war, which, oddly enough, coexists with commerce. This grows, bringing in more money, which feeds violence. It grows because wars cost and because an economic transformation is under way, which aims, first of all, at playing a unifying role as well as reducing its dependence on oil revenues. This process coexists with authoritarianism, which is necessary to keep the political conduct of the country alien to radicalism. Up to now, the international reaction has remained rather soft, perhaps because Islamics are incapable of making themselves agreeable, not even when the seem to be in the right.

The situation follows a relatively foreseeable course: as the feud drags on, the religious representatives come to be seen as martyrs and, at the same time, no consent is gained from the Western world. The excessive freedom in

wielding the internal power, and particularly that in the military's hands, permits to pursue party interests, beyond and outside the effort to reach a general solution of the crisis. Private feuds intermingle with political terrorism and the greatest losers are, from the one side, Islamism, discredited by too much misuse and, on the other side, the credibility of the international organizations.

Faced by the alibi of national sovereignty and the primacy of economic interests, the international intervention marks time. Under the thin crust of cooperation, a solid base of selfishness, opportunism and contingency comes to the surface.

In Mashraq, Egypt stands out, owing to a strategic importance which permits it to hold a dialogue with the main actors of the region: Israel, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, but also the United States and, up to sometime ago, also Russia. The

country extricates itself well between political democracy and Islamic radicalism, perhaps with systems that on the other side of the Mediterranean could be deemed questionable. Its international stature is high. It derives it from its centrality in the Arab world and from its prominent diplomatic role. Its most important managing instruments are precisely a shrewd diplomacy and a steady hand, in order to ensure the internal control, especially as regards the fundamentalist internal fringes.

Of course this goes to the detriment of democratic growth. Between two evils one chooses the lesser; this philosophy, together with that of meeting the contingencies, permeates the whole region and has in Egypt its champion in terms of objectives and results.

Saudi Arabia, religious and economic reference country, is today hit by a serious crisis which derives from a growing political instability, made more delicate by the old King's poor health. The royal family has a size and a role difficult to keep in the future. The economy is fragile; the usual fear of an excessive democratization restrains the initiatives and maintains a more and more penalizing *status quo*.

Jordan has long been playing a remarkable propositional role. Since the English colonial period it has been directly involved, of course also geographically, with Palestine and Israel. Despite legitimate worries regarding its territory and independence, it is open to a propositional dialogue.

Were there a possibility to overcome the conceptual and socio-cultural *impasse* of the peace process, it seems that Jordan would be open to forms of effective cooperation, also to a possible economic, or even political-economic, integration with those countries.

Yemen shows a sound personality; economic strengthening is in progress, it is a probable protagonist in the near future.

Syria and Lebanon have long been constituting a geopolitical binomial, and the control of the first over the latter is on the increase. They are united by ethnic and religious reasons and by the contention with Israel, for



Muhammad ascending into heaven on his mare (illustration by Haidar Kuli on a manuscript, Paris, National Library).

the Golan Heights and for Southern Lebanon respectively. Israel is certainly at the heart of the worries of president Assad, but so is Turkey with its military agreement with Israel of 1996, with the political problem of the Kurds and, above all, with the delivery of the Euphrates' waters that flow from Turkey into Syria. On the whole, the

leading country plays an important and worrying role.

Iraq, with its challenge to the US and the Western world, seems to have an uncertain future. A future related to the level of national cohesion, to the holding degree of its institutions, to the hard core of Hussein's family and his staunch friends. A country that through its leader, but probably on the basis of a very cohesive national spirit, had regional ambitions; blocked and reduced at present. It can be surmised that Hussein has probably lost his magic

moment. A country under embargo.

Iran, author of the first model of a government of the new radical Islam. The coexistence of religion at political level is, after a few years, in an evident internal crisis. A crisis with modest possibilities of evolution because of Iran's anti-American bias, which does not allow ample modernistic changes. The country is committed to the maintainment of good bilateral trade relations with the European countries, which need its oil resources, in spite of the US sanctions. Iran has opened a gap

in the solidarity between the Americans, who try to isolate it, and the Europeans, who try to widen the relations with the moderate basis. Iran feels a sense of being encircled by too many countries, neighbours or not.

Also for this reason Iran has equipped itself with the most valuable conventional weapons and missiles, capable of blocking, today better than yesterday, the Straits of Hormuz, if the contest with the United States were to worsen. It seeks a role of its own, but still draws great attention when it opens to the outside world, like it did in Teheran with the Islamic conference in 1997, where 55 countries promptly arrived. Probably in the future it will be again a great frontier-country, that will run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, like Egypt and Turkey.

At present Turkey is the most dynamic country of the Middle East. An evolving country. The United States tolerates its behaviour because it has the merit of restraining Iran's ambitions. Turkey's foreign policy shows a dichotomy deriving from its strategic position. Islamic Turkey interprets its relations with Europe as an incentive to modernity, democratization and secularization, which, on the contrary, the Arab world uncompromisingly condemns as symbols of colonization. This is the reason of the combinatorial relation Turkey-Europe-Arab World, that leads the first to adopt separate and distinct policies in its relations with the second and the third. These two channels of the international Turkish policy are not reciprocally mediated, but they are functional to the country's interests, which is in a position to take the greatest possible advantage of the mentioned double value. Moving from principles to facts, Turkey has always kept a position of essential balance, avoiding carefully to interfere with the relations of the two worlds, both in the internal relations and in those among countries. Nevertheless, always careful to obtain a positive perception of its positions in foreign policy, it acts with the objective, not always achieved, of receiving the maximum benevolence from both worlds. Probably, most of its past, present and foreseeable future problems derive from its difficult, not

well coordinated, or coordinable, double foreign policy.

The not-too disguised wish of the North and Central European countries would be to keep Turkey in a condition of frontier-country as regards the Middle East problems, to have a buffer-state with which to keep privileged relations, but to keep it separate. This selfish aspiration is made easier by the constant Greek ostracism, originated by a number of unsolved questions: from the occupation of Cyprus to the territorial waters and to historical and religious contrasts.

For what concerns national interests, Turkey's present activism depends largely on the reaction to such a role, based on a renewed geostrategic function. In fact, in the new regional scenario, Turkey stands in the middle of three critical areas (Middle East, Balkans, Caucasian countries). This makes Turkey a possible guardian of the entrances, through the Caucasus, into Russia and China, as well as into a sensitive three-border zone of the most important Arab-Islamic Middle East countries (Iran, Iraq, Syria). Turkey is near regions of remarkable energy value, it holds water resources, because the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates flow into Syria and from there towards Iraq. These potentials are increased by other significant *trumps*: its belonging to the Atlantic Alliance and the religious affinities with many countries in the area. The model dispute is that with Iran: The West against Islamism at country-management level. Behind the activism of the last period there is probably a suggestion of the US, which, with Turkey and Saudi Arabia as intermediaries, through Pakistan and Afghanistan, can have access to a region of great strategic importance, with a wealth of energy resources, controlling the contemporary Russian activity in the area.

Turkey stands out also for its strategic position in relation to the exponential growth of the criminal powers, especially those connected with drug trafficking at international level. Through Turkey travels the heroin produced in Central Asia, but also the chemical drugs produced in the Russian laboratories and also South America's cocaine destined to the markets of Eastern Europe. The countries of Central Asia do not control

their territories because of indifference, or intentionally. In any case, the lack of control fuels the regional conflict processes already in progress and sets the best preconditions for starting new tensions.

THE PRECONDITIONS OF COOPERATION

On the whole, Islam, as a charitable blanket, covers, or better it should cover, too many problems: the economic gap, the stagnation of the socio-cultural growth, the incomprehension among models, the incomprehension within the great Arab family, the mischiefs in wielding the power made in the countries that, once upon a time, had a fundamental role in the conquest of a large part of the known world, in the name of Islam. At the same time, Islam, in the way it has lived, greatly restricts the scenario of the possibilities of development, binding romantic peoples to the game of contingencies and to an excessive use of compromise. There is no heroic future. There is no future at all. Rise and fall of an empire. Only dignity and pride are left, mixed with Islam. An Islam which, living together with everyday's miseries has lost a great part of its splendour, becoming mainly a drug for the poor. The energy resources, the joker card for change, have long been managed in this perspective. There are few daily satisfactions and too many ethical values, lavished copiously so that they may perform a function that surrogates other certainties and benefits that are available almost everywhere in other countries and to other peoples of the Earth.

Nationalist pride, more often tribal pride, and Islam constitute a dangerous cocktail: the strict interpretation of the law, does not allow easy adaptations; it lacks flexibility in order to evolve in harmony with all the others. Even if one wishes to prescind from the radical forms, one sees that the border-line examples show the tendency to make grotesque imitations of the Western model, or to exclude it.

As regards the first, suffice it to watch the New York Arab TV channel, where singers and players dressed like Elvis Presley, with similar gaudy outfits, employ the latest technologies at their

disposal to deliver the same sing-song which can be heard amplified in the bazars or outside the mosque. As for the second, the annual version of the pilgrimage to Mecca offered by the Western TV broadcasts, shows a human river inside an impenetrable enclosure: all wearing a white uniform, with in-unison movements that would cause the envy of any professional ballet, once more a proof of intransigence applied to the simplest aspects of life. The unifying element of the two shows is that the actors are exclusively men, who, by now, only in the Arab world enjoy a visible presence and arrogance. Therefore, in view of the West's primacy as a model, not only intransigence but also countertrend. Anyway, in the outlook of these countries there is good portion of the past's fairy-like suggestion, and autolesionism.

The abovementioned behaviour is there to show that Europe has done too little, that the individual European countries have done too much and that America still finds it difficult to understand it all. The bilateral relations have increased the confusion, because they more easily reflect what the countries of the South want to see, permitting also the local isolationism between State and State, except meeting again in the name of Islam, like we used to do on Sundays, at midday, going to Mass: wearing our best suit, smiles and "careful now, let's behave". The economic factor dominates more the Northern than the Southern scenario, because for the Arab countries it is important but not vital, otherwise they would not have wasted the resources that nature generously gave them.

As regards mutual acknowledgement, which remains the first step towards a better common future on the Mediterranean shores, it seems that so much attention to economy proves to have quite the opposite effect. First of all, for the approach, which could even appear neocolonialist, considering the development gap. Moreover, since in the South it is not a priority, it has the potentiality to facilitate only a superficial change. Finally, because with money one can buy anybody's consent to very questionable behaviours. Fear brings about the rest: false

behaviour, false attitudes, diplomacy of smiles, but lack of appeal. Appeal, on the contrary, is an important element that could be played upon. Appeal, with time has been satisfied in exchange for profit, with the result that pride too often becomes arrogance and somebody else's polite, nice and outgoing behaviour is considered a sign of weakness, with an ensuing loss of respect. The cycle is closed, with the result that also dignity is lost.

If one is willing to intervene in a framework of prevention, the political and diplomatic instruments should show themselves less condescending and complying, for the simple fact that these tactics have given ample proof of being ineffective. Preliminarily there is a urgent need of communication techniques capable of obtaining results by acting on the vital ganglia of the local thought, which clearly takes us back to Islam: Starting to avoid seeing this religion as the origin of all problems and crises, finding and emphasizing the multiple elements that are shared with the other monoteist religions, in order to create a communication in what is the fundamental essence, ethic for us global for them, of behaviour.

Through the channel of religious interpretation it will be possible to lead the flow of doses of Western civilization, accurately avoiding the ones most noxious to them and to us. This strategy of approach through Islam is beneficial because it will enable us to understand our neighbours and, at the same time, we will be able to acknowledge also the troubles that we caused ourselves and those that we could still cause if we do not take the appropriate measures. Islam is welcome as quality-control of the model in which we have thrown ourselves headlong.

Also national pride can bear positive fruits in a common framework. It has already done something: the military units that cooperated in the last peace-keeping operations have shown great will and capability of doing, of standing out, of excelling; this cannot but please us, in a world where professionalism grows in width but decreases in depth. If the Arabs start a dialectic competition starting from a superior

level, that of Islam, we could, or should, do the same. With the sword of our religion, with an interpretation of the Koranic law as modern as possible, and on the other side, with the shield of universality, the supremacy of peaceful coexistence among the peoples of the Earth, overcoming compromise partitions. All this with the preliminary objective of establishing a contact, a dialogue, like we would do with anybody, even with visitors from space. Successively, with a reciprocal positive attitude and in a framework of mutual understanding it could be possible to proceed to the fundamental issues, in order to reduce the gap and establish a productive dialogue as regards: the economic aspects, the flow of foreign investments, the regulation of emigration and work forces, agriculture, international laws and the necessary agreements. In addition, human rights, non-discrimination, terrorism, fight against terrorism, role and tasks of the conventional and non-conventional armed forces.

THE CASE STUDY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS

At present, the most complex level of the dialogue develops about the so-called pacification process between Israel and Palestine, an unending armistice between two declared enemies. A good *case study*, indeed the perfect regional *case study*.

Here like everywhere else, according to where one turns one's attention, there are different scenarios which give rise to evaluations that might be widely different. For instance, one could start from the observation that when a new sovereign entity emerges in a limited historical, political and geographic context, the upsetting of the previous balances and the adaptations to the new ones usually occur through violent perturbations of the international relations. Or it could be said that after the failure of the Pan-Arabic experiment, Islam indeed in the struggle against Israel, which represents the West after all, finds a cohesive point among the countries and, admittedly, also a



religious and political justification.

But we could start with the consideration that the ferment for the development of a civil society and of democracy in the Arab countries flows through two non-communicating channels, meaning that the intentions and the objectives of the masses are probably very different from the objectives of the leaders. What there is in common is the awareness that democracy remains an indispensable precondition for a possible modern and emancipated Arab unity, a goal that presumes, if not a confederation of the countries, at least a profitable level of cooperation. And what about the consideration from the historical point of view of this dispute that is becoming eternal? In Palestine the problem of the Jewish return coincides three times with the weakening of the imperial power on the region. The first Jewish kingdom is established with David's dynasty from 1000 b.C. to 586 b.C. when the Pharaoh's hegemony is fading. The second comes to power with the Maccabean dynasty from 167 to 141, to the detriment of the Ellenistic imperial kingdom and disappears under the imperial power of Rome. After a long eclipse, the Jewish sovereignty surfaces again for the third

time, while the Ottoman empire is crumbling, and following the French-English mandate. The unsolved questions increase with every return. Today it is enough to mention the political, water, demographic and nuclear issues.

Underneath distrust, unbalance and insecurity are smouldering. Sionism is seen by the Arabs as an aggressive movement, conniving with Western imperialism. Israel's distrust is born out of knowledge of the Arab thought, fed by the psychological impact of several wars. Israel's insecurity grows vis-à-vis the evident quantitative, demographic, energy, territorial and military superiority of the Arab states. The same can be said for the Arabs as regards Israel's growth among the industrialized countries.

And here we are again to the deep roots of the malaise: the lack of mutual acknowledgement on both sides. Dignity, pride and lack of recognition can become the fuel of revolt. Recognition reminds us immediately of Palestine's recognition as a State. Which stresses the importance of an internal dialogue between Palestine and Israel but also with the neighbouring countries. To say that nothing has been done would be incorrect. The Oslo agreements of four years ago prove the zeal used in

"The Dome of the Rock" -also called Omar Mosque- in Jerusalem.

seeking to take maximum advantage of propitious situations. Even today, to talk about peace is better than to make war, but the level of compromise and ambiguity at which the armistice talks are moving does not leave us much hope, also because the number of the actors is too large.

The event confirms the importance of mutual recognition, which implies a preliminary effort of understanding, to lessen the reciprocal frustration. Moreover, this proves the absolute foremost value of the religious instrument for regional communication. Islam, freed from the ingredients of radicalization, but also from widespread authoritarianism and nepotism, could perform a function of ideological glue; or it could effectively operate towards the socio-cultural aggregation of the various cultures of the world by opening the historic, ethic and cultural treasures of its peoples to the other peoples of the Earth.


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** Major General
(ret.)*

THE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DETERRENT

by Maurizio Boni *

The debate on the constitution of a common policy of European defence has acquired a new theme which, as regards sensitiveness and complexity, does not fail to raise polemics. Is it possible to conceive a military cooperation that includes the French and British nuclear deterrents? The outcome of these discussions is hardly foreseeable and anything but marginal, for it concerns often clashing interests





The possibility to realize a nuclear arsenal, independent of the United States' and based on the weapons in possession of Great Britain and France, is one of the most discussed and controversial aspects of the process aimed at defining common European foreign and security policies. The idea of the so-called "Eurodeterrence" has been formally fostered and supported by the French. It was in fact Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission in 1992, who made the proposal of placing the nuclear deterrent of the Force de Frappe at the disposal of the Community, in view of the desirable development of a common defence policy. According to the intents of the then President François Mitterrand, this should have led to the implementation of a common nuclear policy.

In more recent times, also President Chirac expressed himself in these terms, followed by



Soldiers of the French Foreign Legion engaged in the international mission in Bosnia.

other credible representatives of the French government. First among them, for example, Alain Juppé, who suggested to institutionalize the debate on the Europeanization of the nuclear arsenals of the United Kingdom and France, during the Intergovernmental Conferences of 1996, 1997 and on successive occasions, in order to constitute a "concerted" deterrence.

On this item, the United Kingdom, Eurosceptical by tradition, has always manifested a very cautious attitude, feeling a scarce enthusiasm for any form of military cooperation which would exclude or drastically reduce the Euro-Atlantic link with the United States as regards European defence. In addition, in the background of Great Britain's and France's viewpoints, suggested by

not-exactly coincident politico-military interests, there are those of the other EU countries, characterized by different political, military and institutional situations, which produce different and often irreconcilable trends in the European foreign policy. It is moreover well known that while there is a tendency to internationalize the national policies of defence, with the ensuing establishment of integrated military forces of various kinds, in reality no country has up to now dispensed with its prerogatives concerning security, thus mitigating the easy enthusiasms for the integration of the defence policies, always wanted but never implemented.

Probably, already these simple observations would be sufficient to discourage even the beginning of a debate on so wide a subject. Nevertheless, the study on the conditions that may lead to the achievement of a European nuclear deterrent must be based also on less generic considerations.

For this reason we deem it

appropriate to take into account some significant parameters which are at the foundation of the development of a possible Eurodeterrent, such as:

- the characteristics of the of the UK and French nuclear components;
- the cooperation realized between the two countries in connection with nuclear issues;
- the role that nuclear deterrence should play in the European continent;
- the political design that is at the background of the French proposal.

THE FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR ARSENALS

The two nations have achieved the development of their nuclear potential at different times: the first British "A" bomb exploded on October 3, 1952, the French one almost eight years later, February 13, 1960. This is mainly due to the participation of British scientists in

the "Manhattan" project carried out by the United States, but also for political choices made at the end of WW2.

In 1947, the British decided to acquire a nuclear deterrent, not so much to counter an impending threat, but because they were convinced that the new weapons proved the scientific and technological superiority of a nation that had won the war, destined to play a preeminent role on the international stage, but characterized by a scarce availability of manpower.

France, in fact excluded from the military nuclear cooperation established among US, Canada and Great Britain, in 1946 had decided to develop exclusively the civil nuclear sector, relying on the knowledge acquired from the Allied cooperation maintained until the eve of the beginning of the US project. It was the increasing weight of international isolation of the immediate post-war period that increased its will to provide itself with a nuclear arsenal. The programme was secretly started at the end of 1954, with Mendès-France's government, but it was De Gaulle that openly and definitively legitimized the project. Anyway, unlike what had occurred in Great

BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS			
Platform	Vehicles	Number of missiles	Operating range
3 Vanguard class SSBN	Trident II-D5 SLBM	48 on 16 Tridents*	7,400 Km

* Some D5 missiles are equipped with a single warhead, in a sub-strategic role.

Source: IISS - Military Balance 1997-1998.

Britain, the issue was the object of discussions.


Once established, the two arsenals were criticized especially for their assumedly scarce deterrent credibility. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union never considered fundamental the inclusion of these forces in the various negotiations on the control of nuclear weapons carried out with the United States during the Cold War (SALT -INF - START) for they were considered, like China's, not essential within the general balance of forces between East and West. All this, nevertheless, quite facilitated the London and Paris governments' conduct which, free from international diplomatic pressures, were free to maintain

their strategic and substrategic forces, adapting the amount to their financial means and politico-military necessities.

France has always had an arsenal numerically superior to that of Great Britain, mainly for two series of reasons: first of all, the geographical continuity of the country with rest of Europe, in comparison with the discontinuity of the UK territory from the continent. Secondly, the different philosophy of employment of the respective strategic forces. According to Great Britain's viewpoint, the philosophy has always been NATO-centric and the British weapons have been an integrant part of NATO's plans since 1963, but not as a simple addition to the US capabilities. In fact, in the UK's opinion there was the risk that the Soviet Union, despite the formal existence of the nuclear "umbrella" over Europe, could start offensive actions, reckoning that, in such circumstances, the US might abstain from employing its nuclear weapons, in order not to risk "Detroit for London". On the contrary, the Kremlin would be forced to consider the existence of a second and independent "decision-making centre" within the Atlantic Alliance. Thus the British deterrent would strengthen NATO's wider one, eliminating a possible cause of weakness for the latter. The idea of a second decision-making centre is still an integrant part of the British doctrine and the foundation of the

FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS			
Platform	Vehicles	Number of missiles	Operating range
4 SSBN 3 "Le Redoutable" class 1 "Triomphant" class	SLBM M4 AB M 45	64 48 MsbS 16 MsbS	6,000 Km 5,000 Km
60 "Mirage" 2000N 36 "Super Etendard"	ASMP ASMP	45 24	650 Km

Source: IISS - Military Balance 1997-1998.



British paratrooper of a lead patrol radios his instructions for an airdrop.

missiles (SLBM) (1) installed on nuclear-powered submarines (SSBN) (2). Great Britain has given up the substrategic air component based on the by now obsolete WE-177 gravity bombs carried by Tornados. France has maintained, until 1996, a deterrent "triad" based, besides the mentioned submarines, also on a land component (two launching sites for 18 strategic missiles located at Plateau d'Albion in the south of the country and a stocked reserve of 30 "HADES" tactical missiles) and on an air component, a part of which on ships.

By the end of 1998 the triad will be transformed into a "dyad" because the French government two years ago started the disarmament and removal of both the strategic missiles and the relevant warheads from their launching pads, and the dismantling of the tactical missiles (3).

On the other hand, given the latter's limited range (about 450 km), when launched from the French territory they could only hit targets located on German territory. Moreover France has emphasized the survival capabilities of the C3I component (4), setting up an air-carried, mobile command and control centre installed on C-160 H Transalls, borrowing the American "TACAMO" (Take Charge and Move Out) concept. Finally it should be remarked that the British submarines and warheads are designed and produced in the United Kingdom, while the missiles and the guiding systems are bought from the United States. The French, on the contrary, have developed their arsenal in a totally autonomous manner and, following the completion of the last series of nuclear experiments, they are realizing a simulation programme

so-called preferential relations with the United States.

On the other hand, instead, France considered its strategic forces solely as an instrument to affirm and maintain its national sovereignty and the integrity of its territory, and the relevant employment principles were dictated by politico-military considerations concerning the vital interests of the nation alone, and this facilitated the promotion of a quite self-sufficient deterrence.

In more recent times, the two countries have started a process of modernization and, simultaneously, of reduction of their respective arsenals. The reduction has concerned mainly the medium-range tactical component, and it has occurred - and this should be emphasized - as the result of unilateral initiatives of both governments, outside any negotiated measure of armaments control.

The present capabilities of the United Kingdom and France are based essentially on ballistic



Soldiers of a French reconnaissance unit on training in a forest area.

capable of reproducing the functioning phases of nuclear weapons.

BRITISH - FRENCH COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD

The cooperation has been concretely in existence since 1990, taking essentially two forms: the creation of a forum for the exchange of doctrine and political information on nuclear matters and the collaboration in the field of nuclear weapons acquisition. Owing to the latter agreements, Britain recently considered the possibility of acquiring from France the ASLP (Air-Sol Longue Portée) air land missiles to replace

the mentioned WE-177 bombs. A fact of this kind would have been extremely significant for the purpose of fostering a common policy of European defence. The United Kingdom would have shown the political will to move more concretely towards Europe than towards the United States and, together with France, it would have been possible to lay the foundations of a wider cooperations in the field of nuclear armaments. As a matter of fact, Great Britain has given up acquiring a "dedicated" substrategic launching system like the ASLP (mainly in view of the abolition of the nuclear air component), conferring, as we have seen, this role to the SLBM. The establishment of a closer cooperation between France and the United Kingdom, would have been a very important encouragement to the collaboration in the field of European defence, if compared with the Russian-American one, which

was emerging at the beginning of the nineties and could move in a direction not entirely compatible with the West European interests, especially as regards the proposals of negotiations on armament controls which could have threatened the integrity of the respective arsenals.

Following the already mentioned proposal advanced by Delors on Eurodeterrence, the nature and contents of the French-British talks have been kept substantially secret; nevertheless the most significant events have been made public, i.e.:

- the institution of two joint commissions (armaments; nuclear policy and doctrine)
- the ensuing start of a wide-ranging debate essentially centred on the concept of nuclear deterrence, with particular reference to possible threats, and on the assistance to Russia and Ukraine in dismantling their nuclear warheads,



British "Sea King" helicopter, with IFOR striped colouring, on a flight over Bosnia.

- the definition of a common position as regards the non-proliferation of nuclear armaments.

DETERRING WHO?

During the Cold War the European deterrence was aimed mainly at preventing the occupation of Western Europe by the Soviet armed forces. In view of this, the strategic dimension was an integral part of the deterrent design. The European nuclear delivery vehicles, like those across the Atlantic, had to be capable of inflicting heavy destructions to the possible aggressor. For the French, who have always manifested their scepticism as regards the principle of "flexible response", also a tactical nuclear attack from the Soviets would have

automatically entailed a substantial nuclear retaliation against the Russian main cities. The "against-city" strategy, in the case of France or, more explicitly, "the Moscow criterion" in the case of Great Britain, has constituted, up to now, one of the parameters employed in defining the quality and quantity of the long-range weapons to keep in service. Nevertheless, an unsuspected nuclear action from the Soviet Union would have achieved no plausible political objective, while with a well conducted conventional attack, supported with the employment of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union would have made decisive territorial conquests. For this reason, the task of nuclear weapons, on the European theatre, was that of deterring and countering conventional attacks.

Having these fundamental operational assumptions ceased to exist, the problem arose about defining new plausible missions for these weapons, being aware that a European doctrine based

on an inconsistent threat would let the rest of the world think that military nuclear force is an instrument disconnected from strategy and politics. It is in order to fill this gap that various supporters of nuclear deterrence have recently been inclined to stress the deterrence exerted on the "rogue states" capable of threatening the vital interests of the European countries through the employment of biological or chemical weapons (the poor's nuclear bomb).

Clearly, in this latter instance we refer to a significant list of countries, such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and others, which are trying to equip themselves, or to increase their arsenals, with mass-destruction weapons. This point of view is nevertheless not totally acceptable: In fact, it is very difficult to advocate a policy of employment of nuclear weapons which is not a response to an attack carried out with equal arms. Whatever the damage caused by a rash action of a proliferator state's mad

leader, to carry out a retaliation involving indiscriminately the civilian population of the country subject to the retaliation, is certainly incompatible with the Western values that we try to affirm and defend. In practice, it is not a matter of deterring any particular country as such, but rather of dissuading the individuals who, as their rulers, could think of threatening the vital interests of one or more nations. If deterrence, besides making unacceptable any kind of offensive action, must include the possibility of retaliation, this cannot be directed against the country itself and its population, but against those responsible for the crimes that are the aims of the retaliation.

Consequently, a conventional response to this kind of threat is more appropriate than the nuclear option, which remains credible only if compared with a similar type of offence. Therefore there is no necessity to define new missions for the existing nuclear arsenals. It is enough to confirm the "balancing" role that the European weapons can have, relating to those already existing in the other countries and to those of recent or possible future acquisition.

If the new Europe believes that, in the future, it could be the object of a strategic nuclear threat, an idea that cannot be totally excluded, considering the unforeseeable politico-military developments in some critical areas of the world, and to have to counter it without the support of the United States, then, clearly this is more than sufficient to justify the presence of a nuclear capability and the development of the relevant rules of employment.

The point, if anything, is different. The United Kingdom and France have achieved their nuclear arsenals, first of all in

order to ensure their own security. Furthermore, a great part of their national identity and the international prestige they enjoy (including the permanent seat at the UN Security Council) derives from the status of "nuclear nation". What are the reasons that could have induced these two nations to transfer a part of their politico-military "privileges" in a wider European context?

THE INTERESTS AT STAKE

There are at least two motives at the basis of the French proposal to "Europeanize" its nuclear forces. First of all the cost of their maintenance: France has paid, and is still paying, a very high cost for its independence in the nuclear field (5).

Secondly, the problem of consent: in the historical period we are going through, national nuclear deterrents are under debate within public opinion and can lose their legitimization. A European nuclear force could be more justified, especially if included in a shared politico-military context such as that of

foreign policy and common defence. Especially for this latter reason, the French continue to maintain that the non-solution of the military nuclear question could jeopardize the future realization of a federal Europe.

This point of view found its verification also in high-level documents such as the "White Paper of Defence" of 1994, where it is stated that "*a European policy of defence is credible only if it has a nuclear capability at its disposal.*" Furthermore, one should not underestimate a more instrumental aspect of the French proposal, i.e., that of raising a political debate on the said issues, both for easing the pressure exerted by the community on Paris, following the last series of nuclear experiments of 1995, and in order to avoid that the future negotiations on armaments control may significantly affect its non-conventional capabilities.

This wide-range strategy has already involved one of the most creditable actors of European policy, i.e., Germany, which signed with France, in Nuremberg, in December 1996, an agreement for



French legionnaires proceeding in a desert area.



MLRS area-saturation system.

the development of a "common strategy of defence. In this accord the parties, among other things, state their willingness to start a dialogue on the role of the nuclear deterrent within the European policy of defence. The spokesman for European affairs of the main party of the German government has successively specified that *"it is in the German national interest to have a voice in what regards the conditions of employment of the European nuclear weapons"*. It is not a matter of deploying nuclear weapons on German territory, nor is the country trying to equip itself with such arms. As a matter of fact, Germany signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1969 and shared with the other Western countries the policy of indefinite extension of this Treaty. In addition, the status of *"non-nuclear state"* was part of the

prerequisites necessary in order to achieve reunification in 1990. Nevertheless, it is interesting to remark that the NPT was formulated in such a way so as not to exclude the possibility of developing a European nuclear defence.

In some diplomatic notes that are part of the German ratification document it is stated that Bonn joined the Treaty *"with the conviction that no obligation assumed through the stipulation of the Treaty can preclude the successive possibility of developing the European unification and particularly the creation of a European union possessing appropriate capabilities"*. With this we do not maintain that Germany is ready to share the European option tout-court, especially if this is promoted to the detriment of the Euroatlantic bonds.

In reality, the prevailing idea is still that the German national interest can be better pursued by promoting non-proliferation and

negotiations on armaments control.

The willingness shown in accepting the principles of Eurodeterrence and contributing to the formulation of the rules of employment it is a significant politico-military event; if nothing else, it is an alternative direction of foreign policy admitting of further developments.

In the French long-term perspective, the US nuclear guarantees concerning Europe are certainly not taken for granted. The old Continent is no more the fulcrum of the American foreign policy as it was in the past. At present, the support to Russia and the Asiatic problems are considered more important. As the new trends of the US foreign policy become more apparent and the European Union and the United States diverge on trade and economic issues, Atlanticism fades and then the development of a common nuclear policy becomes a natural consequence of the evolution of

international relations. Under these circumstances, the idea of Eurodeterrence becomes therefore fundamental in view of giving Germany a protection as credible as the American one and also to avoid that, lacking Euroatlantic certainties, the Germans may opt for home-made solutions. In short, it is a matter of "anchoring" the German security policy to a firm European reference, such as, for example, that of a common defence policy.

For the French, therefore, it is a question of taking into account the fact that their vital interests have a more political than geographic horizon and that France and its closer European partners must form a "common strategic space". Paris' objective is that of achieving a political consent on the contribution to European security provided by the French and British deterrent forces; this consent constitutes, as we have seen, the essential foundation for developing common credible foreign and defence policies.

As regards Great Britain, there is no plan comparable to the French one. The discussions on the nuclear post-Cold War policies were mainly centred on the expedience of maintaining one's own nuclear arsenal and successively, on the amount of forces that must constitute it. As for sharing the common strategic space, the British are more cautious than the French and there is hardly a question about the US guarantees.

On the other hand, the cooperation with the United States in the nuclear field has, up to now, allowed the United Kingdom to maintain a technologically very reliable arsenal at acceptable costs, and, above all, a "discreet" one, considering that all the tests have been carried out at American ranges.



At the same time, the "second decision-making centre" policy is nevertheless more and more difficult to sustain: with the old enemies formally become partners, the existence of NATO's nuclear capability has been presented in terms of contribution to the maintenance of a setting of international stability, rather vague, in whose context it is difficult to insert a distinct role for the British deterrent, especially if this is proposed as an integration of the credibility gap in the US guarantees towards Europe. For this reason, many British analysts do not exclude the possibility that, if Atlanticism

assumes more uncertain forms in the sense surmised by the French, Eurodeterrence might constitute a politico-military option that should be developed.

At present, the cooperation with the French could be suggested by very practical reasons, such as those of costs: from 1985 to 1995 the decrease in the defence sector has been 29,6%. As compared to these reductions the maintenance expenses for the British arsenal have remained substantially unchanged, weighing remarkably on the overall budget. All this is of great consequence, both in the short term (there are already talks of possible

joint patrols with the French, in order to spare on the expenses) and in the medium-long term, when the question will arise about finding the system that will replace the Trident. A further possible common interest is represented by the evolution of the negotiations on the control of armaments. On implementation of the provisions of the START II Treaty, - underwritten by the US and the Community of Independent States (CIS), which call for a 50% reduction in the respective arsenals - also Great Britain, like France, will be no more in a position to assert that its equipment is statistically insignificant. Hence the need to legitimate its existence, proposing it as warrant of supranational European security.

LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES

Great Britain's and France's deterrents can serve the interests of their European partners only if the latter share the idea of nuclear deterrence. One can have no illusion in this regard. Eight Western European Union members out of ten were opposed to the last French nuclear experiments and thirteen European Union members out of fifteen, through their governments or through the vote expressed at the United Nations, either stood against France or abstained. The three new EU members, Sweden, Finland and Austria, in their position of neutral countries or, anyhow, no partners of military alliances, have manifested their clear hostility against Eurodeterrence.

In the present scenario, who would then be entitled to have the control of nuclear arsenals? What institution should define its doctrine and the strategy of employment? And, above all, who will have the responsibility of launching the nuclear weapons in case of a crisis? Certainly not the Western European Union. In fact, not all members of the European Union belong to it.(6).



Therefore one third of the EU members would not profit by the nuclear deterrence controlled by the organization, which, on the other hand, counting several members associated with full rights, would extend its effects to non-EU members, such as, for example, Turkey, Iceland or Norway. In addition, a future further enlargement of the European Union, which envisages the participation of some East European countries will only add more (and legitimate) needs in the field of security, with as many interpretations of the international politico-military situation and perceptions of the risks.

There is a very complex intertwining of different institutional situations and, clearly, common foreign and security policies (inevitably linked) represent a possible option for the future; a far-

off goal achievable only if and when the constant advances in all the other forms of integration transformed the EU into a real unitary political entity, with autonomous sovereignty in the political choices regarding security and international relations, and the member states clearly renounced pursuing self-serving objectives, according to exclusively national outlooks.

Considering the question from this point of view, not only there is no concrete possibility to connect the option of nuclear defence with an enlarged European political context, but an excessive insistence on nuclear issues could be detrimental to the project aimed at realizing a European defence and jeopardize, rather than encourage, the emerging of a widely-shared politico-military identity. On the other hand, the present military



A "Warrior" APC, armed with a 30mm gun, keeps watch on two A590 self-propelled 155mm guns, capable of employing also semi-selfpropelled munitions.

profitability of nuclear weapons, in part to promote the implementation of measures for the control of armaments in the former Soviet republics, and in part to isolate possible proliferators like North Korea. Nevertheless, the recent experiments conducted by India and Pakistan have made the reality of these issues reemerge vigorously, proving, whether one likes it or not, that the supporters of nuclear deterrence in the whole world were right. As commented by the influential French newspaper "Le Monde": "one must acknowledge the failure of the disarmament endeavours made in the last thirty years!...Tomorrow, any democratic or non-democratic state, attacker or convinced of being attacked, or simply wishing to ensure its own security, will be able to consider well founded its right to equip itself with its own bomb" (7), and all this despite the existence of consolidated regimes of non-proliferation.

There are therefore the conceptual grounds for tackling the problem in a different light: far from being a taboo, the future and the role of the British and French arsenals can become not-at-all marginal European issues, although, clearly, the promotion of Eurodeterrence can be suggested by the not-exactly altruistic motives of the two powers that have nuclear weapons.

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

The debate on the construction of a common defence policy

acquires a new theme, up to now considered insignificant by many European countries. The results of this discussion are hardly foreseeable and nobody can tell what shape a concerted deterrence may finally take. In

fact, many variables will be at the background of these problems: ambitious politico-military designs, particular national opportunities and interests, institutional difficulties, just to mention the most easily perceivable. What is clear, instead, is the theoretical foundation which has motivated the analysis of the role of nuclear weapons in today's international political context. If one examines a scenario where the laws of deterrence can be asserted, the possession of nuclear weapons continues to be of particular value, provided that the owners of such weapons have a clear vision of the possibilities offered by their arsenal and are aware of the consequences deriving from their employment. Therefore, it is a mere illusion to think that a European nuclear deterrent could escape these rules which demand of the Community's future foreign policy to form a global vision on this delicate matter, consistent with its employment capabilities. This of course depends only in part on the will of France and the United Kingdom.

□

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NOTES:

- (1) *Sea Launched Ballistic Missile.*
- (2) *Ballistic Missile Submarine/Nuclear Fuelled.*
- (3) Besides its naval component, France can avail itself of 36 "Super Etendard" and of 60 "Mirage" 2000 N.
- (4) Command-Control Communications and Intelligence.
- (5) About 16.6 billion francs out of a budget of 184.7 billion (Budget de la Defence 1998).
- (6) Denmark, Iceland, Austria, Finland and Sweden have not signed the agreements.
- (7) *Le Monde* - editorial "Un nouveau monde", May 30, 1998.

agenda contains problems that are much more urgent, among which, for example, the creation of integrated, really operational, multinational units, a really effective, interoperational C3I chain and a satellite observation system. In practice, these are questions related to the development of a concrete conventional capability that can keep the European negotiators busy for at least a decade. Despite this, the military nuclear problem, with all the limits we have pointed out, is part of the European agenda and the political and institutional problems will have to find a concrete answer. Until only a few weeks ago, the international community was unanimous in marginalizing the role of nuclear deterrents in the post-Cold War era.

The NATO policy itself has removed the emphasis on the

POLAND

THE NEW ARMY



Interview with Gen.
Henryk SZUMSKI,
Chief of Staff of the Polish
Defence

by Enrico Magnani*

Continuing with our initiative aimed at knowing the reality of the European Armed Forces, we have deemed it appropriate to turn our eyes to the other versant of the Old Continent.

We begin with Poland which, as is known, is due to attain full-fledged membership in the Atlantic Alliance, together with Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Our meeting with Gen. Henryk SZUMSKI, Chief of Staff of the Polish Defence, enabled us to acquire a good deal of information about the efforts being made for the structural and operational reorganization of the military instrument of Poland, a European Nation more and more willing to actively participate in the construction of stability and peace.

General, Today the Polish Armed Forces are on the eve of the great changes connected with the approaching integration within NATO.

Could you give us your appraisal of the activities under way for the improvement of the structure and the operational capabilities of the Forces under your command?

A process of radical changes is now under way in all sectors of our State, including the military. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland are now going through an indispensable restructuring and a deep adaptation to the new needs.

The decision to join NATO puts our Armed Forces in front of great challenges and a great deal of duties. The changes related to full integration have been carried out for some time. A remarkable acceleration of this process has taken place in the spring of 1997, when we started the conceptual draft of the "Introduction to the Government's Programme for the Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, 1998-2012". The concept takes into consideration the need to prepare our Armed Forces for the





following tasks:

- defence operations together with NATO Integrated Forces, in case of an aggression to Poland;
- participation in the defence of other members of the Atlantic Alliance;
- participation in peace-keeping or peace-enforcing missions outside the Polish territory.

In 1998, after the conclusion of the negotiations on the "Objectives of the Armed Forces", we introduced indispensable changes in the "Introductions", which became the "Programme of Integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, 1998-2012". The prerequisite of the programme is the reorganization of the military structure in all the aspects of its functions. The new structure, composition and equipment, together with the new level of interoperability will assure the capability of carrying out all activities within the Alliance, in

accordance with its military doctrine.

The changes we are introducing in the Armed Forces and the approaching entry of Poland in NATO make necessary that the General Staff be an efficient "brain of the defence" on which all tasks - analysis, planning, mobilization, logistics, strategy and operations - converge, together with the command duties. For all this, we have planned the introduction, starting from Jan.1, 1999, of a new Staff structure of the *Wojsko Polskie*, i.e. a joint Staff, adequate to the integration needs of NATO.

In the future there will be two basic components of the Armed forces: one assigned to NATO and the other under national command. We are carrying out the division of the Armed Forces into operational forces and territorial defence. The tactical, operational and specialistic preparation of the Armed Forces is fundamental. Our system of

higher military training has adjusted its programmes to fit the standards of the Alliance. A considerable number of officers has graduated from the Military Academies, or has attended courses in various NATO countries; many are still studying.

A constant element in the process of approach to the status of member of the Alliance is the participation of our Major Units, formations, ships and aircraft in combined operations with NATO partners. The study of English is now a norm in the training and preparation of the Cadres at all levels. At present, about five thousand regular soldiers speak English and more than a thousand can use it fluently.

After the end of the Cold War, the Polish Armed Forces, like all the other European forces, have gone through a radical reorganization, due both to the

Facing page.

ZU-23-2 two-barrel machine gun.

Right.

Polish soldiers adjusting the sight of a 120mm mortar.

changes in the strategic scenario and the effects of the CFE Treaty.

What have been the most significant expectations in relation with the evolution of the Armed Forces in this period?

In the '80s, the *Wojsko Polskie* consisted of 400,000 soldiers and relevant equipment. As a result of the negotiations on disarmament, the size of armaments and personnel was significantly reduced. At the present time, a little more than 200,000 soldiers are on duty in our Services.

The abovementioned "Introduction to the Government's Programme of Development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland for the years 1998-2012" and the "Programme of Integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Modernization of the Armed Forces of Poland for the Years 1998-2012" outlined the prospects of change, taking into account the defence needs of the Country and the financial possibilities. The most important features of the reform of our Forces are: reduction to 180,000 soldiers, gradual introduction of surveillance, command and communication systems, and the adoption of antiaircraft and antitank defences, modern and adequate to NATO standards. With the increase in the capabilities of financing the defence expenditures, we will gradually supply the Armed Forces with new and modern arms and equipment, and improve the mobility of the Units.

The Polish Armed Forces have gained a remarkable experience



in peace operations, starting from the '50s in Korea. The NORDPOL Multinational Brigade which has been commanded since last July by a Polish general, operates within the Multinational Division of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). To what extent can the Polish participation in the SFOR force be considered a test for Poland's admission to NATO?

The *Wojsko Polskie's* soldiers have been participating for many years in international missions, especially UN ones, aimed at supporting the peace processes. So

far, more than 30,000 servicemen have taken part in almost 40 missions in various continents. At the present time, several Polish units are engaged in many countries of the Middle East, Africa and Asia. The mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, one of the most important, is also the one closest to us from the geographical point of view.

The IFOR/SFOR mission, generally considered a new type of peace support operation (based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter) is organized and led by NATO. Its mandate envisages the recourse to force not only in self-



Paratroopers of the peace contingent in Bosnia (above), and soldiers engaged in a UN mission (facing page).

defence, but also in order to support the mandate's resolution in form and substance. For the Polish Armed Forces, this is the first instance of operations in a real situation under Allied international command.

Poland assigned to IFOR/SFOR a paratroop battalion plus the officers for the Headquarters, NORDPOL Brigade and its organic units. Furthermore, in the course of the operation, our Country assigned to the SFOR strategic reserve an assault-paratrooper battalion, employable on order of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), after approval by our national authorities. It must be underlined that since June 1998 the NORDPOL Brigade has been commanded - with very good results - by the Polish General

Mieczyslaw Bieniek.

The experience gained with the participation in IFOR/SFOR reduces the differences in the operating methods between NATO and Polish units, helps us to master the joint planning and training procedures, and make possible for the Cadres at tactical and operational-command level to participate in common actions.

From the general point of view, these experiences allow us to put into practice the organization, procedures and command-and-control principles required by NATO.

Therefore the IFOR/SFOR mission is the most important school of associative collaboration among partners. There, the Polish youth in uniform, together with their colleagues from the NATO member Countries and various other Nations, participate in the reestablishment of peace in a country destroyed by war. They work in difficult conditions, in a war environment, under the operational control of the Atlantic

Alliance. It's not an abstract study anymore: these are concrete actions, based on strictly defined procedures. In a not-too distant future, the Cadres of our Armed Forces, who are gaining experience precisely there, will begin to work at NATO Commands and Staffs.

The German-Danish binational Corps, after the addition of a Polish Division will become a trinational Unit, whose Headquarters will be located in Stettin.

At what stage are the plans for the constitution of the North-East Multinational Corps? Is there any plan for the creation of other multinational units on the central territory, with the participation of German and Czech units?

The North-East Multinational Corps is being established on the initiative of the Defence Ministers of Denmark, Germany and Poland. The analysis on its feasibility started in the autumn of 1997. The



result of this work was a report - submitted to the Ministers in March 1998 - which unambiguously upheld the feasibility of such a joint operational undertaking and of locating its Headquarters in Stettin.

Later on, the intergovernmental accord and the interministerial accord (respectively, Corps Convention and Corps Agreement) were drafted and agreed upon. In the autumn of 1998 the Ministers of our three Nations signed the Corps Convention, which was then sent to the respective Parliaments for approval.

Meanwhile, the modernization of the barracks for the Corps Headquarters has been going on since 1998. Foreseeably the Multinational Corps North-East (MNCN-E) will begin its existence after the admission of Poland to NATO in 1999. The official opening ceremony will take place in the early summer of the same year.

The Polish Armed Forces have

two mountain brigades. Will both of them be maintained? Is the development of these manoeuvre units envisaged, following the example of similar formations in other NATO countries, such as Italy, Germany, France and Spain?

Up to now, in our Army, there have been too many units equipped with heavy weapons. Today we strive to obtain units with higher mobility, equipped with lighter and more effective weapons.

For this reason, both mountain brigades will continue to exist in the structure of the Polish Armed Forces, but they will undergo a revision process. Due to the character of the tasks envisaged for it, the 22nd Mountain Infantry Brigade will be organized within the territorial defence units.

The 21st "Podhale Marksmen" Brigade will instead become more versatile, through the incorporation of armoured and

mechanized companies. The 21st Brigade includes a Polish-Ukrainian battalion, appointed to participate in international peace-missions.

Joining a structurally very strong alliance such as NATO implies remarkable efforts connected with standardization and with having to learn technical norms, operational procedures and training philosophy.

What initiatives have been taken in order to achieve interoperability between the Polish and Allied Armed Forces?

For some years now we have been trying to increase the possibility of cooperating with the Armed Forces of the NATO countries. The National Defence Academy already seven years ago, started to train its students for the cooperation with NATO officers. Also the other academies and schools for senior officers are doing the same; each school according to

its own characteristics. A deep reform of the training programmes has already taken place. Instructors and students, during the teaching process, deal with the new contents of the art of war and the strategic concepts of the Atlantic Alliance.

The work in progress is aimed not only at conforming our units to the standards of the Atlantic Alliance, but also at increasing the number of the units selected for having achieved the interoperability level.

For the achievement of interoperability a special agenda has been worked out, which defines the tasks deriving from the "Planning and Evaluation Process" (PARP) for the Polish units earmarked for the collaboration with NATO, the "Force Goal Targets", as well as the work carried out by the remaining units in order to achieve interoperability.

The concept adopted in order to attain the objectives of interoperability is based on the contents of the abovesaid PARP document for the years 1997-1999. More than 40 objectives were considered. They should be achieved during this period by the formations, units and infrastructural elements assigned by Poland to NATO.

I would like to explain the situation with some examples that I consider interesting. The Paratroop battalion of the NORDPOL Brigade in Bosnia Herzegovina had reached, already in 1997, the preparation level necessary for the collaboration with NATO. This is true also for the Assault Paratrooper battalion and for the Headquarters' Hospital. By the end of next year, interoperability should be achieved also by the Headquarters and Staff of two army Divisions, as well as by one Brigade Staff of each of these Divisions.



Furthermore, the following units should be ready for NATO cooperation: the Search and Rescue Air Squadron, two Search and Rescue ships, and a corvette.

The changes in the operational concepts are a significant cultural fact, touching also the political and social aspects of the Nation.

Have there been particular training problems on account of the introduction of the "shared responsibility" principle between

junior officers and NCOs?

The reorientation of Poland towards the West is taking place with the approval of a very large majority of our society and with the agreement - expressed by more than half of our people- for our entry in NATO and the European Union. On this subject, we did not notice any problem in the Armed Forces. Civilian control and the apolitical nature of the Armed Forces are, in our life, a legally decreed norm, fully respected by



all soldiers.

The "shared responsibility" principle you ask me about does not concern only junior officers and NCOs. I want to stress that in Poland each soldier feels responsible for the questions related to the Nation's security, even though the responsibility strongly depends upon the individual's particular job.

If we have to speak about problems, the only worth mentioning would be the economic ones. The changes

which are taking place in Poland are really deep, and they concern all sectors. Because of this, the expenses for defence are limited by the needs of the other sectors of life as, for example, social security, health services, public education. As far as I know, this is not a Polish problem only. Nevertheless, some of our regular military cadres experience some economic inadequacy and, sometimes, find better earnings outside the Armed Forces. This concerns all corps and all ranks. At times, this leads to

wrong conclusions. If a soldier makes the voluntary and autonomous decision to leave the service, this is a private matter, although sometimes, when these decisions become too many, there could be problems for the Commanders of the units concerned. Something of this kind happened last year. However, these personal decisions have no political character.

The reform of our Armed Forces is a necessity. In relation to this, part of the Cadres will have to move to other units and garrisons, some will retire, while a large group will be included in a reconversion programme and train in civilian jobs. We envisage that the reductions in the strength of the Armed Forces will affect the life of many thousands of families of cadres and civilian workers in the Armed Forces. We are aware of the fact that they have offered the Armed Forces the best part of their life. The solutions adopted will certainly mitigate the difficulties deriving from the need to leave the Service.

In the Polish Armed Forces there is a considerable number of conscripts, who serve for 18 months. How will the structure of the Armed Forces change in the coming years? Are they going to be reduced? What will be the role of regular soldiers and female personnel?

Our reform envisages that our Armed Forces be 50% professional. This means that the number of regular and on-contract soldiers will be between 80,000 and 90,000 while among the conscripts there will be between 16,000 and 18,000 re-enlisted men. The structure of the established strength will be: 30% officers (1/3 senior officers), 30% senior non-commissioned officers, 40% other NCOs. Therefore, in the future, the number of positions for officers will be considerably reduced. It will be necessary to discharge

from 12,000 to 15,000 officers in the course of five years, and to enroll between 15,000 to 20,000 regular NCOs, doubling the size of the latter category. This is a serious undertaking, involving particular social consequences. The fact that in the next five years we want to have a considerable increase in the number of on-contract and re-enlisted soldiers, is also important. This, among other things, is the result of the introduction of a twelve-month conscription and of the more and more intense employment of fighting techniques.

In Poland, military service is almost exclusively for men. This does not mean, however, that women are prevented from joining the Services. At present we have a group of women in uniform, not very large but much appreciated. I am sure that in the future the presence of women will increase, but not - I venture to say - in the combat units...

Besides the NATO initiative, Poland is very active in supporting, together with its neighbours, the idea of the constitution of multinational units, such as the Polish-Lithuanian and Polish-Ukrainian battalions. But the security of Europe is obtained also through WEU. What are the relations of the Polish Armed Forces with the structures of this organization?

Membership in WEU - together with that in NATO and EU - is one of the fundamental elements for the full integration of Poland with the European and Euro-Atlantic politico-military structures.

It is necessary to underline the fact that just WEU was the first security organization of the West to grant the status of associated partner to Poland and to the other Central European Nations. Since that moment, the engagement of our Country in WEU activities has been constantly growing: we participate in the meetings of the



Council of Ministers and Permanent Council, as well as in the activities of other important bodies.

As regards the relations of the Polish Armed Forces with WEU, our Country can participate in the Politico-Military Group and the Military Group. One of the signs of our Country's commitment is the fact that we offered our Forces for the participation in WEU-sponsored operations, as well as

our active participation in designing the exercises policy.

Poland assigned some military units to the so-called Forces Answerable to Western European Union (FAWEU) for their possible employment in Peace Support Operations. They are: two battalions (one from the Air Cavalry Brigade and one from the Air Mobile Brigade), a field hospital, a search-and-rescue air squadron and a rescue ship.



Above.
«BAT» tracked vehicle of the Engineer Corps, equipped with a trench-digging system.

Facing page.
«Godzik» 122 mm self-propelled gun.

We have been participating for some years in CRISEX exercises, ("Crisis Management") at the beginning as observers and then, after CRISEX 97/98 as full-fledged members. Another step forward in the enlargement of the collaboration of the Polish Armed Forces with WEU is the invitation to the Chief of Staff of the Wojsko Polskie to take part in the CHODs meeting in Rome, in preparation the new tasks deriving from the change of our status in the organization.

The participation in the works of the Union will enable Poland to contribute to form the image, and realize the idea, of a secure Europe.



* Journalist

Gen. Henryk SZUMSKI was born on April 6, 1941. In 1961 he joined the Armoured Corp's Officer School in Poznan, where he graduated as a Second Lieutenant in 1964.

Assigned to the 68th Armoured Regiment in Budow, he held the positions of platoon commander and company commander.

Between 1968 and 1971, he attended the General Staff Academy; later he was appointed Chief of Staff of the 24th Armoured Regiment in Stargard - Stettin and Commander of the same unit.

After attending the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff Academy, in 1983 Gen. Szumski was assigned to the HQ of the Pomerania Military District.

In 1986 he was appointed Deputy Chief of the Operations Office, Defence General Staff, and in 1987 assumed the command of the Military District of Silesia.

Between 1989 and 1993 Gen. Szumski returned to the Defence General Staff and was later assigned to the National Security Office, where he held several prestigious positions.

On March 10, 1997 Gen. Szumski was appointed Chief of the Defence Staff.


General Henryk Szumski is married and has four children. He is an expert in history and literature.

TURKEY

THE NEW ARMY

by Enrico Magnani*

**Interview with General Hüseyin Kivrikoglu
Chief of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces**



The strategic role of Turkey; the Turkish Army's contribution to the safeguard of world peace; the strength of tradition in the military Cadres, training, conscription and the great European vocation of ancient Anatolia: in the following interview, we introduce these and other subjects that we discussed with Gen. Hüseyin Kivrikoglu, Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces.

General, Turkey stands between two areas of great instability, the Balkans and Western Asia. What are the tasks and responsibilities of the Turkish Army within this intricate politico-strategic scenario?

Since the Cold War the threats against Turkey's security have remarkably changed.


Today, Turkey stands in the middle of a triangle in the most unstable area in the world: between the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East (from the military point of view, this is a very strategic position).

In this complex scenario, the policy of the Turkish Army is based on the principles of creating greater stability and security, giving its contribution to peace and striving to placate the conflicts that unfortunately occur on its territory and on the immediate vicinity.

For this reason, Turkey must have Armed Forces capable of safeguarding peace and stability, preventing possible crises and, in case of threats, defend the unity of our Motherland and its national interests.

Since its foundation, modern





The Turkish Army has equipped its special units with all-terrain vehicles for patrols in impervious areas.

Turkey has always remained faithful to the great principle expressed by Kemal Atatürk: "peace in our Country, peace in the world".

Turkey is an element of equilibrium, stability and peace in the most unstable area in the world.

In this context, we always seek to establish friendly and peaceful relations with all the world Countries, especially with those around us.

Historically, the Army has been an element of socio-cultural growth for Turkey. What is the

role of the soldier in the civilian society?

The Army mirrors the people, and represents the social classes of the Country with all their characteristics.

With its high sense of discipline deriving from its past, as well with its strong culture based on the deepest traditions of the people, the Army has always been highly appreciated by the citizens. As a matter of fact the Turks, whenever they needed help, always found their Army at their side, always close to them.

In case of natural disasters of

different kinds, the Army has always been of vital help to the population, giving all types of assistance with a high sense of duty, thanks to the professionalism of its young members, who start their military service at twenty.

The Army's most important function is to safeguard all the principles set forth by Atatürk (the Father of the Country) as well as that of guaranteeing, on the basis of our Constitution, the existence of the Republic, guided by the principles of democracy and laicism.

The Army's great trust in democracy has been the most important factor that made us deserve the high consideration of the people.


Today some Army Units are included in the Northern Multinational Division and participate in the IFOR/SFOR mission; in the past they operated in Korea and later in Somalia. What lessons did the Turkish Army learn from the participation in these different operations?

Army Units participate in NATO and UN Peacekeeping missions.

Many lessons have been learned from the multinational operations.

I list the most significant ones:

- it would be appropriate to send, together with the Peacekeeping troops, also an assistance organization, in order to achieve the political objectives;
- any type of initiative capable of impairing the principle of the troops' impartiality should be avoided;
- the Peacekeeping troops must be a deterrent factor;
- the troops must be self-sufficient;



M-108 self-propelled 155mm howitzer of the Turkish artillery.

- the troops must have the characteristics of special teams, highly mobile, and a sufficiently flexible command-and-control system;
- the equipment and materials of the troops must be suitable for the conditions of the Regions, in order to permit them to operate for long periods of time;
- before sending Peacekeeping forces to the operational territories, it is necessary to clarify, with all participants, the agreements reached during the negotiations;
- it is very important to give the troops the necessary training before the missions, increasing the number of field-fortification exercises;
- the troops participating in the operations often feel obliged to assume also the task of supporting the host Country, and this creates serious problems from the logistic point of view;
- the favourable outcome of the Peacekeeping operations mostly depends on the collaboration between soldiers and civilians;
- from the viewpoint of standardization and interoperability, at times there are problems in the operations in which several Countries participate;
- it is essential to coordinate the collaboration between military and civilians with appropriate public relations, as well as to keep the local population always informed;

The Turkish Army, thanks to the reductions envisaged by the CFE Treaty, is now modernizing its tank line, as well as the infantry and artillery equipment. Are there other modernization and reinforcement programmes under way?

Our modernization and reinforcement planning for the next 25 or 30 years envisages an expenditure of about 150 billion dollars. At the present time several projects are in progress in

the sectors of air defence, tanks, helicopters and ships.

The Turkish Army includes a high number of conscripts who serve for 18 months. Are they able to handle the everincreasing complexity of the weapon systems now in use or to be adopted soon? Do you envisage an increase in the number of long-term personnel or professionals?

According to our Constitution, every male, physically and mentally healthy, has the duty and the right to do his military service. The duration of conscription is determined according to the needs of the Armed Forces. At present, the conscription duty lasts 18 months for privates and 16 months for Officers.

In Turkey, conscripts are trained in a very serious and professional manner and learn to employ very new and sophisticated technologies.

To maintain all this has very high costs, and this is why we are trying to find a balance point


between professionals (long-term soldiers) and conscripts.

At the present time, the professionals in the Armed Forces are Officers, NCOs and civilian personnel.

The military history of Turkey is rich in very important reference points and heroic deeds. Do you believe that the call to traditions could represent, even today, a real cultural vocation, in a moment when technology acquires wider and wider spaces?


The Turks are very traditionalist, and perfectly conscious of their past and their history. Therefore, they are capable of looking back in order to have constructive references for their future.

Obviously, the Turkish Armed Forces have the same characteristics



Above.
Soldiers of a trasmission unit during an exercise.

Left.
Elements of an infantry unit engaged in mopping up activities



of the people to which they belong, and they express their traditionalism through a high sense of loyalty, discipline, courage and obedience. Both the ancient and the more recent history of the Armed Forces are full of acts of heroism, precisely thanks to the values deriving from traditions. The Army has obtained glorious results during the War of Independence and the First World War.

Furthermore, during the international operations in Korea, Somalia and Albania, the Turkish Army carried out its tasks with



great motivation and success, in order to give its contribution to world peace.

Will the change of the Headquarters in Izmir from the present *Allied Forces Southeastern Europe* to the envisaged *Joint Sub-Regional Command* - recently decided within the general reorganization of NATO Headquarters - produce any modification in the Atlantic Alliance's presence in Turkey?

Today Turkey is a high-risk frontier Country, due to its geographic situation, and is vitally important for European security, which is strictly connected with the security of the Mediterranean basin.

However, this situation had no effect on the decision concerning the transformation mentioned in

your question.

The Izmir Land Headquarters is turning into a Joint Sub-Regional Command South East. Besides, this situation is valid also for Greece, Italy and Spain.

Ankara is an associated member of WEU. How is this presence expressed, in concrete terms? Are there Army personnel at the Planning Cell in Brussels? Is it envisaged that Turkish units participate in NATO manoeuvres and exercises?

Turkey has been an associated member of WEU since 1992. Among other things, the Allied Countries of NATO have obtained, with the Kirchberg declaration of 1994, the right of speech and

veto (with the exclusion of the decisions taken with the consensus of the full members of the organization). The declaration granted the associates some of the rights of the full members, among which that of sending officers to the Planning Cell in Brussels (3 Turkish Officers are there now) and to join the EUROCOM club. Recently, since August 1995, Turkey has been taking part in the WEU space-group.

Besides this presence in WEU, Turkey has the right to be a full member of the following organizations (transferred within WEU and NATO): ELT, EUROCOM, WELG, WEAG.

□

** Journalist*

General Hüseyin Kivrikoglu was born in Bozüyük, Central Anatolia, in 1934. He attended secondary school at the Isikar Military College in Bursa and in 1955 joined the Ankara Military Academy, where he graduated as Artillery Officer. In 1957 he attended the Istanbul War College and later, with the rank of Major, was assigned to the 9th Infantry Division. After graduation from the Armed Forces Academy, he was assigned to the AFSOUTH Plans Office, to the War College and to the Research Section of the Plans Office, Headquarters Turkish Land Forces.

Between 1978 and 1980, he commanded the Cadet Regiment of the Military Academy.

After attending the NATO Defence College in Rome, in 1980 he was promoted Brigadier General and appointed Deputy Chief Operations at the SHAPE Operations Center.

In 1983 Gen. Kivrikoglu was Commander of the 3rd Brigade and in 1984 commanded the 11th Brigade.

In 1984, after his promotion to the rank of Major General, he was appointed Chief of Staff of Hq. LANDSOUTHEAST, Izmir, and, in 1986, Commander of the 9th Infantry Division.

Promoted Lieutenant General in 1988, he became Chief of Personnel at the Defence General Staff and, later, Commander of the 5th Corps. In 1992 Gen. Kivrikoglu assumed the Office of Undersecretary at the Ministry of National Defence.


Commander of LANDSOUTHEAST in 1993; Commander of the 1st Army in 1996.

In 1997, Gen. Kivrikoglu was appointed Commander of the Turkish Land Forces and, in 1998, Chief of the Defence General Staff.


General Hüseyin Kivrikoglu is married and has a son. He has been awarded several Turkish and foreign decorations.

Since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, the Kosovo region has been closely monitored by international observers. This torn region, where the Serb minority is outnumbered by the Albanian population, is constantly threatened by the outbreak of a war. Will the international community be able to avoid another bloodshed?

The concepts expressed in this article show the authors' personal views.



Kosovo



Written by Giuseppe Caforio*
and Adam Copani**

the region on all the newspapers FrontPages, in the news headlines, in special tv reportages and so on.

However, journalistic analysis is by nature and necessity a synthesis limited to current affairs and chronicle. This approach does not always allow the reader to understand the historical, ethnic and cultural reasons of old and new hatred, in one word: the reasons laying behind a controversy which we are aware of but cannot grasp.

Therefore, the aim of this article is to provide some general and historical information on Kosovo, so that the reader can go beyond the region and understand the reasons.

KOSOVO'S POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Kosovo is a mountainous and rocky country which comprises

Below:

Italian and German soldiers operating in Kosovo in the framework of international cooperation activities.

WHO KNOWS KOSOVO?

We believe we can state, without running any particular risks, that most of the Italians had never heard about the Kosovo region before the outbreak of those events which, over the past few years and in particular over 1998, have placed





The state of internal tension in Kosovo is also due to economic difficulties.

the Metohija and Kosovo plateaus. Geographically it belongs to the Balkans. Politically this is a Serb region known as "The Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Metohija" which, together with Montenegro, is part of a federal state, known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - FRY (1). Kosovo borders on two independent states - Albania and Macedonia - and Montenegro.

Although it is referred to as an "autonomous province", Kosovo has no special statute and it is not independent from Serbia. In fact, the official map displayed by the FRY-Government on Internet (2) does not even include Kosovo with its own name. It can only be singled out by looking at the broken line crossing Pristina and

Mitrovica.

Kosovo, which is mainly inhabited by Albanian ethnic groups (see tables), has 2,100,000 inhabitants living in an area of 10,887 km². It has a density of 193 inhabitants per km².

Its birth and infant mortality rates are amongst the highest in Europe and the population average age is very low (under 30 years of age).

In 1991 the ethnographical data estimated that Albanians were preponderant in the area (although this information might not be reliable). However their presence has increased in time due to a higher birth rate and the partial emigration of Serb ethnic groups. Consequently the Albanian language prevails as does to a lesser extent (roughly 80%) the Muslim religion.

Pristina is the capital of the region and it has about 200,000 inhabitants.

Economically speaking, Kosovo is lagging behind as compared to the average of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosovo's economic situation becomes clear when we look at the employment rate estimated before the breaking up of the Federal State. As the data show (see tables), the employment growth rate was higher in Former Yugoslavia as a whole than in Kosovo. The gap between the Federal State and Kosovo has become wider in time.

However, according to Kosovo's Albanians there is a potential – plumb and zinc mines in Trepeia and geothermal energy – which is not adequately used by the FRY to provide a spin-off for the region.

Agriculture is scarce, whereas sheep farming is very common. Industry, mainly based on wood, textile and superphosphate, is not very well developed.

Furthermore, internal tensions and contrasts between ethnic

groups have made the region's economy stagnate for about a decade now.

KOSOVO'S HISTORY

The current situation in Kosovo can be better understood by briefly looking at its history.

In ancient times the Balkans were inhabited by the Illyrians, a proud and warlike people.

The Romans fought a long war against the Illyrians, which ended with the Romans conquering the whole of Illyria in the Augustan age.

After the fall of the Roman Empire, the Balkans were invaded and ruled by the Goths, the Slavs, the Normans in part, the Venetians on the coast and finally the Turks. All these different dominations caused deep changes in the identities of Albanians who today mainly live in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia (there are also minorities living in Greece and other neighbouring countries). That is why the Albanians searching for their national identity went back to the Illyrians. The Albanians trace their descent from the Illyrians and in particular from the Albanoi tribe, which was mentioned by Claude Ptolemy in the 2nd Century AD. Albanians also say that their present language is the only surviving Illyrian language – even though it has taken up several words from Greek and Latin. At least we can state that today's Albanian is completely different from all the other languages spoken by the surrounding ethnic groups.

Four different Slav ethnic groups occupied the Balkans in the 6th/7th Century AD. And they are believed to be the ancestors of today's four ethnic groups: the Serbs, the Croats, the Slovenes and the Bulgarians. In the 14th Century the Serb groups extended their dominion from today's Serbia to Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and part of

Kosovo, its population and ethnic structure (figures as %)

Year	Total	Albanians	Serbs	Montenegrins	Turks	Others
1913	497.456					
1921	439.010	65,8	26,0		6,4	
1931	552.064	60,0	32,6			7,4
1948	733.034					
1953	815.908					
1961	963.988					
1971	1.243.393					
1981	1.588.400	77,5	13,2	1,72	0,8	4,1
1991	2.000.000*	90,0	8,0			2,0

* estimated data

Source: *The association of Lawyers of Kosovo*

Workers per 1 000 inhabitants

Year	Yugoslavia	Kosovo
1952	103	48
1962	176	77
1972	203	88
1982	270	118
1988	292	124

Greece.

However, the Serb Empire did not last for long. In 1389 the Serbs were defeated in a memorable battle in the Kosovo plateau (known as "The Blackbirds' Field" according to the Venetian maps of that time) and since then the Turks took hold of the region (3) where they ruled until the first Balkan war (1912). The Turkish dominion, which lasted for over five centuries, influenced the Albanian groups deeply and almost totally converted them to the Muslim religion.

The liberation of the Balkan peninsula from the Turkish dominion was strongly supported by Russia, whose influence in the creation of the new Balkan states has been of major importance.

Albanian historians record that the European powers participating in the 1913 London Conference did not trust the Albanian ethnic group because they converted to

Islamism. Historians also say that Russia's support to the Bulgarian and Serb populations went to the detriment of the Albanian ethnic group. In fact, during the 1913 Conference, held after the Turkish defeat, Kosovo was handed over to Serbia and other Albanian territories were taken away from the new Albanian State and handed over to bordering countries.

Two more circumstances may have caused disadvantage to the Albanians: a) ethnic Albanians fought the Second World War with Germany and Italy (Albania was an Italian colony); b) after the conquest of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Axis integrated Kosovo and the Macedonian and Montenegrin territories inhabited by Albanians into Albania.

The post-war redistribution accomplished by the winning powers brought the Balkans back to the pre-war situation, the only difference being that the

Yugoslav State was now a Federal Republic.

Within this state, no particular autonomy was at first granted to Kosovo, but after the 1967 popular protests, president Tito provided Kosovo with the *status* of autonomous province of the Serb Republic. In 1974 this *status* was increased to a *special status* granting Kosovo its Parliament, Government and a greater political and administrative freedom from the Serb Republic. The Yugoslav State was now a Federal State.

Tito also acknowledged the Albanian language and culture by establishing the Pristina University.

After the breaking up of the Yugoslav Federal State, in 1989 the Serb Republic reviewed its Constitution for a more centralised state power. Subsequently the autonomous provinces were eliminated and the Albanian language and culture were denied their previously acknowledged freedom.

The Albanian community in Kosovo responded by drawing up a declaration of independence and secession from the Serb Republic in 1990.

THE LATEST EVENTS

On 2nd July 1990 Kosovo's Albanian Parliamentarians met once again as Parliament of the Province and declared the region's independence. On 7th September of the same year they proclaimed the Republic, which has been recognised only by Albania. A popular referendum on these decisions was held from 26th to 30th September. According to party data (4), 87% of voters took part in the referendum and the secession was approved of almost unanimously (99%).

On 24th May 1992 they held illegal general elections which defined the party structure and a new Parliament: the voters



equalled those participating in the referendum, always according to the source mentioned in footnote 4. There was a striking result: 96 seats out of 100 were won by the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) and the remaining seats were divided amongst minor parties (The Farmers' Party, The Christian Democratic Party, The Kosovo Parliamentarian Party).

Ibrahim Rugova was President elect of the Republic of Kosovo and Bujar Bikoshi became Prime Minister (5).

Serbia did not recognise neither the secession nor the election and started a campaign against the "illegal" movement. At first the Albanians reacted non violently (6), but later things changed.

On 2nd November 1994 the US-Consulate Information Paper

Intense ethnic tensions require a massive presence of police force.

reported:

"Kosovo: Ethnic tensions are particularly intense in the province in the south of Serbia. Demonstrations, at times violent, take place without warning. Over the past few months, several armed attacks to the Serb police have taken place, causing deaths and wounded.

The security forces are on the alert and police roadblocks are being set up everywhere. Travellers are frequently questioned and inspected by the police".

Seemingly these were spontaneous and random actions. The "Kosovo Liberation Army"



(UCK) first appeared officially on 27th November 1997. During the funeral of an Albanian killed in a shoot-out with the Serb police, according to the editorialist mentioned in footnote 7, three armed men wearing a camouflage uniform and a balaclava turned up and publicly declared: *"We belong to the Kosovo Liberation Army. We are the real representatives of Kosovo's struggle"*.

This episode was widely reported by the international press and undoubtedly confirmed that there was an organised armed movement of the Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo.

The political struggle in the region appeared to be economically supported by the Albanian communities living in the neighbouring countries and,

to a larger extent, by the Albanians who had emigrated to Western European countries and the USA. Seemingly they subsidised the illegal Government and the Albanian community in Kosovo.

Obtaining weapons in the region was not difficult as long as you had a little money to pay for them. Bardhyl Mahmuti, spokesman for the Kosovo's illegal Government in Geneva, wrote that you could buy a "kalashnikov" for 70 DM from arm traffickers in Serbia and that weapons were even cheaper and easier to buy in Albania (article mentioned in footnote 7).

As stated before, Kosovo's secession was not recognised by the international community (Albania did) and it was increasingly feared that the Serb

The clashes in Kosovo have repercussions on the population. A war could involve other States in the region.

Government would carry out repressions and an "ethnic cleansing" against the Albanian residents in Kosovo. The reaction of the Albanian communities was also feared. The Bosnian writer Tihomir Loza wrote (7):

"Since the breaking up of Yugoslavia in 1991 we have known clearly that Kosovo is a potential humanitarian disaster and a threat to the European security. All the southern Balkan states are claiming territories from the bordering Macedonia, which hosts a large Albanian minority. Therefore, a war in Kosovo could directly involve



Each individual must have the opportunity to speak his/her own language, study his/her own culture and have the right to follow his/her own religion.

half a dozen of the region's states, including two NATO members - Greece and Turkey" (8).

This concern was largely shared by other neighbouring countries, as the Government declarations reported by journalistic sources showed. A case in point is what Reuters wrote from Athens on 24th June 1998: *"Yesterday, the Greek and Macedonian Foreign Ministers, Teodoros Pangalos and Blagoje Handziski, opposed a NATO military action in Yugoslavia to put an end to clashes in Kosovo....The problem of Kosovo must be solved within Yugoslavia. Any changes to the borders would lead to a wider war in the Balkans"*.

The stance of the international community was clearly expressed in 1993 in a letter which the Foreign

Ministers of various countries (including the USA, the Russian Federation, Great Britain and France) sent to the UN Secretary General. The letter focused on Kosovo and wrote as follows:

"We favour a greater presence of international observers in Kosovo. Human rights must be strictly respected in the once autonomous region of Kosovo, even though we do not support its declaration of independence".

In the Regional Statements of the Foreign and Finance Ministers of the Countries taking part in the May 15, 1998 G8 Birmingham summit, a deeper concern was felt: *"The ongoing violence in Kosovo increases the fear of the outbreak of another war in the Balkans"... "Peace and stability in Europe are based on the principle of the borders inviolability and on the principle that any political change must take place peacefully"*.

On 24th June 1998 NATO Secretary General Solana asked Mr. Rugova, the leader of Kosovo's

Albanians, to reopen the dialogue with the Serb President Milosevic and reminded that the international community was not supporting the independence of the Serb province.

The Governments' initiatives were followed by the initiatives of Governmental as well as Non Governmental Organisations (9) which on several occasions had paved the way to peaceful official solutions (see the Mozambique case supported by the Italian St. Egidio Community). And in September 1996 the St. Egidio Community mediated between the parties. That agreement was not implemented but is worth mentioning because on that occasion Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Rugova restored the right to use and study the Albanian language in state schools in Kosovo, previously suppressed by Government of the FRY.

They certainly made a first and important step towards dialogue, but no initiative was taken after that.

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION (10)

By way of conclusion....conclusions cannot be drawn as this would go beyond the aim of the present article which is mainly to inform. However, some general remarks on Kosovo can be made.

Nationalism and similar claims do not fit a world moving towards globalisation and supranationality. In fact they would trigger an uncontrollable chain of clashes which would not help anyone live better but only cause deaths.

Each people and each individual must be allowed to learn and speak their own languages, to study their cultures, to devote themselves to their own religions. Local groups should be allowed to live according to their own traditions, while striking the right balance between their rules and the laws of the state they belong to. More than 5000 sociologists met at the 14th World Congress (11) and they also drafted the future world's aim from the social point of view: to provide each individual with the opportunity to fulfil oneself while respecting the fulfilment of all the others.

An ethnic community should then be given this opportunity without posing any threats to the sovereignty and the borders of the state it belongs to. This is the freedom granting international stability and social peace.

In Italy the Government dealing with the South Tyrol region agreed to a similar solution which could be taken as a start to further find a way out for the Albanian ethnic groups living outside Albania. But in this case the parties' will plays a major role.



* Brigadier General (Reserve),
Italian Army

** General, former Chief of the
Albanian Army General Staff.

FOOTNOTES

(1) The USA do not recognise the FRY as the continuation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) after the secession of the other republics. But the FRY claims it is so and on its official Internet site (see footnote 2) the secession is called "illegal".

(2) The Internet address is <http://www.gov.yo/map.html>.

(3) In memory of that battle, the Turks named the entire region Kosovo. In the Kosovo plateau the Turks defeated the Hungarians led by John Hunyadi in 1448 and confirmed their hegemony in the Balkans.

(4) Data provided by the "Kosovo Information Centre", an organisation of political exiles whose headquarters are in Great Britain. 87% is the percentage of the Albanian population in the region today. Then these data can be considered as reliable.

(5) The large success achieved by the DLK can be explained by the strong presence of the party within family networks all over rural areas of Kosovo. This allows to monitor the region's most effective and widespread means of information, that is "passing the word on".

(6) It was based on the non payment of taxes and bills, the refusal to talk to the Serb police, etc. . Tihomir Loza, in his article mentioned in footnote 7, wrote that the Information Minister of Kosovo's Parallel (illegal) Government, Xhafer Shatri, gave Albanians the following instructions: "Don't pay your electricity bills: it doesn't matter if you have your light cut off. We have managed without light for centuries and we can do without it for another couple of years."

(7) The source is an article written by Tihomir Loza, a Bosnian journalist: "Kosovo's Albanians are closing the ranks", which was published on "Transition" in May 1998. "Transition" is a monthly published in the USA and subsidised by an industrial group lead by Mr. Soros, a finance expert.

(8) Macedonia is making the international community feel deep concern. Since the beginning of the Kosovo/FRY controversy, the Albanian groups in Macedonia have

given a stronger support to those living in Kosovo and their claims than any other Albanian population in other countries, including Albania itself. Journalistic sources (such as AIM Athens, 30th April 1998) reported that demonstrations against the repression in Kosovo were held in March 1998: "tens of thousands" of Albanians in the Macedonian towns of Skopje and Tetovo and "only a few thousands" in Tirana took part in the demonstrations. The reason for their greater involvement is probably due to the fact that 23% of the Albanians living in Macedonia consider themselves as an inadequately recognised minority and therefore share the ideas of Kosovo's independentists more than Albania's Albanians do. Moreover at present days Albania is dealing with other serious problems.

(9) Such as "Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research", Sweden; "Bertelsmann Foundation", Germany; "Toward Comprehensive Peace in Southeast Europe", USA; "Greek Foundation for European and Foreign Policy", Greece; "Aspen Report Unfinished Peace", Germany and USA; "Campaign for a Non Violent Solution in Kosovo", Italy.

(10) This conclusion is only General Caforio's personal view.

(11) Held in Montreal, Canada, from 26th July to 1st August 1998.

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A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Globalization and Multiethnic societies

by Ornella Rota *



....our freedom as a people lessens when other peoples are not free. Therefore, we must unceasingly hold ourselves responsible for giving every possible contribution to the birth of a new international order in which all the peoples of the world, including our own, live in conditions of democracy, peace, prosperity and equality. To this end, we must carefully avoid the arrogance of power and the attribution, to ourselves, of a messianic role that would be out of place....

(from Nelson Mandela's speech on the 84th anniversary of the African National Congress).

Would it still be suitable, in the third millennium, to give to a tale or a history book the title "one king, one law, one faith", after the motto that till yesterday has practically governed the fate of the overwhelming majority of the Nations of the Earth? Today, indeed the vastness of the world forces us to take into account the existence of many Heads of State, many laws, many faiths, while the very national societies become more and more heterogeneous, pluralistic and multiracial.

The first enemy is fear. Out of instinct, almost all of us tend to belong to a herd, with shepherd and watchdog. On the contrary, the modern multiethnic and multicultural democracies give the same dignity and opportunity to

all citizens, making no difference as regards the colour of their skin, their features, culture, religion, social class, opinions: they prevent anybody from forcing his own "truth" upon others. On the contrary, they demand to tolerate anything that could reciprocally be felt as the other's "mistake".

Here are the roots of fear. Not so much for an identity to protect, but rather for the threat of chaos, and/or of ethic relativism. Racisms exploit these fears, and economic rapacity gives them a big hand. And the repercussions on the national and international security can be serious.

Statuettes in polychrome clay, of the Tang period (7th-10th Century), representing Chinese dancers.



Within the borders, it is immigration, with the uneasiness of the foreigners vis-à-vis the host societies, and of the latter towards them, that poses exemplary questions in a world in evolution. Within the international sphere, it is the globalization process that delineates new problems, especially for the unavoidable increase in the number of occasions of confrontal between Nations and civilizations.

The very subject of international relations, is connected more with the existence of conflicts than with the way of preventing them. But, if a world without more-or-less declared wars remains an utopian concept, the possibility of settling those conflicts on lawful bases is already there. The UN should be enough to prove this, due to its explicitly politico-diplomatic functions, and to the activity of agencies like the High Commission for Refugees, just to mention one. And if it's true, as objectively is, that the globalization process is now irreversible; the supranational organizations will assume an increasing importance. One of these is the European Union. In international politics, the EEC is the greatest innovation of the 20th century, and the European Union presumably gives birth, through the long times of history, to other new and different political bodies. The right (or duty?) of intervention is an urgent issue. As a matter of fact, it is not always compatible with the law stating that Nations are the sole protagonists of international relations (Treaty of Westfalia, 1648). Of course the point of mediation must be found and codified, on the basis of principles and interests shared by the world community as a whole. The West, following its values and references has produced, using its own vocabulary, a system of International Laws, the Declaration of Rights, and established a hierarchy of norms and values. The possible codification of the right (or duty?) of intervention

INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, US AMBASSADOR TO ITALY

In all the world, the United States is certainly the first example of multiethnic and multicultural society. What are the historical reasons for this?

Diversity is one of the most positive peculiar traits of our nation. The success of our Country has been built on the essential contribution of all racial and ethnic groups. In the course of time, people from many parts of the world have come to America, taking with them their experiences, their uses and customs, their culture, contributing to the growth and strength of our Nation. Today, America's face is mostly white, but the "mix" is rapidly changing. In the last twenty years we have received many more immigrants from Latin America and the Pacific coasts than from Europe, and we expect that, already at the beginning of the next century, our Hispanic population will replace blacks as our first ethnic minority.

President Clinton, aware of the challenge represented for America by the constant evolution of our society, last year announced a new programme - "America in the 21st century" - to tackle our racial divisions. This initiative on the racial question is an important factor in the President's efforts to take into the 21st Century an even more united Nation. The President wished an America founded on opportunities for all, responsibility from all, and a community for all Americans.

Many forces have followed each other at the lead of this change, and certainly I don't want to give history lessons. I only know that, since we are a Country of immigrants, we have almost always welcomed newcomers. Americans know that immigrants are a reservoir of the fundamental values of our national character - *renewal, creativity, confidence in the future*. As newly arrived, or descendants of those landed in more or less recent times, we believe that the massive flow of immigrants to our Country has favoured mobility and contributed to avoid rigid social and class divisions. Each group of immigrants has enriched the population, both numerically and qualitatively. No single culture, no single education system, no single religion represents the American culture.

The very experience of my family is an example of the journey made by many Americans. In 1880, when my grandparents landed in America, they found the opportunities they were looking for, and also a very hard work. Like many other immigrants, they maintained many Italian traditions, keeping in close contact with others of the same origin. This permitted my grandparents, who had both come from Molise to America without knowing each other, to meet in Philadelphia and get married at Santa Maria dei Pazzi, the first Italo-American church in the US. If, on the one hand we kept our bonds with Italy, on the other there was no doubt about our participation in the community of Philadelphia and the United States. My grandfather was a businessman, but played in the bands of John Philip Sousa, the "king of the American march". My father was a member of the Philadelphia City Council, where later I replaced him, before working in the Congress for 17 years. This is how "multiculturalism" has worked in my family.

On what basic values have you succeeded in mixing so many different ethnic groups and cultures?

Our values can be seen from different perspectives. Essentially, the basic ingredients of rapid integration were *pluralism, tolerance and diversity*, together with the growing openness of the political and economic system.

From the very beginning, pluralism was a peculiar feature of American life, and the immigration phenomenon confirmed and strengthened it. Result: several ethnic groups - within certain limits - have kept their identity for generations, while others have become completely integrated within a short time. Anyway the assimilation process has never implied any action aimed at wiping out the differences; rather, it was a progressive settling, where the different groups took something from each other, adapting, meanwhile, to the new language and the new institutions. This is how the "melting pot" I just mentioned has been working.

What is the impact of such a society on national and international security?

The motto of our Nation is *E Pluribus Unum*. Beyond our place of origin, our religion or our race, we all believe in the role of law, and fight for freedom, democracy and equal opportunities. These are values that cannot be acquired once and for all. One must constantly work for them, wherever he is. But this continuous and unlimited commitment has created a unique bond, giving us a strong sense of national identity and a clear vision of our place in the community of nations. Therefore, our diversity adds force and motivation to national security.

During my long time in Congress, I was the only white Representative of a largely Afro-American district. A dear friend and colleague of mine, Representative Ron Delums from California, was exactly in the opposite situation, since he was a black in a white district just outside San Francisco. It was a great challenge, for both of us, to represent the interests of our two constituencies, but I am proud of the fact that the voters of the First District of Pennsylvania reelected me several times, and with a growing majority. This is the way our system must work: "*E Pluribus Unum*".

On the international plane, in the course of our history there has been a tug-of-war between isolationism and involvement in world affairs. One of the forces which contributed to push us in the direction of international involvement was the multicultural nature of our society. Gradually, both this impulse towards external involvement and the hard lessons learned in the first half of the century on the dangers and costs of an isolationist policy, induced us to assume a new attitude vis-à-vis international security. Now, besides the military aspect, we base our security on a close cooperation with our European partners, within and outside NATO, on the active participation in international organizations of all kinds, as well as on our support to European integration.

President Clinton and many other American leaders have explained to what extent the integration of Europe has favoured, in particular, the US-EU partnership. The Undersecretary of State for International Economic Affairs, Stuart Eizenstat, recently underlined that, now, we have set up a new idea of foreign policy - the so-called "critical mass", made possible by the existence of the European Union. In substance, working in close contact with the EU in critical political areas, such as telecommunications and financial services, it was possible to lay the foundations for smoother agreements. Therefore we can proceed together seeking to extend the accords to the "critical mass" of the developing countries, encouraging the mutual interest in a freer trade and more open markets.

The success of our partnership with the EU in preserving the stability of the region as well as in promoting the economic objectives, has also paved the way in other areas of cooperation, such as Europol, which created a European voice to boost the flow of information with our Department of Justice and the FBI, increasing the effectiveness of our common fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime and other important issues related to public order. This explains why with Europe we do not share only the military alliance within NATO, which contributes to international security. Rather, we believe that the steps Europe has taken and is still taking, in order to create the European Monetary Union and to achieve a stronger and more unitary system, are also in the interest of the United States. Integration seems therefore to be very useful for security, both national and international, for us and for Europe.

Is there a price to pay for the realization of a truly multiethnic and multiracial society?

You are asking me if what we call "The American dream" is a reality for the majority of our people, and how much pain and anguish were necessary to make it become a reality. Dreams are very personal, like pain and joy in adapting to a new life. My grandfather Angelo was a musician who, after his decision to settle in Philadelphia had to earn his living as a shoe-shine. At any rate, the openness of American society allowed him to buy a stall where he polished shoes, and then, in a couple of years, a newsstand nearby, which permitted him to raise the family's living standard.


I mean that, in America, the society of the immigrants, and especially its openness and plurality, has always been an inexhaustible source of continuous and different opportunities for the majority of Americans; in short, I believe that this system, more than any other, has given people the possibility of looking

presupposes the respect of those who think that ours is only one of the many interpretations of the great universal principles. To interact peacefully not only with the different, but also with the unloved, is today's challenge, both in international relations and within the borders.

"Is it better for a girl to attend high school with her head covered with a scarf or to be confined at home by her family which will certainly prevent her from integrating into the society in which she lives?". This was the question that Pierre Joxe, Minister of the Interior under President Mitterand, asked himself when France (and Europe by contagion) was stirred by the "case" of some very religious Moslem girls who wanted to attend school with their head covered. He went on: "The fact that some girls wear a scarf during the process of formation of their personality, when they are looking for a model, be it their mother or their sister, does not mean that the unanimous will of a billion Moslems is suddenly focused on their heads. In fact, the school of the Republic receives Catholics who claim their right to the Crucifix, Jews who cannot work on Saturday, Moslems that, during Ramadan, can be tired in daytime".

The circumstance that at national and international level, the possibility of a peaceful coexistence among people with different colour of skin, features, religion, social class and opinions is closely connected with the chance of a decent life for all, is an accepted fact. This can be verified simply by observing a world map: the dangerous areas coincide with the anguish of survival, with areas where, most of the time, social disparities are unbearable. But the *condicio sine qua non* of a decent life is not per se sufficient to exorcise the flaring of intolerance.

For centuries, the different communities of Bosnia have been living in peace. Then, the



The United States is a valid example of a Nation built on the essential contribution of all racial and ethnic groups.

conflagration. According to Vlatko Kraljevitc, Ambassador to Italy, *"that absurd war did not break out because of interethnic hatred, but for the hegemonic ambitions of the leaders of other neighbouring countries. On the other hand, the plan for the construction of a Greater Serbia goes back to one and a half century ago". "I know my Country well"* he goes on, *"I was born in Herzegovina, near Mostar, I went to school in Split and Zagreb, therefore in Croatia, but I spent most of my life in Bosnia. I know well all the three components of my people, or rather four, if we include the Jews, but in April 1992 almost all of them went away".* Synagogues, churches, mosques, were burning. They had been side by side for centuries, sometimes within a perimeter of a few hundred metres. *"In the most difficult moments"* Kraljevitc remembers, *"when the Moslems felt surrounded and couldn't see any way out, the danger of radicalism emerged. Now this is finished. Before*

forward and fulfilling their dreams. But there is still a great disparity in the real opportunities, especially for the racial minorities physically isolated from our context, in depressed areas. Recently, nevertheless, we have been able to transfer from welfare to work a number of people higher than in any other period of American history: 36% in the last couple of years, according to the President's Advisers for Economic Affairs. I believe that your questions also refer to what many define as "the costs of an open society", and there are some. But I think that the overwhelming majority of Americans are convinced that the price was very low, compared to all the benefits created by our open and pluralistic system.

Today, the globalization process seems to have reached, albeit to different degrees, an irreversible stage in all sectors and everywhere. What are the major obstacles to overcome?

In the last ten/fifteen years, in the US and all over the world, deep changes in global economy and in global financial markets have offered great opportunities to the workers, the farmers and the firms.

The greater flow of trade, capital, information and technology has given enormous benefits to the US, through the increase in export, the creation of a large number of jobs - including high income ones - and a reduced inflation rate. At the same time, the developing Countries have taken upon themselves more and more important roles within the global economy, absorbing about two fifths of the American exports. Nevertheless, the new era does not imply only potentialities but new challenges and new risks as well.

The economic crises in Asia show that the deficiencies in the financial sector of some developing Countries, and the inadequate assessments of the risks by international creditors and investors, can have a remarkable impact on global economy. In the next years, our economic welfare will depend very much on how efficiently, today, the international community meets these challenges and controls their risk. In answer to these challenges, America has fixed three clear objectives: promote a wide-ranging growth both in the industrialized and in the developing world; be more adroit in the prevention of future crises; confront any crisis when it occurs. The US has undertaken the effort of strengthening the architecture of the international economic system at the Naples summit of 1994. More recently, it joined other leading economies in support of the following initiatives: give better information, fostering diffusion and transparency; build stronger national financial sectors; create mechanisms able to make the private sector more responsible for the consequences of its decisions on matters concerning credit and investment.

The latest and most disturbing element is that globalization does not involve only the most industrialized countries, but also Countries whose economies are very different from those of the US and the EU. We must find the way to make globalization useful for the largest possible number of people, all over the world. To have a larger cake is not enough, if everybody cannot have a larger slice.

that absurd war, among our communities there was not only tolerance, but we lived together well". Mixed marriages were 30% of the total, and "the people of Bosnia never enquired about nationality, ethnic group, religion: it would have sounded almost like an insult". And now? "The supporters of the policy of ethnic hatred are decreasing; the ethnic groups, none excluded, act in a more and more pragmatic way. Problems are mainly economic; no more than 50% of the active population has a job. I am sure that in the near future my Country will

recover its traditional multiethnic and multicultural character, and I hope that the politicians elected last September will move in that direction".

Everywhere, education and culture, even more than the possible government choices, are the elements which can encourage or discourage this type of mentality, which consists of two elements. The first is ethical, and is the acknowledgement of equal dignity for others, accepting them as they are. The second is intellectual and consists in believing that the others'

A CONVERSATION WITH KALARICKAL PRANCHU FABIAN, INDIAN AMBASSADOR TO ITALY

With at least 8 religions, 3 civil codes, 23 federal States, 16 official languages and almost 500 dialects, India -over 1 billion people: the greatest eastern democracy - has always breathed the pluralist dimension. Until the British partition of 1947, India included Pakistan which, in its turn, included Bangladesh, which became independent in 1971.

From Aryans and Dravidians, primigenial and principal ethnic groups, an immense mosaic intermingles throughout the millenniums, "maintaining, nevertheless, some common denominators", observes Kalarickal Pranchu Fabian, Ambassador to Italy, "which permit a practically unitarian vision of the cultures of the subcontinent. For example, the linguistic roots in Sanskrit, or Hinduism, the belief in karma and reincarnation".

But it is not correct, according to the Ambassador, to define the Hindus as a "majority", nor to consider their creed an out and out "religion". He explains: *"The Hindu world is so diverse, divided into castes and groups, some of which don't believe in a God while others believe in a thousand Deities. Hinduism, which does not make proselytes, is a philosophy of life rather than a religion. Buddhists, Jews, Christians, Muslims and other faiths are traditionally present. Today, the Muslims are 120 million: diffused since the 9th century, "Islam" - says the Ambassador - "belongs to our tradition and history. We have a specific tradition of religious tolerance: by this term I don't mean a kind of endurance, but mutual respect. We should avoid attributing the monopoly of truth to a single religion: no, each one is a way to go closer to the truth, to God. "Mahatma" Gandhi read the Bible, the Koran, the Bhagavad Gita ("The Song of the Lord", venerated by almost all the Hindus). Ours is a secular State, where the Constitution guarantees to everyone the right to practice his own faith". But also in India there has been violence, very serious incidents. How can further clashes be prevented? "First of all, by going back to "Mahatma" Gandhi's teaching, then reviewing the approach of the history books, finally by hanging, in all schools of every order and level, a meteorological map of the world, side by side with the political one. A meteorological map? "Yes, because the young must begin to learn right away about the existence of phenomena like "el Niño", which ignore borders. The world becomes more and more interdependent, the destiny of each Country is tied to that of the others. But what are we globalizing? Pollution, drugs, crime? We should globalize the access to drinking water, to education, to work. And stop reducing history to a succession of wars, won or lost: why can't we give at least the same importance to other aspects of human life? On the school benches, the citizens of tomorrow's world should learn that recourse to violence always implies a crescendo of violence. It is unthinkable to practice it within certain limits, and then draw back. Violence always leads into a mutual vicious circle. We should all go back to "Mahatma" Gandhi's thought, for the diffusion of which thousands of volunteers, in India and in the world - Italy included - continue to strive, even full-time and without any kind of advertising.*

cultures are equally fundamental experiences of life, as well as in feeling the curiosity of knowing these cultures.

"For us there is no distinction between citizens of different ethnic groups and cultures. Our President is of Syrian origin, no one pays any attention to mixed marriages, there are no special quarters for foreign workers, public schools are open to everyone, and we have had freedom of worship since 1825", says Argentinian Ambassador Juan Felix Borghonovo. Fostering elements of this attitude, - the Ambassador

continues - were essentially, immigration and a certain type of culture: *"On the one hand, the most different peoples settled in our immense country, with our peasants, they all led the same life. On the other, we slowly absorbed in our tradition the great French, Spanish and Italian thinkers". Still, racism is everywhere, like cancer. Have you discovered the vaccine? "Some racists are also among us. But they are few. They are the result of a wrong education, they believe to be members of a pure race. Hum! If they were to dig into their past, they*

would probably have great surprises....Recently, the papers have reported the case of a Jewish boy beaten by two youths with very short hair: they have been sentenced to some years in prison".

As a matter of fact, tolerance must have its limits, fixed by the rules of living together. One cannot, nor should, respect everything, always and in any case. Voltaire wrote that a phenomenon is to be considered intolerable when it meets all these three requisites: be dictated by fanaticism; be contrary to truths about which there is no possible ethical doubt, (for instance, slavery and racism are evil), be the cause of injury to the physical and/or moral integrity of others.

If in the by now remote civilization of the village, everybody controlled the life of everybody else, today the global village spurs its citizens to model their personality as they please and to self-regulate their conduct.

The nostalgia of the flock gives birth to radicalisms - not only religious, and sometimes self-styled ones, - while the dimensions of "we" and "they" seem to make way for the individual dimension. (It is significant that, for some years now, in the political parties, traditionally structured in concentric circles, there has been - in ours as well as in other Countries - a constant thinning of the central hard core, made of strict observants, and a continuous repopulation of the more autonomous peripheral areas.

In order to safeguard itself and its inhabitants, different in colour of skin, features, religion, social class and opinions, the global village needs only a code, both penal and civil, able to guarantee the freedom of all kinds of behaviour, under the sole and only condition that they do not cause damage to others.

□

*Contributor to
"La Stampa" and "Prometeo"



OPERATIONAL PLANNING IN MULTINATIONAL CONTEXTS

We continue our examination of the *Lines of Operation*, with the help of a number of examples taken from the Operations carried out in Bosnia Herzegovina and Albania.

With this third and last work we go into the planning of the campaign, expounding the methodological principles adopted within the Alliance, which can be precise reference models for updating the Italian doctrine devised in the '60s with the SMD-104 publication.

in the Bosnia-Herzegovina operation, defined it as "...the perception of the belligerents that they are treated fairly and equitably according to the terms of the peace agreement". The "perception" concept illustrated at Fig.1, introduces a new dimension, the fifth, in the space of the battle.

Before proceeding it should be specified that however good a plan, it always contains numerous elements of uncertainty, among which the assumptions play a key role.


The failure of one of the assumptions on which the plan is built makes it necessary to reconsider it in the conduct phase. At worst, if also the mission changes, one will start all over again. In view of this, the following examples refer to the planning phase rather than to the actual conduct of operations.

Fig. 2 graphically illustrates the Gantt diagram (1) regarding the operation in Bosnia, started in a Peace Enforcing environment,

by Pier Paolo Lunelli *


The doctrinal principles illustrated in the second section of this work apply not only to the so-called warfighting operations but, with the suitable adjustments, they hold good also for peace-support operations. Among the outstanding adjustments, one should mention the so-called "virtual" Centre of Gravity. Lt. Gen. M. Walker, ARRC Commander

Fig. 1



PHASES OF THE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA OPERATION (1995)

(Peace Enforcing with already in-Theatre UN Forces)



which has entailed the replacement of a UN mission already active in that Theatre. In particular, we refer to an operation aimed at separating the warring parties, in compliance with the peace agreements signed by the opponents before the beginning of the mission.

In the case at issue, the Decisive Points which give shape to the Lines of Operation along the way towards the Centre of Gravity of the opponents are: (1) cease-fire; (2) creation of a free zone between the warring parties; (3) withdrawal of the opponents' forces inside their barracks and demobilization; (4) duration of peace (5) Transfer Of Authority (TOA) to another organization.

The operation consists of five phases, the third of which refers to the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed by the parties. The activities envisaged for each phase are connected with the Decisive

Points in logical sequence. It must be pointed out that in the 3rd phase there is a mention of a possible application of a Contingency Plan for withdrawing the multinational contingent in case of emergency.

Such possibility must be taken in serious consideration, because one can never predict exactly how things will turn out. Considerable human losses, in fact, could undermine the consent of the participating nations' public opinion, entailing a fissure or a rupture in the cohesion of the coalition. This gives rise to the necessity of an emergency plan and a strategy for leaving the Theatre, which should be worked out before getting into it.

Another important aspect regards the so-called "mission creeping," mentioned in the 4th Phase. It corresponds to a change in the initial mission, as that which required to provide Humanitarian help or to hunt down persons


deemed to be war criminals by the International Court. On the other hand, in future operations, such "mission creeping" should be considered a physiological rather than an occasional fact.

Also in peace-support operations one can find the Lines of Operation after having determined the Centres of Gravity (one's own and the opponents'; in this case, both should be protected) and the Decisive Points. A detail that should not be overlooked is that the Lines of Operation must always be related to the End State:

Fig. 3 represents in detail the Lines of Operation directed towards the Centre of Gravity of the opponents related to the same operation. This is the outcome of a planning activity at suboperational level, concerning a sub-campaign planned and conducted by the Land Component Commander (LCC). The latter always plays the

"LINES OF OPERATION" TOWARDS THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY OF THE WARRING FACTIONS
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA OPERATION (1995)

Fig. 3



central role in peace support operations, for he commands the forces deployed on the ground.

The Gantt graph of fig.3 is the result of the conceptual activity that applies the method used for solving military problems, known in NATO jargon as "Operational Planning Process", which will be discussed later on.

In particular:

- the axis of the abscisses describes the times. The double-arrow vectors show the Decisive Points that comprise several phases. It must be stressed that those shown in phase I are not necessarily in sequence;
- the phases from I to V are not separated, but actually often intersect each other;
- the End State is embodied by political-social stability in the area of intervention (to be attained through the separation of the warring parties), by the ensured possibility of free

movement for the populations, etc..


- the opponent's Centre of Gravity consists of "the perception that the peace agreements are equitable and to respect them is in their precise interest". As we said before, in peace support operations the Centre of Gravity should not be hit but rather safeguarded, countenancing all the activities that permit to restore stability, control of the territory, economic recovery and internal political stability; otherwise the End State will always be a chimera;
- the Lines of Operations cannot be connected like in a PERT graph (2) because there is a coexistence of temporal domains (e.g. withdrawal of the opponent forces to their barracks within certain time limits, according to the peace agreements), psychological domains (e.g. support of the

local population to the peace force) and abstract domains (e.g. freedom of movement of the civilian population);

- as regards the Decisive Points it is important to underline the following elements:
 - the popular support to the peace force may be in part an outcome of the Campaign;
 - of particular importance are the Liaison officers to be detached to the opponent's civilian and military agencies and the United Nations;
 - the organization of the Joint Military Commissions as consulting committees for resolving local crises is a winning card;
 - "mission creeping" derived from submitting war criminals to the International Court, entails modifications in the

"LINES OF OPERATION" FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE FRIENDLY CENTRE OF GRAVITY
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA OPERATION (1995)

Fig. 4



mission and rules of engagements of the Force. A negative consequence can be a decrease in the people's consent towards the peace force;

- some Decisive Points derive directly from the peace agreements, some others come from the analysis of the mission made in the Operational Planning Process;
- among the Decisive Points pointed out, while some envisage only the employment of military force (even if only potentially), other require the support of other concurring political, social and economic actions;
- each Decisive Point requires the employment of resources (forces, equipment, money) for a certain preestablished time or, in some cases, for an indefinite time.

The Lines of Operation directed

towards the Centre of Gravity of the opponents should also be correlated with those determined for protecting one's own Centre of Gravity, i.e. that of the coalition which supplies the peace force. These are represented at fig. 4.

Some considerations in this regard:


- the coalition's Centre of Gravity, an element that should be protected, is represented by the cohesion of the Multinational Force integrated in a single chain of command;
- as concerns the Decisive Points, the following elements should be stressed:
 - key aspects are: the rapid introduction of the forces in the Theatre, an appropriate Transfer of Authority to another organization and a rapid withdrawal of the contingent;
 - the joint efforts and keeping of

the initiative permit to give a rhythm to the operations so as to nullify the reactions and to take advantage of the adversaries' inactivity,

- the Rules of Engagement (ROE) must have characteristics such as to avoid the risks of escalation. This is attained through the assignment of responsibilities to precise levels of Command as regards the employment of deadly weapon systems (3);
- the consent in the home country is also essential because it influences directly the cohesion of the Multinational Force, which is determined not only by the intrinsic capabilities of the military component but also by the assent of the political authorities and the support of the media;
- the possibility of carrying out the plan for the emergency

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- SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN AID -®

Fig. 5



evacuation of the peace force is a sign of pragmatism and attention to details;

- some Decisive Points share both Lines of Operation, the one directed toward the adversaries' Centres of Gravity as well as the one that is aimed at protecting one's own.

The reader will observe that Fig. 2, 3, 4, a synthesis of the conceptual activity conducted in the Operational Planning Process, evidence the basic elements according to which the Lines of Action, the Commander's Statement of Intent and, subsequently, the Operational Concept should be defined.

THE CASE OF OPERATION "ALBA".

Operation "ALBA" in Albania, led by Italy and developed

outside the NATO/WEU domain, was conducted by constituting an ad-hoc joint and multinational coalition based on Decision no.160 of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and on Resolution no.1101 of the Security Council of the United Nations. On June 15, 1997 the Task Force consisted of 6300 elements, of which 2950 were Italians, 920 French, 780 Turkish, 400 Rumanians, 340 Spanish, 114 Austrians and 70 Danish. The probable Lines of Operations related to that mission are shown at Fig.5. Nevertheless one should specify that these were determined afterwards, relying on the information available.

Some considerations emerge from the examination of the graph:

- at first sight the Plan, conceived at Defence Staff level, seems to include both the Strategic Level

(Chief of Staff of Defence) and the Operational Level (Commander of the Force). Although there may be good reasons for flattening the two levels one over the other, the risk concerned the superposition of authority between the strategic level, represented by DGS-COI, and the operational level, certainly held by the Commander of the Force;

- the commander of the Force (COMANFOR) undoubtedly had to wear the hat of Commander at operational level (4). It would be interesting to know the freedom of action enjoyed by COMANFOR with regard to the location of the Decisive Points, the Lines of Operation and the areas of responsibility of the subordinate Commanders. Without going into the merits of the reasons, certainly acceptable, it seems nevertheless that the Strategic Lines mixed with the Lines of Operation. As we said before,

such approach presents the drawback of a superposition of responsibilities;

- the Command of the Task Force was transferred from CINCPAC to the Commander of the 3rd Corps (Transfer of Authority-TOA) after only seven days and this decision certainly originated from that particular contingent situation. Nevertheless the Transfer of Authority is a complex activity which entails change in the relations of Command, (and of transmissions), besides the coordination between two Staffs (in the case examined, CINCPAC with COMANFOR). A historical precedent can be found in the Falkland-Malvinas war, but the assumptions were certainly different (distance from the homeland, submarine threat and amphibious operation);
- the Command of the Military Peace Force (FMP), of the "Joint Combined" type, structured in three basic functions, (CJ2/3, CJ1/4 and CJ6), appears to be in line with the doctrine;
- the operational-level End State, not expressly indicated, could consist "in having created a safe environment for the inflow of humanitarian aid to Albania and having turned the responsibility, after 3 months, over to another organization";
- going up one level, the strategic-level End State could have been "the achievement of political stability in Albania. This was achievable through Strategic Lines aimed at giving political and economic assistance to the Country, in order to facilitate the onset of a democratic process through free elections. Also the formation of military elites was part of the Strategic Lines. The Centre of Gravity, also not expressly defined, was probably "the population's perception that the military intervention was in their precise interest";
- as regards the containment of the migration of refugees across the Adriatic, it was an operation of

METHOD APPLIED AT OPERATIONAL LEVEL (ESTIMATED PROCESS)

Fig. 6

INPUT	TRANSFORMATION (Commander and Staff)	OUTPUT
MISSION and/or DIRECTIVES. COMMANDER'S INTENT. (higher level)	COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT. 1. MISSION ANALYSIS. (and of the higher Commander's Intent) 2. ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE FACTORS AT PLAY (or SITUATION analysis) 3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURSES OF ACTION. 4. COMPARISON OF THE COURSES OF ACTION, WARGAME. 5. SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION AND WARGAMING.	1. MISSION STATEMENT. 2. PLANNING DIRECTIVES. 3. WARNING ORDERS. 4. COMMANDER'S DECISION. 5. COMMANDER'S INTENT. 6. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. 7. CAMPAIGN PLAN. 8. OPERATION ORDERS.

support to the principal one, and it could be seen in this perspective and conducted separately.

After completing a comprehensive survey of the application of the instruments of operational planning to the operations of peace support, we start to deal with Campaign planning, the essential elements of which have been anticipated in Part 2.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

The Campaign Planning process; which starts with the Commander's assessment of the operational requirements for carrying out his task, presents many analogies with that indicated in SMD-104. The process is essentially based on the analysis of the mission and the higher Commander's Intent. Its constitutive elements, in terms of input-transformation-output are resumed at Fig. 6.

It is sometimes possible to refer to a Contingency Plan (COP), if part or all of the assumptions on which it is based prove to be still valid. In this case it will be a matter of adjusting the existing Plan transforming it in Operation Plan (OPLAN). If this is impossible, a new Operation Plan will have to be developed on the basis of the contingent situation.

The Campaign Plan is defined as a sequence of joint multinational


operations planned to achieve the strategic objective within predetermined space and time limits. It requires a synchronization of the activities of the land, naval and air forces. It indicates the goals, the ways to pursue and achieve them. Generally it includes several phases, each one usually characterized by an End State".

The operational Campaign Plan should:

- include the Commander's Intent;
- point out the condition/-status/situation which identifies/-materializes the success of the operation (End State);
- focus the attention not only on the enemy operational Strategic Centres of Gravity, but also on the protection of one's own operational and strategic Centre of Gravity;
- indicate the subdivision of the operations into phases (such as, for example, pre-crisis, force's inflow, combat, stabilization, post-conflict) each of which must contain a Commander's intent;
- refer to the principle of jointedness of the air, land, naval and special forces' effort;
- constitute a planning base for the subordinate Commanders.

Although the method described in the preceding figure is a valid

PROCESS OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING



instrument for on-the-spot planning, if time permits it is more suitable to use the **Operational Planning Process**. For further information we suggest reading the "MNC" Guidelines for Operational Planning, volume III, 1996 Edition (NR)".

INPUT AND OUTPUT IN THE CAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESS

Before continuing it is appropriate to clarify the key role of the Commander in the Operational Planning Process (6). He, together with his Military Assistant and with the support of the Command Group (7) carries out the conceptual activity together with his Staff, as is clearly shown at Fig.7.

It is possible that during the preparation phase, the Commander

intends to issue an **Initiating Directive** (8) with the aim of supplying a framework for planning, defining priorities, establishing restraints, allotting resources and determining training objectives for the amalgamation of the forces. This directive, which helps filling the initial void determined by the absence of higher directives, can be issued before the materialization of the mission's nature. The issue of the Initiating Directive in the initial phase is a point of reference for the subordinate Commanders, for developing their plans and making decisions. The directive can nevertheless be issued in advance by the higher-level Commander.

The Mission Statement is a concise phase that defines **Who** will carry out the operation, **What** will have to be done, **When** this

will occur, **Where** it will take place and **Why** it must be done. We could make the following example: "At the H-hour (or on D-day or on order) (**When**), Joint Task Force Alpha (**Who**) will be brought into Beta (**Where**) to destroy Beta's forces (**What**) in order to force Beta to stop its hostilities and lead it to the table of negotiations (**Why**)".

The Mission Statement (10) derives from the examination of: (A) assigned tasks (explicit and implicit); (B) limits and restrictions; (C) higher-level Commander's Intent. Each of these factors is analyzed in a matrix in relation to the Centre of Gravity of the opponent forces (generally it must be hit) and one's own (it must be protected). The analysis is of the iterative kind, and continues until each factor is incorporated in the

APC of the "Garibaldi" Brigade in Bosnia, equipped with additional armour.

Mission Statement, or excluded if not deemed important in relation to the Centre of Gravity. At the end of this iterative process, the Mission Statement is reexamined and assessed in order to verify its potential ability to achieve the wanted End State. The matter should already have been defined in the Initiating Directives.

The **Commander's Statement of Intent - Commander's Intent** is a concise expression by which the Commander indicates **not only the operation's aim and the wanted End State** but, relying on the higher-level Commander's Intent, on the available information and on his intuitive capability, specifies how the operations will develop in order to achieve the End State, starting from the present situation. It must be drafted in such a form as to be understood down to two levels of subordinate commands, because its purpose is to concentrate the attention of these Commanders on what should be done to obtain success even when the operation concept and/or plan are surpassed by the events. Actually, the Commander's Statement of Intent is a unifying element, because it supplies a framework within which the subordinate Commanders can exercise their freedom of action instead of submitting to the restrictions imposed by a specific operational concept or manoeuvre scheme. In particular, while a modification in the situation is often followed by a revision of the operation concept, generally the Commander's Intent remains unchanged. Therefore the Commander's Intent is neither the Operational Concept nor its synthesis.

In other words, the Commander's Statement of Intent expresses the Commander's point of view on the reason of the operation and the

results that must be achieved. It is a constant reference point for the Staff, which will have to concentrate their efforts on factors essential for success, avoiding a dispersive analysis which would not sufficiently focalize the problem.

In particular, in an Operation Theatre the Commander's Intent allows the Commanders to pursue the desired End State - related not only to the entire operation but also to each of the phases that compose it (i.e. preparation, introduction in Theatre, etc.) - in those difficult conditions defined by Clausewitz as "the fogs of war". Nevertheless it should be observed that from the analysis of the mission generally stem the so-called "Commander's Initial Intents" which describe only the aims of the plan and the intended End State. In particular, these initial intents are the key element of the **Commander's Planning Guidance**.

The Commander's Planning Guidance (11) is a section of the document which synthesizes the initial directives, decisions and concerns, and describes what the Commander intends to do as

regards the mission assigned to him. The directive's **two key elements** are: the Commander's Initial Intent, which, as we said, contains essentially the End State, the purpose of the operation and the **Mission Statement**.

The Decision Briefing (12) is prepared by the Staff in order to state the range of the possible options. The briefing is attended by the Commander, Command Group (13), Liaison Teams detached from subordinate higher-level Commands and frequently by the subordinate Commanders. During this briefing - but there can be more than one - the Commander can indicate further Courses of Action to investigate, others that can be overlooked or must be perfected. Besides, he may choose the Course of Action, an-embryo Operational Concept, to be translated into an Operational Plan.

The Commander's Decision on the Course of Action, accompanied by further directives (Commander's Decisions on COA and additional guidance) is an output of the **Decision Briefing**.

The selected Course of Action (COA) takes shape in the **Concept**




of Operations (CONOPs), around which the Plan is built. The Concept of Operations, which must be approved by the higher-level authority, is subsequently sent, in the form of a Warning Order (WO), to the subordinate Commanders. Even if it contains many elements that will concur in forming the plan, it does not go into detail; it emphasizes instead the reasons and the ways to achieve the objective. It can nevertheless include tasks for the subordinate commands (if already determined), dates, and other information deemed suitable. At this stage of the Planning Process it is improbable that the forces should have already been assigned from the Nations for the implementation of the Plan. It is therefore important, in this phase, to clearly identify the Force Capability Requirements, (Capability Packages) in such a way as to define the requests to the possible contributing Nations.

The Campaign Plan should be concise and avoid describing in detail the execution of the phases or containing tactical details. Its end is in fact that of providing only the guidelines for the development of plans at tactical level. For example, the Campaign Plan drafted by Gen. Mc Arthur for the operation in the Pacific was synthesized in only four pages (which, on the other hand, referred to numerous and bulky enclosures).

THE CONCEPTUAL PHASE OF THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

Let us go on describing the conceptual phase of the planning process carried out by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and his Staff (14) whose output are the Campaign Plan and the Operation Orders. Before going ahead we deem it suitable to point out the position of this Joint Force Commander (JFC) within the command and control structure of



the operation.

The model of a generic command and control structure, which we assume activated for an Italian-led operation called "Charlie" is illustrated as a didactic example at Fig. 8.

The logical process of orders and directives is as follows:

- the Chief of Defence Staff issues his Directives and mission for operation "Charlie" to the Joint Force Commander (and often indicates also the Joint Force/Contingent Commander). In the national ambit the Joint Commander could be compared to the COI Commander;
- the Joint Commander, who in his turn must monitor the coincident operation "Alpha" and conduct operation "Bravo", issues his Directive and the mission for operation "Charlie" to the Joint Force/Contingent Commander appointed by the Chief of Defence Staff (or proposes a Commander).
- the Joint Force/Commander, after the analysis of the mission, addresses appropriate Planning Directives to the Commanders of the land, maritime and air components, etc;
- at the end of the planning process,

the Joint Force Commander issues his operational Campaign Plan for operation "Charlie".


As can be noticed, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) is an operational-level commander, the same as the commanders of the land, air, amphibious, maritime, logistic and special forces components. The Commander of operation "Charlie" (at strategic and sometime at operational level) is the Joint Commander appointed by the Chief of Defence Staff. As shown at Fig.8 this Joint Commander, besides, has already the task of monitoring and/or conducting the coincident operations in Bosnia and a natural disaster ("Alfa" and "Bravo"). The model indicated appears sufficiently flexible, because each level of command introduces an added value to the decision-making process.

THE OPERATIONAL-LEVEL PLANNING PROCESS

Going back to the **operational-level planning process** (referred to the Joint Force Commander), the five steps of the conceptual phase are:

- Analysis of the Mission;
- Analysis and Assessment of

APPLICATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING



factors;

- Development of the Course of Action;
- Comparison of the Course of Action;
- Commander's Decision (choice of the course of action).

Before starting this process, the Commander will make a geostrategic analysis which may include the historical context: causes of the conflict, external political influences, political economic bonds and restrictions related to international law, national interests and position of the neutral Countries.

The Joint force Commander will then conduct the analysis of the mission and factors, employing the instruments of operational planning (End State, Centre of

Gravity, Decisive Points, Lines of Operations, Sequencing, Phases, Culminant Point, Operational Pause, Contingency Planning, Branches and Sequels). In particular, he will act according to the instructions contained in the Initiating Directive received from the higher Commander, focusing his attention on his own command level without going into details entrusted to the subordinate commands.

The in-flow graph of Fig.9 illustrates the logic-functional relations between the concepts of operational design and the planning process.

First step: Analysis of the Mission

The analysis of the mission is aimed at determining precisely what the Military Force is called to

do. Here, the attention should be concentrated essentially on three concepts of operational design:

- the **End State**, which derives (but not always) from the strategic-military objectives to be achieved;
- the **Centres of Gravity** (one's own and the adversary's) found in the geostrategic analysis;
- the **Decisive Points** along the way towards the enemy Centre of Gravity and those intended for protecting one's own. Actually the Decisive Points will be accurately determined at the end of the second step.

The correct identification of End State, Centres of Gravity and Decisive Points in an essential element of the planning process and it will probably be refined along the way (see St. Andrew's cross at Fig.9).


The analysis of the mission should keep into account also other means, such as the economic and diplomatic instruments, because they concur to the attainment of the strategic objectives. The military Lines of Operation at Operational level should in fact be **synchronized with the non-military ones.**

The output of the analysis is:

- the so-called **Commander's Critical Information Requirements** (CCIRs), in other words the essential elements of information on which the J2 (or JC2) must focus his attention in preparing the Information Research Plan. These are informative aspects which influence decisions and include: (1) the Essential Elements of Information (EEIs) that regard the enemy; (2) the Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs); (3) the Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs);
- the **Commander's Planning Guidance** directed to the Staff and to the Commanders of the land, air, maritime amphibious, logistic and special forces Components;
- if suitable, a **Warning Order** to the Commanders of the land, maritime air, logistic, etc. components. The Warning Order can be in the form of an **Initiating Directive**, which may include the **Commander's Initial Intent** as well as the Mission Statement.

Second Step: Analysis and Assessment of the factors at stake

Once the Commander has completed the analysis of the mission, found his Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) and provided the directives to his Staff, he moves



on to the following phase, called analysis of the factors at stake. The range of factors at stake depends on the type of operation and on the level of joint and/or multinational integration. From their analysis not only new tasks could emerge, but also the need to improve the Centre of Gravity and the Decisive Points already defined in the first step. This is generally guided by the Chief of Defence Staff on the basis of the Commander's input.

The factors to analyze and evaluate are:

- **the environment.** The analysis of this factor proves to be rather complex, especially in the

instance of Joint Multinational operations. The General Staff must concentrate its efforts on the environmental aspects which have direct reflections on the campaign, without going into details that could be completed by the Staffs of the subordinate Commanders of the land, air and maritime components. In general, the analysis should include the characteristics of the Operation Theatre - including the topographic, hydrographic, climatic, weather, transport and telecommunications aspects - as well as the economic and social aspects which affect the operations;

GLOSSARY

Combat Power

(1) All the deadly and non-deadly weapons that a unit or a formation may apply on the adversary in a given time. It is a potential capability. (2) All the combat functions of a unit or formation (Command, manoeuvre, fire, protection, intelligence and logistic support capabilities).

Parallel Planning

Process through which all command levels are involved in the planning process. It is initiated by Warning Orders.

Assumptions

Basic statements/assumptions on unknown elements of a situation, without which it is impossible to start the development of a plan.

They are laid down at the beginning of the Plan and are the basic preconditions for its implementation. Generally they are not applied to the Operation Orders. They are applied instead to the Contingency Planning inserted therein.

Strategic Objective

Objective defined at strategic level and assigned at operational level.

Its achievement permits to attain the strategic-level End State.

Operational Objectives

Objectives defined at operational level and assigned at subordinate-command level (sub-operational or tactical levels). Achieving them permits to attain the operational-level End State.

Campaign Plan

Sequence of joint multinational operations planned for achieving the strategic objective within predetermined limits of time and space. It requires a synchronization of the activities of the land, naval and air forces. It indicates the goals, the ways of pursuing and the means for achieving them.

End State

State or situation that must be reached at the end of the operation. It embodies the conclusion of the conflict or its favourable settlement. It is connected with the objective assigned.

It applies to the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Centre of Gravity

Characteristic, capability or locality from which the enemy or the friendly forces derive their freedom of action, the physical force and the will to fight. Attacking and destroying it leads to defeat or negotiations. It applies to the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Decisive Points

(1) Events whose positive outcome is a precondition for the elimination of the enemy Centre of Gravity. (2) Generally geographic points which, when conquered (or maintained) give the Commander a remarkable advantage over the adversary.

In both acceptations they apply to the strategic, operational and tactical levels (up to Corps, Division and Brigade levels). They may have space, time or immaterial connotations (i.e. in the domain of electromagnetic fields, ethics or morals).

Lines of Operations

They describe how the Military Force is applied in space and time along the Decisive Points singled out on the way that leads to the enemy Centre of Gravity. They apply to the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Sequencing

Arrangement of the campaign events in an order that permits to have a high probability of eliminating the adversary Centre of Gravity. A Concept connected with the Lines of Operation.

Contingency Planning

(1) Process through which possible options are nested in the basic plan, so as to anticipate opportunities or threats. (2) Activity carried out in peacetime in order to produce plans to be implemented in contingency areas, focused especially on the phase of introduction of the forces into the Theatre. The process is largely based on assumptions. The outcome is a Contingency Plan.

Culminant Point

Point of the operation where the situation can only be maintained and does not permit to obtain further advantages. It can have space, time - and sometimes immaterial - connotations.

- **the enemy.** The analysis of the factors concerning the enemy intends to define its capabilities, operational effectiveness and vulnerabilities. One should evaluate the enemy present and future courses of action, its political intentions and relevant objectives. Other aspects concern: limits and restraints; possible external military support; intrinsic features (force structure, instrument, logistics, bases being used or available); moral aspects etc. In the peace support operations the analysis focuses on the warring parties;
- **friendly forces.** The analysis of the friendly forces follows the preceding model. One should also evaluate the impact on the operations caused by the presence in the Theatre of governmental structures (i.e. Red Cross) and non-governmental organizations (i.e. "Caritas");
- **time and space.** The analysis of the time and space factors is essential in order to find out the best sequence within the Lines of Operation. It is actually very likely that the campaign will have to be subdivided into phases, some in sequence and some in parallel. One should also consider that the Campaign Plan should be coordinated in time and space with the non-military Lines of Operation related to the already mentioned political, economic and diplomatic activities;
- **surprise and security.** At operational level surprise and security are more important than they are at tactical level. Surprise has a direct impact on the enemy Centre of Gravity, while security affects the friendly one;
- **other factors.** Other factors may be considered in connection with the type of operation. For example, in low-intensity conflicts one should take into account those factors linked with the media, the so-called interagency operations (15) and the concept of "perception".


Having completed the analysis and assessment of the factors, the Commander should make a synthesis of the assumptions, which will be useful in the subsequent phase when tasks and Decisive Points are connected with the Lines of Operation.

Third step: Development of the enemy and friendly Courses of Action

The third step of this process, which defines the possible Courses of Action, is generally guided by the Chief of Staff. Each friendly course of action should be formulated as an operational concept and include assigned tasks, necessary forces, logistic concept, concept for bringing the force into the Theatre, time-space factors and employment of the reserves. A test for verifying the validity of a Course of Action includes the following questions: does it permit to carry out the assigned task? Can it be implemented with the available resources? Are the resources used in an efficient way? Is the risk acceptable? Is it different from the other Courses of Action? (16) Is it complete? Does it answer the questions: Who, What, When, Where, How and Why?

Fourth Step: Comparison of the Courses of Action.

The comparison among the determined courses of action takes into consideration the pros and cons of each one of them as compared with the enemy's. This is done using also instruments of operational research supplied by the Operational Analysis Branch and, at operational level, the criteria used for the comparison are the war principles. More generally, such criteria can be found in the higher-level Commander's Intent, the Commander's Planning Guidance and in the risk factors. Each course of action is then compared with the



enemy's during a process named wargaming, illustrated at Fig.10.

Fifth Step: Commander's Decision

The following step is the Decision Briefing, at the end of which the Commander selects the course of action considering the pros and cons in relation to the probable action of the enemy. The output of the fifth step is:

- the Commander's Statement of Intent for the Staff and the subordinate Commanders; in the form of a warning order, it indicates what to do, where, when, why and how;
- Warning Orders;
- the selected Course of Action is accompanied by other directives for the Staff. The Operational concept will be developed consequently.

After that, the planning process enters the developing phase of the Campaign Plan. On its completion the Commander issues the orders, makes sure that his intentions, the mission and the context have been clearly understood by the subordinate Commanders. He arranges for the allotment of the


necessary resources, limiting the restraints as much as possible.

The **joint campaign-plan will generally include the following aspects:**

- security of land air and maritime Lines of Communication (LOCs) as far as the operations area;
- deployment;
- acquisition and maintenance of the necessary level of sea control/air control in the Operation Theatre;
- allotment of forces and other resources to the Commanders of the land, air and maritime component, in order to achieve the strategic objective;
- employment of Command and Control Warfare (C2W);
- start of land, air and maritime operations;
- logistic support of the joint contingent and support supplied by the host Nation;
- withdrawal of the force from the Theatre;
- civil-military cooperation and media management.

As illustrative example, at Fig.11 we have outlined a hypothetical Campaign Plan, applicable to a single situation, that of a natural calamity. For the graphic description

Model of Campaign Plan in a Situation of Natural Disaster



we have used a PERT diagram.

We can notice that one of the essential assumptions is the unity of command, in this case held by the Commander of a Task Force (which should include also Police forces, Fire Brigades, etc.) with the responsibility of managing the emergency.

In particular, the diagram represents:

- mission received by the Joint Commander;
- operational concept and Campaign Plan deriving from the Planning Process;
- Lines of Operation, in terms of macro-activities to be carried out in a time sequence. Each macro-activity generally coincides with a Decisive Point which can also be associated with a specific date;
- critical course described with a sequence of blue-coloured macro-activities;
- End State, identified with the

“handing over to another organization and the consequent withdrawal of the forces”.

PARALLEL PLANNING PROCESS IN AN OPEN SYSTEM

The planning process examined until now is based on a system founded on the trinomial “**Input - Transformation - Output**”, to be implemented at a determined level of command. This system can be considered of the **closed type** until the interactions - which certainly exist - among the various levels of command are not analyzed. These interactions were already illustrated in the concept of Parallel Planning (see Part.1).

Introducing therefore the latter concept, **the planning process takes place within an open system**, where on the one side restraints and rigidities are

brought in (such as, for example, the approval of the assumptions, of the operation concept, etc.) and, on the other, the process is given its unity by acting on an **essential resource: the time available**.


As an example, Fig.12 illustrates the interactions at play among four levels of conflict (politico-strategic, strategic-military, operational, sub-operational and tactical) in planning a peace-support operation in a UN or OSCE environment.

We have considered the case of a generic operation which envisages the establishment of:

- a Steering Committee, formed by the contributing nations, at politico-strategic level;
- a Joint Multinational Planning Staff at strategic-military level;
- a Combined Joint Task Force HQ (CJTF-HQ) at operational level;
- Commands at suboperational level of the land (Joint Force

PARALLEL-PLANNING PROCESS

Fig. 12



1. Initiating Directive, Warning Orders, Mission (according to considered level).
2. Commander's Intent and Particular Assumptions (to be approved).
3. Concept of Operations (possibly to be approved)
4. Input to UN Resolution and cease-fire agreements.
5. Input/ Requests of Rules of Engagement.
6. Forces needed (types and quantities).
7. Requests of support from Host Nation and Intelligence.
- 7a. Memorandum of Understanding, Status of Force Agreement.
8. Approval of assumptions and Concept of Operations.

9. UN Resolution and cease-fire agreements.
10. Matrix of ROEs to be implemented.
11. Assigned Forces, Positions in Hqs, Intelligence
12. Request for approval of Plan.
13. Distribution of Directives, Plans and Operation Orders, according to considered level.

NOTES: (1) The figure has a didactic purpose only, and does not show interactions with supranational organizations (ONU-OSCE), Intelligence cycle, Liaison teams etc.
(2) Contents vary, although they keep the same numeration.

Land Component Commander-JFLCC), air (Joint Force Air Component Commander) and naval (Joint Force Naval Component Commander) components;

- Commands at tactical level of air, naval and land forces.

The table shows only the interactions of the first three levels (politico- strategic, strategic-military and operational). For the sub-operational and tactical levels only the inputs are indicated.

Here are some explanations regarding the scheme:

- the illustrated interactions refer to a stage where a crisis in a certain area occurs. In this case the Nations, which are going to establish a Steering Committee, decide to start planning for the intervention and appoint a leader Nation (which hosts the Multinational Joint Planning

Staff). This group of Nations, in particular, is responsible for the appointment of the Commander and the Command tasked with the constitution of the Combined Joint Task Force HQ;

- at this stage presumably the UN has not issued any resolution and no agreements have yet been defined on a ceasefire. Therefore the Staffs at strategic and operational level can supply specific inputs (no.4) which, if taken into consideration (no.9), become situation elements on the basis of which the planning can be improved;
- in order not to plan in the void, Initiating Directives and Warning Orders will be issued (no.1);
- the Staffs at the various levels start planning on the basis of assumptions (no.2); this leads to the formulation of an Operation Concept (no.3). Both will have

to be approved (no.8). Only the assumptions of importance for the higher level ought to be approved by the latter, while the others, outcome of reasonable assumptions deriving from the analysis of the situation, need no approval;

- the Staffs at various levels, besides, provide inputs for the Rules of Engagement (no.5) (which will have to be approved and distributed at Steering Committee level (no.10), find out the type and amount of forces needed (Forces Capability Requirements) (no.6), and finally state the support requirements that should be met by the Host Nation (no.7). This support will then be made formal by a specific Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and/or a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) (no.7a);
- later on, the Forces are

allocated, the positions within the Multinational Staffs are assigned (no.11), Plans are approved (no.12) and then issued (no.13);

- it should be stressed that the interactions' contents change in accordance with the levels, although in the scheme the same enumeration was maintained for technical reasons;
- the figure shows no other interactions, which nevertheless exist, with organs such as the UN, OSCE and NATO, the exchange of Liaison Teams, etc.

At first sight, the parallel planning system appears to show a certain degree of stiffness. Nevertheless it should be considered that the interactions among the various levels will occur through the employment of Liaison Teams, detached both to the higher and the lower levels. Moreover, the Decision Briefings are actively attended by the subordinate Commanders as well as by higher- and lower-level Liaison Teams. Finally, we wish to emphasize that this type of planning process is applied only when the time available permits to carry out a detailed planning.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE FORMS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

The command authority is expressed at the strategic-operational and tactical levels of conflict in the forms of **Full Command** (FULLCOMD), **Operational Command** (OPCOM), **Operational Control** (OPCON), **Tactical Command** (TACOM) and **Tactical Control** (TACON). Other forms are the Coordinating Authority (17) and the Administrative Authority. This system of assigning the Authority of Command (18), conceived over thirty years ago, during the Cold War, could be considered valid within predefined, national areas of responsibility (the reinforcements were provided by the US). Nevertheless, while since 1989 we have been witnessing a proliferation

of multinational formations, following a trend that is going to grow with the enlargement of NATO, every attempt to adjust the system to the times has failed, because some countries of the Alliance have not been able to reach an agreement.

The question that deserves more thought concerns the fact that the operational Commander, although responsible for the operation, often receives only OPCON on the assigned forces. The consequences are: limitation of his freedom of action and non-respect of the "command unity", a well-known principle of warfare. **The most evident outcome is a clear-cut distinction between the command authority on the operation and the command**

AB 212 of the Army Aviation on a tactical flight over Bosnian territory.

authority on the forces. In fact, while the former concerns the responsibility of the Commander for the accomplishment of the assigned mission, the latter introduces restrictions in the employment laid down by the contributing Nations. At worst, while an operational-level Commander can have OPCON on the multinational forces assigned to him, a tactical-level Commander of a national formation could hold OPCOM if not even FULLCMD.

In particular, the operation





"Implementation Force" (IFOR) in Bosnia Herzegovina has highlighted such abnormalities, expressed with original (and amusing) forms of command and control. In fact, considering that the Commander of the land component (COMARRC) held only the OPCON, the commanders of the subordinate US, British and French framework divisions could express themselves in terms of OPCAN-OPCAN'T (I can or can't do), OPWON'T (I won't do it), OPNON (no way). Necessarily, the Commander, in order to carry out his mission, should have at his disposal not only the required forces but have also the authority to employ them; an authority which is often limited by the

OPCON restriction. A contradiction in terms, if not a paradox.

It is widely acknowledged that the present system shows several weak points. Among which, in the first place, the definitions of OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM, TACON appear particularly complicated and often create confusion, misunderstandings and wrong interpretations. In the second place, the transition between OPCOM and OPCON appears excessively abrupt, to the point that the nations which allocate their forces for an operation have no other choice but to delegate the latter. In the third place, although the allocation of forces to an operational Commander under OPCON has become a habit in peace-support operations, such solution could have

very serious sequels if applied to a medium- or high-intensity conflict. As a matter of fact, these types of conflict require immediate decisions that turn out to be inconsistent with the parallel decisions-making process which might even involve the strategic-military level of the contributing Nations. In the last place, no mention is made of the coordination of the logistic support, which from many points of view is essential in any multinational operation. Therefore it cannot be excluded that in the near future these concepts will be revised.

CONCLUSIONS

Here we end the illustration of the "Outlines of Operational

Armoured VM of the Italian contingent on patrol duty in Sarajevo.

Planning". Certainly there is still a lot to be said, especially in the areas of logistic support, Command and Control, campaign conduct, intelligence, and many more.

It is nevertheless essential to acknowledge that every operation and/or campaign is unique (19) and any attempt to class a conflict employing planning patterns already used in the past can lead to serious consequences. In fact, in the range of possibilities that go from peace to war, each conflict has its own dynamics, and therefore the operations will have to be conceived and organized in view of the specific circumstances. Moreover, the nature of the operations may change in the conduct phase, as, for instance, when a contingent employed in a Peacekeeping mission finds itself operating in a Peace Enforcing environment. The keystone, in these cases, is an accurate definition of the political objectives, which, in their turn, will affect the structure of the forces necessary to attain them. It should be remembered, anyway, that these forces have not only to carry out the assigned mission but also to operate in the course of the campaign, in unpredictable conditions of transition from one type of operation to another.

In any case, the forthcoming operations will probably have limited strategic objectives even if subject to the already mentioned mission creeping. Among these, in particular, the peace support ones will be conducted in support of political and diplomatic initiatives - whose main goal is to achieve a solution to the conflict - and will operate within the complex international environment, where the interests of the individual nations are often divergent. These types of operations may last a long time, the mission may change along



the way and the chain of command and control will be, at best, confused. Finally, international law and diplomatic considerations may impose limitations as regards the resources to be employed, including the deployment and use of some deadly weapon systems.



** Colonel,
Commander, 4th Regt
A/A Artillery*

NOTES

(1) Gantt is a list of correlated activities and information

associated with a Gantt bar diagram which represents the activities and their duration. It permits to programme a series of activities.

(2) PERT, unlike Gantt, is a reticular diagram which indicates all the activities and their interrelations. It permits detailed programming in the form of a flow chart.

(3) While deadly weapon systems produce a visible damage (i.e. air/land fire, etc.) the non lethal weapon systems produce no visible damage (i.e. information campaigns, electronic measures, psychological operations, etc.).

(4) Referring to what was said in the first part (and according to British thought) a Commander is



of operational level when the action meets at least one of the following criteria: has a political dimension, influences directly a campaign, aims at achieving a strategic objective - Unquestionably a multinational operation meets, by itself, the first criterion.

(5) Allied Joint Publication AJP-1(A)-1997 Edition, Chapter 3.

(6) The UK doctrine (Army Doctrine Operations) and the US doctrine (FM100-5, FMFM 1-1 Campaigning, etc.) differ from NATO's, defined by AJP-1(A). We shall therefore refer to the integrated NATO doctrine for what refers to non-UK and non-US definitions.

(7) The Command Group is a

group, led by the Commander, who participates with suggestions in the Decision Brief. As a rule, it is formed by General Officers. At ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) it is constituted by: Deputy Commander, Deputy CoS Ops, Deputy CoS Log (responsible for personnel), Office-Heads/Commanders of engineer, artillery, communications, air force, etc. It should be stressed that the Command Group is an organ of support for the decisions, which, however, are always made by the Commander in person.

(8) For the standard format of the Initiating Directive see MNC Guidelines for Operational Planning, volume III, 1996 Edition (NR) Volume III, Part 2,

Chapter 5.

(10) For the analysis process of the mission see MNC Guidelines for Operational Planning, Volume III, 1996 Edition (NR) Volume III, Part 2, chapter 5.

(11) For the standard format of the Guidelines for Planning, see the same document, Part 2, chapter 5.

(12) The briefing format includes: (1) Introduction (purpose and decisions to be made); (2) Review (Mission, Objectives and Assumptions); (3) Background (political implications, questions concerning Personnel - G1, Intelligence G-2, Logistics G-4, civil-military Cooperation G-5, Operations (G-3); (4) Opponent Forces and their potential Lines of Action; (5) One's own Lines of Action taken into consideration (Objectives, possible outline of the operational concept).

(13) See preceding notes.

(14) This paragraph is the outcome of the comparison of three documents: (1) MNC Guidelines for Operational Planning, 1996 Edition (NR) Volume III; (2) Allied Joint Publication, AJP-1(A) 1997 Edition, Chapter 3; (3) United Kingdom Combined Joint Operations Joint Warfare, 1998 Edition (draft).

(15) The Interagency Operations refer to the activities that must be carried out.

(16) The parameters of differentiation include: Scheme (phases and times) of the manoeuvre, Main Effort, Employment of the Reserve, Task Organization.

(17) For instance, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) is the coordinating authority for the forces contributed by the nations as concerns some forms of training, contingency planning etc.

(18) See NATO Military Committee Document 036/2, May 20, 1960. Division of Responsibilities in Wartime between National Commanders and the Major and Subordinate Allied Commanders.

(19) Army Doctrine Publication Operations, 1994 Edition, page 1-6 to 1-10.

THE ARMY OF



DEVELO

THE FUTURE

During the past year Rivista Militare, with the special feature "Army - Project 2000", devoted ample space to the definition of the "operational concept of the Army", the revision of the Command and Control structure and the operational, logistic, school-training and territorial reorganization of the Army, describing, at the same time, the configuration of the "operational capability packages", each understood as a whole of individual operational capabilities, harmoniously assembled to carry out a specific mission.

But this could not be everything, owing to the fact that the large restructuring process under way is a continuum which entails the need to proceed along the way of discussion, comparison and in-depth study.

We have therefore deemed useful to start a new feature: "The Army of the Future. Development Plan", which in the course of the present year will propose to the readers interesting themes, aimed at outlining the further transformations to be introduced.

In this first installment we present the following works:

"Planning Tomorrow" by Col. Claudio Graziano.

The article illustrates the difficulties that have historically accompanied the efforts of the military planners in their various and labourious undertakings to reorganize the Army.

It describes, moreover, the changes in the politico-military scenarios, emphasizing the new concept of security, which today must be seen at global level and referred to multiform and varied risks.

"The Army's International Dimension" by Lt Col. Sauro Baistrocchi.

The article deals with some issues of preeminent interest for the Army, with particular attention to the development of force planning and outlines, albeit through a survey necessarily limited to some significant aspects, the results that the military instrument is capable of achieving.

PREMIER PLAN

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

PLANNING TOMORROW



by Claudio Graziano*

In the last quarter century the Army has started extensive restructuring processes, always reductive ones, in a "continuum" which, far from representing a desirable dynamic updating of the structures, in order to adapt them to the changed security requirements of the Country, seems rather to mark the moments when significant cuts in the defence budget were decided.

This process can be dated back to 1975, the year of the beginning of what, until yesterday, represented the most ambitious reorganization in the history of the Army of the Republic of Italy. The result was an about 35% decrease in the size of the land military instrument, a cut that, however, essentially concerned only the operational component: the Regiments disappeared and the Army adopted the organization that is still in force in most armies of the West, which envisages four basic levels of force employment: Corps, Division, Brigade, battalion. Although reduced in size, the Army of '75 was still sufficiently large, with its 24 Brigades, plus 3 on mobilization, and more than 200,000 men: therefore, a structure that had to be considered with respect and, if observed with today's eyes, even elephantine. Furthermore, the Army of '75 was conceived in an essentially correct manner, based - as it was - on a threat which at that time was easily identifiable, and on the need to mechanize most of the forces, because of the foreseeable and well-known operational scenarios; and this, taking in due account the technological developments. After a few years, the Army General Staff even issued the doctrinal publications which, although the doctrine had not been at the origin and was not the conceptual support of the reorganization - as it should happen in a theoretically perfect process of transformation and development -



at least arrived in time to sustain its implementation. These things are not unimportant, if one considers that the successive, real revision of the doctrine has taken place a very short time ago.

The duration of conscription was diminished, introducing the so-called "imitation" training system. It was an "on the job", system which, at the time, found very few supporters and, within a few years, was first distorted in its substance and then replaced by a "by cycles" system, although the imitation system had some really innovatory aspects and, with a well - established structure and a suitable number of instructors could have proved fully adequate, and capable of ensuring high levels of operational readiness. Unfortunately, the restructuring of '75 was not completed, because the relevant financial estimates were not met.

After the early '80s, a period in which many new proposals were made, and following Mr. Spadolini's tenure of the Ministry of Defence and the publication of the White Paper of Defence, some minor organizational changes took place again, such as the abolition

The Army must be capable of intervening in local conflicts or crises involving the security and interest of the Nation.

of the Divisional level. In particular, the transformations exclusively were made because of financial external influences, and were always decided without long-, medium-, or even short-term plans approved by the government.


The end of the '80s, then, arrived in a situation of hovering uncertainty. The fall of the Berlin Wall was approaching, even if no one could foresee it, but the detente process, albeit amid many difficulties, seemed to have started, and the recurring negative financial junctures of the Country required that funds be found wherever possible, with a particular eye to the Armed Forces.

The constant trickle of reductions, for lack of a far-reaching programme, essentially due to the impossibility of planning with the necessary minimum of accuracy and reliability, produced - and still does - perverse effects on the procurement policy. Often, the real dimensions of these effects escape the attention of the

The quantitative levels of materials or systems to procure are determined on the basis of the Army's organizational reductions.

inexperts. In practice, taking into account both the technical times necessary for introducing advanced weapon systems and the times - often very long - due to bureaucracy and accounting, a complex system requires more than 10 years to be introduced into service. Of course, the quantity of materials or systems to be procured is based on the size and organization of the Army; these elements, at the moment of the final introduction, must be the same as ten years before. It follows, that if at a certain moment an unexpected curtailment is decided, in most cases it produces a considerable redundancy of equipment which, although no more necessary, for contractual clauses cannot be reduced. In this picture, the Army finds itself with materials which too often are obsolete, since they were procured over too long a time, and in excess vis-à-vis the size of the organization. Furthermore, this takes place in a situation of scarcity of resources, which makes it impossible to acquire new serviceable materials.

In this regard, suffice it to think of the large cut-down of the early '90s which, based on the "New Defence Model" devised by the Defence General Staff, produced a reduction of almost 50% in the operational units. From 27 Brigades (of which, 3 on mobilization) to 13, but some materials had already been ordered, in a quantity necessary for a number of units which no longer existed. This is a perverse cycle that, if not corrected, will force the Army to run after its modernization within a framework of insufficient resources, with the result of procuring only obsolete materials, in spite of very honest



and laborious conceptual efforts. The responsibilities for this situation are manifold and involve also some past mistakes made by the military planners, but certainly the most serious ones must be imputed to the scarce attention paid by the Country to military problems, which has led to a kind of conceptual separation and physiologic incomprehension.

And now we consider the present time, and the introduction of a bill which proposes a reduction that it is not rash to define as epochal. It envisages an Army of only 85,000 men, all professionals, which means 20,000 less than the Carabinieri force, which is only one of the numerous police forces operating on the Italian territory. This comparison -

taken by itself - could seem not very meaningful, also considering the theoretical subordination of the Carabinieri to the Army. But it becomes significant if we bear in mind the global tasks assigned to the Army, that can be summed up in the joint missions which, at a first scrutiny, do not seem to be adequately performable with 50% of the present strength. As a matter of fact, one must not forget that today the Army consists of approximately 159,000 Officers, NCOs and troops and is already earnestly engaged in a rationalization - and reduction - process which, eventually and surely, is aimed at ensuring the efficiency of the Service. In a little less than ten years, this process should produce the configuration of the Army of the 2000s, made up



of 137,000 men and significantly up-to-date in terms of equipment, structures and procedures.

Unfortunately - and this has probably been always clear both to the politicians and to the most farsighted soldiers - this project was born outdated in that it was based on the assumption of a composite Army (conscripts and volunteers), while even the most optimistic supporter of conscription does not credit it with more than a few years of residual life.

In short, while we have just started the reconfiguration of the instrument, planned on the basis of the Capability Packages and aimed at shaping, applying and developing a Model of Army conceived and studied for carrying out the new missions, it is already necessary to envisage a

different plan. A scheme where even considering only the above mentioned bill as a stimulus for a timely start of the professional project, only two aspects are clear: the Army will be smaller and made up of volunteers only.

Within this framework, dimensions are not important - be they the announced or, perhaps, only suggested, initial ones, or the final ones - because, in the absence of references on what lesser or different tasks the Army should carry out, any number could be acceptable or even too generous.

PLANNING

Although with some endemic limitations and faults the Italian

Army, up to the end of the bipolar confrontation in Europe, succeeded at any rate in preparing an instrument that seemed to be capable of ensuring the defence of the borders, potentially threatened by the Warsaw Pact. In this activity the planners of that time were helped by a reference picture which was certainly simpler, and could be summed up in the following elements:

- scenario and threat clearly identified in their dimensions, dangerousness, provenience and point of application;
- one and only combat task for the Italian land instrument: defence of the Northeast;
- the organization structure could be easily adapted to the accomplishment of each operational task, and the defence shortcomings could be defined with a good approximation, together with the resulting probable risks and possible corrections;
- the operational forces, with the modest exceptions of the Italian Contingent earmarked for the ACE Mobile Force (AMF-L) and the paratroops, were firmly anchored to the territory where they had to fight.

The planning process of forces and materials, therefore, referred to the existing and immanent threat (albeit perhaps not really imminent) in order to outline, by comparison, the levels of operational capability necessary to perform the tasks assigned by the Country. Everything was made partially easier by the absence of real operational missions, but much more difficult due to the scarce attention that the government authorities paid to an expensive organization, which perhaps could even be useful in case of trouble but which, after all, could be easily disregarded, on account of the effective US military umbrella.

Today almost everything is

The current planning system is based on a programmed-ceiling system, where the ceiling is represented by the resources made available.

changed, at least as far as general and operational planning are concerned. Therefore, we have moved, without solution of continuity, from a requirement-oriented planning (forces structured on the basis of the presumed operational needs) to a programmed-ceiling planning, where the ceiling is represented by the financial resources available. On the other hand, one must consider that the latter system is not conceptually "free" at all - in the sense of leaving ample freedom of manoeuvre to the military technicians on the basis of the allocations - but it has a programmed and conditional ceiling, since the expenditure is subject to socio-political conditions that could be very strict. In view of this, it was almost impossible to proceed to the rationalization of the sectors where civilian workers are employed, and the outcome was that, at least until now, all reductions have concerned the operational component, i.e. the only productive sector of the organization; and this has happened many times.

Finally, we must underline how difficult it is to obtain the only element without which even the most advanced programmed-ceiling planning becomes very improbable: political sanction.

What we have said so far helps to understand some of the difficulties which historically have impeded the work of the military planners and - as one could easily expect - depend on numerous situation factors, both inside and outside the Service. We have already admitted, and can even repeat, that the planners were not without blame and, in the past, we probably witnessed an excessive inaction of the staff tasked with the future development of the forces, and

perhaps also the inability of realizing adequate planning procedures.

But we must underline that, for example, the well-known "Tagliola Canino" proposal, intended to solve the problem of the enlistment of volunteers, was certainly adequate to the quantitative and qualitative requirements of the military instrument, respected the social expectations of the personnel involved, and was also capable of meeting the needs of the police forces in terms of efficiency, considering that they would have received personnel already trained in many of the required functions

and capabilities and, furthermore, tested and improved from the motivational point of view. At this point, it is natural to ask why this proposal that, as we said, had no contraindications, was never fully accepted and the percentages reserved so far for the police forces don't seem to have the capability of ensuring the necessary quantitative and qualitative level of professional forces. The answer is not easy, because while it could be possible to understand the resistance of the police system, which risked to lose a portion of its recruiting power, and felt that its efficiency would have decreased (this was a wrong





assumption, since the recruits would have been older and better selected), the same considerations are groundless as regards the political sector, which obviously has the final responsibility of decision. The doubt remains that, since the proposal was disliked by the contractually stronger side, it was better to let it fade away.

Clearly the problem of general planning and evolutionary structuring cannot be limited to the military sphere only.

It requires, especially in a period - such as the present one - devoid of sure references, at least at decision-making level, the

involvement of the politico-strategic level.

Scenarios have radically and suddenly changed, an immanent and direct threat against the territorial security of the Country does not exist anymore, at least for the moment. Now, the concept of security must be understood at global level and, as such, refer to multiform and diverse risks which, in general, can include:

- proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction;
- armed aggression against the national territory;
- local conflicts or crises, close to the borders or not, but even only

potentially capable of involving the security and/or the interests of the Nation or of its citizens;

- terrorism;
- international drug trafficking;
- clandestine and uncontrolled immigration;
- natural or caused ecological disasters;
- diffusion of organized crime.

It is a whole of dangers which could appear separately, in succession or at the same time, and it would be impossible to foretell their origin, intensity and place of application. This makes it necessary to have an instrument that must be:

- sufficient: capable of ensuring, within the framework of the Alliances, the security of the Nation from the immediate risks, without redundancies that would be financially impossible and not immediately useful from the operational point of view.
- expandable: capable of evolving, according to threats and operational scenarios, during the time available for the preparation of the forces;
- integrable: from both the joint and international viewpoint;
- modular: based on the task organization concept, in order to have the necessary flexibility of employment, adapting itself on the basis of assumptions (preplanned or not) in relation to the everchanging operational requirements.

These are the main reference parameters, which give rise to other principles that must be taken into account when designing the changes that have to be introduced in the Service, particularly in relation to the capability of performing tasks according to the *Task oriented criterion*, which envisages the assignment, to each operational capability, of a limited number of priority interventions, according to the concepts of sufficiency, modularity and projectability. The latter should be

The land instrument must be modular, in order to have the necessary flexibility of employment in relation to the everchanging operational requirements.

understood as a basic capability that all forces must acquire, be they intended for operations outside the national borders or mainly for presence and surveillance operations.

These are the references, but once we have outlined the requirements with some difficulty, and perhaps elaborated a series of theoretical models, two basic elements for the development of the successive planning remain unknown: what human and financial resources will be available in the short and long term.

In substance, the purpose of planning is to optimize the operational capabilities that the military instrument can express, in relation to the available resources. The outcome is a logic process, that can be synthesized in six steps:

- definition of the Armed Forces' Missions;
- definition of the Operational Capabilities needed to carry out the missions;
- composition of the optimal organizational structure;
- verification of the Financial Feasibility of the project;
- issue of the Political Authorization to proceed to the changes.

As can be seen, the examination of the risks is not directly a part of the process, due both to the practical impossibility of foretelling their occurrence and to the fact that the examination, anyway, is included in the more general concepts of "mission" and "operational capabilities".

On the other hand, it must be underlined that, should the verification of the financial feasibility give a negative result, it would be necessary to go through the whole process again, starting from the definition of the missions assigned to the Armed Forces,



keeping in mind that the final purpose of the process is to optimize the operational capabilities and not to reduce or modify the structures. Precisely this type of global and sequential examination, involving, at each stage, those responsible for the various sectors, is a system that in some way or other should be introduced also in Italy.

DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION

It is easy at this point to understand that many elements can take part in a development process that, as we said, must be dynamic and permanent.

The final purpose of planning, is then to conceive a military instrument capable of expressing the necessary operational capabilities in a given situation, as

well as to continuously update capabilities and dimensions, according to the changes in the reference conditions. In other words, it is a matter of realizing an open system which, starting from an initial plan that can be adapted to the evolving situation and assume the strength of an executive plan of verification and variations.

The only necessary condition for the credibility of the project is the Nation's approval, represented by the political "yes" to the initial project and successive variations. In its turn the political decision - or indecision - depends on the perception of the geo-strategic role of the Country in the international context, and in the political capability of operating in a cohesive manner in the strategical arena. In conclusion, the whole planning depends on the political decision about the

role that the Nation ought or wants to play.

Precisely on account of the factors described above, the Italian military planners must probably organize themselves in a better way, in order to win the manifold challenges of the present and of the future, following also the example of other western countries which have a greater experience, in a broad sense, in the development sector.


The Army, for instance, has already started the process of adaptation to the new requirements within the Army General Staff but, nevertheless, the rationalization process has evidently just begun and requires further innovations, not easily determined and introduced.

The Armed Forces in general and, as far as we are concerned, the Army in particular, assume the form of a dynamic organizational structure, guided, as such, by a plan, flexible enough to permit variations - without gaps - when the situation changes but assuring, in any case, the efficiency of the instrument. But, at the same time, the plan must have enough authority to be durable and grant the necessary stability, if conditions don't change.

In this sense, the British Army, which remains one of the best in the world, considers the development of the instrument in the various sectors (organization, doctrine, personnel, equipment) as a cycle which, starting from the research and analysis activities, closely connects all the other elements of the system (Fig.1).

But, in order to permit the study process to continue, it is necessary that all those concerned with its realization work closely together.

To this end, the British Army Staff has been adequately reorganized, with the creation of a new structure, the DG D&D (Directorate General for Doctrine




and Development) that has the task of carrying out the main functions relevant to the preparation of the land instrument. The DG D&D is therefore entrusted with working out the doctrine in all its aspects, as well as with studying the evolutions and development of the land military instrument as a whole.

It is important to point out that the DG D&D is an integral part of the British Army Staff, even if it is physically located at a certain

distance, or - to put it better - is probably the preeminent part of the Staff, and is directly subordinate - through its director - to the Army Chief of Staff.

Within the main functions outlined, the DG D&D deals with:

- elaboration and revision of the doctrine for the land forces;
- long-term study of organization plans, material procurement and technological development for the evolution of the instrument;



The final purpose of planning, which depends on the political decision as to the role that the Country should play, is to optimize the operational capabilities, and not to reduce or modify the structures.

- training conception, to be understood as elaboration of guidelines and reference concepts;
- international cooperation in favour of the whole Service.

In order to accomplish the functions assigned, the organization structure of the DG D&D is divided into four sectors (Fig.2) concerned with:

- Defence studies, with the object of establishing a link with the civilian and military academic institutions;
- development of training, in order to define the training policy, as well as the simulation and experimentation activities;
- international contacts for the management of Working Groups and exchange activities;
- doctrine and development (Director for Land Warfare), which is the heart of the Directorate or, one could say, the real "thinking Staff" of the Service. It is divided into functional branches, which normally interact in the realization of the projects. In particular, the five branches take care of:

- doctrinal formulation, search and diffusion of lessons learned, doctrine coordination and diffusion;
- doctrine elaboration at operational level (joint / combined);
- operational analysis and impact of new technologies;
- conceptual, organizational and technological evolution and development of the instrument (this is the cornerstone of the system's updating process);
- C4I systems and digitization.

The structure just outlined presents several interesting aspects and provides many occasions for reflection, also because, as facts




have shown, it has proved to be a "winning solution". As a matter of fact, it succeeded in getting the approval, by the British politico-strategic summit, of a project envisaging, for the Army an increase of 3,000 men and the addition of an Airmobile Brigade, just when the other two Services were undergoing some minor

reductions.

How to change

The British example described is only one hypothesis of solution, but the possibilities are numerous, starting with the actual location of the Department with the General Staff, or others, even more innovative and radical, but all



pursuing the same ends. For instance, the development structures envisaged by the German, American and French Armies, operate mostly within the various types of TRADOCs (Training and Doctrine Commands), while at summit level there are only very small policy organs, mainly tasked with the submission of problems and requirements to the aforesaid agencies, who must find the solutions and submit the necessary plans. Fig.3 shows the logical development-plan of the instrument, adopted by the US Army.

As we were saying, the location of the planning structure is conceptually unimportant, what does matter is its existence and its capability of carrying out the tasks assigned.

In this perspective, it would be possible to envisage a change in the summit structure of our Army, presented here as a theoretical model only (Fig.4), which will have to be tested in order to optimize its capabilities within three macrofunctions, each one under a sector supervisor. In particular:

- Personnel-Employment sector: practically unchanged;
- Force-Employment sector: it consists of all the elements entitled to interface and dialogue with the "COMFOTER" (Land Forces Command) area for the preparation of the instrument, operational planning, and the activity of high direction conducted by the Chief of the Army Staff;
- Development sector: constituted by the Staff structures responsible for the evolution of the Service (General Planning, Doctrine, Logistic Planning, Intelligence, etc.). The entire Development system should be able to operate for multiple and simultaneous projects, according to the most modern approach of the science of organization, with the capability and responsibility of interfacing with the national TRADOC structure - if established - or with the Inspectorates, providing them with policy lines to be



Fig. 4

developed within the various sectors of interest.

CONCLUSIONS

The Italian Army is probably living through one of the most difficult moments of its history, and also the future looks full of uncertainties and difficulties. On the other hand, the problems are not irresolvable provided that one is put in a position to tackle and overcome them.

The Army, for its part, should prepare a suitable "development plan", consistent with all the planning references discussed on these pages. To this end, it will be necessary to further optimize the planning sector in general - renaming it "Development Area" to start with - as well as to find the men able to elaborate a far-reaching strategic vision. But this is not enough. Today it is absolutely necessary to have a more conscious and resolute involvement of the decision-making political sphere. In the United States, for example, a cascade of directives must be produced annually, starting with the general ones, signed by the President. Purpose of these

directives, at the various levels, is to confirm or, if necessary, change the short- and long-term planning, actually giving constructive dynamism and credibility to the development of the Armed Forces. The example and the comparison are perhaps too ambitious, but a real assumption of responsibility vis-à-vis the Nation and the Armed Forces - starting with the definition of the strategic role of the Country and concluding with the indispensable socio-economic measures in favour of the military personnel - is indispensable. It is barely the case to mention that, at the dawn of the 2000s, also the latter aspects must be included among the planning elements, at least as a negative condition - if not solved - or as a positive accelerator, in that man continues to be the most important and delicate component of the military system, toward which we should devote every possible attention and resource, since it can bring about success or failure for any planning.


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THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

THE ARMY'S INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

REPERCUSSIONS ON THE
POST-"CAPABILITY PACKAGES" FORCE PLANNING
AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES



by Sauro Baistrocchi *

THE REFERENCE PICTURE

With the end of the confrontation of the blocs, the concept of security - a term synonym of defence - has acquired wider and more general meanings.

Security has now assumed the character of global support, both direct and indirect, to the individual national societies and to the international community, within the existing Alliances and outside them. Security mirrors the risk which is called to offset. On the other hand, the risk, as it appears in today's reality and above all in the public perception, threatens every Country in the international community, with the reemergence of significant conflicts, the spread of organized crime, the clandestine mass-immigration, the growing contamination of the environment etc. Not infrequently, just one of these menacing expressions is sufficient to overcome the ability to react.

Risk is indivisible: it does not recognize national boundaries. Security, in its turn, is also indivisible: its efficient construction imposes the active collaboration of all the Countries concerned.

On the other hand, the geostrategic conditions for a preventive control - essentially remote - of the latent or actual conflicts have de facto come into being, together with the growing globalization of politics, economy, information and of certain social problems, perhaps just as a consequence of these factors.

Once the concept of *static* defence was overcome, a common policy of dynamic security took shape and substance, within the UN, NATO and the new-born European Union. This policy is essentially projected outside the national borders, to areas where, within a Nation or among Nations, situations of political, social or economic crisis break out or could occur. These events could lead to the escalation of the conflict and its



extension to neighbouring territories, affect the general interests of economic development and social progress or even violate international law or human rights, rousing international public opinion.

This security policy has an interdisciplinary and multidimensional character and involves complex and delicate problems of political, social and economic nature. Its politico-military component is based on the threefold strategy of enlargement of the alliances, deterrence and remote control of conflicts.

The just mentioned approach seems destined, at least from the military point of view, to take root and spread, and very probably will end up as the General Model for the Control of Conflicts in the Foreseeable Future.

The military instruments, which are the main actors of the triple strategy, tend to assume a mainly international dimension. As a matter of fact they are employed, more and more often, in international contexts - with objectives which, in any case, transcend the exclusive interests of their own countries - in training,

Exchange of information between an Officer of the Italian contingent and the crew of an Ukrainian APC.

administration and study activities.

In this framework, one can see the preconditions and conditions for the assumption of a central role by the Italian Army, within the scope of the outlined threefold strategy. This prospect - in part already realized de-facto, albeit not in a fully aware and systematic manner - represents a significant leap forward which, if on the one hand implies important conceptual repercussions for the Service, on the other presents opportunities which have not been completely explored yet.

It is just on these subjects, of primary interest for the development of force planning in the Italian Army, starting from the solid platform of the "Capability Packages", that this article is going to dwell, with the purpose of constructing - albeit with the support of a discussion necessarily limited to some significant aspects - a logical model of the international dimension of the Army, and of illustrating its possible operation, the preparations implied as well as the results it can



Bosnian citizens crossing one of the Checkpoints controlled by Italian troops.

case, is the responsibility of the Defence General Staff and the higher political Authorities.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE ARMY

The Army gives a substantial contribution in the supply of security, which is a primary public asset, not only by assuring, on emergencies, the defence of the sovereignty of the Italian territory and of the allied Nations, but also in situations that could be defined as "normal", as the present one, contributing, with the use of force if necessary, to the construction and maintenance of a reliable platform of stability and order at international level, upon which the economic and social growth of the whole community can be built.

Within this framework, the Army tends to become one of the

significant instruments of foreign policy, because its capabilities, even when expressed only potentially (credibility of intervention), permit both to influence directly the international events marked by strife and to contribute indirectly to the maintenance, and possibly to the restoration of the conditions for economic and social progress.

The Service, primary military instrument for the conduct of peace-support operations, has acquired, vis-à-vis the national and international public opinion, the International Institutions and many government bodies, a visibility and a value much wider and concrete compared to the Cold War years.

If in the past the Italian Army was a second-lead actor, engaged in a marginal sector, while the fate of the West was decided in the great Central European theatre, today having been a

potentially achieve.

The basic objective is to demonstrate that any future possible reorganization of the Service cannot but assume, as reference and bond, precisely the international role of the Army, the only role which can really qualify its employment and justify the financial efforts asked of the Nation for its upkeep and its reinforcement.

Before proceeding in the discussion, it is necessary to specify that many of the following arguments, although presented in an Army context, have a joint significance and should therefore be considered in the context of a line of military policy whose definition, in any

precursor of the modern strategy of peace-keeping in Somalia and Mozambique, our Army, expression of a Nation located at the centre of the great Balkan-Mediterranean area of instability, of immediate interest for Europe, is called upon to play the growing role of a potential protagonist in the new common security policy, asserting itself also as a main reference for the countries of the area which wish to join the Alliance or, more simply, to strengthen the military cooperation and the technical and training exchange with it.


The Army becomes an active and dynamic subject, capable of understanding and expressing the new times, and of guaranteeing - albeit on a reduced scale, at the moment - the reliability and support of the "Lead Nation". It turns into a real instrument of modern society, and society employs it. The Army pays for the investments it requires, with a useful product, which can be controlled through the concrete results of the tens of missions performed.

The international dimension of the instrument is therefore the basic prerequisite of the Army of today, and will be even more so in the future. Let's see, then, what is the concrete nature of this dimension, and along what directions it can be constructed and developed.

Fig.1 shows the logical connection between the global-security policy and the consequent politico-military strategy - which is the essential implementing component of the former -, the general objectives which qualify the strategy and the groups of activities oriented toward them, carried out at Service level.

The enlargement of the Alliances, deterrence and the remote control of conflicts are the general objectives of what we defined, just for this reason, triple politico-military strategy.

Within this strategy, the Army is called to carry out a wide




spectrum of activities, many completely new and others that are traditional in their names, but, we could say, revolutionary in their contents. Most of these activities have an international character. We can then put the latter together in logically coherent groups, functional to the achievement of the objectives of the politico-military strategy. In substance, these groups represent the characteristic activities of the Army's international dimension,

i.e. the forms through which this dimension expresses itself.

The characteristic activities are:

- integration of the Service in the military structures of the Alliances to which Italy belongs;
- bilateral and multilateral international cooperation, within "Partnership for Peace" and other similar initiatives, essentially oriented towards the Countries of the Balkan area and of the Mediterranean basin;
- establishment of permanent





Roadblock of the "Lagunari" Battalion in the Sarajevo area.

multinational Commands and Units;

- participation in multinational operations, particularly Peace-Support Operations (PSOs), which are the main and more visible form of military intervention of the new security policy.

The four characteristic activities listed above must be considered as a whole, since they are complementary, and they all synergically contribute to the results in terms of objectives, as schematically shown at Fig.2, where the structure of the Army's international dimension is represented.

The participation in the Alliance's integrated structures is functional both to deterrence and to the remote control of conflicts, because on the one hand it shows the interallied cohesion and on the other, mainly through the adoption

of common standards, is the prerequisite for the interoperability of the forces in case of employment. Moreover, it allows the Service - and this is very significant - to assume an important role, also from the visibility viewpoint, within the framework of the activities aimed at enlarging the Alliances.

Military cooperation not only contributes to the achievement of all the objectives, but is a flexible and precious instrument, especially during the initial phases of cooperation with the Armed Forces of other Countries.

The establishment of multinational formations is obviously the starting point of forces integration, also at the lower levels, and is therefore a good preparation for the enlargement of the Alliances, for the operations and - directly and indirectly - for deterrence.

The participation in PSOs is the most significant expression of the Army's international dimension, in that it permits the direct control of conflict situations where they tend to appear. The success in PSOs

depends on the results of the application of the other instruments and gives, owing to the experience and credibility gained, a substantial contribution to the objectives of deterrence and of enlargement of the Alliances.

Furthermore, the activities for the constitution of permanent multinational units and those related to military cooperation can accomplish, if appropriately oriented, a remarkable function from the politico-military point of view. For the participating Nations, they tend in fact to reproduce the gratifying feeling of belonging, typical of the members of the Alliance and, at any rate, they realize the prerequisites for the possible access or association of those Nations to the Alliance, contributing to the establishment of conditions of friendship, mutual confidence and collaboration, which are fundamental for the achievement of the common objectives, i.e. the extension and strengthening of the general security instrument and the coordinated development of the

international community.

On the techno-military plane, cooperation is closely connected with the constitution of multinational units as far as times and aims are concerned, since the latter is often the result of the former.

Repercussions on the conception and organization of the land instrument.

The Army's international dimension is therefore the reference point and the guiding criterion for the transformation of today's Service and the construction of the future one. From the study of this prevalent dimension, i.e., from the review of the characteristic activities to be carried out and the objectives to be achieved, it appears immediately clear that the Army now, much more than in the past, must be characterized by the high capabilities of its operational component.

In its essence, the Service's structure will have then to be established on three components, or basic capabilities, listed here in order of importance and priority of completion:

- an actual operational force, complete, capable of being projected outside the national territory, and sustainable also in long operations;
- an organization for the preparation, projection, support and control of the projected operational force;
- an organization in support of the political decisions and for the conduct of the activities aimed at developing the operational instrument as a whole.

This general scheme is worked out in detail in the "Capability Packages" project. The projectable operational force is known as "Italian Division for Europe" and should be completed in a few years.


Although the project is already in

the implementation phase, it seems that the Service is not completely and surely aware of the immutable fact that the components listed above are - in that order - the instrument's essential elements, necessary and sufficient to permit its effective employment and, therefore, the only ones capable of qualifying the Army's role. Moreover, it has to be understood that even the unconditional acceptance of these preconditions is not sufficient. The acceptance should be followed, at all levels, by an effective action, fast and resolute, based on specific priorities reflecting the actual employment requirements, resisting any possible influence alien to the operational and techno-military aspects of the problem.

An insufficient capability of the projectable operational component would deprive the entire Army of every functional meaning and confirm its social uselessness, with all the possible consequences, in terms of loss of credibility and even risk of disintegration. Any possible new model must therefore be built upon the basic project, that of the Operational Force. The organization for projection

("launching pad"), the support structure in operations and, finally the organization responsible for the development, must be adjusted to the Operational Force. It is possible, at this point, to have another look at the characteristic activities, and make some considerations on the most important spinoffs of each of them upon the Army.

The participation in the integrated Allied structures (NATO and WEU) must be suited, as far as concerns the selections of the positions to hold, the selection of personnel, as well as with reference to the contribution given to the Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces and Euroforces, to the role that the Nation and - on its behalf - the Service wants to play within those structures and to the initiatives that the Nation intends to take. Therefore, all the personnel employed should be in possession of adequate professional and job-oriented skills and, above all, at least the activities of the filled key-posts must be monitored and coordinated by the National Authorities, as well as directed, where appropriate, to the employment of the Forces, on the





A formation of AB 212s on a flight over Bosnian territory.

basis of a specific policy of participation in the Alliances. Only in this way it will be possible to uphold, within the interallied principles of unity and solidarity, the image of Italy and its line of action. Suffice it to think of the importance of the issues relevant to the enlargement of NATO, the reorganization of Commands and Forces, the engagement in Peace Support Operations. This will also give Italy the credibility and contractual capability which are indispensable not only at political level but also at the technological one, both for the normal cooperative relations and for the partnership in multinational missions.

Military cooperation (Fig.3) in this article refers essentially to the relations with the Armed Forces not integrated in the context of the Alliances of the Western World, i.e. belonging to Countries with which is even more important to establish and maintain firm and lasting bonds of friendship and collaboration. The preparation and development of the cooperation activities are aimed at promoting mutual

acquaintance and understanding, at making the most of the complementarity of the respective capabilities and potentialities (sectors of cooperation), and at the continuous search for concrete and feasible openings and objectives for the efforts made together.

Cooperation is achieved through the exchange of visits and training activities, as well as with combined exercises and the stipulation of agreements on technical cooperation.

The cooperation sectors where the so-called "framework Nation"(1) is generally called to give its more significant contributions, are those relevant to operational and logistic procedures, organization of Commands and forces, doctrine and specialistic techniques. The "partner Nation"(2), instead, often offers excellent opportunities as regards the employment of training areas and firing ranges, the examination of particular natural and operational environments, the possibility to experiment procedures and equipment, the knowledge and use of atypical techniques.

Obviously, for the Army, it is

expedient to employ, in the cooperation activities, the intermediate and Brigade Headquarters, as well as the Regiments of the Projection and Reaction Packages. As a matter of fact, they have the specific know-how for the conduct of those activities and, at the same time are in a position to make the best use of their spin-off. The employment in cooperation should be programmed by modules (staff teams and ad-hoc companies), taken by turns from the Headquarters and Regiments, taking into account their training level and possible operational engagements.

The third characteristic activity, aimed at reaching the objectives of the triple security-strategy is the constitution of multinational units.

While vis-à-vis the past well-known threat and employment sector it was possible to structure the forces into formations, preconstituted and pretrained for a particular task, today the forces, i.e. the operational capabilities, although grouped together in standard formations at their garrisons for administrative and disciplinary reasons, can be appropriately assembled just at the moment, or on the basis of the need (force generation), according to the task force principle. Each participating Nation forms its own contingent. The national contingents are then put together, giving shape to the multinational intervention-force and its components.

The need to operate according to the task force principle entails that the units be organized into elementary modular structures, which can easily be put together to form complex structures, in both the national and international contexts.

Furthermore, the organization

into task forces and the modular nature of the components ensure the necessary flexibility in case of reorganization of the instrument during the operations, and facilitate the rotation of the forces in the Theatre in case of long engagements.

It is evident that the difficulties that exist in organizing and combining any task force become more serious when the force is multinational or joint as is almost always the case today. These difficulties are essentially problems concerning command and control as well as mutual support.

In this respect, it is useful to make a distinction between the units created ex-novo, on a contingency, by the participating Nations, and the so-called permanent ones, constituted beforehand on multinational planning staffs and on-call pools of forces, as implementation of a General Agreement and a concept of employment.

Obviously this formula, since it provides a well-tested planning and training platform, should permit to overcome more easily the problem of internal cohesion and unity of intents in operations vis-à-vis the external environment. In fact, the constitution of permanent multinational units has become highly important especially from the politico-military viewpoint, since it represents an excellent formula of "partial integration" of the partner Nations. On the techno-military plane, it allows to develop mutual interoperability relations, but is certainly not, at least in general, an adequate promptly available solution. As a matter of fact, it is unlikely that, at the moment of the operational requirement, the preconstituted intervention unit could represent the political position of the Nations concerned in relation to the specific crisis.

Although it is necessary to keep in mind this critical aspect, permanent units remain an

indispensable instrument, not only for their political spin-off, but also because, in any case, the results they can produce on the plane of confidence and of bilateral and multilateral interoperability can be really remarkable.

The multiplication of the initiatives in this sector gives a clear indication of its importance. At the present time, the Italian Army participates in the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), is an observer in the Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), to be constituted in the near future and has promoted the Multinational Land Force (MLF) initiative: all of them are Brigade-level permanent multinational formations, earmarked for employment in Peace Support Operations.

In substance, the organization model of the multinational formations is based on the application at all levels of the framework-Nation concept, to

complement the task force principle, in order to offset its intrinsic shortcomings. This concept envisages the realization by a participating Nation (lead Nation) of a "uninational carrying structure", in which other Nations' contingents can be inserted.

These carrying structures, in fact, are capable of ensuring a good command-and-control cohesion to the multinational force and, at the same time, they provide a unitarian and effective support organization.

The framework Nation gives an efficient interface of interoperability to the partner Nations. Essentially, it consists - as shown at Fig.4 - of a standard NATO/WEU English-language package, which deals with doctrine, procedures, performance standards for the forces, in the command / control / communications / computers structures, as well as the information (C4Info) necessary for sustaining the package and the general organization of the logistic support system, as well as for other





Fig. 4



A soldier of the Italian contingent on surveillance duty.

possible back-up elements. The approach based on the performance standards goes beyond the not very realistic concept of forces and materials standardization and aims at the more concrete objective of obtaining the standardization of the forces' performance, pursuing the coherence and synergy of the results achieved by employing the units for the higher Command concerned.

As shown by the chart (Fig.4), the interface can be realized at all organization levels also within the Unit. Obviously, the framework subject must be at least one level higher than the partner-subjects (framework-Division, partner-Brigade; framework-Brigade, partner-Regiment/Battalion, etc).

About the fourth characteristic activity, participation in PSOs, we can say that this is the product of the synthesis of cooperation and constitution of multinational formations. Taking for granted that the force generation process must be organized each time on the basis of the mission assigned and of the participating Nations, the experience gained by working together with each Country, and the capability of providing the

abovementioned interoperability interface, should allow the Army to assume the functions of techno-operational framework, and therefore to play a specific role of multinational aggregation.

Evidently the third and the fourth characteristic activities have the strongest influence on the organization of the Army Commands and Units of the Projection and reaction Packages. These Packages, in fact, must be able to operate according to the task-force and framework-Nation principles, ensuring also the interoperability interface to the partner contingents.

In substance, Commands and units should have a modular structure, in order to permit an easy multinationalization in exercises and operations. The preparation and training activities, including those carried out nationally, must be conducted in English, adjusted to the international dimension of the Command/unit (preparation of operation plans and SoPs, control and development of operational capabilities, etc.), and in particular, must aim at realizing and constantly updating the

interoperability interface typical of the level considered vis-à-vis the possible partner Nations.

The exclusively national responsibilities should instead be assigned to an ad-hoc agency of the Headquarters, and should operate also at the garrison, in the same manner of the National Support Element (NSE).

Let's see an example of a task force-framework model for a Division level formation.

The Nation, or rather the nation's Service, which assumes the leading role in the constitution of the combined formation, supplies:

- the interface of interoperability;
- the command and control organization of the Major Unit, predisposed for multinational completion of the staff;
- the division-level C4I system;
- Brigade task forces, also organized according to the framework concept;
- a coherent system of tactical support, predisposed for completion;
- the carrying structure of logistics, predisposed for multinational completion, which is essentially the role of the lead Nation in the logistic sector.

In their turn, the partner Nations supply:

- specific staff elements;
- a Brigade task force module;
- possible tactical-support modules at Division level;
- a logistic-support module.

As we said, the structure can be repeated at Brigade and Regiment level, also within the same divisional formation.

THE EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES

The scheme at Fig.5 shows the four characteristic activities organized in a system. One can clearly see the correlations

between the activities and the different phases of the process through which what we defined as the Army's international dimension is realized.

The process starts with the conscious and active integration of the Service in the Alliances (this objective has been only partially achieved). NATO and WEU are, as a matter of fact, the only military organizations capable of giving effective answers to the problems of deterrence and remote control of conflict situations, and at the same time the reference points for the enlargement of the Alliances or, at least, for the adoption of adequate interoperability standards in the doctrinal and procedural sectors, in view of the employment of multinational units in operations.

The second phase is military cooperation, which aims at establishing politico-technical relations with the various partners, on the basis of a specific strategy of engagement and participation in support of international security and stability.

Cooperation creates the conditions for the realization of closer ties more directly oriented towards the employment of the forces through the constitution of coherent and solid multinational formations.

It is important to note here that the transition from cooperation to the constitution of common forces is made possible by the implementation of the interoperability interface.

The verification of the results achieved, and in particular, of the functioning of the interface, is carried out through specific exercises.

While, obviously, the deterrent effect remains implicit, the explicit output of the model in support of the triple strategy lies in the PSOs and in the association/integration of the partners within the Alliances. But we should consider that even the achievement of an intermediate stage, corresponding to the




Fig. 5

constitution of multinational formations or to simple cooperation can be a satisfactory result when the partner Nation does not (or not yet) qualify for admission to the integration or, politically, does not intend to go that far.

In conclusion, a systematic commitment of the Army to the realization of the international dimension described in this article, - a commitment, imposed by the times, anyway - would give a direct impulse to the political, social and economic growth of the Nation on the international scene, and reduce the risks connected with worrying and potentially disruptive phenomena, such as mass immigration or the spread of extremist Islamism.

In this perspective the Army, following the directions of the triple security-strategy, would:

- remain a producer of credible forces for deterrence;
- build, through military cooperation and the constitution of multinational formations, the prerequisites for a careful enlargement of the Alliances;

- assure, on the front of remote-control of conflict situations, the capability of expressing, at short notice, real operational skill and, if necessary, combat capabilities.

These general functions would be suited to a more participating role of Italy in the decisions taken in the international arena, with the awareness, however, that the assumption of such a role in the military sector can only be the result of ideas and forces, credible for their quantity and quality, as well as of the realization of a specific and innovative capability of aggregation in a multinational environment.

□

*Lieutenant Colonel,
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NOTES:

(1) The "framework Nation" is integrated in the Alliance.

(2) The "partner Nation" is not integrated in the Alliance.



by Manlio Silvestri*

INFORMATION WARFARE

The need of timely information and the risk of intrusions in the net as well as the manipulation of data by potential adversaries, have accelerated the studies on "Information Warfare" (IW), which until a short time ago was considered a kind of specialization of those in charge of the Command, Control and Communications sector.

This is why the term "Warfare" has been replaced by "Operations", to stress its political and operational content.

The technological sophistication in the sector of the information systems has highlighted the ineluctable need of looking over the traditional methodological approach to military operations, or even the necessity of reviewing it completely. This concerns both traditional conflicts and Peace

Support Operations.

"He who knows his enemy better, is also better prepared to face a war", Sum Tzu used to say, and no one could object to this self-evident axiom: yesterday, just like today, the knowledge of the criteria according to which the enemy uses information supplies the main key to the strongbox of success.

Therefore, it becomes extremely important to "understand and seize" the employment secrets of the enemy's information systems, communication nets, databases and especially of the modal architecture of the information nets.

A long experience in "Information Warfare" or rather - Information Operations" (IOs), as they are called today within NATO, would seem to favour the Nations who master it, compared to those with a lesser experience in this field. On the other hand, a doubt is understandable: is it "war"? Are these really new-conception operations?

Alvin and Heidi Toffler, in their book "War and Anti-War", published in the US in 1993, predicted that the technological progress realized in the sector of the information systems would lead to a radical social transformation, i.e. a transition from industrial society to information society. The repercussions of this concept on



the American military sphere, have "de-facto" augmented the importance of the "Information Operations", which will sensibly change the conceptual future of military operations.

This is so true, that a special IO office has been established at the Pentagon.

But what does it mean to have "competence" in IOs? Essentially, it means to grasp and know all details of the information architecture, striving to discover its nature and its expressions, in order to operate subsequently according to a global methodology, i.e. without a limited vision, restricted to some portions of the architecture. This is a difficult task, because many tend to exhibit a great expertise in this sector, while their experience is limited to just one of the many mechanisms of the complex information architecture. To stop at particular and fragmentary aspects, tackling the problem from just one perspective, calls to mind the famous metaphor of the blind man who tries to figure out the vast reality of an elephant by feeling a part of it: if he touches a leg, he will believe to be in front of a tree, and feeling the tail he will be convinced that he is holding a rope. But he will be able to understand the whole reality only after having recomposed the whole mosaic.

Similarly, stopping at the analysis of the EW activities or at the C2 aspects, in order to define and justify IOs, corresponds to tackling the problem in a very incomplete and partial manner, just as in the elephant's metaphor.

This is proved by the fact, underlined by Rino Simeone in an article on "Informazioni della Difesa" of 1997, that up to a few years ago the IO concept was mistaken for that of "Command and Control Warfare" (C2W), which produced limited and incomplete definitions.

Before running through the elements of the IO activities, it could be useful to point out the US attempt to enunciate a definition,

considered "too general and wide" by M.Libicki of the "National Defence University" who, in a recent essay, recalled the confusion created on this subject in the mind of many Americans: "Information Warfare, the systematic challenges at strategic, operational and tactical level, issued - through the spectrum of peace, crisis, escalation, war, war conclusion and peace consolidation /restoration - by conflicting parties, adversaries

Right.

"Centauro" armoured car on patrol during the IFOR mission in Bosnia.

Below.

Patrolling NCO keeping in touch with his base on a two-way radio.



or enemies, using the information means to reach their objectives".

As a matter of fact, this enunciation did not say anything new; in other words, it was like saying that the information war is justified by the will to convince everybody of the greater correctness of one's own perception of the conflict as compared with the adversary's. An abstract, general,

incomplete definition, deprived of clearly attributable responsibilities. And since an ambiguous division of responsibility confuse and slackens the methodological study of any problem (another self-evident concept), it is necessary to deal with each aspect of IOs individually, in order to try, to suggest a more appropriate definition and, as we said before, to finally manage the



question in a global manner.

THE PILLARS OF THE "INFORMATION OPERATIONS"

Although the word "joint" is pronounced more and more often, the tasks and the actions of the joint staff are still obscure to many. In this staff, the Command and control activity is clearly entrusted to J-3, while the planning responsibility and the study of the measures for the security and protection of the C2 systems is usually assigned to J-6. Also, while the different forms of information gathering, intelligence and surveillance belong to J-2, which often operates in coordination with J-9 in PSOs, the continuous developments in the information architecture attribute a great importance to J-5.

Martin Libicki, in his study on the IOs, went along this type of approach, looking through seven

different and complementary sectors of information warfare, which are worth analyzing because they offer a linear and rather complete vision of the problem. Mostly, these activities are well known, since they are the subjects of continuous research and development, while others have not yet been probed into:

- Command and Control warfare;
- intelligence operations;
- electronic warfare;
- psychological operations;
- information piracy;
- information warfare within the economy;
- cybernetic warfare.

The first activity has the objective of cutting off the enemy Command structure from the body of forces subordinate to it. This operation is as old as military history, and can be carried out directly on the Command Post - as was done, for instance, with the attempts to hit Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War or Aidid in Somalia - or

indirectly, by cutting the communication lines, as was done against Baghdad's communication centres.

The pros and cons of this actions can be easily deduced considering the type of hierarchical structure attacked: if it's rigid, the effects of the elimination of the command group will be positive, but if the subordinate forces are able to act autonomously - as was the case, for example, in the Vietnam war - there will be lesser damages or even counterproductive results.

C2 warfare, whose validity is recognized, cannot, and should not, be considered a good substitute for the entire and more complex IO activity.

On the other hand, with the present technologic escalation, the recent developments of the "counter-C2" activities - and their effects - show rather interesting possibilities. On the contrary, while the "modus operandi" of the information systems (that could banally be described as a simple exercise of transformation of bits into information) could be controlled rather easily, the knowledge of the uncontrollable decision-making style of each Commander can remarkably alter and influence the conception, organization and execution of any operational activity.

The detectable behavioural methodology, in fact, offers extremely dissimilar examples:

from the simple application of personal intuition to the information coming from the subordinate commands;

to the employment of a group of analysts, who examine "raw" data comparing them with the real situation and then make a selection;

to the direct and personal analysis of the flood of information, correlated only to the "interpretative suggestions" of the analysts.

Evidently, with so many different decisional approaches, there are considerable variations in the



*Antitank TOW system on M-113
armoured personnel carrier.*

effects of "counter C2" activities against enemy Commands.

The operations based on Intelligence, which is the second aspect of IOs, can be better understood if one examines the traditional objectives of the intelligence itself. Normally the Commander (tactical/operational level) employs intelligence in order to know locations, attitudes and intentions of the enemy, to avoid surprises and to plan the operations in an adequate manner. One could say that a "good" intelligence permits a good coordination of the operations, while a "superior" intelligence affords a better and more coherent level of synchronization.

The results of a good intelligence work can be seen during the operations, when one of the parties has understood its mission and is prepared to implement it, while the other struggles in confusion, uncertainty and poor knowledge of the situation.

Nevertheless, besides these already well known aspects, the technological progress in the sector of the information systems provides a deeper and more immediate awareness of the situation, and adds "management" intelligence to the "preparatory" intelligence of the operational environment. The proliferation of sensors, capable of collecting information data with

higher precision and speed, as well as the possibility of processing information very rapidly and broadcast it in real time, for immediate employment decisions, favour the qualitative and quantitative increase of the intelligence flow, widening their offensive and defensive capabilities.

Summing up these two first IO components, we can say that C2 warfare dominates the scene when an attack is conducted "on" the systems, while the activities based on intelligence are typical of an attack conducted "by" the systems.

A third and important component, once considered an element by itself, and now linked to the other two, is "Electronic Warfare" (EW), which is sometimes described as the sum of the IOs operational combat-techniques. A large portion of EW includes the radioelectronic environment, where the antiradar and anticommunications technologies have made enormous steps forward, making vulnerable certain transmission systems which used to be considered unassailable.

The other sector, the cryptographic one, operates between "bits" and "bytes" and, although the initial successful computerized decoding attempts seemed to pension off the cryptic techniques, today the combination of advanced technologies like tri-digital cryptography, is creating serious

difficulties for those who operate in that particular sector.

The fourth pillar of the IOs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), has certainly played an important role in the history of all conflicts and, unlike the other components, directs its information against the human mind rather than against the technology of the systems.

A categorization of PSYOPS, quoted by M. Libicki, sees in the first place the operations against a country's public opinion carried out through the media. The CNN syndrome and its implications have emphasized the great capacity of the media in manipulating information, showing how relatively simple it is to drive public opinion in the desired direction.

If, instead, the employment of the media is directed against the enemy forces (or the different factions, in case of PSOs), psychological success is also achieved.

A clear example is the Gulf War, where the certainty of dying in case of combat against the coalition, or the promise of safety in case of surrender, presented by messages, leaflets of other propagative means produced the well-known positive results.

The third PSYOPS category includes psychological activities directed towards a single Commander, in order to confuse and disconcert him. These operations are much more complicate, because they concern, besides the rational sphere, also the emotional one. In this sense, one would think that, for a Commander, it would be enough to transcend his emotions, but it is a well-known fact that decisions, besides being suggested by reason, stem sometimes from events that - according to the Commander's instinct - are bound to occur. It is then very difficult to reorganize

ideas and change the decisions taken as soon as the occurrences display a reality different from what was emotionally expected.

These attempts at "destabilizing" the enemy Commander's forecasts belong to the third category of PSYOPS and are of particular importance within IOs, even if their practical implementation is more difficult today, on account of the present technologic sophistication of the information process, as compared to past shortcomings (e.g. defects in cryptography) which made easier to confuse the enemy Commander (perhaps with a false message, delivered "by mistake").

The last category of PSYOPS is "cultural warfare", i.e. the invasion of a Country through the slow and relentless introduction of customs and uses foreign to that culture. It is an important element of IOs, but cannot be ascribed to the tactical/operational level. Nevertheless, within Peace Support Operations, the pacific invasion by military and civilian peacekeepers from non-governmental organizations, doubtlessly helps to influence the local behaviour and




customs and this, in the long run, affects the public opinion of the whole Country.

Another supporting pillar, which is certainly in the vanguard of IOs is certainly information piracy which, contrary to what is generally imagined (thanks to recent science-fiction movies) concerns more the civilian than the military environment, since the latter - for simple reasons of separation from the outside world - can be more easily protected. However, the fact that the access is precluded to

outsiders should not induce to lower the guard, because the non-compliance with the rules of employment and security of the military information systems could bring about an even involuntary "internal piracy". Suffice it to think how many times - because of the distraction of an inexperienced officer or NCO, acting as PC - hours of office work have vanished into thin air because the wrong key was pressed, or how much time has been spent in clearing from viruses the computers located in barracks, because non-permitted games had been inserted by the young conscripts. At the moment, these banal examples of intentional or unintentional mini-piracy are not a big problem, nor can be classified as an important IO category; nevertheless, the growing need of links with the external information world could bring about low-cost piracy initiatives that could affect the element of C2 warfare mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

The penultimate pillar of IOs is the one concerning the information war within the economic sphere, which includes



Rangers during a simulated infiltration into enemy territory.



Medium-range mobile radio-relay system.

"blocking the information flow" and "economic imperialism"; in the former category we include the interruption of the flow relevant to economic information using various means, and as regards the latter we want to recall what we said before about the "cultural war", with particular reference to the economic aspect.

As a matter of fact, it is objectively accepted that the economic world is engaged in a permanent war, so that to talk about "war" only in the military meaning of the world, appears rather inappropriate. It is more correct to say that the implications in the military sector concern the strategic level, i.e. the moment when the international market of

the Country, or area, of intervention suffers traumatic changes that could heavily affect the military operations.

Finally, cybernetic warfare, the last pillar of IOs, is perhaps the most nebulous and difficult to analyze, since it contains almost all IO aspects examined so far, projecting them into the forthcoming technology of the informatics, communications and information sectors. We shall have to wait for the foreseeable tremendous development of the information structures; only then we will be able to define risks and advantages of this type of war (to try to approach it with a study conducted today would be comparable to the hypotheses that

Napoleon could have made in considering the employment of modern tanks).

Nevertheless, an analysis of the possible risks of cybernetic warfare leads to its division into four categories: information terrorism, semantic attack, conflict simulation and space-virtual warfare.

In informative terrorism the acquisition/manipulation of data takes place in a direct and recognizable way, endangering the security, the privacy or somehow the work of those "attacked" by this particular kind of terrorists. The semantic attack (unlike information piracy, which causes systematic errors) works in such a way that the information and/or data received appear to be correct while they are completely wrong with the consequences that can be easily imagined.

Conflict simulation is a topical subject for many Countries, which derive substantial economic savings from this type of warfare, since they don't have to employ "materials and troops on the field". Showing to the enemy - through the results of simulation - that one is sure of winning in case of a real conflict, becomes a deterrent which, in a sense, is as effective as the procurement of new armaments. Anyway the variable (besides, of course, the human one) is still the different perception or awareness of the characteristics of the various systems that each opponent attributes to the other or has at his disposal. Finally, spatial-virtual warfare - which, at the moment, is still almost science fiction - is fought in a world which is as impalpable and surreal as is intensely frequented by a large section of the world's population. An offspring of INTERNET or similar systems, this new

M-113 armoured personnel carrier armed with TOW antitank system.

aggregate can be defined as a parallel world where the inhabitants live in a virtual reality, fighting with bits, with the risk - only potential at the moment - of creating serious troubles for national security.

CONCLUSIONS

The classification of the IOs, described above, might seem more complex than it really is, and could hinder the necessary action of investigation and revision of the methodological approach to these operations.

But, taking this wide classification back to a not so much sci-fi scenario, one can see that the real pillars of IOs - those closer to the present conflict reality, and therefore more easily analyzed and managed - are after all only three or four even if they are closely connected: C2 warfare, electronic warfare, intelligence operations and PSYOPS. All the other forms discussed in the preceding paragraphs could be, even if by

default, included within the three/four main categories (space), or, as is the case for space-virtual warfare, not considered, at least for the moment.

Having examined the main forms of IOs, and understood their nature, manifestations and capabilities - which this article does not claim to have done thoroughly - it will be possible to realize a defensive methodology or (according to the results to be achieved) more aggressive

operations, in order to face the everincreasing technological - and consequently behavioural - transformations of the enemy.

The solutions to be found, and the ensuing activities, can be globally described as follows:

- C2-EW: research, development and application of technologies, always abreast of the times, in order to update the anti-radar, digital, cryptographic and informatic anti-intrusion systems, as well as communications as a whole;
- intelligence sector: improvement of the systems installed in order to search, gather, analyze and spread information;
- PSYOPS: study of new techniques and their timely-planned ad-hoc application, training of specialized personnel.

In order to complete what Libicki, Simeone, Toffler and others have written on this subject; we must add, finally, that IOs are not considered by NATO as a new type of special operations, but rather as a whole of activities carried out in order to contribute to the decision-making



"Alpini" on patrol over snowy terrain.



Left.
Command Post on M-113 APC.

Below.
Artillery specialist computing topographic data.

process, in support of the politico-military objectives, using and protecting their own information systems and affecting the enemy's (this definition is undergoing further study by NATO working groups).

From this proposition it is easy to understand that *nihil sub sole novi* and, more simply, that the recent international operations in support of peace and the impressive technological evolution have emphasized the need of thorough studies on the issue of management and vulnerability of the information flow, including in the IO mentality (and doctrine) which is just coming into being, the already existing disciplines which, as we have already pointed out, carry out closely interconnected activities. Anyway, it seems inappropriate to attribute to IOs a purely military character: in case, it would be more correct to define them as a pursuit of greater integration - within the decision-making system - of military strategy with the process of political consultations.

Now it will be the NATO experts' task to organize the complex doctrinal sector - also in view of the entrance of new allies - to establish an intelligible definition

of IOs, a clear political line and a precise procedural methodology aimed at achieving the goal that the member Nations have always pursued, i.e. the effective peacetime application of a policy capable of avoiding the Alliance's military interventions.



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
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SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN



Au nom de l'Islam, par Maurizio Coccia (p. 2).

L'Occident regarde la millénaire histoire de l'Islam comme un bloc monolithique avant-coureur de menaces et de malheur. Ce n'est pas comme ça. Il est une réalité bigarrée pour ce qui concerne l'idéologie politique et, surtout, l'inspiration religieuse. Dans cet article on analyse les plusieurs aspects d'une philosophie de vie qui, de la côte atlantique de l'Afrique jusqu'à l'Indonésie, a donné lieu pour des siècles à un complexe contentieux politique, social, religieux et militaire.

La force de dissuasion nucléaire de l'Europe, par Maurizio Boni (p. 12).

L'Europe s'interroge sur la possibilité de réaliser un arsenal nucléaire commun fondé sur les armes possédées par la Grande Bretagne et la France. L'idée, lancée il y a des années par les français, a trouvé peu de consentements outre-Manche, où le lien avec les États-Unis est fortement consolidé. La vue d'ensemble que l'Auteur fait sur les armes nucléaires possédées par les deux Pays, enrichie d'argumentées considérations sur les réflexions internationales et sur les limites d'une possible «force de dissuasion européenne», permet une claire vision de ce délicat problème.

Polonie. Entrevue au Général d'Armée Henryk Szumski, par Enrico Magnani (p. 24).

On a désormais terminer de préparer le nouveau «Wojsko Polskie», l'État Major Interforce que préparera les Forces Armées polonaises pour l'entrée dans l'OTAN. Il est déjà dans une phase avancée la disposition ordinaire que divise les forces opérationnelles de celles du territoire, en prévoient une forte réduction des soldats effectifs de 400 000 à 180 000 unités. Des détachements polonais ont, cependant, déjà participé, à côté des occidentales, à des missions de l'ONU et de l'OTAN avec plus de 30 000 soldats, tandis

qu'on est en train de constituer le Corps Multinational Nord-Est avec des allemands et des danois. En étant un nombre en plein titre de l'Alliance Atlantique, la Pologne se propose de jouer un rôle de plus en plus important pour la sauvegarde de la stabilité et de la paix.

Turquie. La nouvelle Armée. Entrevue à Hüseyin Kivrikoglu, par Enrico Magnani (p. 34).

La Turquie est placée au centre d'un triangle de forte instabilité: les Balcons, la Caucase et l'Asie Occidentale. A cause de cette situation, l'Armée de Terre de la Turquie joue un rôle vraiment très important à l'intérieur de l'Alliance Atlantique aux fins de la sauvegarde de la sûreté et de la paix. En partant de cette préambule, l'interviewé donne une série d'informations sur la configuration ordonnatrice, d'instruction et opérationnelle de l'instrument terrestre, en soulignent les efforts qu'on est en train de faire dans le secteur de la modernisation des moyens et des matériaux et de la requalification des Cadres et de la troupe (constituée essentiellement par des soldats qui sont en train de faire leur service, de la durée de 18 mois), et n'en manquent pas de souligner la grande vocation de l'Armée de Terre de la Turquie de participer activement aux opérations de support à la paix.

Le Kosovo, par Giuseppe Caforio et Adam Copani (p. 40).

Analysée la géographie politique du Kosovo (deux millions d'habitants dont le 90% est d'ethnie albanaise), cet article donne des nouvelles historiques de la région et, après ça, parle des derniers événements, de l'autoproclamation de la République jusqu'aux récentes manifestations de violence. Les Auteurs ne prennent pas une position. Ils se limitent à souhaiter qu'on soit capable de trouver une solution grâce à laquelle sera possible d'assurer au Kosovo un régime d'autonomie au niveau culturel et linguistique, de la même façon de ce qu'on a réalisé en Alto Adige en Italie.

Un nouveau ordre international. Globalisation et sociétés multiethniques, par Ornella Rota (p. 48).

Des sociétés multiethniques et

multiculturelles sont en train de s'affirmer un peu partout dans un planète dirigé vers une globalisation économique et sociale. De ça dérivent des problèmes de très grande portée concernant la sûreté et la paix. Cet article comprend aussi plusieurs fortes témoignages dignes de foi de représentants de deux grandes Nations, qui sont l'expression la plus grande de la société multiraciale: les Ambassadeurs des États-Unis et de l'Inde.

La planification opérationnelle, par Pier Paolo Lunelli (p. 54).


Cet article, à conclusion de l'étude «Lines of operations»: examine les nouvelles lignes de la doctrine de l'OTAN dans le contexte des opérations du soutien à la paix; il illustre le processus de planification de campagne à l'intérieur des Pays alliés, il propose aussi une modification du méthode utilisé en Italie pendant les Années '60 (SMD-104), en considérant les récentes expériences en Bosnie-Hérzégovine et en Albanie.

Planifier demain, par Claudio Graziano (p. 76).

Ce travail analyse les difficultés qu'ont historiquement accompagnées l'effort des planificateurs militaires dans les plusieurs et tourmentées entreprises de réorganisation de la Force Armée. Il décrit, depuis, les changement de panoramas politiques et stratégiques, en mettent l'accent sur la nouvelle idée de sûreté qu'aujourd'hui est entendue au niveau global et rapportée à des risques multiformes et diversifiés. L'article expose, enfin, la nécessité, pour les Forces Armées, d'élaborer un «plan de développement» par optimiser ultérieurement le secteur de la planification, définir plus complètement le rôle stratégique de notre Pays et lancer des mesures sociales et économiques en faveur du personnel, en ayant la conscience que l'homme reste la composante plus importante et délicate du système de la Défense, sans laquelle même la meilleure planification possible risque un sûr faillite.

La dimension internationale de l'Armée de Terre, par Sauro Baistrocchi (p. 86).

Dans ces derniers temps, à cause du changement du cadre stratégique



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international, la nouvelle idée de «politique commune de sûreté dynamique» a fait beaucoup de chemin. Quels sont les réflexions d'organisation et de structure pour l'Armée de Terre italienne? L'Auteur en illustre les aspects principales: la nouvelle dimension internationale; la participation aux structures intégrées alliées; la coopération militaire avec des Pays que ne font pas partie des alliances occidentales; la constitution de Commandements et d'Unités multinationales à caractère permanents; la participation aux opérations de support à la paix (PSO).

La guerre des informations, par Manlio Silvestri (p. 96).

Les «Information Operations» (IO) sont un ensemble d'activités en faveur du processus de décision et à soutien des objectifs politiques et militaires. Les «IO» sont articulées en sept différents secteurs: Commandement et Contrôle; «intelligence»; guerre électronique; opérations psychologiques; piraterie des informations; guerre économique; guerre de la cybernétique. Ce dernier type de guerre, la plus difficile, car elle est projetée vers le futur, peut être subdivisée en quatre catégories: terrorisme informatique; attaque sémantique; simulation des conflits; guerre espace-virtuelle. La croissante sophistication des systèmes d'information impose une radicale revision du traditionnel approche aux opérations militaires. L'OTAN marche en cette direction.



Im namen des Islam, von Maurizio COCCIA (s. 2).

Der Islam in seiner tausendjährigen Geschichte wird vom Abendland als ein drohender und Unglück bringender Bote gesehen. So liegen die Dinge jedoch nicht. Die islamische Welt ist

nach ihrer politischen Ideologie, und vor allem nach ihrer religiösen Inspiration vielfältig. In dem Aufsatz werden die unterschiedlichen Aspekte einer Lebensphilosophie beleuchtet, die über Jahrhunderte von der Atlantikküste Afrikas bis nach Indonesien um die politische, soziale, religiöse und militärische Vorherrschaft im weitesten Sinne gekämpft hat.

Die europäische Nuklearabschreckung, von Maurizio Boni (s. 12).

Europa fragt sich nach der Möglichkeit, ein auf den Waffen von Großbritannien und Frankreich beruhendes gemeinsames Nukleararsenal zu verwirklichen. Die Idee, die vor einigen Jahren von den Franzosen lanciert wurde, hat jenseits des Ärmelkanals, wo die Bindung an die USA traditionell stark und konsolidiert ist, wenig Zustimmung erfahren. Der Überblick, den der Autor über die Nuklearwaffen im Besitz der beiden Länder bietet, schafft eine klare Einsicht in die delicate Problematik, zumal sie eingebettet ist in ausgewogene Überlegungen über die internationalen Auswirkungen und über die Grenzen einer eventuellen «Europäischen Abschreckung».

Polen. Die neuen Streitkräfte. Interview mit Armeegeneral Henryk Szumski, geführt von Enrico Magnani (s. 24).

Inzwischen ist der neue «Wojsko Polskie» geschaffen worden; ein integrierter Stab, der die polnischen Streitkräfte auf den NATO-Eintritt vorbereiten wird. Bereits weit fortgeschritten ist die Neuordnung, die die operativen Streitkräfte von den Territorialstreitkräften absetzt, wobei die Mannstärke von 400.000 drastisch auf 180.000 reduziert wird. Polnische haben inzwischen schon Seite an Seite mit westlichen Einheiten an UNO- und NATO-Missionen mit mehr als 30.000 Soldaten teilgenommen, während das multinationale Nordostkorps zusammen mit Deutschen und Dänen im Begriff steht, aufgestellt zu werden. Als Vollmitglied der Atlantischen Allianz hat Polen vor, eine immer wichtigere Rolle zum Schutz der Stabilität und des Friedens einzunehmen.

Türkei. Das neue Heer. Interview mit Hüseyin Kivrikoglu, von Enrico Magnani (s. 34).

Die Türkei liegt in der Mitte eines Dreiecks starker Instabilität: Balkan, Kaukasus und Vorderem Orient. Daraus folgt eine Hauptrolle der türkischen Streitkräfte im Rahmen der atlantischen Allianz, zum Schutz von Sicherheit und Frieden.

Von dieser Prämisse ausgehend, liefert der türkische Heeresstabschef eine Reihe von Informationen über die Gliederung, Ausbildung und die operative Konfiguration des türkischen Heeres, wobei er die laufende Modernisierung von Fahrzeugen und Material betont, ebenso wie die Weiterbildung des Führungspersonals und der Truppe, die hauptsächlich aus Wehrpflichtigen, die einer achtzehnmonatigen Wehrpflicht unterliegen, besteht. Er unterstreicht ferner die Bereitschaft und Berufung des türkischen Heeres zur aktiven Teilnahme bei friedensunterstützenden Maßnahmen.

Der Kosowo, von Giuseppe Caforio und Adam Copani (s. 40).


Nachdem die politische Geographie des Kosowo (zwei Millionen Einwohner, davon 90% ethnische Albaner) beschrieben wird, bringt der Aufsatz einen historischen Abriss der Region, um dann die jüngsten Ereignisse zu illustrieren, von der Autoproklamation der Republik bis zu den gewaltsamen Ausschreitungen.

Die Autoren beziehen nicht direkt Stellung, sondern beschränken sich darauf, den Wunsch zu äußern, daß sich eine Lösung finden möge, die dem Kosowo eine Eigenständigkeit auf kulturellem und sprachlichem Gebiet sichert, wie sie in Südtirol verwirklicht worden ist.

Eine neuen Weltordnung. Globalisierung und multiethnische Gesellschaften, von Ornella Rota (s. 48).

Überall auf unserem Planeten, der auf dem Wege einer ökonomischen und sozialen Globalisierung ist, entstehen pluriethnische und multikulturelle Gesellschaften. Daraus leitet sich eine Problematik erheblichen Ausmaßes ab, die den Themenbereich Sicherheit und Frieden betreffen.

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Den Artikel bereichern aussagekräftige Zeugnisse von hochstehenden Repräsentanten zweier großer Nationen, die selbst Inbegriff multirassischer Gesellschaften sind: es sind die Botschafter der Vereinigten Staaten und Indiens.

Operative Planung, von Pier Paolo Lunelli (s. 54).

Der Artikel bildet den Abschluß der Studie «Lines of Operation» und untersucht die neuen Richtlinien einer NATO-Doktrin im Zusammenhang mit friedensunterstützenden Maßnahmen. Es wird der Planungsprozeß eines alliierten Einsatzes erläutert und vorgeschlagen, die in Italien in den 60er Jahren eingeführte Methode (SMD-104) auf den neuesten Stand zu bringen, wobei die jüngsten Erfahrungen in Bosnien-Herzegowina und in Albanien berücksichtigt werden.

Planung für die nächste Zukunft, von Claudio Graziano (s. 76).

Die Arbeit illustriert die Schwierigkeiten, die Militärplaner historisch betrachtet bei den verschiedenen, oft schwierigen Neuorganisationsversuchen der Streitkräfte gehabt haben. Desweiteren werden die Veränderungen der politisch-strategischen Ausblicke beschrieben, indem besonders das neue Sicherheitskonzept betont wird, das heute auf globaler Ebene begriffen werden und sich auf diversifizierte, verschiedenartige Risiken einstellen muß. Schließlich wird für die Streitkräfte die Notwendigkeit aufgezeigt, einen «Entwicklungsplan» auszuarbeiten, um den Bereich der Planung weiter zu optimieren, um ausführlicher die strategische Rolle unseres Landes zu definieren, und um sozio-ökonomische Maßnahmen zugunsten des Personals auszuarbeiten, eingedenk der Tatsache, daß der Mensch die wichtigste und aber auch kritischste Komponente im System Verteidigung bleibt, ohne die auch der besten Planung ein sicherer Fehlschlag droht.

Die internationale Dimension der Streitkräfte,

von Sauro Baistrocchi (s. 86).

In den letzten Jahren ist mit der Wandlung der internationalen strategischen Rahmensituation ein neues Konzept einer «gemeinsamen

Politik der dynamischen Sicherheit» auf den Plan getreten.

Welche sind die organisatorischen und strukturellen Auswirkungen auf die italienischen Streitkräfte?

Der Autor erläutert die wichtigsten Aspekte: die neue internationale Dimension, die Teilnahme an integrierten alliierten Strukturen, die militärische Zusammenarbeit mit Ländern, die nicht zu westlichen Bündnissen gehören, die Schaffung von dauerhaften multinationalen Kommandos und Einheiten, schließlich die Teilnahme an friedensunterstützenden Maßnahmen (Peace-Supporting Operations, PSO).

Der Informationskrieg, von Manlio Silvestri (s. 96).

Die Informations Operations (10 an der Zahl) sind eine Gruppe von Aktivitäten zugunsten der Entscheidungsprozesse und zur Unterstützung der politisch-militärischen Ziele.

Die Operationen gliedern sich in sieben Sektoren: Kommandostruktur und Kontrolle, nachrichtendienstliche Aufklärung, elektronischer Krieg, psychologische Unternehmungen, Informationskaperei, ökonomische Informationskriegsführung, kybernetischer Krieg.

Letzterer, der umfassendste, weil am meisten zukunftsorientierte Sektor, kann in vier Kategorien unterteilt werden: informatischer Terrorismus, semantischer Angriff, Konfliktsimulation, Krieg im virtuellen Raum.

Die zunehmend komplizierten Informationssysteme zwingen zu einer radikalen Revision der traditionellen Herangehensweise an militärische Operationen. Die NATO geht in diesem Sinne voran.



En el nombre del Islam, de Maurizio Coccia (p. 2).

La milenaria historia del Islam viene

vista del Occidente como un bloque monolítico dador de amenazas y desventuras. No es así. Se trata de una realidad varia por ideología política, y antes de todo por inspiración religiosa. En el artículo se focalizan los diferentes aspectos de una filosofía de vida que, de la cuesta atlántica de Africa hasta el Indonesia, ha dado lugar para muchos siglos a un complejo político, social, religioso y militar.

El deterente nuclear europeo, de Maurizio Boni (p. 12).


El Europa se interroga acerca de la posibilidad de realizar un arsenal nuclear común que se base sobre las armas de posesión del Reyno Unido y de la Francia. La idea, expresada hace algunos años por los franceses, ha encontrado pocas aprobaciones ultramar, donde el vínculo con los Estados Unidos se ha consolidado mucho. La panorámica que hace el Autor sobre las armas nucleares de posesión de los dos Países, enriquecido por argumentadas consideraciones sobre los reflejos internacionales y sobre los límites de una eventual «eurodeterencia», permite una clara visión de la delicada problemática.

Polonia. El nuevo Ejército. Entrevista al General de Armada Henryk Szumski, de Enrico Magnani (p. 24).

Ya ha sido arreglado el nuevo «Vojsko Polskie», el Estado Mayor Interforce que irá preparando las Fuerzas Armadas polacas a la entrada en el OTAN. La disposición ordenativa que divide las fuerzas operativas de las territoriales ya está en fase avanzada, preveendo una brusca reducción de los efectivos de 400 000 a 180 000 unidades. Unidades polacas ya han participado, juntas a las occidentales, a misiones ONU y OTAN con más de 30 000 soldados, mientras está para constituirse el Cuerpo Multinacional Norte-Este con alemanes y daneses. Como miembro con pleno título de la Alianza Atlántica, Polonia se propone de desarrollar un rol siempre más importante para la tutela de la estabilidad y de la paz.

Turchia. El nuevo Ejército. Entrevista a Hüseyin Kivrikoglu, de Enrico Magnani (p. 34).

La Turquía está en el centro de un triángulo de fuerte inestabilidad:



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Balcános, Cáucaso y Asia occidental. Sigue un rol de primaria importancia para el Ejército turco en la Alianza Atlántica para la tutela de la seguridad y de la paz. Empezando de esta premisa, el entrevistado da una serie de informaciones sobre la configuración ordinativa, adiestrativa y operativa del instrumento terrestre, poniendo el acento a los esfuerzos en acto en el sector del modernamiento de los medios y de los materiales y de la recalificación de los cuadros y de la tropa (constituida fundamentalmente de militares del servicio militar subpuestos a una parada de dieciocho meses) y no olvidándose de subrayar la grande vocación del Ejército turco por participar activamente a las operaciones de soporte de la paz.

El Kosovo, de Giuseppe Caforio y Adam Copani (p. 40).

Trazada la geografía política del Kosovo (dos millones de habitantes de los que 90% son albaneses), el artículo nos da noticias históricas de la región para ilustrar los últimos acontecimientos, desde la proclamación de la República hasta las últimas manifestaciones de violencia. Los Autores no toman una posición. Se limitan a desear que se logre individuar una solución que asegure al Kosovo un régimen de autonomía en el plano cultural y lingüístico, a igualdad de lo realizado en Alto Adige.

Un nuevo orden internacional. Globalización y sociedades multiétnicas, de Ornella Rota (p. 48).

Por doquiera se van a afirmar sociedades multiétnicas y multiculturales en un planeta que va hacia una globalización económica y social. De esto derivan problemas de gran magnitud que invierten el tema de la seguridad y de la paz. El artículo es enriquecido de fuertes declaraciones de importantes representantes de dos grandes Países que son la máxima expresión de la sociedad multiracial: los embajadores de Estados Unidos y de India.

La Planificación operativa, de Pier Paolo Lunelli (p. 54).
El artículo, al final del estudio «Lines of operations», examina los nuevos rasgos doctrinales de la OTAN en contexto de

operaciones de sostén para la paz; subraya el proceso de planificación de campo en ámbito aliado; propone una actualización del método adoptado en Italia en los '60 (SMD-104), teniendo presente las nuevas experiencias en Bosnia-Erzegovina y en Albania.

Planificar en el próximo futuro, de Claudio Graziano (p. 76).

El trabajo ilustra las dificultades que han acompañado históricamente el esfuerzo de los planificadores militares en las diferentes impresas de reordenamiento de las Fuerzas Armadas. Describe, pues, las mutaciones de los escenarios políticos-estratégicos, poniendo la atención en el nuevo concepto de seguridad que hoy tiene que ser entendido a nivel global y referido a riesgos multiformes y diversificados. En fin, piensa en una futura necesidad por las Fuerzas Armadas de elaborar un «papel de desarrollo» para optimizar más el sector de la planificación, definir más el rol estratégico de nuestro País y promover disposiciones socio-económicas para el personal, en la consapevolezza de que el hombre queda siempre el ser más importante y frágil del sistema de defensa, sin el que también la mejor planificación, riesgo un seguro fracaso.



La dimensión internacional del Ejército, de Sauro Baistrocchi (p. 86).

En los últimos años, con la mutación del cuadro estratégico internacional, se ha abierto camino el nuevo concepto de «política común de seguridad dinámica». ¿Cuáles son los reflejos organizativos y estructurales por el Ejército Italiano? El Autor describe los principales aspectos: la nueva dimensión internacional; la participación a las estructuras integradas aliadas; la cooperación militar con Países que no pertenecen a pactos occidentales; la constitución de mandos y unidades multinacionales con carácter permanente; la participación a las operaciones de sostén de la paz (PSO).







La guerra de las informaciones, de Manlio Silvestri (p. 96).

Las «Information Operations» (IO) son un grupo de actividades para el proceso decisional y a sostén de los objetivos político-militares. Los diez son

articulados en siete diferentes sectores: mando y control; «intelligence»; guerra electrónica; operaciones psicológicas; piratería de las informaciones; guerra económica; guerra cibernética. Esta última, la más compleja porque proyectada al futuro, se puede subdividir en cuatro categorías: terrorismo informático, ataque semántico, simulación de los conflictos, guerra espacio-virtual. La sofisticación de los sistemas de información que va creciendo siempre más, impone una radical revisión del traicionable acercamiento a las operaciones militares. El OTAN procede en este sentido.



THE EDITORIAL STYLE OF RIVISTA MILITARE



RIVISTA MILITARE

JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856





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
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AND
THE COMMANDER
IN CHIEF OF THE
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




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Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

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
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A high-speed train, possibly a Shinkansen, is shown in motion, blurred by a long exposure, against a sunset background. The train is dark and sleek, moving from left to right. The background is a warm, orange and yellow sky with a bright sun low on the horizon, creating a lens flare effect. The overall mood is dynamic and futuristic.

by Vittorio Barbati *

**POLITICS
ECONOMY
TECHNOLOGY
STRATEGY**

FOUR CONNECTED VARIABLES

It is not easy to define the relations that exist among the factors which determine the international military action-reaction lines of the Nations.

In order to find a guiding thread in this maze, we must resort to a schematization procedure, dividing the factors examined into four fundamental categories: one belonging to the political sphere, one related to the economic field, and the technological and strategic ones.

It is then possible to explain the fundamental choices made by the States as regards their foreign, defence and strategic policies.

It is not easy to define the relations that exist among the factors which determine the Nations' action-reaction military lines, be they war or non-war, when the latter operate, or are forced to operate, within the international sphere.

There are innumerable factors, sometimes inherited from the past, sometimes projected into the future, sometimes short-term, sometimes medium- long-term ones, often intertwined in inextricable entanglements. In order to find a guiding thread in this maze, we must resort to a schematization procedure - accepting its unavoidable limits - dividing, for what concerns this writing, the examined factors into four fundamental economic, political, technological and strategic categories.

But before going into the heart of the matter, an essential point should be emphasized, i.e. the risk of getting lost in a more- or less-brilliant and abstract theoretical

disquisition. Here one should highlight - and this is indeed the author's intention - the elements that determine, or help to determine, the fundamental choices that the Nations make, or are forced to make, as regards their foreign, defence and strategic policies.

Politics, understood as the government of public affairs, is based on difficult choices, on a scale of priorities and on a constant activity of coordination, aimed at meeting multiple requirements, which sometimes converge and sometimes are antithetical. There should be no dissent on this. The problems arise - it should not be forgotten that politics is the art of the possible - when, considering the scarcity of resources, (a factor that concerns, more or less, every State) a priority must be fixed in satisfying the requests.

Still as regards our subject, it must be said that the impossibility of finding the necessary resources

for meeting "all" the needs of a Country is, from various points of view, a determinant factor in the international options. In the first place, it can have influence on the participation in a politico-military coalition or in a more- or less-binding economic partnership. In both cases, in fact, joining in a multinational organization means sharing, financially first of all, the efforts and therefore the burdens necessary for accomplishing one or more tasks (starting, for what concerns us, with those related to defence).

The definition of a range of priorities in meeting often-clashing requirements is obviously the result of almost-always difficult choices which pertain to the responsibility of the political sphere. The factors that can influence these choices are manifold and deserve a short examination. But, first of all, one should specify a few essential points.

The growing complexity of the modern activities demands that the choices be made considering programmes projected over a rather long period, in other words over a period of several years. By now, this applies to all the main developments: from the ones regarding medical and biological research to those concerning infrastructure, up to those relevant to the most important weapon systems.

In many cases, these developments require expenditure commitments stretching over many years which, at least in the countries governed by democratic regimes, abundantly exceed the duration in office of the bodies charged, from one election to the next (and even excluding the hypothesis of earlier elections), with the administration of public affairs: on the average the most demanding programmes - and not only those concerning defence - are projected over a period of ten-fifteen years or more, while the average duration of the period in office of a legislature, in a democratic country, is four-five years. This inconsistency is due to the necessity of having the

people's frequent control on the administration of public affairs, but this doubtlessly creates quite a few problems.

The first problem can be detected in the contribution that this way of proceeding (imposed, on the other hand, by compelling technical requirements) gives to the rigidity of the public expense, increasingly reducing the margins of choice for the politicians who, in the really democratic countries, follow one another in the government of the Country. What can the margin of choice be for anyone who comes to power when certain programmes, - started from someone who had completely different conceptions (or in a very different national and international political context) - have reached the so-called "point of no return" (i.e. the point where the interruption of a programme becomes more expensive than its completion)? Clearly it can only be a very limited margin, which, at the most, can permit little-affecting emendations (besides, of course, the emendations imposed by the technological development and the changes that intervene in the international relations and balances).

The international economic factors, besides, influence in various ways the States' programmes, and not only the military ones. They affect them through the bulk of the exchanges, and therefore the credit and debit of the balance of trade and the balance of payments, through the greater or lesser solidity of the various national economies and their possible weakening vis-à-vis the international organizations, without considering the currency and stock fluctuations, which contribute to increase or reduce the possibilities of investment inside and outside all countries and in the various currency areas (from the Dollar area to the recently created Euro area). This is true in particular for the industrialized countries, especially for those poor in raw materials and primary energy resources, whose economies



are essentially transformation economies, increasingly related to imports of raw materials and energy products and to exports of semimanufactures and finished products.

Right.

The USS "Harry S. Truman" aircraft-carrier, eighth ship of the "Nimitz" class. Its gross tonnage, when fully loaded, exceeds 100,000 tons.

Below.

The French "Caesar", a wheeled 155 mm self-propelled gun, can be carried by aircraft of the C-130 class.





Now, it must be observed that they are, in their turn, closely connected with the evolution of the international political relations and to the ensuing strategic balances, or unbalances. For example, closing, or the simple threat of closing, an important watercourse can produce an increase in price of certain raw materials or in the costs relevant to their transport, altering the flows and volume of the exchanges, causing currency and financial shocks and imposing after all, within the limits of feasibility, more or less important modifications in the civil and military programmes under way.

The effects of the modifications just considered can be faced in a more or less effective way according to the "degree of rigidity", if we can call it that, of the States' budgets and according to the greater or lesser "capability of reaction" of the productive structure.

When the budgets are excessively rigid, because of the amount of current expenses (or maintenance expenses) and heavy indebtedness, the States are sometimes forced to delay even the important programmes, not only the military ones, and to resort to often painful "manoeuvres", employing, in many instances, the tax lever. Besides, as

we just mentioned, the absorption of the effects of the international crises (including those originated by political or military causes) is also connected with the productive structures of the various countries. In fact, the nations with strong productive structures, not only industrial ones, can better absorb, in determined circumstances, the repercussions of such crises, differencing both the sources of raw material and energy supplies and the outlets of their finished products (it is worth mentioning that this is also a two-faced coin, because widening the sphere of imports and exports, the risk of negative repercussions originated even by far-away events also increases).

As can be inferred from what we have just said, in a context of global economy like today's, many national programmes, especially the medium-long-term ones, are influenced, in a more or less significant way, by both structural internal factors and external conjuncture factors (even if it is very difficult to separate these two types of factors, often linked by reciprocal relations of interdependence). It should be added that, in various cases, these factors weigh also on the multinational programmes, and particularly on the military ones.


The differences that mark the various productive systems have a heavy impact on the technological evolution; and not only for what concerns the development and production of weapon systems.

The productive system that best exploits the advantages of innovation is certainly the American one. Generally speaking, one can say that, at least for what concerns us, i.e. the defence productions, this system appears to consist, with some important exceptions, of two important categories of firms: the one including the big and very big multivalent firms, divided into specialized branches, and that of

specialized, mainly medium or small firms (only a few have large dimensions), which supply the major concerns with precision instruments, electronic systems, fittings, semimanufactures, metal alloys, compound materials, etc...Through complex competition-cooperation mechanisms, in the phases of development and production of means and of supplies and sub-supplies, or during the phases of production of the said means, intense technological exchanges occur within the system, which are also facilitated, as regards the most important programmes, by the creation of powerful partnerships. Moreover, leading research centres, both public and private, (besides, of course, those belonging to the concerns) work in support of the entire complex.

Also in the other Western Countries (considered in a political-economic sense and not in a geographical sense) one can notice similar tendencies. Multivalent companies, especially in the defence sector, operate in various European Countries (some of which, particularly those of the aerospace industry, often work in both military and civil productions), but only some of these reach sizes comparable to the huge US concerns. Studies and negotiations are in progress to promote mergers and concentrations which involve not only European companies but also American ones (recently there has been a merger of the latter type), but it may be premature to refer to a picture which is still evolving. Moreover, already in these past years some particularly significant programmes have been, and are being now, carried out by multinational partnerships. Research centres exist also in the West, but the structures are more modest than the American ones. Besides, as there is no European policy of research, their relations are entrusted more to particular initiatives than to organic plans.

On the opposite side, the Russian apparatus, inherited directly from



the Soviet one, is struggling under a series of irremediable contradictions, determined also by a real financial paralysis. It is a fundamentally rigid system, formed mainly by specialized firms, with research and planning centres also specialized (only in the past years they have been permanently connected with production firms of the same sector). Therefore, within this system, the technological exchanges among the various sectors are rather limited, also because they are hindered by rigid bureaucratic barriers (innovation, which is remarkable in some sectors - like the aerospace, missile, nuclear, electronic and land-weapons sectors - remains often

confined to the areas of their original application).

These three types of mechanisms - which are here summarily schematized, without even mentioning many intermediate situations - show remarkable differences, as we have just pointed out, both as regards the approach and the results. Actually, the speed and the intensity of the innovation and of the technological exchanges are extremely high in the US mechanism, significant but not so high in the other Western systems, and more limited, especially as regards diffusion, in the Russian apparatus.



leaving to the "producer", or the "producers", rather limited margins of manoeuvre.

This occurs, admittedly with different modalities and effects, in all mechanisms - in the American and the Western ones as well as in the Russians' - which are simultaneously producers and employers of technologies and, as far as we are concerned, of military technologies. But the relations between producer and employer do not exist only within the individual Countries.

As a matter of fact, besides the industrialized Countries, several politically and economically very different countries produce little technology but use, especially in the military field, highly technological foreign products. Also the representatives of these employer-countries issue specifications, or ask for proposals, based on

Left.

The second pre-production model of the F-22 "Raptor". This aircraft employs advanced "stealth" techniques and can cruise at supersonic speed.

Below.

The USS "Port Royal" (CG 73) is one of the two cruisers used by the US Navy to test the "Aegis" system in the defence against theatre ballistic missiles.

The efficiency of these mechanisms depends on various factors, besides the ones mentioned before. It depends first of all on the relation that exists between the bodies "producers" of the innovation and the technological applications and the bodies, the military in particular, "users" of the said technologies. The roles of these two categories of bodies are closely interconnected and, once more, it is often impossible to set a precise boundary. In fact it is the "employer" that - through the specifications and sometimes through the results of his studies and experiments - fixes the lines of development of the technologies,



determined requisites, in which the industries of the more advanced Countries are invited to participate. With all the ensuing implications.

In general, the industries that produce materials for defence are subjected to strict government controls - sometimes a real supervision - with a threefold purpose: promote innovation avoiding, as much as possible, detrimental loss of effort (and time); prevent the exportation of the technologies that are, or could be, considered vital for the security of the exporting country (and possibly of its allies); facilitate, at the same time, both for economic and politico-strategic ends, the industrial and commercial penetration in the importing Countries. These, in their turn, tend to secure economic and/or industrial compensations and acquire, in case through production licences, new technologies to be employed, when possible, in view of autonomous developments or eventually to re-export, all or in part - according to the agreements with the "original" producer-countries - the technologies acquired (it should be noted that this occurs, and on a larger scale, in the relations between the industrialized countries, especially if the nations are allied).

In most cases, the relations that are established between the countries producers of technologies, especially military ones, and the countries employing them are transformed in a politico-strategic-economic bond, both because the military instruments of the acquiring countries are inevitably oriented towards determined directions and especially because through the technical assistance, which becomes increasingly necessary, the supplying countries tend to influence, to their own

The Eurofighter 2000 (EF 2000) - seven prototypes of which are now in existence - is the result of the cooperation of four European Countries (Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK).

advantage, the "international" choices of the acquiring countries.

A particularly important issue is the management of technologies for military purposes. The level of the management - if we can call it that - is connected with numerous factors and with two in particular which vary from country to country and which, moreover, cannot be quantified: technological culture (1) and experience (2).

Also in this case there is a real hierarchy, which puts the United States in the first place, followed by the other Western Countries and by Russia and successively by all the other countries.

Let us proceed methodically. Together with the factors that were described before - mechanisms of production/innovation of technologies, economic structures of the various countries, availability of financial resources, etc. - the last two mentioned factors contribute, in a minor or major way, to determine the political, and consequently strategic, inclinations of all the actors of the international scene. A



few examples can supply the key for explaining these concepts.

We should once more focus our attention on the United States of



The latest version of the American mighty "Abrams" MBT is the recently perfected M1A2 SEP (System Enhancement Program).



America, the only nation remained to play the role of military (as well as political and economic) superpower. It must be pointed out that only the great North American Federation has managed to integrally fulfill the assumptions - doctrine, equipment, organization - of a global planetary strategy, conceived to confront all possible war options, from total nuclear war to limited conflicts. This was made possible by a sound cultural-technological basis, which went through a considerable development during and after the second World War and which permitted, starting precisely from the enormous experience accumulated during that conflict, to build and bring to perfection, along the decades, a multivalent military instrument which has no equal in the world. In the years of the "Cold War", the

Soviet Union tried to give itself a planetary global strategy but it managed to construct only some components; and probably the enormous effort sustained in order to reach this objective contributed to its disintegration.

Resuming the thread of our speech, it should be said that only the enormous technological and operational experience accumulated along the years has permitted, and permits, to the United States to organize and govern, at reasonable costs, a mighty nuclear deterrent, a multivalent air-force, land and amphibious forces equipped with actual planetary strategic mobility, and naval, or better air-naval, forces, in whose task forces there is a level of integration much higher than that of the similar (and besides much less powerful) forces of the other countries. Needless to add that

this mighty instrument is controlled and directed by a highly efficient and flexible joint command structure.

At a lesser or greater distance follow the other industrialized Countries - the Western ones, including Japan and Russia - which, despite having obtained remarkable technological results in some sectors, sometimes comparable to those achieved by the United States, have not been able to equip themselves with all the means necessary to implement - also when they have tried to do it (it is the case, already mentioned, of the disappeared Soviet Union) - really multivalent, wide-or very wide-ranging strategic designs.

Many pages should be used to highlight the numerous relations that exist among the variables we have considered in this article. But it is appropriate and necessary to close the conversation stating that a strategic approach adequate to the needs of a Country, or of a coalition, can be obtained only on the basis of a clear political vision, which is in a position to take the best advantage of the not unlimited financial and technological resources available, in view of short-, medium-, and long-term realistic objectives.

□

**Contributor to Italian and foreign military magazines, author of essays on international policy, economy and contemporary history.*

NOTES

(1) V. Barbati, Sicurezza e cultura tecnologica, "Rivista Militare", It. Ed., no.2/1995.


(2) V. Barbati, Strategia e tecnologia, "Rivista Militare", It. Ed., no. 3/1996.

Photos from the Author's personal archives.

GREECE

THE NEW ARMY

by Enrico Magnani*



**Interview with the Chief
of the Hellenic army
General Staff Lieutenant General
Manoyssos Paragioudakis**

Contrary to NATO member countries' general trend, Greece has increased the defence budget allowing the Army modernization programme. Within short time the Hellenic army will be flexible, light and well trained and capable of playing an ever-important role during Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations.

We made an interview with Lieutenant General Paragioudakis, Chief of Hellenic Army General Staff, and focused on several important issues.



General, did the Hellenic Army change after the end of the Cold War, the instability in the Balkans and the decision to have an Allied Headquarters in Larissa as part of the NATO re-organization?

To face new challenges the Hellenic Army has made steps leading to:

- a. the mechanization of the army;
- b. a streamlined chain of command with Brigade as basic operational formation;
- c. an Immediate Reaction Force at Army Corps level to:
 - immediately intervene in any area of the country;
 - meet international agreements requirements,
- d. the deployment of a number of forces in sensitive areas to safeguard national borders.

Moreover, training is now performed according to national and international operational requirements and the Army has been equipped with modern weapon systems.

As to the implementation of the Allied Joint Subregional Headquarters in Larissa, it was partially manned last April and is scheduled to be fully operational


Commandos in amphibious training.

along with the Allied Joint Subregional Headquarters of Spain, Italy, and Turkey by October 1999.

Greece has assigned 1 Mechanized Infantry Division to ARRC and 1 Field Artillery Battery to AMF. Are these units combat ready today?

I must say that these units were already *combat ready* before being assigned to ARRC and AMF(L), but further steps have been made to meet NATO's high standards. For example I would like to focus on the improved training, the wide participation in national and allied exercises and the upgrade of equipment well beyond NATO standards.

The operational tests prove that we are successful, but we must go on.



Greece has a long lasting Peace Keeping tradition. Today Greece is taking part in SFOR with a transport and military police unit. Is the Hellenic army planning to increase its support to PK in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Greece has participated in the Bosnia-Herzegovina IFOR and

SFOR operations since December 27, 1995. The Hellenic Force (250 to 300 men) was part of the Multinational Transport Unit named BELUGA (Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Austria). Since July 1998 different Countries have participated in the group that was consequently renamed HELBA. Greece is in charge of the

multinational operations coordination and is responsible for the military camp since April 1, 1997. The 25-man transport platoon from Bulgaria joined HELBA on the 3rd of July 1998.

It was decided and planned that Greece will participate in Phase 3 (until June 1999). The Alliance will then decide whether to keep troops in the region or not, in which case Greece is ready to take further decisions.

I would like to underline that during IFOR and SFOR the Hellenic Transport Battalion's missions totalled 500,000 kms, which makes an example of successful multinational operation.

Greece took part in ALBA operation with a mechanised unit which was tasked with missions also in the sensitive



One of the first AH64A "Apache" helicopters in service with the Hellenic Army Aviation.



1A5GR "Leopard" tank. Many of these tanks, formerly in service with the German Army, and redundant according to the CFE Treaty, have been transferred to Allied Armies.

area of Valona. Can you tell us any lessons learned?

Greece took part in the peace keeping and humanitarian ALBA operation with a force at Regiment level (90 officers 690 other ranks). The lessons learned can be outlined as follows:

- the armed forces should be trained also for Peace Support Operations, which have further special requirements compared with article 5 operations. Furthermore, multinational interoperability should be a teaching topic at military Schools.

- bilateral agreements should address all aspects of logistics and be enforced since the very beginning, in particular referred to role 3 medical support.
- a number of English speaking officers should be included in the national delegation, but also a number of officers speaking the language of the Leading Nation and the Host Nation.
- criteria based on security and logistics should be agreed upon and complied with when selecting an area for the camp of the Peace Force.
- there must be extraordinary co-operation and mutual support among the multinational units.

But we basically learned that when a nation really supports another nation, this is welcomed by the local population with deep gratitude to the peace force. And we

have got it many times in Albania.

Today about 3,000 women serve in the Hellenic Army. When did women first enter the army and what have they been allowed to? Are there major problems arising from the presence of women in the Hellenic Army?

The Hellenic Army has recruited women in Medical Service Since 1946. In 1977 a bill was passed allowing women to other branches of the Army. As a result, in 1979, for the first time, 80 women joined the army as enlisted volunteers with a 5-year contract. Since then, thanks to this successful experience, more women have joined the army.

Furthermore another bill was passed allowing a number of women to Officers and Non Commissioned

Officers Military Academies and Schools. Today about 3,000 women serve in all branches of the Army as officers, warrant officers and Non Commissioned Officers. Our experience proves that women are as skilled as their male colleagues and very successful too.

As a result, military leaders are planning to increase the number of women in the army.

The Hellenic Army is based on a 95,000-men conscription. This service lasts in some cases up to 19 months and is one of the longest in NATO. Are you planning to reduce it?

The conscription service for enlisted in the Army lasts 18 months. At the moment we are not planning to reduce it, although benefit measures have been taken, including:

- partial service for the those living abroad permanently;
- a 3 to 12-month reduction and partial service for older soldiers;
- possibility to serve in the neighbourhood of the place of residence.
- reduced time for those who have serious family problems etc.

The Hellenic Army is making a great effort to have modern equipment and structures. Are there programmes under way concerning the Territorial



Above.
Replacing the engine of a "Leopard" tank.

Below.
Russian-made BMP1 combat/transport armoured vehicle.



Defence Units and the National Guard? Will these units be more similar to the operational ones?

There are modernization programmes for all units of the Hellenic Army. Obviously those believed to be in critical areas come first. We planned to provide all of our units with the necessary equipment to carry out their missions.

In recent years the NATO member countries' defence budgets have been cut. On the contrary, Greece has increased it. Can you tell us about the guidelines for sharing the budget among the three services, considering that also Navy and Air Force have modernization programmes?

In Greece, the procurement of



T80s on parade. Some of these tanks have been procured in order to make evaluations, in view of the renewal of the whole tank line.


armaments for the three Services is implemented through a Defence Planning System issued by the Ministry of National Defence. The army requirements are consequently met according to a three-service list of priority decided by the National Defence General Staff and procured depending on the budget. In fact there are no special guidelines for sharing the budget and it is worth noting that the operational requirements of Armed Forces are met as a whole.

□

** Journalist*

Gen. Paragioudakis was born in 1938, attended the military academy and was promoted Second Lieutenant in 1960. In 1993 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. Gen. Paragioudakis attended a number of national and international military schools and has University Degrees in Political Science and Law. As an artillery Officer he has been assigned to important training and Staff posts during his career. Lieutenant General Paragioudakis has been awarded several decorations. He speaks fluent English and French, is married and has three children.

TODAY'S ARMY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

A photograph of a Czech Army anti-aircraft missile launcher vehicle, specifically a ZSU-23-4ML Shilka, in a field. The vehicle is dark green and has the number '065' on its side. It is equipped with four 23mm gun tubes and a missile launcher. The background shows a line of trees and a clear sky.

by Enrico Magnani *

**Interview with the Commander in Chief
of the Czech Army
Major General Frantisek Hrabal**

In order to better know the Armed Forces of the Eastern European countries we held an interview with Major General Frantisek Hrabal, the Commander in Chief of the Czech Army.

This interview gives a piece of information on the effort the Czech Republic is making to reorganise its Army.

General, the Czech Army is preparing to join NATO. What is the on-going reorganization aiming at?

The Czech Army has been divided into several forces and adjusted to NATO patterns, including Immediate Reaction, Rapid Reaction, Main Defence and Reserve Forces.

On April 1, 1999 an ABC Czech Company was earmarked for NATO Immediate Reaction Forces, meanwhile NATO Rapid Reaction Forces were assigned a Czech Emergency Brigade. The remaining mechanized Brigades of the army make up the bulk of the Main Defence Forces. We are shifting to NATO standards gradually and steadily as part of a long-term programme due to end by 2003.

The SFOR South West Multinational Division includes several units from the Czech Army which also took part in past Peace Support operations. Are there any lessons learned?

The Czech Armed Forces have been taking part in PK-Operations





The Spingot Anti Tank Missile Training System.

understand how NATO works.


these international exercises?

since 1991 and I can say it has been a good experience, definitely. We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from UNPROFOR and UNCRO in Croatia to start with IFOR and SFOR within the SWMND in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNPROFOR and UNCRO focused on autonomy at squad level meanwhile SFOR relied on autonomy at platoon and company level. At SWMND Headquarters the Czech Officers cooperated with their NATO colleagues and experienced NATO operational procedures. I am trying to make my best to have Officers and NCOs rotate every sixth month in order to have a widespread useful experience of such an international environment. It is also worth noting that the Czech army is giving an important contribution to UK Forces, which makes the experience more interesting and allows us to better

Recently Czech soldiers have participated in the Spain-based Strong Resolve exercise. Can we take it as a general test for a future integration into NATO? Are there any benefits from

Strong Resolve was a Command Post exercise also involving

The 2K 12M KUB Tank equipped with an antiaircraft system operated by a crew member.





Bosnia: MP Officer with soldiers from the 6th Mechanised Battalion participating in SFOR.

platoons from different countries. The mission focused on a crisis undergoing in an unidentified State. A Czech paratrooper platoon from the national Emergency Brigade took part in the exercise. During the first week our platoon got familiar with the rest of the multinational company and finally they conducted a common live fire exercise. During the second week the Czech platoon was tasked to work in the «Zaragoza» area and carried out its the mission as professionally as the other units. Thus *Strong Resolve* can be seen as a successful integration test.

Getting closer to NATO the Czech Republic has switched from the *Directed Leadership* concept to the *Mission Command* principle. The latter requires

more initiative from the soldiers who in fact must be able to make an effective operational analysis. What are the major changes in training and education?

Czech professional units have already experimented the new training programme based on NATO principles. Individual and sub-unit training will be

emphasised and harmonised with the national doctrine which takes into account the revised tasks of the armed forces. Professionals and conscripts are being trained after NATO principles. Furthermore the quality of training is being

Land Rover Defender: Western-made equipment for the Czech Army.





Mine clearing.

enhanced by all-level international relationships.

NATO means also standard equipment. What about standardisation in the Czech army?

Communications and Data Transfer are two major priorities. But languages are an important issue as well.

The Czech army is aiming at balancing the number of volunteers and conscripts. How is this process developing? Are you going to recruit women?

The recruitment of volunteers started with Immediate Reaction and Rapid Reaction forces. They


Bosnia: NCO at the SFOR Communication Centre Grech.

paratrooper mechanised battalion is expected to be fully manned by volunteers within 2001, and the Emergency Brigade within 2003.

The recruitment of women started after the parliament had passed the required legislation. Today women attending military academies are on the rise and they are mainly employed at Staff level. There are about 258 of them.

The Czech Republic separated from Slovakia peacefully. What did it change to the Army? Did you maintain any relationships with the Slovakian army?

Obviously there are good relationships. Visits at all levels are exchanged and common exercises are carried on using both Czech and Slovak training areas. For example last September General Emil Vestenicky, Chief of the Slovak Army General Staff, visited the Czech army Headquarters where he was briefed on the current re-organisation and the reviewed institutional tasks. General





Honour Guard with the uniforms adopted in 1989.

Vestenicky also observed an exercise by the Emergency Brigade.

As to Defence and Security the Czech republic can refer not only to NATO but also to WEU, EUROFOR and the Italy-Hungary-Slovenia Force. Did you already contact these international organisations? Are you going to take part in the Austria-sponsored CENTCOOP?

Today the Czech army is not part of any international units. The Army Headquarters is not responsible for contacting international security organisations. The government, the Parliament, the officials in charge at the Department of Defence and the Czech Joint Staff will do it.

□

** Journalist*

From 1976 to 1980 Major General Frantisek Hrabal attended High School at the Jan Zizka Military College in Opava. After that he attended the Military Technical School in Liptovsky Mikulas and was promoted to Second Lieutenant in the Signal Branch.

At the 1st Signal Regiment in Plzen he was platoon and company leader and in 1986 he attended the Military Academy in Brno.

In 1989 he was promoted to Major and appointed Chief of Staff of the 2nd Signal Regiment in Pisek.

In 1992 he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and commanded the 2nd Signal Brigade.

In 1995 he attended the Defence Resource Management Course in Monterey. Then he was promoted to Colonel and in 1996 appointed Chief of the Communication Development Department at the General Staff.

In 1997 he attended the National Defence University - National War College in Washington and won a Master of Science on Security Strategy.


After that he was in charge of the Communication Section (G6) at the Army General Staff and in 1998 was appointed Chief of Staff at the Operational Headquarters in Olomouc.

After this assignment he was promoted Major General and appointed Commander in Chief of the Czech Army in 1998.

Major General Frantisek Hrabal is married and has one daughter.


THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND ITS STABILIZING ROLE

by Giovanni Marizza *



The stabilizing role played by NATO for half a century is a sure guarantee for the safeguard of security and peace in the most risky areas of our Continent.

Italy's support to the Countries aspiring to join the Alliance, starting with Slovenia, Rumania and Bulgaria, fits into this picture.






On April 4, 1999, NATO turned fifty. It has been the first half century of peace in the European continent; this result seems to be even more significant and unusual if we consider that the Atlantic Alliance is formed by Nations that from ancient times until 1945 have been continuously at war against each other.

In fact, if we take a glance at the past, we see a scenery of conflicts, more or less extended, and civil wars which never ceased racking the Old Continent.

Our list of past conflicts, limited only to today's members of NATO, without involving the three newcomers, practically covers the whole period, without showing any period of peace lasting longer than about ten years.

The first Countries to show restlessness were not those with the most "caliente" blood but, curiously enough, the Scandinavian ones.

In 1262, in fact, Iceland was militarily occupied by the King of



Norway, Haakon IV, and, a few years later (1350-1370), Norway, to gain predominance on the Baltic Sea, started fighting against Denmark and in 1380 it was precisely the latter which took possession of Iceland, replacing Norway. Less than two years later, Holland attacked Belgium, which was occupied from 1382 to 1389.

Obviously, the Mediterranean Countries appeared very soon on the scene: Spain occupied Portugal for no less than sixty years (1580-1640), before attacking France twice, in 1659 and with the War of Devolution (1667-'68), which was soon followed by the Netherlands War (1672-1678) between Denmark (member of a large coalition) and France. At the same time, France occupies Luxembourg from 1684 to 1697, during the Grand Alliance War (1688-1697) and, after that it is Spain's turn to occupy Luxembourg from 1697 to 1714.

During the same period, the Atlantic and North America had their share of conflicts: they were bloodied by the colonial wars between France and England (1700-1713), the Spanish succession war (1701-1714) and the British maritime campaign



Tab. 1

Belgium	BEL
Canada	CAN
Denmark	DEN
France	FRA
Germany	GER
Greece	GRE
Iceland	ICE
Italy	ITA
Luxembourg	LUX
Norway	NOR
Holland	HOL
Portugal	POR
UK	UK
Spain	SPA
US	US
Turkey	TUR

Tab. 2

[illegible]

against Spain (1718). Then, in sequence, the Anglo-Spanish campaign of the same year for the succession in the Hapsburg dominions.

At the time, the most active power on the scene was France, which from 1756 to 1763 fought the Seven years' War against England, and from 1793 to 1801 again another war against England and Italy. In

The events of the twentieth century, as the Italo-Turkish War (1911), the Balkan war between Greece and Turkey (1912) and the two World Wars are too well known to be dwelled upon.

Moreover, if we examine the history of each country, we notice that each one of the present NATO Nations has been in conflict situations with at least two other members of the Alliance (Table 1).

The historical panorama up to 1945, therefore, shows an apocalyptic scene, made of bombings of cities, territorial changes, annexations and dismemberments of sovereign Nations, coups d'état, forced migrations of millions of exiles, concentration camps, millions and millions of persons dead, wounded and missing.

The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance indeed represented a sharp reversal of the past trend in the field of conflicts:

Being members of that



Canadian soldiers disembarking from a wheeled vehicle during an exercise.

Alliance, which after 50 years proved to be the most efficient in history, has meant, for its partners, the elimination of conflict situations, both within and without their borders.

In its interior, it has succeeded in keeping cohesion and peace among 16 Nations which, in the past, had been "speaking" to each other mainly with cannon shots. Not only, but NATO has succeeded also in reducing the conflict situations to their lowest possible levels: it is an unquestionable fact that the simultaneous admission of Greece and Turkey has been a "winning move" of the Alliance which, by doing so, avoided at least a couple of wars between the two quarrelsome neighbours across the Aegean.

Still considering the Atlantic Alliance in its internal organization, we note that the famous "article 5" says that one

attack against a member Nation would be tantamount to an attack against the Alliance as a whole. As a consequence, no power (not even the opposing superpower) had the courage of attacking NATO's soil. That well-known article, the most affective one in the history of all Alliances, worked things in such a way that the USSR and the

Warsaw Pact countries attacked only each other (suffice it to think of the brutal repressions in East Berlin, Budapest and Prague, where the intervention of the WP tanks was passed off as "brotherly help", in the name of the "limited sovereignty" doctrine invented by Brezhnev).

NATO has succeeded in keeping

FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

a low conflict level also outside its area of responsibility, mainly thanks to the deterrence represented by its nuclear capability and to the principle - that no one has been willing to test - of "mutual assured destruction".

No wonder, therefore, that - once the USRR and the Communist regimes had crumbled - the countries of what was erroneously called "Eastern Europe", at last returned to the West, asked in a very loud voice for a full-pledged membership in the Euratlantic institutions, and to join NATO first of all.

Let's now get rid of two misunderstandings that come up often when discussing the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance. The first one concerns the so-called "first wave" of the enlargement.

To say that Czekia, Poland and Hungary belong to the "first wave" is not completely right, since NATO had already undergone a first enlargement in 1952 with the adhesion of Greece and Turkey, a second one in 1955 with the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany, and a third one with Spain in 1981, while the reunification of Germany produced what could be considered a fourth enlargement as, in a certain sense, the French "reapprochement" was a fifth amplification.

The next wave, therefore, will not be the "second" but rather the "sixth" one.

Another prejudice concerns the extension "to the East". It is not true that the extension is directed towards the East. First of all, we define countries like Hungary and Czekia as belonging to the East only because we were conditioned by the existence of the former "Iron Curtain". They are not at all oriental; they are absolutely Western or, at most, Central European nations. Furthermore, even if the most eastward country after Russia (Ukraine) were to join NATO,



"Centauro" armoured car on patrol over snowy terrain.

there would still be a NATO Country located even more to the East, i.e. Turkey.

So, let's just call it "enlargement", without dragging in the cardinal points.

Consequently, today only three applicants have been admitted to the Alliance, after having been kept waiting for almost a decade. A very lengthy wait (lasting as long as the two World Wars put together) which is not very easy to understand, even if we spasmodically try to justify it, using the most refined geopolitical and geostrategic motivations, striving to prove to ourselves (and to those who don't take kindly to the enlargement) that, before being admitted, the

applicants must meet well defined requirements. Please, let's leave the "convergence parameters" to the mainly economic organizations! To demand the respect of certain parameters could be sound in the case of a common currency (although the Maastricht parameters are severely criticized by those who consider them anything but all-inclusive); but let's avoid applying the same pharmacopoeia to mainly politico-military organizations such as NATO.

In this case, the principle should be that each Nation is entitled to choose the international security-system it prefers. To make the Countries of Central-Eastern Europe wait too long, while they insist to join, seems to be tragicomic, considering that Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East



Germany became members of the Warsaw Pact from one day to the next and against their will and, therefore, without any apprenticeship or "waiting-room".

Therefore, let's admit all the Nations which apply for NATO membership, without flaunting hypocritical justifications like "Country X could only give a very modest contribution to the Alliance's military capabilities..." (one wonders: do Luxembourg or Iceland contribute more?) or "Country Y must make more progress in human rights and democratic control of the Armed Forces..." (again one asks: are we really sure that all present members of the Alliance are "faultless"?)

The "open door" policy which - on the basis of the outcome of the Madrid summit (July '97) - must characterize the enlargement of NATO is not only sacrosanct but even physiological, and typical of

any healthy organism.

No one questions the legitimacy of the admission of Czechia, Poland and Hungary, whose applications were supported with conviction by Italy. The admission of those three Countries is right, but not enough.

It is right, since this means that three more countries will never again wage war against each other, that stability will extend to 485,000 more square kilometres of European territory and, moreover, 60 million European citizens will no more be threatened by any hostile power in the world.

But this is not enough, because expanding NATO means extending security. Projecting security to an area such as Central and Northern Europe, already stable per se, is not very useful; security should instead be projected to the areas which lack it, and nobody can deny that the Southeastern/Balkan

area is the one most in need.

And this is precisely the area which must be the object of the next enlargement waves.

Obviously and understandably, there will have to be a kind of "classification list" (albeit not an "admitted" one) of applicants, but the times of their acceptance must be as short as possible. The list should avoid letting Hungary to remain a "NATO" island, surrounded by non-NATO countries. This is why one of the very first accepted countries should be Slovenia. This will help achieving NATO's territorial continuity and will prove to Russia that the Alliance's enlargement is not directed only towards the former Warsaw Pact Countries, but it serves the purpose of projecting stability, in this case towards former Yugoslavia.

For the same reason, and with equal speed, it is convenient and appropriate to admit Rumania and Bulgaria, so as to enclose the Balkans within a kind of "security belt", which would serve to project stability into the area and to limit the outflow of instability. The admission times of the other applicants (as the Baltic Countries) could be longer, but the important thing is that they should not be "biblical".

In Southeastern Europe time works against security, and the only international organization that proved to be capable of fostering security in the Balkans was, and still is, precisely NATO.

Everything suggests that the Atlantic Alliance will remain also in the future, and for a long time, the only organization capable of doing this, at least until a word like CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) ceases too be an acronym and becomes a reality.

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Defence General Staff


THE ROLE OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AFTER BIPOLARISM

by Giovanni Bucciol *

If it's true that the three key terms which define this declining era of ours are - as was stated by the seven intellectuals quoted by a daily some time ago - "nuclear", "war" and "God" (1), certainly in the near future there will be a lot to do for the Armed Forces of the whole world. If, for my part, I add the terms "geological and ecological disorder", the scenario in which the Armed Forces will have to play their role is not very difficult to imagine. *"At the sunset of the century"*, writes the

newspaper, *"to turn and look back can make one dizzy, so vortical, fast and violent have been the changes occurred between 1900 and 2000: in the depth of the consciences, in the exterior aspect of the planet, in knowledge and in human relations"*.

A century departs which is deeply different from the one from which it was born. One can legitimately think that the impetuosity, rapidity and violence of the changes occurred mainly in the last 30 years will influence, by inertial force, the



Dense storm-portending clouds continue to appear on the horizon of the 21st century: cultural, religious and ethnic clashes, drugs and organized crime, terrorism and environmental degradation.

In this complex and worrying scenario a determinant role is played by the Armed Forces of the Western Countries, and by the Italian ones in particular, to defend peace and safeguard international law.

same number of years of the next century. Changes have been so radical that even the concept of "alliance" is changed: before, it was "against", now is "for" someone. And we shall prove it.

We can say that with the end of bipolarism, ended also the century of ideological wars. During the last hundred years, Democracy formed an alliance with Communism, finding in Nazi-Fascism - which





was defeated - the external reason for the coalition; then, in the difficult competition for power with Democracy, Communism wore out, and it was more like a suicide than a defeat. On the one side, the shouts declaring "the end of history" - which did not really convince the intellectuals - on the other, the clear voice of the Holy Father who launched the courageous idea of "humanitarian intervention" in Countries which were starving because of the sudden stop in Soviet aid.

In view of this, it is not only interesting, but also useful and very important to outline the role that the Armed Forces will have to play, especially in the light of both the forecasts for the third millenium and the interventions for protecting innocent lives from the ferocious greed of ignoble rulers and from the natural disasters caused by the environment in revolt against a

"homo faber" gone crazy.

WAR FORECASTS FOR THE NEXT MILLENIUM

"The main source of conflicts in the new world era created by the end of the cold war will be neither ideologic nor economic; it will be cultural". This is a statement by Samuel Huntington (2), a political scientist at Harvard University, who also felt the need to demonstrate, in contrast with Francis Fukuyama, that history seeks different ways of expression. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world has been under the illusion that an era of peace had begun, where capitalism, having outlived Communism, could go arm in arm with democracy. We have all changed our mind. We are living through the first post-cold-war period and, as in all post-war periods, we are in a world in ferment. Criticism, contrasts,

disputes and settlements are in reality signs of great vitality. All the peoples in the world coagulate around cultures with well-defined features. Within these "homogeneous identities", man wants to go back to his origins. This search for cultural sources will result in antagonistic conflicts of values, which risk to create a permanent world-disorder, that will not produce large-scale conflicts but rather the fragmentation of the world into different sectors. There will always be military-type conflicts, conducted by the military, but they will be local. Today, already, we see warning signs of this: Huntington says that in the world there are eight different civilizations: there is the Western civilization - including also the United States, Israel and Canada - and the Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slav-Orthodox, Latin American, African civilizations. The eight hundred million people of the

Facing page.
Italian soldiers in Bosnia.

Right.
M113 APCs equipped with TOW A/T missile systems.

Western culture seek a relationship, which has proved difficult so far, with the four and a half billion persons belonging to the other seven cultures.

If in the 18th century, wars were economic and among monarchies, in the 19th century among nations, and in the 20th century among ideologies, in the 21st century they will be among cultures. At the present time, a country is attracted by the cultural orbit of other countries with identical language, traditions, customs and religion. It is precisely in the name of religion that the most terrible conflicts break out: in Bosnia, between Moslems and Slav-Orthodoxes; in Armenia, where Islamic Azers carried out "ethnic cleansing" against Christian Armenians, as did the Abkhazians against the Georgians; in Kashmir, with Hindus against Moslems on in Russian Central Asia, where Tatarstan's Moslem Chechenians demanded independence from Moscow's Orthodoxes; today in Algeria, where the Islamic fundamentalists commit daily slaughters of compatriots of different faith; in Kosovo, and in other parts of this restless world.

These conflicts, of a cultural and ethnic nature, where the Serbian or Rwandan concept of "ethnic cleansing" corresponds to Hitler's "final solution", are nothing but the preamble of what is going to happen in the 21st century. Conflicts will not break out in the West anymore, but move to the areas where the Nations have transformed themselves, turning from passive objects into active protagonists. Furthermore, the different civilizations will also try to join together, following the models of the alliances of the old continent.



Beijing already sells sophisticated equipment and modern armaments to Teheran, Damascus, and Tripoli: is the Confucian civilization seeking a coalition with Islam? The Islamic world is known for being non-homogeneous, and at the present time it would be impossible to form coalitions for warlike purposes, but progress is running ahead at a dizzying speed.

Moreover, in the Islamic world a wider and wider ditch separates the elites and the middle classes - which tend to become "westernized", unable as they are to resist the fascinations of market economy and technology - from the popular masses, attracted by religious integralism and ethnic factors. The integralists, who have discovered the use of the liberal democracy of the West for the conquest of power (3), are either ignored by the electorate, as in

Jordan, or outlawed, as in Algeria, because with fundamentalism the economic conditions do not improve. The Iranian leaders, in the intent of recovering traditions, truth and the "straight path", incite women to go back to the chador and to bigamy, and to defend the solidity of the great Islamic family against the "plague of western feminism". These problems, nevertheless, don't interfere with the economy, which is what matters to the people: they stop at moral and legal level.

Islam has not only mingled with Judaism for irreversible reasons, but is spreading in the most advanced European countries. A third invasion is under way, peaceful and more effective than the preceding ones. At any rate, no one wants the Moslems to convert, it is sufficient that they do not ask us to respect their religious precepts. Most

Moslems belong to European, Afro-Asiatic, Indo-European countries, or to countries bordering Europe. The demographic pressure at the doors of the Countries of our continent is enormous and, among them, Italy is the most vulnerable, owing to the uncontrollable length of its coasts, open on three sides. Our demographic growth, close to zero, will create a serious manpower problem, since shortly the number of workers will be equal to that of pensioners. It will then be necessary to introduce other ethnic groups and other races in the productive chains - including the security one - reconciling ourselves also with the idea of multicontinental armed forces.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS

"We cannot permit that wars among Nations and internal conflicts condemn defenceless civilians to starve to death for egoistic and factional reasons. In these circumstances, food and medical aid must be assured at all times, and all obstacles must be removed, including those deriving from the arbitrary recourse to the principle of non interference in the internal affairs of a Country. The conscience of mankind, now supported by the norms of International Law, requires that humanitarian interventions be mandatory in situations which seriously endanger the survival of a people and of an entire ethnic group. This is a duty for the Nations and for the International Community (4). The Holy Father therefore admits armed interventions where defenceless civilians suffer hunger and the arrogant actions of others, exactly one and a half year after opposing the Gulf War, during which he had been urging the adverse parties to reach an agreement. Nevertheless in these words we perceive: the obligation of humanitarian intervention which, for the first time after the Crusades, has the

blessing of the highest authorities of the Church; the refusal of any arbitrariness in interpreting and distinguishing what is good and what is evil; the Church's complaint about both the lack of judges with the power to pass sentences and the absence of the military strength to enforce them (5).

The soldier, concerned about his role in the near future, wonders about the sense of an intervention such as that predicted by the Pope, since these activities are not only risky, but they also alter the very characteristics of the military.

An army engaged in mainly humanitarian operations - and it is a humanitarian and civil task also to contribute to the search for victims under ruins, to remove mud, to repair a bridge, and so on - very possibly would no more be capable of hunting down the enemy and destroying it, if necessary, which is the army's main task. The fact is that in an armed intervention sometimes there is the possibility and the necessity of using those arms, as was the case at Checkpoint "Pasta" in Somalia. Then one wonders whether it is right "to kill in order to feed" starving people, and to accept the risk of dying to help others. In short, it is not clear whether it is right to solve the problem of hunger and poverty with gunshots, with the consequence of having to answer - even if just as witnesses - to an international Court. A Court that adopts the Anglo-Saxon system, which is different from the Latin one (6). In this type of intervention in the internal affairs of a devastated Country, the role of any Army becomes increasingly difficult. The Armed Forces involved must in fact be capable, if not of replacing, at least of finding on the spot alternative government forces, able to take the place of the remnants of a defaulting, broken-up and incompetent local administration, in a Country ravaged by civil war. In this regard, it must be added that it is not sure



"Ariete" tanks in training.

that the alternative government forces guarantee a better behaviour than their predecessors. The peace corps in question should resort to specialists of every origin, not only military, able to restart the mechanisms of a Nation, or of an entire region with a completely disintegrated economy due to absence of unity and social cohesion.

But caution is necessary, because it is not sure that the Countries that complain more are those which need aid more badly, especially if the rescuers are the former colonizers, who consider their intervention a kind of duty:



no one can be certain that the experts in charge of the mission are well prepared to carry out their task.

To tackle the first problem correctly, taking for granted that there are many Countries that request assistance, it is necessary to see if there are other Countries in worse conditions, and to investigate "why" they don't ask for aid. It is also important to know "who", in those Countries, are the promoters of those requests. It could be the leader of the Nation, starver of his people, who wants to profit, directly or indirectly, from the value of the goods given as aid. It is also fundamental to know "how great" is the need, compared to that of other Countries which don't ask

for anything, since their leaders have good reasons to keep silent, as they destroy the enemy ethnic groups also by starving them. A case in point is that of Jean Kambanda, president of the Rwandan government from April to July 1994, who confessed to the UN Tribunal in Arisha, Tanzania, his responsibility in organizing the genocide and in instigating the Hutus to slaughter the Tutsi population. This gave a group of French colonels "a bad quarter of an hour", since they, called as witnesses by the International Court of Justice of the Hague, were almost put under charge, because of the above-mentioned Anglo-Saxon system of inquiry. The answers to these questions may or may not be satisfactory. In

the latter case it is necessary to investigate if the rescuers insist to have the exclusivity of the aid because they are former colonizers who intend to establish a formal neocolonialism, by showing a false remorse or because they want to turn the events to their advantage since, being more familiar than others with the place, the people and the local customs, they consider themselves as the most qualified operators.

To solve the second problem, that of the preparation of the rescuers, especially the military ones, it is necessary to organize masters, like those existing in many civilized countries. These courses should prepare the leaders, as well as all the persons responsible for programming and

executing the assistance activities. This must be done in complete security from hostile acts, and in a spirit of fairness towards the various applicants, who must be identified and verified according to their real need, without political, ethnic or Mafia-type labels, making sure that they do not disguise personal interests behind the intervention. In all this, a right balance must be found between the "stick" and the "carrot". To hunger, misery and greed the military oppose weapons rather than good words, and they shoot at man's height, not always rubber bullets.

At any rate, I should not want these remarks and these questions, caused by my being a military man, to be the result of a "psychic conflict" deriving from traumas suffered, if not on the battlefield, during the long personal experience of a slalom-like professional life, through a thousand difficulties and hostilities. *This psychic conflict - a great and effective Sigmund Freud wrote in 1919 - takes place between the old peace-loving "I" and the new warlike "I" of the soldier, and it becomes acute as the peaceful "I" realizes that he is risking his life thanks to his recent parasitic double. One could say that the old "I" protects himself from a mortal danger by fleeing into a traumatic neurosis*".

EUROPE ON THE MOVE

It is impossible to have a complete picture of the Armed Forces' role in the near future if one does not examine the rather dynamic behaviour of the European nations (almost all members of OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) shown on the map. The idea of CED (European Defence Community) came to an end in 1954, thanks to the French, who acted simultaneously as supporters and buriers. The common currency has been introduced on May 1,



1998 and still there are again talks about a common defence. According to the European Parliament, this is the other side of political integration, the only real counterbalance to the economic union. Common defence, nevertheless, has become a taboo for the Commission and for the member Nations, owing in part to old neutralist reflexes and in part to Atlantic extremism. Some partners consider "political obscurantism" the idea of strengthening the European wing of NATO, an idea which appeared immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and led many Countries to reappropriate

the Armed Forces, "renationalizing" and "rationalizing" them. With the end of the ideologic confrontation, a serious crisis was triggered off by the increased US requests to the medium and small powers to contribute to the expenses. Since these requests coincide with a general economic crisis, many European nations have decided to reappropriate their Armed Forces, restructuring them on the basis of defence models considered less expensive. So, in Western Europe, while the Foreign Ministers were on their way to Maastricht to work for a United Europe, the Defence Ministers, through their Chiefs of



Non-commissioned officer of the Railway Engineers on surveillance duty during the SFOR mission.

Staff, split in two: one side following the national directives and the other those issued by NATO, from which, to tell the truth, no Nation - playing on the ambiguity of the situation - has ever withdrawn.

The first section of Staff ran immediately into difficulties, and was isolated vis-à-vis the second. All the more so because, instead of "nationalization" - which very soon turned out to be expensive for lack of a scalar economy - the idea of "rationalization" had taken root, still within an Atlantic strategic picture.

So the corps born as "multinational" were nevertheless able to keep intact the national independence of the forces. The US superpower, on its part, gave "command access at crucial levels", as recognized by the Belgian Defence Minister Guy

Coeme, making the medium and small powers, always interested in the reinforcement of the European wing of NATO, more influential than they should really be.

The enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance, which is asymmetric vis-à-vis the present NATO, will cause the requirements for the development of defence policy to grow in direct proportion to the adhesion of the various Countries to the EU.

As a matter of fact, in the 48 years of its life, the EU has grown from the six founding members to fifteen Nations, and at the beginning of the third millenium the members will be twenty-one, twenty-five and perhaps twenty-eight, with a population of more than 500 million. Tindemans' document (7) proposes: integration of WEU into the EU structures; regular meetings of Defence ministers for coordinating the restructuring of the European armament-industry and the question of arms export; creation of

a European armament-agency, as envisaged by the Amsterdam Treaty; establishment of an international police-force for rapid interventions; strengthening of the body concerned with the security issues within the Commission; restructuring of the investments for the development of the European capabilities in the sectors of strategic air-mobility, space information and satellite communications, i.e. in those sectors where the Europeans are totally dependent on the American logistic support.

In short, Europe has been on the move since 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed. As somebody says, Europe is like a bicycle: it works only if it moves. Without pedalling, it falls down. The "Agenda 2000", prepared in Strasbourg on July 16, 1997, marks out the road. The consequent decisions taken by the 15 Countries of the EU at the European Council in Luxembourg are a milestone for the future of Europe, also from the military point of view. From the



Recruits in training at the Military Paratrooper School.

Copenhagen summit in 1993, after the admission of Austria, Sweden and Finland, to the enlargement to the East. This enlargement, which has no economic justification (8), has potential strategic and military reasons overshadowed by diplomatic considerations, and will anyway entail structural reforms, not only in the common defence, but especially in the agricultural policy and structural funds. To cover only the military aspect, the enlargement to the

East means to reach the borders with Russia and Ukraine, taking under NATO's strategic umbrella the former Communists, who have a physiological fear of Moscow. In order to save at least Belorussia from this advance, and stop the Western powers at the eastern borders of Poland, Eltsin is giving shape to a Moscow-Minsk axis. In any case, this is certainly not a utilitarian phenomenon but rather a historical one, aimed at retaking possession of a wholly European history, mutilated by 50 years of cold war (9). The enlargement has also a humanitarian character, since NATO, whose characteristic is not mainly military, is no more

"against", but "for" someone.

WHAT ARMY FOR 2000?

The role of the Army, even if we accept the principle that Nations should mind their productivity rather than war - and the Army cannot but vouch for this - will never be secondary as to the other institutions.

In March 1998 the member Nations and those sharing the internal and external values of the EU met for a "mutual commitment to peace, security, good neighbourhood, respect for sovereignty and for the EU's principles, for the integrity and inviolability of the external borders, for the principles of International Law which favour the peaceful solution of international disputes through the recourse to the International Court of Justice of the Hague. Hence the need to reestablish a common defence starting from the basis constituted by the WEU Countries. A military alliance will have to be formed, but of a prevalently socio-political nature. Its structure should include not only elements for mutual armed defence, but there should be also cultural, financial and industrial sectors, and even branches for environment protection.

This last aspect was the object of a distressed intervention at the UN, on June 6, 1998, of the Vice President of the US, Al Gore. The worsening of the "greenhouse effect" was described as a battle that must be fought by all. *"After the Soviet expansionism - he stated - we must contain our planet's warm-up"*. Nature, tampered with in a heedless way, rebels and takes revenge. In the next hundred years the earth's temperature will increase by 1.5 to 3.5 degrees, if the emission of gases and carbon oxides is not checked. According to some scientists, "El Niño", mother nature's avenger, has psychological effects, exciting

souls and causing serious tensions that may produce wars, famines and other disasters, such as the French Revolution and, just recently, the political terrorism in Indonesia, with Suharto's fall and the financial panic in the Far East.

If seems that the Kyoto agreements of December 1997 - where the industrial powers pledged to decrease, by 2010, 5% of the gas emissions produced in 1990 - did not advance much. This is also due to the fact that many developing countries are installing highly polluting primary industries; those who can afford it, buy a "Trabant" car or heat their houses with coal.

These countries were not represented in Kyoto or, even if they were, left the burden of gas-reduction to the industrial powers. The role of the military alliances, in this sector, will be that of acting, directly and indirectly, mainly in the field of prevention.

In short, this alliance will be a global one. It will complete, or rather change, the traditional concept of "alliance". Anyway the Eastern Countries will find a shelter in it, on the pretext of a virtual external threat against their sovereignty and independence, but in reality they will join a coalition under an umbrella of high strategic level, knowing very well that they will enjoy an unprecedented global protection. In all this the Army cannot but have a preminent role.

The discussion of the conditions that determine the Army's role would not be complete if one does not examine also international terrorism, which has a planetary dimension and could be a primary threat in the 21st century. It appears that many Countries don't realize this fact and, in order to balance their budgets, cut their military expenses for personnel, experimentations, studies, maintenance and modernization of their equipment. When regimes change, some military are pensioned off, if not removed, as was the case in South Africa,



where Nelson Mandela, after his election, reduced the ranks, discharging mainly the veterans of the special units, who had served the cause of Apartheid. These "bad mercenaries", who knew only the job of soldiering, joined the "Executive Outcomes", the most important world organization of "war monsters", which works with Nations like holdings do with firms. Together with the British "Sandline" and some German, French and other organizations, it is a private concern which gives international advice on the security and defence sectors. Its first intervention took place 5 years ago in Angola, where it helped the Government to recover oil wells and diamond mines. Since then, it has been hired by other African nations, such as Sierra Leone, where it saved 500 children when, in 1995, it reconquered the diamond mines occupied by the rebels in order to finance the insurrection. On that occasion, the forces of the "Executive Outcomes" freed the leaders from the siege of the guerrillas, and were thanked by the Catholic missionaries. They also fought in Papua New Guinea

Armoured car of the 19th "Cavaleggeri Guide" Regiment in Bosnia.

and once more in Angola, signing regular hiring contracts. But they refused to go to Mobutu's aid, in former Zaire, because - being sharp businessmen - they knew that the West and the US would not take kindly to the rescue of the old dictator. The group includes many "stray dogs", some free-lancers, and many Serb veterans who had fought in Bosnia. If a government has a problem (suppression of an armed revolt, defence of the borders, reconquest of infrastructure held by guerrillas) the organization examines the situations on the field, draws a cost estimate and, if the government approves, hires the necessary personnel and intervenes.

A small Army can be mobilized in three weeks, with land, sea and air Officers, military intelligence, logistics (specially medical elements) and even military chaplains.

They go, reach the objective, perform their task, cash the cheque and go back home. They do this

only in favour of lawful governments. The mercenaries of 2000 want to take the place of the Blue Helmets, becoming the Armed instrument of the UN, less costly than those formed by regular units from different nations. They consider themselves more efficient and better trained for carrying out humanitarian missions, escorting food convoys, protecting civilians, giving technical assistance for environment protection and for preventing conflicts. And they are much cheaper. They say that they informed Kofi Annan of their willingness to carry out humanitarian tasks in Africa in place of the international contingents. They reckon that the UN mission in Angola costs a million dollars a day. When the organization defeated the guerrillas in Sierra Leone, respecting human rights, it earned 27 million dollars in all. They consider their interventions "a real bargain". Tens of curricula arrive daily on their Internet site, sent by people who want to work with them. The organization has an office in Pretoria that looks like a stockbroker's bureau (10).

Who can say that this formula is not the good one, considering that many governments have mainly problems of sabotage, terrorist attacks and guerrilla warfare, which must be contrasted with equally specialized and light forces, used to fight without fronts?

CONCLUSIONS

In Italy nobody wants to privatize the Army, entrusting the responsibility of defence and security to a society of "holy drinkers" such as the one described above. We might have to think about it when we realize that reducing the conscript force, without making the salaries of the professional volunteers competitive with those paid by the private industries, means to suppress - little by little - an institution which will find even

nature among its enemies. Prospects are not rosy: a national role, a European role, a NATO role and a UN role are too much for the few operational units still in activity. We need multiple-role, variable-geometry units, promptly employable everywhere, avoiding the crises that at times have affected Cadres and troops also in the past.

The United Europe, once the envisaged common defence is realized, will require a suitable allowance for keeping up an efficient military instrument whose role will continue to be a primary one or, at least, on a level with the part played by other institutions. Furthermore, this role will become "certain", thanks to the integration between defence and protection on the one hand and, on the other, to the clear fact that all the available resources must be used. It is then the EU which will incite to employ all the resources available, to avoid using the false corrective of reducing the defence budget in order to redress part of the public deficit, to shut-down useless military and civilian organizations, to supply the military with new and functional barracks - capable of accommodating also "the other half of the sky" - through the permutation and sale of old infrastructure, to uphold the competitiveness and strength of the military industry. In short, Europe will implement all that was proposed in the Tindemans document, approved by almost two thirds of the European Parliament. In this sense, Europe seems to be on the right path. Its parliamentarians, with their vote of May 1998, proved to have dropped the idea of a "European wing of NATO". Europe will have to play its military card with the US, not so much, and not only, because the Atlantic Alliance is the only organizations which keeps Anglo-Saxon America in Europe, but because it is



"Leopard" tank on reconnaissance near the Sarajevo stadium.

fundamental for the "Western culture" to remain united in an anti-Islam function. China, which is moving to a market economy, in the 21st century could become a "Confucian-culture" military threat, giving a concrete meaning to Huntington's theory. One can only hope that this threat does not come true, proving the American political scientist to be mistaken as Guido von List was (11).

□

**Major General (ret.)*



NOTES

(1) See "Twentieth Century, a Black Century", by Cesare Medail "Corriere della Sera". May 12, 1998, page 29.

(2) Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", Foreign Affairs Review, September 1993.

(3) Bernard Lewis, "Islam and the West", Oxford University Press ed. 1993.

(4) From John-Paul II's speech on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the International Conference on Nutrition, organized in Rome by WHO and FAO on December 5, 1992.

(5) As Blaise Pascal said: "Ne pouvant fortifier la justice, on a justifié la force".

(6) The Anglo-Saxon procedure in force in the Hague and Arisha

Courts envisages that witnesses appear at a public hearing and be submitted to a cross-examination by the public prosecutor and the counsel for the defence. This, sometimes, can give witnesses the impression of being accused.

(7) Leo Tindemans, former Prime Minister of Belgium, prepared a report on "the progressive introduction of a common WEU defence-policy", which was passed in mid-May 1998 by the European Parliament in full session by 340 votes to 94, and 30 abstentions.


(8) When Europe is joined by the vanguard Countries (Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus) by 2003 or 2004, and by those who wish to join but at present don't meet the Maastricht parameters (Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia and Rumania) - excluding

for the moment Turkey, which is a special case because of its dispute with Greece over Cyprus and for the serious Kurdish question - the EU will increase its population by 110 million, while its total income will be lower than the GNP of the Netherlands (an increase of 30% in territory and population, and only 10% in wealth).

(9) See "Now We Can Extend to the East", by A. Bonanni, "Corriere della Sera", May 3, 1998.

(10) See "Mercenaries: UN, Help Us... and We'll Take Care of the Peace" by Riccardo Orizio, "Sette", supplement to "Corriere della Sera", June 4, 1998, pages 110 to 117.

(11) In "The Occult Roots of Nazism", Sugar ed. 1993, Nicolas Goodrick Clarke theorizes about a "Millenary Reich", which fortunately lasted infinitely less.



Since the end of the USA-USSR confrontation the defence industry in Europe has experienced a deep crisis. A process was started to make industry more efficient by means of a supra-national pool of enterprises supported both politically and economically. This international co-operation aims at winning a state-of-the-art, competitive and cost-effective production in the field of defence.



The political and military disruption of the Warsaw Pact culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall required NATO to review its strategy, prompted co-operation with the Eastern European Countries and sped up the European Security and Defence Identity.

The Western governments have reduced their defence budgets and started to re-organise their military forces which were intended for facing the Soviet threat and now considered insufficient for the risks existing in the new world theatre made up of different crisis-breeding areas also far away from Europe.

Today we need light and flexible, joint and multinational armed forces equipped with state-of-the-art technology and capable of reacting to a wide range of unexpected threats by means of wider use of compounded systems.

It is also worth noting that public opinion calls for safe operations and that human lives can only be saved with the aid of sophisticated-technology weapons used to directly or indirectly protect troops.

Modern weapon systems meeting modern armies' requirements have high research costs and go into a small-quantity production because

of the reduced budgets. The defence industry wants to benefit from its investments as much as possible and consequently uses its resources carefully.

Notwithstanding article 223 of the Treaty of Rome, industry must be competitive. In fact competitiveness has become more and more important also within the Defence industry.

In order to offer high-quality products at competitive prices the Italian defence industry has rationalised and reorganised itself courageously: the number of employees has been much reduced and the resources concentrated upon areas of excellence. These measures allowed the Italian defence industry into European partnership.

The generally reduced defence budgets and the small-quantity production call for international co-operation and foreign markets. This cycle suggests almost all Countries, with a few exceptions for the United States, to procure the weapon systems they need through international co-operation.

International co-operation takes place on economic grounds but the participating Countries can then also implement and carry on their respective foreign and security policies, which is important to establish, maintain and strengthen relations with other States.

Thanks to political co-operation national enterprises can take part in international programmes. And this makes possible an exchange of knowledge also in terms of technology, management and procedures. The national industry benefits from this potential international exchange which makes the organisation better, more functional and effective.

But industry will join international co-operation only if common operational requirements for weapon systems are agreed upon. Although this may be difficult at an early stage of the

by Franco Baldi *

programmes, products from different Countries would then perfectly interface when used during international Peace keeping or Humanitarian Operations.

Moreover, within the frame of international co-operation it is easier to export products to third Countries which are not involved in the programmes. In which case there will be an added value only if the co-operating enterprises comply with common export rules and if they do not import parts from Countries which can limit the end-market of the product.

In this respect France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. have an interest in restructuring the European defence industry and started an important process aiming at harmonising their respective national legislation.

Should any of the participating Countries release its production capability it would be granted procurement by an industry now existing at European level, thus implementing a European exchange of defence products following rules similar to those already governing the exchange of other Community goods.

The six participating Countries expressed their common will to refrain from past mistakes and agreed to separate industrial activities from those carried on by governments in order to have a successful outcome in any event.

As you know, sometimes political reasons have forced industry to accept illegitimate obligations, responsibilities and costs. Economic reasons were overwhelmed by political ones and this resulted in the duplication of lines of production or logistic support.

But today governments have adopted a totally different stance on current co-operation. Industry is given autonomy and generally can decide how to join the programmes and how to share out the work obtained from the national political commitment.

«Centauro» armoured car.

As to the share capital of Corporations it is worth noting that in Italy the partially state-owned enterprises are not being imposed managerial guidelines any more and the executives are being given more freedom to make any necessary steps leading to a credit balance.

Moreover, in the near future, the new technologies implemented for designing, developing, producing and managing logistics step by step during its cycle will set a different framework for co-operation programmes. Industry and governments will benefit from office and production automation with savings in general expenses deriving from the optimisation of the production process and the reduced maintenance costs of the modern weapon systems.

This innovation will make industry more competitive and enable governments to acquire less expensive weapon systems requiring a reduced logistic support (particularly referred to stocks).

But the technology-based industrial co-operation requires international standards to be complied with allowing the national industry and the armed forces to exchange information at an international level, which is a critical issue the European Countries are still facing.

In conclusion co-operation is not an option but a must for national governments and defence industry if they want effective and sustainable armed forces and to be competitive on the national and international armaments market.

Europe is a multi-need area with a widespread potential in the field of technology, industry and economy providing grounds also for defence industry co-operation. But this will only grow if the national legislation provides for the transnational integration of



industry and if enterprises are given an international equal status to be competitive world-wide.

With the implementation of the latest design- and management-technologies the production and the procurement of weapon systems will follow new procedures through digital and standard information available to anyone,



anywhere and any time.

The Italian government co-operation policy supports industrial co-operation at the international level. In this framework executives can take their decisions without any political interference as to technical and general policy issues.

In Italy the reorganisation


process is complete today and the Italian industry is now geared to build up European transnational enterprises different from any past conventional joint ventures which caused uneconomical overlapping of structures.

The Italian government and industry are researching and developing new technologies to be

competitive both nationally and in co-operation programmes.

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The targets set by social development are a new and widely accepted reference point to overcome the inequalities threatening our civilized way of living together.

Fostering economic growth and at the same time reducing poverty and unemployment, promoting development processes and respecting different cultures, combating the causes of violence, instability and conflicts actively, have become political prospects which have gathered global consensus.

But a key issue is still unsolved: how to put these prospects into practice.



nor artistic and cultural intuitions, nor those information flows against which undemocratic regimes have always tried to build bulwarks. Interdependence is already an established phenomenon, which is destined to widen its scope.

Today to co-operate with those who are worse off is profitable both for industrialized and developing countries, besides all other considerations.

Decent living conditions reduce the need to emigrate, quell the outburst of violence, both collective and individual, rule out all temptations to adopt undemocratic solutions, limit the unwise employment of natural resources (there is also a detail which will have significant long-term repercussions: 80% of the world future consumers live in developing countries).

There is no doubt that the higher the number of self-sufficient, conscious and responsible people, the better life will be for all.

From the second post-war period to our present days global poverty levels have decreased more than in 5 centuries, over 70% of the world population live in democratic countries, the human rights concept is spreading everywhere and special attention is being paid to the conditions of women.

But huge tragedies are still there: over one quarter of the developing world's population (4 billion and 400 million people) live on a yearly per capita income of less than \$ 750, over 850,000 people are still

suffering from hunger, 1 billion and 300 million people at least do not have drinkable water, 880 million people cannot avail themselves of a public welfare system and about one quarter of teen-agers do not attend compulsory school.

In industrialized countries one person in 6 dies before the age of 60, or undergoes long periods of unemployment, or lives on an income below the national poverty level, or lacks a minimum of instruction. All over the world the poorest of the poor are women: they make up 70% of the total, are 2/3 of the illiterate people and own less than 1% of the land.

Development guarantees stability, peace and security, but to be completely successful it cannot be limited to economic growth only. It must create and maintain new jobs, (the unemployed or underemployed are 2 billion and 800 million people, i.e. 30% of the world active population), further enhance the instruction, health, social organization and environment sectors and abolish all sorts of discrimination stemming from many kinds of racist attitudes.

Everything has changed after the fall of the Berlin wall. A U-turn has been made from the period in which censorship prevailed, political parties and civil associations were outlawed and travel restrictions were imposed. Probably we would never understand the enthusiasm of those who can own a passport


Which problems could be solved at national level, among the major issues presently at stake?

Certainly not intolerant behaviors triggering acts of terrorism, nor conflicts and poverty compelling hordes of desperate people to flee (today 200 million people at least are roaming about the world, the highest figure ever recorded in modern history), nor illegal trade - mainly drug trafficking- nor unemployment, nor environmental disasters or epidemics.

And which among the main assets of our time could be confined within national boundaries? Certainly not scientific discoveries and research, nor technological achievements, nor profits deriving from financial activities and trade,

Poverty is not only the lack of an income, but also of the pre-conditions to live a dignified life, i.e. a decent hygienic/sanitary environment, a minimum level of instruction and security, the possibility of carrying out an adequately compensated job, being informed and taking part in community life.

The fight against poverty is the UNDP's first priority and the UN devoted the 1997-2006 period to it.



for the first time.

Over 400 million people from Eastern Europe and the Independent States Confederation (ISC, made up of 18 countries belonging to the former Soviet Union) have been plunged into the global communication era, where large capitals are moved all over the world in real time; sometimes these sums are huge enough to influence the performance of Stock-Exchanges, money trends and political/economic decisions. The number of travelers has doubled. Telephone tariffs have been reduced, following a constant down-trend started from the first half of the century (3 minutes of conversation between NY and London cost \$ 3 in 1990 and 20 cents today, while in 1930 the price was \$ 244,65). Computer prices have fallen sharply. In 1960 the price of a computer averaged \$ 125,000, while in the '70s it lowered to \$ 19,474 and in the '80s to \$

3,620, now it is slightly over \$ 1,000.

The world created in 1989 was there to be explored, known and tasted. It was a new, agile and stimulating world, but it could be ruthless to the most disadvantaged people, not from an economic point of view only. In fact, they feel highly vulnerable, living in an era where all must be educated and informed, time and space are shortened and role, values, life styles, working systems, personal security criteria, social and cultural reference points are questioned.

The global village must be tailored to human beings rather than markets - cautions the Report on Human Development 1999, drawn up by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and presented to the general public in these last few days. The UNDP, under the UN General Assembly, is the main body which issues guide lines for a «sustainable human development» (i.e. taking into

account the interests of future generations as well) and finances its projects. It is the largest organization established to promote co-operation world-wide. Its central HQs is in NY, its European HQs in Geneva; there are 132 branches in several countries where a residing representative operates and often acts as co-ordinator of UN local activities as well. Since 1989 the UNDP Report has been issued every year and translated into 10 languages. It gives a clear picture of the status and development of the countries all over the world. Main data and considerations, such as average life expectancy, instruction levels, income, women's conditions etc. are centered around a focal point. This year's topic is globalization, with the risk that only a minority may benefit from it. The focus is on three main aspects: an increasingly market-oriented economy, the growing importance of technology and the proliferation of local conflicts, often fueled by the interests of different Mafia groups. The report states that the prevailing requirements of a free-market economy may deviate the attention of public opinion from health, instruction and environment issues. The sudden advent of different neo-liberist theories, which share the common goal of limiting the State presence, has often created a social and emotional trauma, more than an economic/ideological one. In 7 CSI countries the average life expectancy has been reduced by 5 years, while from 1989 to 1995 the percentage of 3-6 year old children attending nursery school shifted from 64% to 36% in Lithuania and from 69% to 54% in Russia. In other countries neo-liberist theories are sometimes looked upon as a dangerous vehicle of individualism and capable of threatening the balance reached by a still patriarchal society. One of its main cornerstones is women's traditional attitude to shoulder all familiar and household responsibilities, without being rewarded, together with the care of the elderly and the most

disadvantaged in general. This is why fundamentalist movements, which affect the 3 monotheistic religions in different ways, share the common goal of establishing rules to restrict women's freedom.

With the advent of the Internet, technology has given such a boost to man's creativeness, which can only be compared to the invention of the press. For the first time the world is really within reach. Who will make the most of it? First of all, financial operators and their environment. It is noteworthy that in the 70's financial transactions amounted to \$10/20 billion daily, in 1996 they averaged \$ 1000 billion and 300 million and from then onward these figures have been rising constantly. Researchers and scholars, operating in the scientific field mainly, are Internet users as well. At last they can communicate overcoming all distance and cost problems. The Internet can also help specialized workers to widen their chances of finding an adequate position in their country or abroad. In 1998 more than 250,000 highly qualified African immigrants with a technological specialization were employed in Europe or the US, where they need a special visa.

Those who oppose undemocratic regimes are also advantaged by the Internet. Post, telephone and fax services can be easily kept under control. This is impossible with the Internet, especially if adequate measures are adopted.

Moreover, among Internet users there is a number of undefined and curious people capable of communicating in English (language used in 80% of sites), learning how to «surf» the net and paying both the entry fee and the telephone bill.

The world of «surfers» comprises 30% of University graduates, mostly male (women are 7% in China and 17% in Japan). Here are some figures: in January 1999 Internet users were not more than 158 million, 88,330,000 of them lived in Canada or the US,

MILITARY COOPERATION OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

on January 17, 1999

Name, year of establishment, tasks and employment areas, personnel and means.

National missions

DIATM (Italian Delegation for Technical-Military Assistance): 1969; advanced and operational training of helicopter pilots; Rabat (Morocco); 1 military personnel.

MIATM (Italian Mission for Technical-Military Assistance): 1988; training of Maltese Armed Forces; Valletta (Malta); 47 military personnel, 50 Army vehicles and 2 Air Force AB 212 helicopters.

GRUPNAV 28 and Italian Delegation of Experts: 1997, anti-immigration and Albanian territorial waters (Durazzo), assistance to and co-operation with Albanian Armed Forces (Tirana); 240 military personnel, several naval units.

Multinational missions

MFO: (Mission of the Multinational Observation Force in the Sinai): 1982; has no dead-line; control of the Straits of Tiran by the units of the 10th Coastal Naval Group; 86 military personnel, Ships Palma, Bambù, Mogano.

ECMM (European Community Monitor Mission): 1991; has no dead-line; EEC observation mission in the former Yugoslavia for monitoring compliance with the terms of the truce agreement; 27 military personnel.

YIPH/2 (Temporary International Presence in the city of Hebron); started in February 1997 with a further 3 month + 3 month extension of its mandate; to ensure the presence of observers for consolidating peace in that Middle-Eastern Region; 27 military personnel.

NATO MISSIONS

JOINT FORCE :to consolidate and stabilize peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and prevent the resuming of hostilities, create a safe environment and support a civil development plan; 2182 military personnel; 1 Brigade (Italian Army), 9 naval units (Navy), 21 aircraft (Air Force).

EAGLE EYE: gathering information from surveillance and/or reconnaissance platforms in the Kosovo air space; 2 Breguet Atlantique aircraft and 1 G-222 for electronic surveillance.

JOINT GUARANTOR: rescue of OSCE verifiers, if the situation deteriorates in their operational areas (Kosovo); 227 military personnel; (1 Centauro Armoured Vehicle Company, 6 armed helicopters).

OSCE MISSIONS

OSCE-KVM (OSCE Mission in Kosovo): to verify compliance with UN Resolutions 1160 and 1199; 132 military personnel.

WEU MISSIONS

MAPE (Multinational Advisory Police Element): 1998; to support Albanian Police Authorities; 9 military personnel.

UN MISSIONS

UNTSO (Truce Supervision Organization): started in 1958; has no dead-line; to monitor the truce between Arab States and Israel (Jerusalem-Israel); 8 military personnel.

UNMOGIP (Observer Group India and Pakistan): started in 1949, has no dead-line; to monitor the truce between India and Pakistan (Srinagar-Pakistan); 7 military personnel.

UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon); started in 1978; its mandate has been extended until July, 31 1998, by Resolution 1151/98 of January 30, 1998; to monitor the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon (Naqurah-Lebanon); 44 Italian Army personnel, 4 helicopters and 4 vehicles.

UNIKOM (Iraq-Quwait Observer Mission): started in 1998, has no dead-line; to monitor the truce in the border-area between Iraq and Quwait (Ummoasir-Iraq); 5 military personnel.

UNSCOM (Special Commission for Disarmament of Iraq): started in 1991, has no dead-line; to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 688; no military personnel (occasional participation on UN request).

MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara): started in 1991, its mandate has been extended until September 21, 1998 (by Resolution 1185 of July 20, 1998), to monitor the Referendum for the independence of Western Sahara from Morocco (Laayoune-Western Sahara); 5 military personnel.

MINUGUA (UN Mission in Guatemala): started in July 1995, is still underway; to monitor human rights in Guatemala; 7 military personnel.

IPFT (BRCKO), its mandate has been extended until June 7, 1995, by Resolution 1174 of June 15, 1998; an Italian military contingent of Police observers is part of the IPTF; 23 military personnel.



37,760,000 in Europe, 26,550,000 in Asia or the Pacific, 4,630,000 in South America, 1,140,000 in Africa, 780,000 in the Middle East.

Projections forecast that they will reach 700 million in 2000, with growth peaks in Canada, the US and Europe mainly. In fact, 96% of the global trade of high-tech equipment is concentrated in these areas, where another well-established trend has gained ground: offering services instead of finished goods, especially in the information, communication, publicity and entertainment sectors.

As regards civil conflicts, another distinguishing aspect of

our time, the UNDP Report underscores a new element: the increasing interaction between violence and business. How many of the 84 conflicts (79 are internal) which have broken out in 3 years and caused 90% of civilian casualties, have been fueled by the interests of several Mafia groups, operating at various levels and in different sectors?

Another more recent and worrying phenomenon is the proliferation of private military companies which operate internationally. The Report's 1st Chapter, *«Civil conflicts, global interests»* Section, page 12 of the English edition, reads as follows:

«Moreover, mercenaries exchange their services for mining and energy concessions mainly. They become an important economic presence in a country, by establishing subsidiary companies operating in the air, transport, road building and trade sectors». A growing number of multinational companies operating in dangerous areas turn to mercenaries to protect their interests. «Military companies, such as Executive Outcomes, Sandline International and Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) - goes on the Report - offer military services and training to governments and large organizations. They have been particularly active in Africa. These hired military groups have no political goals, but pursue their personal gains only. In 1997 MPRI's turnover was over \$48 billion...Hired military services are a threat to man's safety. In fact, they are not under the control of a superior authority and can be regulated with difficulty. National and international bodies of legislation trying to limit mercenary actions have proved to be highly ineffective so far».

In a world which has changed so greatly and is still changing, it is unconceivable that ways of co-operation and their underlying concepts are not deeply modified as well. Multilateral co-operation, for instance, will take on growing importance, mainly because it is typically tailored to operate in really critical areas, outside the scope of bilateral co-operation.

In this respect the issue of governability is a typical example and a pivotal point of UNDP's philosophy and program against poverty. In fact, providing the under-privileged with a minimum amount of resources and credit grants is indispensable but not sufficient to redeem them. This will only be possible if a nation sets favorable political and legal conditions, its private sector produces income and jobs, its civil society is sensitive to issues of public interest and takes on a proactive attitude towards them. The


interaction of these three components allows a country to be governable. Obviously the related advantages will not benefit national citizens only; in fact, governability requires a system based on the rule of law, reliable transactions, wide investment-boosting conditions. Only a multilateral effort can promote very demanding projects, such as studying how to reorganize the executive, legislative and judiciary sectors, establish effective Chambers of Commerce, rehabilitate degraded social environments and carry out other equally difficult plans. The UN's blue banner guarantees political neutrality, competence and impartiality.

Besides governability, there are other guidelines underlying the UNDP's action, such as job creation, better conditions for women, safeguarding the environment. These objectives inevitably take on a cross-sectorial dimension. All projects must be drawn up with and endorsed by the government authorities of the countries concerned, which usually bear over half of the overall costs. The implementation phases are supervised by experts, either national citizens or organizations.

The UNDP is financed by voluntary contributions from governments almost all over the world; the amount of these sums varies from one year to another, depending on political/economic decisions.

Besides funds allocated to fulfill the institutional task of promoting world development, other contributions come from governments wishing to implement special projects in some countries, through the UNDP (the so-called multi-bilateral system).

Italy plays an active and constant role, both in terms of financing and ideas. Our country, for instance, is a reference point for the methodology of decentralized development, after the outstanding results achieved by PRODERE between 1990 and 1995. It was a



In 1994 the 200 richest people in the world owned \$ 444 billion in all; in 1998 the overall amount reached \$1,042 billion. Of these people 65 live in North America, 55 in Europe, 3 in Eastern Europe and in the Independent States Confederation, 43 in Asia and the Pacific Regions, 16 in Arab Countries, 17 in Latin America and 1 in Sub-Saharan Africa.

program, experimental at that time, implemented by Italy to rehabilitate a region in Central Africa which was coming out of a conflict situation.

Local communities are the foundation of decentralized development. Together with UNDP representatives, national government and donor countries' authorities, they must identify critical requirements, resources and potentialities of their respective territories, propose new programs and supervise their implementation. This system offers a series of advantages, if applied to social environments often suffering from isolation, rivalries, century-old disputes and conflicts. In fact it re-establishes the habit of talking,

stresses the importance to living together peacefully, rather than building infrastructure works. This method may also increase the amount of state contributions received, as Municipalities, Provinces, Regions, Non-Governmental Organizations and other associations belonging to several countries are often willing to liaise with local counterparts and set special relationships in particular sectors. Reconstructing a country's social texture allows for the re-entry of refugees, also to the advantage of the nations which have received and still host them.

□

* Journalist

THE ARMY OF



DEVELO

THE FUTURE


Continuing with our effort to encourage the expression of different opinions and discussions on the most important subjects relevant to the structural and operational reorganization of the Service, in this second installment we present two articles by Col. Claudio Graziano:

- “The Army Project for Europe”, which describes the functions of “Combat Approach”, “Multinationality” and “Task Oriented” in the transformation under way.
- “The New Adherence Logistics”, which provides an analytic picture of the new logistic reference-context, stressing the importance of the four principles on which the support of the units operating outside the national territory is based: Great Base; Command and Control; Activities’ Programming; Specialization of the Organizations.

IMPLEMENT PLAN

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

TASK ORIENTED THE ARMY PROJECT FOR EUROPE



by Claudio Graziano *

In the previous installments of this series we outlined the reasons for the renewal of the Service and the consequent structural adaptations deriving from the new concept of dynamic security.

But what are the conceptual parameters that our Army must adopt in order to be fully entitled to play the difficult role of defender of stability and peace in the Balkan-Mediterranean area?

The article "The Army Project for Europe", by Col. Claudio Graziano, gives us several elements for a clear comprehension of the issue.


The work describes the function of "Combat Approach", "Multinationality" and "Task Oriented" in the transformation under way. After a reference to the French model, the Author describes the new "Operational concept of the Italian Army", with particular regard to the problem of Command and Control.

THE REFERENCE PICTURE

During the forty years of bipolar confrontation in Europe the Italian Army, like those of other NATO nations, has been engaged in the preparation of a defence, as effective as possible, against a threat which, as regards origin, direction and intensity was clearly defined. Consequently several generations of brave Italian soldiers took turns along the northeastern border, for a battle which was won but never fought.

Those were the times when the Italian Army was de facto ghettoized at the margins of the Alliance's military instrument, while the destiny of the West was decided in the great Central European Theatre. This was also due to die-hard stereotypes about the efficiency of the Italian Armed Forces.

Today all has changed, at least at strategic level, so much so that our Army, perhaps for the first time



after the end of WWII, is considered, by the Country's political leaders, as the concrete expression of the Country's will to participate in a European project, both within and outside NATO. This decision is made mandatory by the very position of our Country, at the centre of the great Balkan-Mediterranean area, the only one from which, at the present time, real risks for the Old Continent's stability could originate.

These considerations alone would be enough to assign the Army a much more significant national and international role, i.e. the potential role of protagonist in the new policy of common security, as a clear and fundamental

Paratrooper-rangers on training in a wooded area.

instrument of foreign policy at the Country's disposal. As we said, in all this the real change is that, perhaps for the first time, also the political leadership seems to share these ideas, and probably agree with the military on subjects like the need of professionalizing the forces and assigning to the security sector resources adequate to its tasks. Resources which should be at least comparable to those allotted to the equivalent European Armies (France, Germany, United Kingdom).

On the other hand, these ideas



have been expressed mainly as principles but have not yet been translated into actual and concrete realizations, which can only be substantiated with the allocation of sufficient funds, i.e. increased and comparable to the average appropriations of the abovementioned European allies.

In short, all - or almost all - have become convinced that to build and maintain military forces adequate to the prestige of the Country, it is necessary to spend a little more; what is lacking is the will - or perhaps the possibility - of giving the military expenses a higher priority over others that, although infinitely less important, have a high profile and a significant return at the social level. Unfortunately the examples are numerous, and this is not the

place to mention them, but certainly they are such that there is not much room for optimism, in the short term at least. There are, nevertheless, some positive indications in the planning sector, with the recent issue of the first Ministerial Directive, signed by the Minister of Defence, which deals with security requirements and programmatic indications. Although still at an embryonic stage, the directive represents an ambitious and absolutely correct experiment, i.e. that of confirming annually the strategic-military directives on which the processes of general and operational planning should be based. This circular, furthermore, will permit the creation of the long-awaited cascade of directives, starting from the guidelines set by

the politico-strategic summit and then translated into increasingly specialized programme lines at the different Staff levels.

AN EPOCHAL CHANGE

The limits and the persistent problems outlined in the introduction, far from slowing down the course of renewal undertaken by the Service, must represent instead a spur and an incentive to change and to propose to the politicians, as soon as possible, that long-term development plan which the Army has always been missing (this is a little less true for the Navy and the Air Force). Once approved, this plan could become really binding and,

Facing page.

M109 self-propelled gun of the IFOR Italian contingent.

Right.

Italian armoured cars on patrol during the "Albatross" mission in Mozambique

therefore, concrete. This possibility has today more chances of being developed, precisely because of the recent Minister's Directive.

In view of this, the Army has changed all references on which it bases the restructuring of the forces and defines the operational concept in support of the transformation plan. If in the long term the Service continues to be a producer of forces trained for deterrence, on the much more pressing front of probabilities and times of intervention and of multinational control of conflicts the Army must become an instrument capable of bringing forth real operational capabilities at short notice.

The supporting parameters of the conceptual change can be summarized in the following three concepts: **combat approach, multinationality, task oriented.**

COMBAT APPROACH


As far as the first concept is concerned, the experience gained in the peace support operations conducted in the past nine years clearly indicate that success can only come from the deterrence capability of the contingents in the operations area. This, in turn, is the result of the forces operational credibility and, in the final analysis, depends on the real combat capability clearly shown by the formations engaged in operations and visibly supported by an adequate politico-military mandate. Therefore, both within the framework of the new activities of collective peace and security and the more general aims of defence against any possible aggressor, the

"combat capability" reasserts itself as an ever indispensable prerequisite for the conception and constitution of any military formation. The consequence is obvious but, sometimes, neglected: the soldiers of the future will have to be also operators of peace, capable of integrating and working in the social sphere, but they are - and always will be - requested to be essentially warriors, fighters ready to risk their life, but sufficiently trained to avoid losing it. Also this simple rediscovery is essential for finding and travelling the right route of renewal. In any case the achievement of the combat capability cannot be taken for granted because, at training level, it means hardship, rigour, labour as well as a renewed and serious

discipline. An English saying, coined by the best soldiers in the world, affirms: **"more sweat, less blood"**.

MULTINATIONALITY

As regards multinationality, the reasons for its growth, which was unthinkable even for the most convinced and utopian champions of the "common European house" lie in a widespread sharing of strategic security objectives within the international community. In other words, the areas of instability that concern the West European Countries are basically the same for all Nations and - albeit in a slightly different measure - all of them are equally and greatly interested in controlling the crises





in those areas. Furthermore, the absolute need of achieving success in peace operations and the always limited resources at the Armed Forces' disposal, are some of the motives which induced the main European Nations to accept a configuration of the military instruments reduced in size, but joint and decidedly open to multinationality. In this respect, suffice it to think of the German Army which, for a while now, has placed all its forces within multi- or bi-national formations. The issue of multinationality has already been discussed, and will probably be taken up again, on these pages. As a matter of fact, it is an ambitious challenge, and not all the relevant initiatives seem

capable of "taking off" right away and in a positive manner. Besides, its development is affected by political considerations and cultural legacies whose importance cannot be disregarded. So, without entering into any polemic evaluation but, rather, analyzing reality with simple objectivity, it appears much more complex to think of bilateral formations, for example, with Germany - a Nation which has a different geostrategic perception of the importance of Eastern Europe as compared with the Mediterranean area - than with nations sharing similar geostrategic interests: in these terms, the reference to France is all too clear. To conclude this subject, suffice it to mention that, in all the latest

peace missions, the Franco-Italian military forces have always operated under the same command. Also today, the extraction force is commanded by a French general, with an Italian Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander, while in the Alba mission, in Albania, France accepted to place its units under the command of the Italian "framework", and Germany, on the contrary, had declined to participate in the stabilization mission in the Adriatic. One should not overlook the composition of the "Salamandre" multinational division in Bosnia: the components are many, but the "framework" is basically French and, after France, Italy is the Nation with

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"Bersaglieri" during the "Ibis" mission in Somalia.

Right.

AB205 helicopter in landing.

the largest contingent.

An obvious lesson can be learned from all this: the knowledge of languages must be improved. While within the Service it is necessary to create the capabilities to deal with practically all languages, all Cadres and regular troops must have the operational knowledge of English and French, the two languages that our soldiers will have to use in combat, or even just in the defence of peace.

TASK ORIENTED

The last parameter, "task oriented", has the strongest influence on both the new doctrine and the modern structure of the forces in the Italian Army. It is, furthermore, a parameter which most interferes with the other two, imposing a confrontation with the Allies, at concepts and solutions level. Nor would it be conceivable, within the present multinational framework, not to strive for the highest possible integrability in the international environment. On the other hand, the multiform operational requirements and the absolute lack of a well defined threat, as regards dimensions and source, implies the capability of rapidly and timely assuming the task-oriented configuration most suitable to exploit, in the best possible way, the limited resources available. In other words, the previous organization of the Italian Army, based on fixed "task forces", preconstituted at Brigade level, oriented to conduct a defensive battle on the Friulian-Venetian plain, against a perfectly known threat, has lost most of its "raison d'être". This is proved by the fact



that organic units have never taken part in any of the missions carried out by Italy outside the national borders, and the command and control system has always required specific adjustments. This was the case for the first and by now glorious mission led by Gen. Angioni in Lebanon: ITALCON was a Brigade-level unit, but was not based on any Brigade. In the "Airone" mission, in assistance of the Kurdish populations, forces and capabilities were drawn from different structures, while in Somalia and Mozambique the base was closer to specific Brigade Headquarters, but within the contingents there were units from the whole Army. We can conclude with Bosnia, where it would be difficult to find, among the Brigade

Headquarters which have rotated in the Theatre, one having more than 20% of its own organic forces.


Therefore, having to guarantee a high functional flexibility both towards the exterior (multinational integration) and towards the interior (capability of changing the structures according to the tasks) - and all this in times coherent with the intervention options - the land force complexes must be more and more fully integrable in the joint and multinational formations where they are called to operate but, at the same time, they must be integrated, i.e. must ensure the highest internal effectiveness in all the different - and not known in advance - configurations of employment.

"The Italian Army's Capability Packages", is a project which

starts precisely from the three abovementioned parameters, with the purpose of defining and realizing the programmes for the reconfiguration of the Army according to the new scenarios of employment. This means that the project as a whole intends to transform the Service from a traditional military instrument, organized and trained for the defence against a predetermined and direct threat to the national borders, into a completely different organization, able to express complex, integrated and integrable operational capabilities. An instrument, therefore, intended not only for the military defence of the Country, but rather for its global security according to the new Italian strategy, within the NATO and ESDI (European Security and Defence Initiative) strategy, in support of peace and for the preventive and remote control of crises.

THE FRENCH MODEL

In connection to the need of structuring the forces in relation to a specific mission which cannot be assigned in advance to anyone in particular - since it refers to an unknown option of employment - the French Army is the one that has made very interesting decisions, from which it is at least possible to learn some lessons; also because the size of the future transalpine military instrument is completely assimilable to that of the desired Italian model. Furthermore, also very similar are the operational concepts and the strategic perception of the importance of the Mediterranean basin or, as it is called today, of the concept of an "enlarged Mediterranean". Thus, although the Italian Army will probably not be identical to the French one, it certainly will have to be able to integrate more and more with it. Consequently, it will have to be not too dissimilar, at least as



regards the principles of force employment.

Considering only the operational component, we notice that France's transformation process is based on two concepts: the first, "Task Oriented", has already been widely introduced and the second, "Planning Commands", is following the first in the consideration that, once the former is adopted, the latter becomes practically mandatory.

The new operational structure of our transalpine Allies envisages four main organization levels, subordinate to the Chief of the Army Staff: Operational Forces Command, Division-level Planning Staff, Brigades with their subordinate manoeuvre forces and, last, the Regiment level (Fig.1).

Among these, the only one with a fixed and complete organization is precisely the Regiment, which is by far the most important operational and organizational level of the French Army. Its subordination can change, and it can receive additional forces in relation to the mission but, in the end, the manoeuvre will be

conducted by the Regiment's Commander. Therefore, the core of the change is formed by eighty single-branch Regiments (there are a couple of multibranch ones at Djibouti and in Polynesia), each consisting of about 1000 men.

The immediately higher level is the multibranch Brigade, obtained by reducing the preexistent divisional level, with the main purpose of establishing a demultiplier meant also, or mainly, to avoid the dispersion of the fundamental cooperative capability of the different operational functions. Thus the Brigades are organizations light in command and Staff, flexible in their employment, without units and responsibilities for logistic support, and can be completed according to the mission. The command function performed by the Brigades over a certain number of Regiments already in peacetime, must therefore be considered essentially related to the preparation phase. Afterwards each Brigade will be called to operate with forces that could be very different from those originally assigned.

Ranger of the "Col Moschin" 9th Regiment training in a wooded area.

As regards the four Division Headquarters, they don't control any unit responsible for the manoeuvre. They are therefore virtual planning commands, which become operational only when the "Task Oriented" principle is fully applied, assembling, under the Major Unit's command, the operational and logistic forces suited to the envisaged mission. One must remember that the operational concept of the French Army always envisages the participation in a mission of at least a Division Hq., even with only one subordinate Brigade Hq. In this way, the Division is responsible to act at operational level, if no higher organization level is present in the Theatre, leaving to the Brigade only the responsibility for the tactical level. On the other hand, this is a moment of great changes also in France and , therefore, some of these concepts could be subject to variations. In this respect, and for some minor missions, the divisional level could for example find its place within the "Mounting Headquarters" function, without therefore envisaging its deployment in the operations zone.

The last is the "Operational Land Forces Command" level, whose functions are identical to those of the Italian FOTER in Verona, with the only - but important - difference that all Brigades are subordinate to that Command.

To conclude the French example: a clearly expressed strategic consideration deems most unlikely a threat capable of directly involving, in the next fifteen years, the security of the metropolitan territories. Hence the absolute uselessness of an organization structured for this case.

What has been said so far originates the operational concept of the French Army, which in



substance envisages three possible security scenarios: one of European interest (multinational), one of extra-European interest (multinational), and finally one still outside the metropolitan territory, but with an exclusively national configuration. For each option, exhaustive studies have been conducted on the maximum level of the forces available and these studies have been submitted to - and approved by - the political authorities. In substance, the number of theatres that can simultaneously be sustained does

not vary according to the availability of manoeuvre forces, but is rather related to their logistic sustainability and to the availability of Command and Control organizations, considering also the requirements of rotation in the theatre.

THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF THE ITALIAN ARMY TODAY AND TOMORROW

The New Defence Model, recently approved by the Government, entrusts the Italian Armed Forces



Left.

A "Centauro" armoured car in Mozambique.

Facing page.

A unit of the IFOR Italian contingent.

with five joint missions:

- defence of the national territory;
- participation in the collective defence of the Atlantic Alliance;
- participation in multinational operations in support of peace and international security;
- contribution to the safeguard of the Institutions;
- contribution to the relief of the national community in case of disasters.

Among these, of particular importance are, at planning level, the second joint mission (participation in the common security system) and the third one (contribution to the defence of the external interests and of the international security and stability). These are in fact the two types of missions which potentially include the peace-support military operations that are by far the most probable

ones. If the need arises to include within the third mission a reference - improbable, perhaps, but not impossible - to the conduct of security operations - always within the framework of the indispensable and required international legitimation, but carried out only by national forces - these missions give a wide set of employment options for the Army, derived from the possible combinations of the parameters which characterize them, such as:

- type of the operations, which can go from a traditional conflict to the whole spectrum of the so-called other-than-war operations, the latter being, by far, the most probable, if not exclusive, option;
- the operations theatre which, within certain limits, could even be located on the national territory or within the NATO area

of responsibility; but the latter option is not very probable in the short term. The theatre could also be located out-of-area, as has been the case for all operations - past, under way or presumable - in which Italian military formations have participated;

- finally, the operational context, which can be, joint, multinational, or have a Service configuration. As we have seen, the norm will be a joint and integrated context, with a prevailing land component.

On the basis of the assigned missions, and taking into due account the lessons learned from past operations, as well as of the above considerations, also in the light of the experience gained by the Allies, it is possible to derive the employments which should be met by the Army formations.

As we underlined several times, the wide spectrum of tasks and the marked differentiation of the employment scenarios require formations specifically structured to answer the needs. This means that the units, even if assembled in standard formations at their garrisons for reasons of discipline, training and administration, must be appropriately selected and organized into task forces on the basis, and at the moment, of the operational exigencies. The preparation for this is called "force generation", and is also characterized by times of readiness, mixing and deployment. The observance of these times implies the assignment of a **readiness category and status** to the forces and imposes the adoption of exacting organizational measures.

It must be added that, as we have



learned from the Bosnian example, peace support operations are often long but do not imply, a priori, an active armed confrontation. The military formations involved, therefore, are essentially subject to wearing out, owing to the duration of their employment. Thus, one should envisage their periodic rotation, organizing the capabilities and functions to be projected into several groups (as a general rule, there should be three echelons: preparation, employment, reorganization).

On the basis of the elements pointed out and keeping in mind that the military instrument as a whole will have to be able to concur to the common defence in case of direct threat, today the operational units of the Army are organized into three **Capability Packages**, according to the foremost options of employment:

- **projection forces for out-of-area operations**, made up of projectable commands and units, rapidly employable and capable of operating in multinational and joint contexts, manned by volunteers;
- **reaction forces earmarked for NATO's Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces**, for the management of crises in the contingency areas of the Alliance, also constituted by volunteer personnel, but as a second priority;
- **presence and surveillance forces for territorial control**, manned at present by conscripts and capable, in an emergency of helping to meet the needs of common security and defence.

The last package of capabilities, the "Defence Package" includes, if needed, all the forces and capabilities necessary for the unitary

employment of the whole military instrument in defence of the Italian territory.

The Capability Packages are therefore the first attempt at finding a solution to the problem of general planning, acknowledging that, as we said before, there is not a definite adversary anymore and, as a consequence, the operational missions can be expressed only in general terms. Thus the military instrument cannot be built according to a specific mission, nor can it be quantitatively and qualitatively adjusted against a specific enemy. It was therefore necessary to go, from the so-called planning on the threat of the past, to the present system of capability planning.

It should be considered moreover that, in a moment of extraordinary dynamism such as the present, one should pursue flexible solutions, capable of undergoing successive



adjustments. In this sense, the distinction between reaction and projection forces appears to be essentially a planning device, since it refers mainly to the availability of professionals and modern materials. As from the year 2003, this distinction will have no meaning, if not that of attributing to certain units a greater inclination towards some missions rather than towards others. Likewise, if the Army, as it seems certain, were to become entirely formed by professional forces, there would be the immediate need to assign the missions for the control of the territory indifferently to any unit of the Army.

The details regarding the number of theatres and the employment options, envisaged by the Army's operational concept, will be discussed in another

article; now we can say that the Italian Army's staunch support of the "task organization" principles have led to the planning concept that envisaged, for the operational forces, the achievement of a precise objective: a **"Division for Europe"**. This should not be intended as the establishment of a standard formation, but rather as the availability of professional forces capable, for their size and professionalism, of sustaining long-lasting operations, at the maximum level of a Division, to be employed within NATO and WEU initiatives, also in application of the "European Initiative of Defence and Security" project.

As regards planning and preparation, the projection and reaction forces, at least until the complete transition to professionalism, can be based on a

complex of eight Brigades of different types, plus support units. A reservoir of forces where the modular operational capabilities can be located, in order to assemble different types of "Task Force" for employment in all scenarios, outside the national territory, presumably in a medium-term perspective. We are therefore discussing the forces necessary to realize the "Division for Europe", capable of operating in any operational environment outside the Country, always keeping in mind that other forces must be available for strictly national tasks. In conclusion, the concept is based upon the availability of two Division Hqs which, at the start of the project were divided - because of their structural affinity and employment orientation - into two Division-level groups, a heavy one

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Men and equipment of the Italian contingent in Mozambique.

Right.


Soldier of the "Lagunari" Regiment during the SFOR mission in Bosnia.

and a light one. Considering the subsequent changes, such aggregation does not have a particular *raison d'être*, and it seems that the moment has come for at least a partial evolution towards the French model, adapted to the national characteristics. A model envisaging two Division-level planning commands, to which the number and types of units required to carry out any specific mission would be aggregated. Since the two Divisions must have "a priori" the capability of rotating in the Theatre, both should be able to express identical capabilities.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

In the near future the number of aggregations of forces will not be so important since, as is known, the strength of a Brigade can vary from 3000 to 8000 men. What will actually make the difference is the principle of complete modularity of the formations which, within certain organizational limits, will result in the creation of force basins which will include all the operational functions - starting with command and control - to be credited to command and control systems tasked, in advance, with planning activities only. In other words, and this shows the real change of mentality occurred within the Italian Army, the authority in charge of the preparation will no more be the one that leads the forces during the mission, but that which supplies a preparation service to another body, actually responsible for the employment in an emergency.

This concept corresponds in



many ways to the one derived from a dynamic conception, which distinguishes the most modern organization systems and, in the medium term, will bring about the end of the "staff and line" system, upon which all the armies in the world have been traditionally based, in order to proceed to a better performing system, albeit more difficult to manage in the first phase of its introduction.

On the other hand, also the Law on the Reform of the Military Summit has given the responsibility for planning and

employing the Armed Forces, as a whole, to the Chief of Staff of Defence, leaving to the Service Chiefs only the responsibility for their preparation.

As is known, the present Command and Control Organization of the Army envisages a command structure (COMFOTER) responsible for the preparation and employment (and the possible management) of the operational land forces; the latter option could be adopted in the rather unlikely case of a warrant by the CHOD.

From the organization point of



view, the Operational Forces are subordinate to four Major Unit Commands, the Intermediate Operational Commands (COI). One of them, the Projection Forces Command (COMFOP) can be expanded in a joint and multinational sense, and is responsible for out-of-the-border operations, as Command of a generic intervention-force or of the Italian Division assigned to the NATO Reaction Forces. The Alpine Troop Command (COMTA), potentially projectable and expandable, is instead earmarked for taking turns with COMFOP in case of long missions, or could also be called to replenish it in the theatre. The two Projection Commands have their own forces. On the other hand, considering what has been said so far, the assignment in advance of units to the projection commands is, at this

point, conceptually incorrect and not in line with the basic principles of the new Army. Thus it would be indispensable to see the two Projection Commands as the sole assignees of the divisional level, and therefore transformed into pure employment-Staffs, in conformity with the French model. If not directly involved, in relation to the size of the mission, the Projection Forces (FOPs) would also be capable of performing the task of Mounting Headquarters, without having to endure the distractions connected with the management of resources not relevant to the operations under way.

The requirements of the other two intermediate-level command structures, the Defence Operational Forces Commands (COMFOD) are different, since they must meet the operational needs on the national territory and,

therefore, they could easily assume responsibility for the preparation of all operational forces in peacetime, passing the necessary ones to the two FOPs for external projection, or keeping the responsibility for them in case of operations on the national territory. For these levels, the appropriate rank of the commanders should be that of three-star general.

Below the COI, the importance of the Brigade level appears to be confirmed, both for the preparation of the forces and for their coordination in operations even just a little above the regiment level. Also in this sector, there are still problems of organizational simplification and optimization, connected with the impossibility of employing an organic Brigade. There are practically two possible solutions, integrated with each

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The activity of territorial control was of great importance during the mission in Mozambique.

Right.


An NCO of the Italian contingent making friends with two Mozambican children.

other and gradually achievable with the transition to a professional Army. The first one is the transformation of one or two commands of the level considered into further planning-commands, after the subtraction of their manoeuvre and support forces. The second solution is the employment of modular packages of cadres provided by the planning Major Units and by other commands, possibly deprived of the regimental level in order to reinforce the Brigade Hqs to be tasked for a specific mission.

These are not yet acquired concepts, but they can generally represent the evolutionary trend already in the short term.

CONCLUSIONS

The references and concepts outlined in this article certainly describe a cultural revolution in the real conception, preparation and employment of the forces. It is a modern and logically correct project, albeit not the only one possible. But what really counts is its irreversibility after introduction - unless one is willing to accept confusion and, therefore, a reduced effectiveness of the system - and the need to adopt the project in its conceptual essence. In other words, the "task oriented", or if one prefers, the "modularity" principle, functional to the task or to the economy of formations, requires an application as precise as possible. Above all, the personnel in charge of planning should strongly believe in the new model and, therefore, determinedly pursue its



implementation.

On the other hand, and contrary to the indiscriminate distribution of resources made in the past, the project has already permitted to apply the criterion of progressive achievement of capabilities, complete and ready for employment, according to the "Capability Packages" concept. As a result, the Italian Army has already attained a level of operational effectiveness and international credibility higher than ever before.

This should be amply sufficient to dispel the possible remaining


doubts about the reasons and objectives of the change in progress, and should be an encouragement to work hard for its realization. We must remember, besides, that the present one is perhaps the Italian Army's last opportunity to cross with dignity a ford which, although not easy, is certainly within its reach.



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Chief, Planning Office,
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THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

THE NEW ADHERENCE LOGISTICS



BY CLAUDIO GRAZIANO *

Among the various sectorial projects, individually aimed at achieving partial pragmatic objectives in the diverse functional areas of the Army, of particular importance is the project of renewal of logistics in general, and of adherence logistics in particular. As a matter of fact, these are projects that, as a whole, have the purpose of giving shape to the medium-term general planning objective: the realization of the integrated Army model of 137,000 men of all categories, as approved by the Minister of Defence. A model proportionate to the resources assigned and capable of accomplishing its tasks.

In this sense, within the framework of the global revision and rationalization of the Service, and in line with the "Capability Packages" project, which started in 1997 and, at this point, is the supporting frame of the Army Project, many conceptual and organizational resources have been devoted to studies on the adjustment of the Army's Logistic Organization to the changed needs of the operational forces. In substance, it is a matter of pursuing, also in the logistic sector, the development and the concrete realization of working principles and organizational structures consistent with the missions and employment scenarios assigned, and compatible with the available resources.

In this introduction it is necessary to underline that, precisely because of the growing importance and complexity of the "logistic support" problem and the constant increase in the number of missions outside the national territory, logistics is one of the functional sectors of the Service which have been more thoroughly revised within the evolutionary projects under way. Therefore, many nations and concepts expounded in this article are still being tested, but the basic ideas are well-established. Consequently, any



possible change introduced later on should not modify the fundamental concepts.

Thus, the purpose of the present article is to summarize the guidelines and basic concepts of the renewal, keeping in mind that some final organizational solutions could be somewhat different from those described here.

THE LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

As we mentioned before, in the last years the logistic organization has undergone a significant process of rationalization with the purpose of simplifying the procedures and making the system more reactive

A/T team with a "Folgore" gun.

and flexible. In other words, a system capable of fulfilling, with a good cost/effectiveness ratio, the numerous employment options which have replaced the past fundamental ones, based on the defence of the Gorizia Threshold.

During the bipolar confrontation, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the operational land-instrument, including its logistic organization, was carefully and specifically structured for a particular threat, well-known as regards size and origin. The logistic organization was therefore gauged on average instances of employment, thoroughly planned and that could



very probably occur, while the logistic support to units employed outside the border was conceived only in favour of a limited number of formations, for a limited time and at short distances. It might be worth remembering that, besides the delivery of a field hospital during the Korean war and the deployment of a helicopter company at the border between Israel and Lebanon, the only peace mission carried out by units of the Italian Army before 1989 was the one in Lebanon between 1982 and 1983. After that date, there have been so many that it's difficult to count them.

Putting it simply, from a strictly logistic point of view the situation implied:

- allocating to all organizational levels the organic resources necessary to meet the support requirements connected with

employment plans, logistic and operational doctrine, and Intelligence assessments. For example, each Brigade had at its disposal a logistic battalion, capable of meeting the basic requirements of the logistic activities, within a conceptual organization which envisaged, among other things, medium transport-distances, well-defined medical requirements and so on. In other words, since the place and the manner of employment of the various operational units were sufficiently known, all logistic aspects, starting with the organization, could be structured and arranged in view of a well-known mission;

- allocating equipment and materials to the units, and establishing stocks at the various logistic levels, on the basis of assumptions of national employment and allied

Above.

"Istrice" minelaying system on M 113 hull.

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APC assigned to the IFOR mission in the landing phase.

requirements. This involved the immobilization of considerable assets, whose maintenance and technological updating was very costly in terms of resources;

- adopting a support chain which was identical during the operational pauses and in operations, with the ensuing difficulties in training the logistic personnel, since the executive organs were constantly engaged in real support activities.

It must be underlined, anyway, that despite the well-known lack of human resources and materials



which for decades has been a constant factor with the Army, the logistic organization described above was conceptually suited to the requirements of that period, and proved fit for the performance of the tasks assigned.

But today the geostrategic situation is different, involving an epochal transformation of the missions entrusted to the Army, especially as regards the new functions of crisis prevention and control of conflict situations.

The lack of a clearly defined threat and the absence of real external dangers for the Country's integrity, together with the wide diffusion of risks concerning Europe's security and the supernational/multinational globalization of the security needs has oriented the Army towards a conceptually new choice, implying

original solutions in the organization of the Italian military sphere. The solution adopted - similar to what is under study in the Allied Countries, and particularly in France - is a wide introduction of the principles of "modularity" and "task organization" which, at operational-force level, led to a planning system by Capability Packages. This system aims at realizing actual capability basins - represented by basic modules conceived in accordance with each operational function - containing all that is needed for the constitution of task forces suitable for a specific mission. Thus, this criterion has been amply introduced also in the new logistics of the Italian Army. The lack of a standard type of employment does not permit to organize the logistic forces on the basis of that assumption. As a consequence the basic modules, i.e.

the Regiments, will need their own logistic bodies, which are adapted to the mission on a case-by-case basis, drawing from resource basins realized for that purpose.

Now, some recent history. Up to 1991, the logistic-support chain was structured on four levels (rings) - Battalion, Brigade/Corps, Military Region, Central Organization - within which several levels of specialization were realized for the development of the various logistic activities (degrees of the logistic activities). This organization has been simplified and streamlined from 1992 to 1995, joining the 1st and 2nd ring in a common organization, where the logistic battalions of the Brigades and the logistic battalions of manoeuvre (2nd ring) assumed the preminent role of reserve basins, in support of the Regiments' own capabilities, although they carried out similarly

complex logistic activities. Thus, there was no more a cascade of activities, but rather resource basins to draw from, in order to achieve the specific capabilities required by the operational situation.

Afterwards, in a step-by-step rationalization process which is practically still under way, once the concept of the logistic rings was overcome, the logistic organization has been divided starting from 1996, in two main parts:

- adherence logistics, which includes all the executive organs of the operational component, as well as the activities in direct support to the units. In the multinational environment, the adherence logistics is generally called "Combat Service Support";
- support logistics, which sustains the operational component from the outside. This form of support is often called "home base support" or "strategic support".

One of the most important measures recently taken in the renewal of logistic - which is part of the general revision of the Command and Control structure of the Service - was the placement of all the organs of support logistics under the responsibility of a sole Commander: the Logistic Inspector (Fig.1). This permitted, among other things, to separate studies, planning and management, activities which, before, were concentrated at the Logistic Support Division of the Army Staff. The Logistic Inspector is an essential element, which gives the Operational Forces the possibility of expressing all their potential capabilities, corresponding to modular capability-packages suitable for any form of employment, and also expandable by including support elements provided by other Services or Allied Countries.

The Logistic Inspectorate, as

responsible of Support Logistics, performs the tasks of the Central Organizations, those of the territorial support (previously assigned to the Military Regions), as well as those of a certain number of installations of the Technical - Administrative area which carry out maintenance activities that interest the Service which were transferred to the Technical-Operational area. In practice, the Logistic Inspectorate is responsible for defining, obtaining and allocating the resources for logistic support (in operations, in training and in garrison), for the issue of technical guidelines (ILE series) as well as for the "home delivery" of supplies to the users.

Directly subordinate to the Logistic Inspector are two Area Logistic Commands, scaling-down organs with the task of managing on the territory the supply, maintenance and transport logistic formations assigned to the area.

NEEDS FOR CHANGE


Despite the significant innovations described above, the operational

experience of the Army in the last years has shown both the persistence of some shortcomings connected with a residual gravitation to the North-East of "mentality" and resources, and the existence of some functional discontinuity between the two logistic components (i.e. Support, subordinate to the Logistic Inspector, and Adherence, controlled by the Commander of the Operational Land Forces).

Even the direct support to the forces (adherence logistics) seemed to perform less efficiently than expected, considering the remarkable weight of the logistic system as a whole.

Therefore the need emerged to devise a new and far-reaching project, with the objective of achieving a reorganization of logistics, in line with the emerging operational requirements and based on the priorities fixed during the planning process relevant to the "Capability Packages". In view of this, the highest priority was given to the elaboration of a logistic concept for the support of the forces that are to be projected outside the national borders.

The "logistics project", therefore, intends to structure the logistic organization as a whole in such a





way as to enable it to produce "logistic systems", i.e. "organized aggregations of procedures, personnel, equipment and resources, committed to the support of specific missions.

In this perspective, the concept aims at realizing a "home delivery" logistic in the true sense of the word, through the development of preventive activities carried out by the Mounting Hq in favour of the projection force and the tendential annulment of the requests submitted by the user in order to concentrate primarily on a planned and preventive type of logistics. In this way, a specific distribution of responsibilities is achieved between the forces destined to the actual projection and the Command (generally one step higher) responsible on the national territory for all the activities necessary to make the projection possible.

In devising the "logistic system" that had to be activated for conducting operations outside the national territory, a preliminary evaluation was made of the overall size of the forces that the Italian Army could be called to project outside the national borders.

THE ARMY'S OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

On the basis of the assigned missions and keeping in mind that the military instrument as a whole must be capable of contributing to the common defence in case of direct threat, the Army's operational units are organized, according to their envisaged employment, in three Capability Packages: Projection Forces, for peace and security operations outside the national

Heavy ACP 6 x 6 truck, equipped with a platform for transporting "Leopard" tanks.

borders; Reaction Forces for employment with the Immediate and Rapid NATO Reaction Forces; Presence and Surveillance Forces, for territorial control. The last body of capabilities, the Defence Package, includes the Command and Control structures as well as the tactical and logistic support elements indispensable for the "connection" and the unitary employment of the military instrument, as a whole, in defence of the Italian territory.

In this sense, the Army's Operational concept envisages the availability of units capable of:

- accomplishing Peace Support Operations outside the national territory producing as a



M 113 APC, armed with a TOW A/T missile system.

maximum capability, in a single Theatre, a division-level complex of 2 Brigades (or 2 Brigades in different Theatres). This complex will be organized as a Task Force, possibly multinational, projectable and sustainable from the logistic viewpoint and from that of the units' rotation, in case of long operations. Of course there could be other options envisaging more than two Theatres at the same time: in this case, some limitations will have to be accepted, in terms of flexibility and, above all, of sustainability in the long term;

- contributing, together with the

other partners, to deterrence, crisis management and possibly to the defence within NATO, through the engagement of the units assigned to the Reaction Forces of the Alliance or, in case of threat to the national territory, with every resource available;

- performing the tasks connected with the defence of the territory, employing primarily - either in turns or as a mass, according to the contingency - the forces taken from the two remaining divisional units.

In short, the planning system organized by "Capability Packages", which is already working, intends to maximize the effectiveness of a dimensionally modest military instrument vis-à-vis the complex operational requirements that are

only partially foreseeable and somehow subject to changes both in time and in space. The reference objective of the planning - in the medium term, and for the operational forces - is the "Division for Europe", not intended as an organic Major Unit, but rather as a virtual complex, based on the availability of professional forces, able to sustain, for long periods of time, Division-level units to be employed within the framework of NATO or WEU initiatives, also in application of the "European Initiative of Defence and Security".

THE REFERENCE LOGISTIC CONCEPT

With reference to the requirements

described above, the logistic concept adopted as reference concerns the support of formations outside the national territory, and is based on four principles (Fig.2):

- Great Base;
- Command and Control;
- Programming of the activities;
- Specialization of the organizations.

The Great Base

The Great Base (Fig.3) is the model of organization of the available logistic resources, destined to support the projection of the forces outside the national borders and their sustainment in peace support operations and crisis management activities.



The possibility of predetermining the points of probable exit of the forces that are to be projected - basically located in the South East of the Country - is one of the most important points in support of the renewal of the logistic instrument.

The possibility of planning in advance the procedures for the use of port and airport infrastructure, as well as of organizing the necessary resources, is an indubitable advantage, both in terms of efficiency and in terms of economy.

The Great Base is therefore a complex organizational structure of support logistics, prepared in advance, in periods of operational stasis, which is fully activated only at the onset of an emergency. In its most complete configuration, it consists of:

- G.B. Command;
- Operations Room for Support Logistics and Operations Room for Adherence Logistics, logically connected and physically close to each other;
- all the necessary resources, wherever located on the national territory;
- G.B. management unit.

At conceptual level, the Great Base should be the prepositioning place of all the equipment,



materials and weapon systems necessary to realize the projection force for a particular employment and for supporting it during the operations.

To carry out the allotted tasks, the Great Base will need executive bodies in the supply, maintenance and transport sectors, as well as structures for the quartering and training of the units.

The idea is to organize areas and capabilities specifically assigned, capable of receiving the forces to be projected, complete their configuration (and possibly their preparation) for the mission, project and support them during the operation, up to their redeployment (Fig.4).

At first, the Great Base will have an essentially "virtual character",

since it will be realized through the centralization of the control of resources and capabilities located all over all national territory. In the medium term, the structure can take on a more physical form, in order to make the most of the economy deriving from the concentration of materials and equipment, and to optimize the performance of the support units.

Command and Control Organization


Within the picture just outlined, a very important role is played by the "Command and Control Organization" which is the very essence of the working mechanisms both of the Great Base and of the adherence logistics in the Operations Zone. It is based on the availability of Operations Rooms, one for adherence and one for support, specifically designed for the logistic function. The Operations Rooms permit to concentrate and control the activities and to manage the resources, and consequently to achieve the integration between support logistics and adherence logistics, as well as the optimization of the system's effectiveness.

The organization is centralized, and envisages the development of the programming, preparation and control functions - the latter both as pilotage and feedback - appropriately subdivided into operational control and tactical control.

The activity of the Operations Rooms, during the various phases of the action, consists of four stages, in relation to the unit to be projected:

- preparation;
- projection;
- Transfer of Authority (ToA);
- development of the operation, in that the Great Base must exist albeit not in its most complete version, prescinding from the occurrence of an emergency.

When there are no operations in



progress, only one Operations Room is active in the Great Base: the support one. On issue of the warning notice for employment, the preparation phase starts, and the first step is the activation of the logistic system and, therefore, of the adherence Operations Room.

The support Room deals with the transfer of the force to be projected and with the resources needed by the adherence to form and sustain the force. As a result of the reconnaissance activity - carried out, when possible, in the employment zone or, otherwise, on a previsionsal basis - the allocation to the adherence of the necessary resources will then be completed.

While the adherence Operations Room is activated within the Great Base the deployment is also started - beginning with the logistic and security systems - and therefore the first logistic measure will be the activation of an Operations Rooms of the in-theatre adherence (ADERLOG F). This should be the last activity necessary to complete the deployment of the bulk of the projection force.

Up to this moment, the support logistics has operated under the operational Command (OPCOM) of the Logistic Inspector; while the projection force and the adherence logistics have been under the OPCOM of the Mounting Hq. Commander.

Once the projection force has reached the Theatre, the logistic system will pass under the OPCOM of the Commander of the projection force, who carries out his command activities through his own in-theatre Operations Room, which becomes the "master" of the system. At this point, logistics will be under the Operational Control of the Commander of the projection force who, through the in-theatre "master" Operations Room, will be able to manage both the resources in the Operations Zone and those previously allocated to the Great Base.

Logistic Activities' Programming

Another cornerstone of the logistic concept is the Logistic Activities' Programming, typical of the logistics known at NATO as "Directed". Programmes are

based on the statistical-probabilistic analysis of the needs related to the evolution of the situation, and are centered on the development of essentially preventive interventions aimed at lowering the threshold of indeterminacy which characterizes the support to military operations. As a matter of fact, the logistic system must fully meet (Fig.5):

- fully predictable needs (those concerning normal consumption);
- needs that can be predicted (maintenance activities, which are mainly centred on preventive interventions and therefore can be planned);
- needs deriving from logistic stress (flow interruptions, war events, etc.).


As regards the first two types of requirements, it is a matter of gauging correctly the logistic system on the basis of the capabilities, programmed with acceptable precision, with no redundancies or deficiencies.

The needs related to possible logistic stress must be instead be dealt with on a case-by-case basis in a balanced manner, establishing capability flywheels and predisposing urgent interventions.

The Specialization of the Logistic Organizations

The specialization of the directive and executive Logistic Organizations (Fig.6) is at the same time the prerequisite and the objective of the reference logistic concept.


On the one hand, the complexity of the support organization and the costs of its deployment require a marked professionalism of the men and units destined to operate in the logistic sector at all levels. On the other, the same factors and the wide spectrum of missions require the availability of a modular logistic instrument, easily assembled and integrated



when a specific contingency occurs.

The basic organizational philosophy in concentrating all logistic capability and resources (Fig.7). Its end is to construct specialistic modules, to be assembled into logistic task forces suited to the most diverse operational needs, to be employed after due consideration, in order

to enable the Commander responsible for the manoeuvre to operate with the greatest freedom of action. The task forces must integrate the different specialistic modules in a harmonious way, in order to achieve a synergy of employment, but must also be capable of integrating in the different contexts - generally multinational - where they will



have to operate.





From this point of view, the organization of the logistic units is undergoing a complete revision, within the framework of the experimentations mentioned above. The assumption is to maintain the capabilities, albeit substantially reorganized, of the regiment-equivalent units (i.e. units at regiment or independent-battalion level with their own logistic organs).

The executive organizations of adherence logistics should be relieved of the support requirements typical of the periods of operational


Sapper tank on "Leopard" hull, for the Engineer Corps' activities on the battlefield.

FROM READY-MADE TO TASK ORGANIZATION Fig. 7

YESTERDAY-TODAY: DECENTRALIZED UNITS



TOMORROW: CENTRALIZED UNITS




stasis, giving to the Logistic Inspectorate the possibility of “home delivering” what is needed for the support of the regiment-equivalent units. In particular, the possibility is being considered of equipping the supplying organizations (mainly CERICO and CERIMANT) with the transport assets necessary for the “home delivery” of the normal supplies, in order to entrust the transport regiments only with the operational activities. Likewise, in-contact teams must be organized and prepared for the maintenance of weapon systems and combat vehicles, while the other requirements will be met with extensive recourse to civilian firms.

The logistic adherence units, i.e. those operating in the Land Forces Command (COMFOTER) area, will be reorganized as specialized units (transport, maintenance, supply, medical corps) within four Manoeuvre Logistic Regiments (RELOMA) at Forces Command level (Fig.8). These Regiments will include a maintenance battalion, a supply battalion, a medical unit as well as Logistic Contingency Units, and will be flanked by four Transport Regiments (Fig.9). In short, there will be eight “reservoirs”, obtained through the upgrading and reorganization of the existing logistic battalions and Regiments assigned to the various organizational levels (Fig.10), which will provide their logistic capabilities for the constitution of the task forces needed to support the manoeuvre forces engaged in the operations.

The number of units has been calculated on the basis of the maximum options of employment, taken as planning references. Practically, two Brigade-level formations simultaneously employed in long-duration peace support operations in different Theatres (therefore requiring in-Theatre rotation), or the deployment of the Reaction Forces envisaged by NATO in

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE UNITS Fig. 8




case of “art.5” operations.

In operations, RELOMAs and transport Regiments will originate, with their component modules, the so-called “adherence support groups”, which must be considered variable-geometry modular

structures, organized each time in relation to the mission.

The “adherence support group”, established by taking the capabilities from the original logistic units according to the task it is charged with, organizes

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE UNITS Fig. 9





"Centauro" armoured cars of the Italian contingent in Bosnia.

into a logistic system - through a telecoms net - its own resources, those of the Regiments it has to sustain, those released by the Support, the market resources, the Host Nation Support, the multinational capabilities assigned, as well as any other type of resource available.

HOW THE SYSTEM OPERATES

We shall now describe briefly the typical operation of the new Logistic System in the most probable option, i.e. a PSO, which, in our example, is at Division level (Fig.11).


The key elements concurring in the activation of a logistic system for outside - the - border operations are COMFOTER, Support Command, Logistic Inspectorate, Mounting Hq, Great Base,

Projection Forces Command (FOP). COMFOTER draws up the operational planning; in this context, it points out the logistic needs to the Logistic Inspectorate and appoints a Mounting Hq to

each activity. Meanwhile, the Support Command prepares the logistic-administrative order.

The Logistic Inspectorate activates and/or completes the prepositioning of the resources at

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE UNITS Fig. 10





Motor column on a Bosnian road.

the Great Base, directs the gravitation of the logistic activities towards the FOP and prepares the Operations Room of the Great Base (SOSTLOG).

The Mounting Hq is charged with the preparation of the operational and logistic assets of the Projection Force (FOP), and must carry on its activity throughout the whole operational cycle. Normally, as we said, its level is higher than that of the forces projected. To this end, the Mounting Hq will employ its own assets' and/or the resources assigned for the specific need.

The FOP Hq activates the adherence component of the logistic systems, using its own assets as well as those received as reinforcements. Normally the logistic command of the FOP is the sole "controller" of Adherence Logistics.


The "core capability" of

Adherence Logistics in operations is the Adherence Support Group, whose main characteristics have already been described.

The Adherence Support Group is a logistic task force (logistic

employment-unit), complete with all its functional components and especially structured for employment in a specific operational mission.

The figure shows its functional





M 109 L self-propelled gun in Bosnia.

position and the scheme by blocks in operations (logistic system).

The Adherence Support Group is located between SOSTLOG, active in the Great Base, and the Regiments it supports. The system's "master" is ADERLOG-F (forward), the one realized in the Theatre, which has its own "dependence" represented by the operations room "housed" in the Great Base and side by side with SOSTLOG, for the real-time control of the resources assigned by Support to the operations under way, as well as for the interface with the Support Logistics on the national territory. Thus the "fracture" between Support and

Adherence is healed. The resources, stocked in the Great Base at ADERLOG's disposal, correspond to the logistic programmed requirements for the entire operation, or for an appropriately long operational phase.

In order to control capabilities and activities in operations, ADERLOG-F will avail itself of a telecoms net which integrates its own capabilities with those of the logistic system (Adherence Management Units- UGA).

In a NATO context, the Adherence Support Group generally corresponds to the DSG (Division Support Group), while ADERLOG-F, which operates at national Division or Contingent Hq level, detaches part of its elements to the Theatre MJLC (Multinational Joint

Logistic Centre).

A possible variation to the Logistic System outlined above could become necessary in case of a great distance between the operation theatre and the home country.

In that particular case, it could become indispensable to "project" elements of support logistics, extending the Great Base to the operation theatre or its immediate surroundings.

Here is a synthetic description of the main guidelines for the operation of the various branches of logistic support which work on the basis of the C2 logistic system outlined above:

- **Medical Service** (Fig.12): the regiment-level units will have their own ROLE 1 NATO capabilities



6 x 6 crane-truck.

and - if they are isolated - will have at their disposal the additional resources necessary for obtaining stabilization before the evacuation. ROLE 2 and ROLE 3 must be available in the Theatre, but multinational or joint organizations can be employed in order to save resources. ROLE 4 is represented by the territorial medical organizational of ISPEL, with particular reference to the Military Polyclinic;

- **Supplies:** the organization of the Great Base and the organization for the transfer to the operation's commander of the resources destined for the specific logistic system, permit to reduce the in-

NATO ROLE SPECIFICATIONS

Fig. 12

- 1** Assembly - Evacuation to higher level.
First aid and stabilization for evacuation.
Routine medical support.
- 2** Assembly (direct or from ROLE 1) and sorting.
NBC decontamination.
Emergency surgery, to save lives and for stabilization.
- 3** Assembly and sorting - Evacuation to higher level.
Surgery to save lives and organs (within 6 hours).
Hospitalization.
- 4** Long treatments and hospitalization.
Evacuation to civilian organizations.

NOTE: Each ROLE provides also the capabilities of the lower ROLES.



The distribution of essential supplies is one of the many activities of the humanitarian missions.

Theatre stocks to the lowest functional levels, provided that the resources of the Great Base be kept at an even level and the means for activating the flows of "urgent" supplies be made readily available. The organization will be based on units of measurement such as pallets and containers endeavouring, if possible, to prepare at home the loads destined to the final user; in order to reduce the need to recondition the loads in the Theatre. The management of the


flows will require a great effort to improve the computerized system of management and control of cargos;

- **Maintenance:** the basic policy's goal is to achieve the efficiency of the means for the operational activity through the concentration of the preventive activities and the rotation of unserviceable materials with others in stock. To this end, there must be an in-Theatre functional reserve - gauged on the operational requirements - both for the periodical rotations and for the actual contingencies. The corrective activities should be preferably carried out at the Great Base, through a further rotation of the in-Theatre

equipment; the execution of corrective activities in the Theatre should be considered a makeshift solution, imposed by particular situations such as, for instance, the excessive distance from the home country.

Transport: the adoption of pallets, containers and dismountable platforms will reduce the loading and unloading times, optimizing the employment of the personnel involved and simplifying the system's management.

In view of this, any measure for the best computerized management of the loads will have to be taken, initially at manual level and then through the implementation of the "asset tracking" systems now under study.



Members of a logistic unit engaged in the maintenance of an armoured car in Bosnia.

CONCLUSIONS

The revision of the system of logistic support to the operational units, as was synthetically represented in this article, has the ambitious objective of improving the efficiency of the support, reducing the resources destined to that support. It is certainly an exacting goal but not impossible to achieve in view of the growing professionalism and professionalization.

Beyond the necessary organizational

interventions - already being applied - and the need for a radical technological growth as regards in particular the computerized management of logistics, the new logistics - like all other partial projects that, as a whole, form the Army's development plan - asks the Cadres to change their mentality, in view of an instrument which probably will not be very similar to the one we used to know.

The general concept is that the forces will no more be structured on an average case of employment, but will have to be capable of carrying out a variable plurality of particular employments, structuring themselves, with high readiness standards, on the base of

the tasks assigned.


To say it more simply, the Army will go from a "ready-made" organization, typical of a bipolar confrontation, to a "tailor-made" one, corresponding to the requirements of the "task oriented" period. This is true also in the sector of logistic support. It is not an easy challenge, but it is essential to meet it, in order to continue growing within a reality which, vis-à-vis the increasing operational tasks, does not seem to be willing to increase the resources destined to the defence function.

□

**Colonel,
Chief, Planning Office,
Army General Staff*

We learn from our mistakes





THE LESSONS LEARNED CYCLE

by Pierluigi Monteduro * e Michele Risi **

During World War I the armies fought along the Western front unsuccessfully four years. Both the Alliance and the Entente made their efforts to find new weapons, doctrine and operational procedures and get out of that stalemate. The Alliance opted for an indirect approach which led to the *Gallipoli* and *Salonicco* Campaigns, for

particular thanks to the new concept of Deep Defence it defeated the British and French troops during the bloody battles of the *Somme*.

In 1918 the Germans took advantage of the situation and launched an attack on the base of their Deep Defence principle and also making the best out of the mistakes the Alliance had made previously.

The thorough change in the structure of the German armed forces was brought about by the military itself. And this epoch-making change paved the way for a new warfare which would last the next 40 years.

The new offensive doctrine was based on the simultaneous and targeted use of manoeuvre and fire power. Infantry attacked the weakest points of the enemy's defence line with the support of fire adjusted to the situation. In conclusion there was no pre-planned action.

The new doctrine was not conceived by a genius. On the contrary it resulted from common experiences of soldiers. The changes were not just in

This is an ideal forum of discussion to make the best out of past mistakes made during national and international missions in order to check the skills of Officers and NCOs, test doctrine and operational procedures and finally set a permanent updating programme for future changes.

technology – a tank was used for the first time – and used their fire power to mechanically open the enemy's defence line.

On the other hand the German Empire reviewed its doctrines and reorganised its army, also availing itself of new technologies. In

theory but immediately taught and experimented at schools and training centres as part of a global programme involving soldiers and units. But there were no binding rules. On the contrary there was an on-going adjustment to the changing situation of the battlefield.

This means that there are lessons to be learned also in warfare.

The variables the British and the French took into account were Strategy, Technology and Equipment without including Organisation. The latter was instead considered by the German army which introduced innovations by analysing past mistakes.

THE LESSONS LEARNED CYCLE

Until recently past experiences were not considered as a valuable resource by the Military.

In recent times out-of-area Peace Support Operations have become more frequent and allowed to understand that mistakes can be avoided. That is why the lessons learned from experiences have been extended to all the armed forces in order to prevent mistakes from being made again in the future.

In the month of June 1997 the Chief of the Army General Staff set the rules to collect, evaluate and circulate the lessons learned and called them "Cycle of the lessons learned".

The major aims of this programme include:

- analysing past mistakes to prevent them from occurring again;
- checking the training level during operations and to give directions to fill the gaps;
- testing doctrine and procedures in the light of past experiences to



consequently update them;

- having targeted education and training to increase the unit's skills.

The above mentioned directions allowed for studying past experiences systematically and disseminating the lessons learned among Officers and NCOs.

Nine seminars on the major operations and tasks assigned to the Italian Army have taken place so far. Those who gave their contributions focused on mistakes which had been made and that could have been avoided.

Instead of blaming anyone for the mistakes the seminars aim at taking advantage of past experiences in order to change

mistakes into added value. This approach has prompted changes in doctrine and procedures which may prevent mistakes from being made in the future. At the same time it was understood that complex problems can be solved by deeply revising training, specialisation and education of Officers and NCOs, and the organisation as well.

Doctrine, Training, Education of Officers and NCOs, Organisation, Logistics for Personnel and Equipment are the 5 pillars supporting the Army, which have to be reinforced depending on the situation in order to fill the gaps.

At the beginning of the seminars the participants give



their contributions as to the tasks carried out and the problems faced during the mission. After that, branch-oriented (G-1, G-2, etc.) working parties - including personnel directly or indirectly interested in the issue - make a final statement as to problems/mistakes, lessons learned and proposals. Said document is then delivered to all Brigade Headquarters and Divisions of the Army General Staff which make an appropriate analysis and take their decisions. Later on the Training and Doctrine Office of the Army General Staff asks all Divisions of the Army General Staff to report the step made to fill the gaps referred to during the seminar. These decisions are then

disseminated downwards to the units through the Inspectorate of the Schools.

In Italy several Inspectorates are responsible for collecting and processing information. And they are also responsible for implementing changes to training, doctrine, procedures and organisation. From the lessons learned schools and military education bodies have prompted changes to doctrine, training and procedures; the Logistic Inspectorate and the Logistic Support Division set new technical and operational requirements for future equipment and also changes to the Army Logistic Doctrine.

Thanks to the lessons learned a

Lebanon: Soldiers of the Italian Contingent.

lot has been done to fill the gaps. The decisions taken address the Army as a whole, from Command and Control to Intelligence, from Procedures to Logistics which is the driving power of any successful operations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

In past out-of-area operations Command and Control were not successful. Headquarters were not sufficiently manned to plan and implement their tasks. The Staff

was collected among people who had never met before and who had experienced no common training and no spontaneous mutual understanding. The Command organisation was never up to the situation (the Alba Operation Force Commander had to pull as many as 22 wires!) and the desirable changes to the Command and Control organisation required a lot of time to be implemented. Moreover the national routine duties took a great effort from the Army General Staff. Officers and NCOs at the Headquarters were not trained to work autonomously and to co-operate with the staff from other countries.

After such analysis a proposal was made to set two Commands in charge of planning, which can potentially become Joint and Combined. Said Commands should include no forces and, during operations, should be only in charge of Command and Control. Within this framework all Brigades would belong to two Defence Combat Forces (FOD – Forze Operative di Difesa) responsible for training the units.

So there would be mutual agreement within staff who would be well trained as to planning and procedures and the Command organisation could then be adjusted to the different situations.

From the educational point of view major changes have been made aiming at establishing a lifelong education of personnel who must be updated steadily during their careers in order to give them the Know How to face any situations.

In this respect, as far as Officers' education is concerned, it should be emphasised that currently the staff course is based on an initial 3-month phase aiming at harmonising the knowledge of the participating Officers and which prepares to the second 5-month phase held at the War College. The course is divided into 8 sections addressing any possible scenarios



IFOR: A "Bersagliere" on duty.

from the methodological and operational point of view.

At the War College other courses are being held, including **Informative Sessions** for Large Unit Commanders, **Informative Sessions** for Regiment and Battalion Commanders, **Qualifying**

Courses attended by Officers committed to headquarters. The High Staff Course itself was established to harmonise the military executives' knowledge in the light of modern operations which are generally carried out by combined forces.

The Army General Staff has also actively supported Officers and NCOs participating in international meetings and



courses. The completely new training process for Marescialli, based on the study of university subjects (such as: geography, history, war international law, planning and organisation of simple structures), enables the would-be Commander of task forces to develop a professional background that makes him able to cope with and solve problems in unstable and changing environments autonomously.

Training courses for Sergeants and Volunteers, lasting four and two months respectively, provide for teaching elements of humanitarian law for armed conflicts, elements of anthropic geography and history of international organisations.

From a doctrinal point of view, the Army staff has prepared the 1ST edition of its publication on Command and Control. It introduces

a new decision-making process more similar to that of NATO, more flexible and employable in different situations, scenarios and time limits.

It also gives new methodological instruments aimed at coordinating operational functions: synchronisation blueprint, target selection process, wargaming in contingency planning.

Moreover, said document stated the basic criteria to create

Command Posts. The most important one is: a structure based on functions, modules and extension.

Again, at doctrinal level, the Plans and Situation Office of the Army Staff has issued directives defining the tasks to be fulfilled so that forces can be employed on call according to pre-established employment scenarios.

Another lesson learned during the seminars is the insufficient knowledge of foreign languages, mainly English. This drawback has impaired communications between Staffs of Units employed in out-of-area operations and within PFP programs. It has turned out to be particularly serious when personnel concerned have been assigned major functions.

To overcome these obstacles, the Army Staff and the Schools Inspectorate are following a new policy which stresses the importance of language training, also thanks to the effectual co-operation of the Foreign Languages School of the Army.

Measures taken provide for new courses to be held at the School of Foreign Languages, which do not focus any longer on "every day language", but on a professional language to be used on-duty and in particular on the knowledge of procedures in force within NATO.

Therefore, the School of Foreign Languages aims at giving personnel selected to cover special positions a training tailored to each job description, based on their assigned tasks. So, as the knowledge of foreign languages has been given great importance, one of the major goals of our training Schools is the knowledge of one of the NATO languages. Personnel wishing to attend the Joint Staff School can be selected only if their knowledge of English is good.

"Out-of area" operations have shown a lack of technical and procedural directives allowing for the interconnection and integration between different C2 systems of the




three Armed Forces. This problem will be solved establishing a "top-level C4I Task Force" charged with making the C4I systems of the three Armed Forces interoperable and with developing an operational requirement for a C4I system that can not only be used by each Armed Force but also jointly and within NATO.

During territorial control operations and particularly during "Forza Paris", the need has been felt to use automated Command and Control Systems. The insufficient interoperability between the Command and Control Automated System (SIACCON) and the Command and Control Training System (SIR) is the source of the most serious problems. These have been partially solved and will be further validated during exercises scheduled for this year.

Even during the earthquake in Umbria and in the Marche regions, some structural difficulties have come up, which have shown that the structure of the Military Region Command is not up to the required standard to cope with this kind of situation. This is why it has been necessary to change the Command structure and its functions.

A "Red alert" Force has been established and the Army is tasked



with providing its *Framework Unit*. This implies the activation of one Brigade Command and of several units at Regimental level which have been selected to carry out the mission and are listed in the specific planning documents.

INTELLIGENCE

As for *Intelligence*, lessons learned from recent out-of-area

Left.
Sarajevo: "Bersaglieri" inspecting the wreck of a vehicle.

Below.
Officer talking to Somalis.

Right.
Forza Paris Operation: Paratrooper Patrol.

operations have highlighted two kinds of flaws: the first refers to the availability of an information support since the very first phase of the operation and the second refers to the structural inadequacy of intelligence agencies at Brigade and Force Command level.

As far as doctrine and training are concerned, the necessity has



"insiders" to pay a greater attention to the "so-called" general issues, that is historic, sociological and cultural aspects. These must be known even at tactical level, particularly at the lowest organisational levels and must no longer be within the jurisdiction of the strategic level only as, for instance, an inappropriate behaviour can doom the entire mission.

PSOs have also confirmed the strong segmentation of the Army Staff sections, and particularly G-2, G-5 and PSYOPS and the result has been an unsatisfactory maximisation of the intelligence sources.

As for the organisational level, on the contrary, Regiment and Brigade Commands have turned out to be undersized.

To date, guidelines have been indicated to strengthen the intelligence Section of a Brigade

Command with analysts, experts in the local language, area experts, SIGINT experts, photo interpreters and experts in interrogating prisoners. Moreover, a proposal has been put forward to equip Brigades with research and information collecting agencies, both organic and attached, tailored to carry out the missions.

Therefore, the possibility has been envisaged to assign Military Police units, electronic research cells, human intelligence (HUMINT) cells and to access open and closed local sources.

As for materials, the Battlefield Surveillance and Target Acquisition Sub-system (SORAO) has again been considered useful and, though created for PSOs or territorial control operations, it seems to be up to the required standard. The data cross-reference centre (CCD) allows for the integration of counter fire radars,

been confirmed for intelligence activities to start very early, since the alert phase, and all Command levels must be included to allow for a proper planning. Based on the main mission the unit has been tasked with, Regiment and Brigade information agencies must collect all information to constantly update the situation of the area of possible deployment.

Moreover, PSOs, unlike traditional war operations, force a part of the



CRESO system and unmanned crafts like RVP and *Drones*.

As for the training system, up to individual combat training level, military personnel are now trained to find out signs of critical situations as considered by the Commander.

Multimedia aids are now being studied to develop more effective training procedures.

At operational /strategic level, updated information on the area of operation could be available only after a Cell of the Joint Intelligence

Centre has been set up, whose intelligence activity allows for integrating and maximising resources for information research and collection. Moreover, splitting the information flow into two parts, one for the Multinational Force and the other for the National Operational Chain, has made the information management slow and inadequate.

After this experience, the need has been felt to assign a cell to the National Command of the Contingent for out-of-area

operations. This cell will be tasked with monitoring assets for research and information collection and with managing the information flow, including data from exclusively national sources.

To evaluate the situation at strategic and operational level, joint intelligence agencies have been tasked with conducting intelligence activities at strategic level to fulfil the need for a constantly updated situation.

Said activities are to be conducted within areas of major



strategic relevance according to the Chief of the General Army Staff in compliance with the ministerial directives which are the primary source of the whole operational and force planning.

A solution has been finally found to the problem created by national regulations which do not provide for the employment of crypto-approved materials for the State Secret protection in an international context including NATO and PfP countries.

To overcome this obstacle,

materials approved by the National Security Authority are being supplied and can be used to fulfil specific needs, modified or alienated later on.

OPERATIONS

As regards operations, the main issue, which is the source of all other problems, is the fact that those who carried out an operation had to shoulder the responsibility of organizing great part of it as well.

"Vespri Siciliani" Operation: Patrolling.

Other drawbacks were also the limited time available between the "force alert" and the "force prepare" orders, the difficulties stemming from a lack of intelligence and from other unclear orders issued during the preparation phase at home.

The Command of the "Alba" mission, for instance, had to plan, organise, set up its C2 in the field,

"Centauro" armoured vehicle patrolling a Bosnian motor-way.

project its Command and forces into the theatre and at the same time carry on its routine activities at home.

The Army General Staff has adopted a series of measures mainly based on the implementation of the following concepts: operational cycle, Mounting Headquarters and top-down planning (colloquially called the "Chinese box" principle).

The first concept tackles the problem of readiness and sustainment of out-of-area operations. By defining the phases of a yearly operational cycle - general preparation, preparation based on an OPORD, employment and recovery - the aim was to allow Commands and units to successfully operate and adequately prepare their forces to carry out their mission and finally recover their combat capability and reorganise.

With the introduction of the Mounting Headquarters, the earmarked unit is exonerated from all activities not dealing with the preparation and accomplishment of its assigned operational task. In essence, there was the need to task a Command with all organisational duties, monitoring the entry of combat-ready units into the theatre (Mounting HQs). This Command has to carry out operations including troops' assembly, preparation, staging within the "augmentation area", movement at loading points and embarkation on carriers to convey them into the theatre. "Top-down planning" has allowed Commands, upon receiving a mission order, to adapt the size of their instrument to the time available and to streamline their planning phase, ruling out the technicalities connected with force generation processes.

In general, both in out-of-area and territorial control operations, or in missions to support to the earth-quake stricken population in the Umbria region, media relations



have not been adequately developed and have sometimes become confrontational, during the alert, preparation and development stages. Moreover, psychological operations (PSYOPS) have been limited during out-of-area operations.

Problems of this kind, which are taking on an increasing importance, have sparked a two-pronged debate: one solution is to create a wide-spread range of capabilities, by giving a specialised training to a certain number of personnel who will attend national and international courses; the other solution is to set up a joint centre, where personnel and means earmarked for these operations will be pooled together.

As regards the manoeuvre function, the main problems stem from: "limited" awareness of areas of deployment and areas of responsibility at regimental level; constant break-up of the links between patrols and sub-units, lack of materials employed in field fortifications and deployment areas; wide-spread dispersion of troops,

with repercussions at logistic, administrative and communication levels; need of marksmen and non lethal weapons and munitions.

The following provisions will be adopted in the organisational sector: task forces at regimental level will organically avail themselves of light Infantry units belonging to an armoured vehicle Company; 6 high accurate rifles will be assigned to a team of marksmen, made up of personnel capable of acting autonomously; one medical platoon will be set up within the Command and Support Company.

In the training sector the Infantry School has adopted a number of kits and simulators to enhance the training of personnel using CENTAURO armoured vehicles in PSOs, in the field of convoy escort, route control and cordoning operations.

A MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War) Centre has been established at Cesano (Center of Italy), mainly tasked with training units' instructors in this field.

The participation of the artillery in

Engineer ordnance-disposal experts de-activating explosive ordnance confiscated during a SFOR mission.


Peace-Support Operations has required doctrine and training sectors to be also revised. The Army Staff Doctrine Training and Regulations (DAR) Office, taking into account out-of-area requirements, has drawn up a document indicating the "Guidelines for the employment of field artillery in peace support operations". In fact, the artillery takes on a "strategic" importance in this kind of missions, thanks to its capability of deterrence which does not necessarily require large deployments, but can also be exerted by employing a single tank.

In the Engineer sector, the main lessons drawn from the experience of out-of-area operations are the following:

- requirement to assist in clearing areas of operations,
- need to reinforce the Engineer component within Large Units;
- insufficient means to ensure water supplies;
- increasing demand of Engineer units to carry out targeted operations in support of civilians.

These problems have been solved at organisational level by establishing one Army Operational Centre for clearance operations – within the Engineer School – tasked with training ordnance-disposal personnel in the anti-sabotage role as well; one water conditioning platoon to meet local water requirements; one Area clearance Centre, with one mine clearance expert assigned to the Contingent's Operations Room and with Engineer Officers and NCOs who served in reconnaissance teams and can organise an "Engineer squad" within the Civil-Military Co-operation Cell.

In the training sector, volunteer and regular personnel's specialisation programs have been revised. Special training periods have been devoted to instruct personnel on "Engineer



works", "field fortifications" and mine clearance.

As regards materials, the need has been felt to carry out a general updating and upgrading in the sectors of water sterilisation equipment, high power stations and communication systems to be shelterised. The requirement has also been perceived to modernise the materials necessary to guarantee logistic trafficability, as those currently in use have become obsolete and insufficient.

LOGISTICS

Out-of-area operations have given a great spur to the reorganisation of logistics. Drawing from the experience of the lessons learned, this sector has been streamlined and simplified, to overcome all functional gaps between general support and close combat support and balance the ratio between combat and logistic forces, which was tipped in favour of the latter.

Logistic agencies have also been

downsized, to reduce the number of personnel operating in the close combat support area and rationalise the logistic and administrative functions of a force Command in operations outside the home territory.

These seminars have highlighted the fact that, during the operations in the Balkans, supplies, transport and general services have not always been adequate to the logistic requirements of the forces in the field. In general material supplies, especially vehicle spare parts, have met delays and drawbacks. This has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the vehicles. To overcome all supply problems, the concept of a "Home Base" has been devised, which is tasked with supporting forces' projection and sustainment abroad. The base includes an agency to co-ordinate ADERLOG (close combat support) and SOSTLOG (general support) and is equipped with one Operations Room for general support and one or two Operations Rooms for close combat

support, to ensure a seamless transition between the two.

Peace support operations have also advised against carrying out maintenance activities in the theatre, not to put an extra burden on the military and lower its effectiveness.

A solution has been adopted to increase the number of "on-site teams" belonging to logistics operational agencies and made up of highly specialised personnel. These squads are assigned to the close combat support sector, when on-site maintenance is required.

Moreover, as doctrine is concerned, a new maintenance policy has been enforced, based on the principle that a vehicle which is out-of-order must be replaced. Thanks to this solution, situations in which it was extremely difficult for a unit to carry out repairs with its own

was the inadequacy of military and civilian carriers, as regards their transport capabilities and frequency of connections. A solution has been envisaged by allocating transport carriers, such as ad-hoc units (vehicle, helicopters) or movement credits (military and commercial ships and aircraft) to move troops and materials.

Another problem on the table was that of the existing regulations. The new Army Logistic Inspectorate has studied and overcome contractual red tape linked to tender procedures, as provided for by the present rules. In fact, the compliance with these rules made it difficult to find companies capable of ensuring *on call catering services*.

The regulations adopted take into account these new



resources or on-site structures were successfully overcome. In future, fielded units will be reinforced through a stockpile of vehicles, commensurate to the time necessary to receive a piece of equipment from the home country and to their basic loads. Maintenance activity will be carried out within the capabilities of field unit's operational teams. Other equipment will be replaced using the stocks in store at the "Home Base".

Among other problems there

requirements and have established more streamlined administrative procedures in this and other sectors, compared to the past.

Materials have been updated, thanks to the lesson learned, as in the case of the Army Aviation, which has fielded a particle filter on aircraft operating in sandy environments, or in the case of the Transport and Materials Branch, which has introduced into service a Tactical Logistical Truck (ACTL),



Above.

"Vespri Siciliani" Operation: Roadblock.

Left.

Armoured vehicles of the 19th Reconnaissance Regiment "Cavalleggeri Guide" in Bosnia.

to enhance its transport capabilities, and other special vehicles (tank trucks in an ACTL version and 500 l. flexible tanks) to fulfil water supply requirements.

The fielding of the "CENTAURO 4 P" is particularly noteworthy, as this vehicle has been designed to meet the need for a means capable of guaranteeing both mobility and personnel safety.

The first version of the CENTAURO has been modified to accommodate 4 fully equipped men, besides its crew.

CONCLUSION

To sum up the results of the



first round of lesson learned, we have concluded that the Army is engaged in a cultural revolution in which the staff, tired of co-starring only, want to play a leading role.

Certainly it was not easy for those who were explaining their experiences to the audience of a seminar to avow the mistakes made when they had been trying to do their best. They were obviously somewhat reluctant to admit their faults, but then realised that the best way to exploit their experience was to analyse the most unsuccessful events.

Units and Commands have acknowledged that some changes have to be made, notwithstanding the results of the first cycle of lesson learned. The question is: what was wrong with the analysis of the lesson learned? Perhaps the approach should have been more global.

Each problem, either at C2, fire support or logistic level, was solved by choosing a solution

which tackled training, organisational structures or materials separately. A single problem has never triggered a simultaneous and synchronised revision of doctrine, training, organisational structures, materials and personnel. In fact, these sectors are still looked upon from a static point of view, and not systemically and procedurally.

Seminars alone are obviously not sufficient to fully exploit the experiences made by the Army. In fact, both training and combat activities enable all Army personnel to co-operate in creating a more efficient Organisation with their proposals and recommendations.

We therefore suggest to set up a study, possibly within the TRADOC Organisation, permanently tasked with collecting proposals connected with problems, experiences and mistakes as well.

This would allow the Army to integrate the seminars with the results reached by experts, in each operational sector (C2, manoeuvre,


combat support, logistics, PSYOPS, CIMIC, etc). They would follow units' activities over a certain period and point out the problems detected. Thus an immediate feedback would be available, together with an in-depth one. In this way problems would be analysed in detail (immediate feedback) but with the impartiality deriving from having "digested" them (in-depth feedback).

The second suggestions stems from the above-mentioned observation of a lack of systematic order. Expert teams may act as a guide and a link among doctrine makers, planners (of forces, training and material development) and personnel officers, within their effort to boost and update the military.

□

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ITALIAN CIMIC UNIT




THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE ENGINEER OFFICERS AND NCOs IN BOSNIA

For about a year, an Engineer Corps Task Force has been carrying out a fundamental task in Bosnia, for the planning and direction of works, reconstruction of buildings and repair of roads and railroads. The activity of the Italian Officers and NCOs is earning the unanimous appreciation of the local authorities and the international community.

On February 13, 1997 the Italian military contingent in Sarajevo was supplemented with a Technical Team of the Engineer Corps, tasked with the planning and direction of the works of restoration and reconstruction of important socio-cultural buildings destroyed during the war. Its members were Officers of the Engineer Corps, with previous well-established experience in the infrastructure sector. They were immediately assigned the project for reconstructing three important buildings at Sarajevo University: the Faculties of Mathematics, Law and Engineering/Mathematics. The work was financed by the European Union, and was essential for the resumption of the university courses, interrupted during the four years of conflict.

The professionalism of the Engineer Team was immediately appreciated by both the NATO Military Authorities and the civilian Bosnian Authorities. The latter, at the end of 1997 issued a set of postage stamps to extol the diligence and effectiveness of the Italian military technicians. The projects were prepared during this first phase, and the restructuring work of the Faculty of Law started in the Spring of 1998.

The results achieved, and the need to reach as soon as possible the objectives envisaged by the "Framework Agreement for Peace"



annexed to the Dayton Treaty - of fundamental importance for the resumption of the social, economic and cultural activities in Bosnia - suggested, at the beginning of 1998, to give a substantial boost to the activities carried out until then within the framework of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Therefore, the NATO Command of the Stabilization Forces decided to establish a "Combined Joint CIMIC Task Force", with the purpose of tackling and solving all the major problems connected with reconstruction. The new structure was born in June 1998,

and the former Technical Team of the Italian Engineer Corps, appropriately strengthened, assumed the name of "Italian Cimic Unit" (ICU), directly subordinate to the Coordinator Officer, Representative of the National Authority (UCRAN) within the NATO Hq.

The Italian Cimic Unit is the key element of the Italian CIMIC Activity within SFOR. It performs planning and managing tasks relevant to building reconstruction and road/railroad repairs. In practice, the ICU, after technical inspections, lays out the projects for the various activities, directs the works - including the contractual phase and assesses their effectiveness through the necessary technical tests.

To set the said activities under way, the personnel necessary for the completion of the unit were rapidly dispatched to the area. They are mainly Officers of the Army Engineer Corps - all graduate engineers - later joined by Aeronautical Engineer Corps' Officers, and Engineer NCOs as Technical Assistants, Draftsmen and Accountants.

The complexity of the CIMIC activities, all highly technical and of remarkable political value, has made it indispensable to institute a well-defined national interlocutor, technically qualified and capable,

FINANCED PROJECTS	PROJECTS BEING FINANCED	PROJECTS TO BE FINANCED
SARAJEVO: * Faculty of Mathematics. * Faculty of Law. * Faculty of Engineering and Architecture. PALE: * Repair of secondary roads . * Repair of septic tanks and water cisterns in the villages of Hotocina and Bogovici. * Repair of tunnels. * Restructuring of the Podvitez elementary school. * Construction of the «Kasan - Potok» road section. * Restructuring of housing units in Hotocina and Bogovici. * Repair of the electric lines of Hotocina and Bogovici.	SARAJEVO <i>Removal from schools of structures not suitable for disabled persons .</i> PALE <i>Reclamation of a valley, through the realization of a controlled dump for urban waste materials.</i> GORADZE <i>Restructuring of a multifunctional agricultural centre.</i> BRCKO <i>Reclamation of urban infrastructure and open spaces.</i>	FOCA <i>Realization of a suspended footbridge in Cerenluk.</i> PALE <i>Reclamation of the Palajanska Miljacka river bed.</i>

from the managerial point of view, of giving the appropriate support to the ICU. For this purpose, the function of "Parent Unit" was assigned to the Engineer School which, through direct contacts with Army Commands and the possibly concerned Organizations, has the task of solving and submitting all the issues concerning personnel and logistics, as well as the typically technical problems relevant to the ICU.

In particular, the Engineer School:

- coordinates the rotation of personnel and issues directions for their appointment;
- adapts "job descriptions" to the particular functional requirements;
- secures its support in supplying special and technical materials;
- provides technical advice on particular problems;
- controls the technical and managerial aspects of the activities, also through on-the-spot inspections.

In little more than one year, the Italian Cimic Unit has tackled and solved numerous problems, some of which were crucial for the achievement of the political and social objectives fixed by the Dayton Treaty.

The Italian Military technicians have developed projects, amounting to about 7 billion Lire, for the reconstruction of University buildings and civilian infrastructure in the urban area of Sarajevo, for the repair of the road system, for the urbanization of the Pale area and for interventions of environment reclamation. The technical know-how of the Italian Team and its managerial skill in coordinating and directing the works are constantly praised, and are elements of great renown for the whole NATO military contingent in the area. In particular, the works for the restoration of the Law Faculty in Sarajevo, planned and directed by ICU personnel, are a significant example of the enthusiasm and professionalism of

the technicians of the Italian Engineer Corps.

The work accomplished, essential for ensuring the Bosnian students the complete resumption of the lessons, was highly valued, so much so that Prof. Dr. Ismet Dautbasic, Dean of the Law Faculty, has personally expressed his appreciation to the ICU. Soon the building will be officially inaugurated and handed over to the local Authorities for the resumption of the normal didactic activities.

Finally, the ICU has been very recently assigned a further task: to monitor the electricity distribution network and the relevant 13 hydroelectric and 4 thermoelectric power plants of the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to create a "data base" for the development of the CIMIC activities.



The efforts made by the Italians were continuous and not easy, but essential in order that the local people, coming out of a long and disastrous civil war, could accept and appreciate the presence, on their territory, of foreign military Contingents, and cooperate with these men, in order to assure in the future a durable and constructive peace.

The success achieved so far by the CIMIC military personnel confirms, more and more and in every circumstance, the importance of the

role played by the structure performing the activities of Civil-Military Cooperation. It is a natural and very important linking element between the local realities and the Military Contingents called to carry out "International Police" operations. CIMIC, in fact, intervenes in sectors of high social interest, characterized by important humanitarian content, tackles contingent problems of great interest for the population, which at times are solved only thanks to the enthusiasm and professionalism of the military technicians and specialists of the interposition Force operating within the individual national teams. This commitment will increase in the future, in other circumstances which, like the Bosnian one, require the presence of military forces to ensure stability, and can be fulfilled only with the availability of personnel professionally prepared and trained to solve, with their generous enthusiasm, the technical and operational problems. This is an obligation that all participants in Peace Support missions must be able to honour, just as the Engineer Officers of the Italian Cimic Unit have been doing so far, together with their "badge colleagues" who every day are engaged in the difficult task of clearing mined and trapped areas.



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Politique-Economie-Technologie-Stratégie. Quatre variables liées, par Vittorio Barbati (p. 2).

Les Pays industrialisés de l'Occident, la Russie et le Japon ont atteint des niveaux de technologie avancée mais ils ne sont pas réussis à mettre à exécution des stratégies capables d'aller au pas des temps pour ce qui concerne les secteurs de la politique étrangère, de la Défense et de la sûreté. Les difficultés existantes sont à attribuer à la serrée interconnexion parmi la politique, l'économie, la technologie et la stratégie: quatre variables, dont l'harmonisation dépend essentiellement de nombreux facteurs internationaux changeants.

Grèce. La nouvelle Armée de Terre.

Interview au Ténent Général Manoyssos Paragioudakis, par Enrico Magnani (p. 10).

L'Armée de Terre de la Grèce est projetée vers une complète modernisation des moyens, des matériaux et des équipements. Pour améliorer l'efficacité opérationnelle et pour satisfaire les «standards» de l'OTAN: la Brigade a été élevée à première unité opérationnelle; on a constitué une force de réaction immédiate au niveau de Corps d'Armée; dans les mois qui viennent on activera le Quartier Général Allié à Larissa. Actuellement on peut considérer «combat ready» la Division d'Infanterie mécanisée assignée à l'ARRC et la Brigade d'Artillerie aérotransportable assignée à l'AMF(L). La Grèce après avoir participé à IFOR et à SFOR, sera employée aussi dans la troisième phase de la mission en Bosnie-Herzégovine.

République Tchèque. La nouvelle Armée de Terre. Entrevue au Major Général Frantisek Hrabal, par Enrico Magnani (p. 16).

L'Armée de Terre tchèque, avec la récente entrée dans l'Alliance, est en train d'avancer vers une rapide et profonde rénovation structurelle et opérationnelle. On a repensé les

critères de formation et d'instruction du personnel, tandis qu'on est en train de définir les programmes d'acquisition de modernes systèmes de communication et d'information. Dans quelques années toutes les Unités de la Force Armée seront constituées de volontaires avec un fort accroissement de personnel féminin. D'ici deux ans le Bataillon mécanisé parachutistes sera prêt, avant le 2003 une Brigade d'intervention rapide sera opérative.

L'Alliance Atlantique et le rôle de stabilisation,

par Giovanni Marizza (p. 22).

Le dernier mois d'avril, l'OTAN a accompli 50 ans, une période que représente la plus longue période de paix pour l'histoire de l'Europe. Après avoir parlé un peu des conflits du passé, qui ont vu protagonistes les Pays aujourd'hui alliés, l'Auteur souligne le grand mérite de l'Alliance: avoir garanti la cohésion intérieure et la paix. De ce positif bilan naît l'exigence d'une ultérieure extension de l'OTAN vers les Pays du Sud-Est de l'Europe. La Slovaquie, la Roumanie et la Bulgarie il y a déjà longtemps qu'ont présenté leur propre candidature, et on peut souhaiter un résultat positif.

Le rôle des Forces Armées italiennes après le bipolarisme,

par Giovanni Bucciol (p. 28).

Avec la fin du bipolarisme le rôle de l'instrument militaire est changé. Les Forces Armées du 2000 sont appelées à exercer leur présence dans le domaine national, européen, OTAN et ONU et pour cette raison elles se devront doter d'unités multirôles, compétitives, efficaces et employables partout et dans peu de temps. Le travail est résulté le deuxième classifié au Concours nationale pour des articles sur des arguments de culture militaire.

Les nouvelles stratégies de l'industrie de la Défense,

par Franco Baldi (p. 40).

Pour avoir des Forces Armées efficaces à des coûts acceptables et pour maintenir vive la compétition sur le marché international des armements, on a besoin d'une forte coopération parmi les Gouvernements et d'une féconde collaboration industrielle parmi les entreprises opérantes dans le secteur de la Défense. Pour poursuivre cet objectif on doit intégrer les législations nationales et développer un

plus fort échange d'informations entre plus d'entreprises et plus d'Armées de Terre. Notre Gouvernement se montre favorable à la coopération avec les autres Pays: l'année passée il a commencé, avec la France, l'Allemagne, l'Espagne, la Suisse et la Grande Bretagne, un processus de restructuration de l'industrie pour la Défense en Europe.

La coopération internationale, par Ornella Rota (p. 44).


Après la chute du Mur de Berlin on est commencé un processus de globalisation qui a touché tous les aspects de notre réalité. En particulier, l'économie s'est dirigée vers le marché libre la technologie a acquis une importance toujours majeure et les conflits locaux se sont de plus en plus accentués. Il y a désormais le consentement général dont le développement social soit essentiel pour l'élimination des équilibres menaçants la vie en société. Pour cette raison, on a besoin de faire développer l'économie, en limitant en même temps la pauvreté et le chômage, à travers une méthodologie de développement décentré qui voie comme protagonistes les communautés locales. Tout ça, dans un cadre de sauvegarde de la sûreté et des droits humains.

Armée de Terre futur. Plan de développement. Le plan Armée de Terre pour l'Europe, par Claudio Graziano (p. 52).

À quels paramètres est-ce qu'on doit se référer notre Armée de Terre pour jouer à plein titre le difficile rôle de la plus grande protection pour la stabilité et la paix dans les Balkans et la Mer Méditerranée? Cet article donne des punctuelles réponses à la demande: il illustre la fonction du «combat approach», de la multinationalité et du «Task Oriented» dans le changement en acte; en fin il se réfère au modèle français et à la nouvelle «idée opérationnelle de l'Armée de Terre italienne» en soulignent particulièrement l'irrésolu problème du Commandement et Contrôle.

La nouvelle logistique d'adhérence, par Claudio Graziano (p. 66).

Cet article brosse un tableau analytique du nouveau contexte logistique de repère, en soulignent les quatre principes sur lesquels se base le soutien des formations qui opèrent au dehors



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du territoire national: la Grande Base; le Commandement et Contrôle; la planification des activités et la spécialisation des organes.

L'erreur comme ressource. Le cycle des leçons apprises, par Pierluigi Monteduro et Michele Risi (p. 84).

Le cycle des leçons apprises, décidé par le Chef d'État-Major de l'Armée de Terre italienne au juin 1997, doit permettre l'analyse des erreurs faits pendant les principales opérations militaires et les activités de la Force Armée, par tirer d'utiles enseignements pour le futur. Ce cycle se déroule à travers les phases suivantes: séminaire; rédaction du document; valuation et vérification du même par les différents sièges et les compétants bureaux de l'État-Major de l'Armée de Terre; notification des résultats à l'Inspection des Écoles. Une leçon apprise dans les «leçons apprises» consiste en les carences trouvées dans les cadres du Commandement et Contrôle, de l'«intelligence», de l'emploi des armes et de la logistique.

Italian Cimic Unit. L'emploi des Officiers et des Sous-Officiers du Génie en Bosnie (p 98).

Du mois de juin de l'année passée il est opératif en Bosnie l'Italian Cimic Unit, constituée grâce à l'«input» du Siège de l'OTAN par résoudre les problèmes liées à la reconstruction. Cette nouvelle structure s'occupe des plans et de la direction des travaux publiques et est composée par des Officiers, tous ayant le doctorat d'ingénieur, et par des Sous-Officiers du Génie. Dans peu de mois les techniciens italiens ont commencer et développé des plans vraiment très importants, en se conquérant l'estime et la gratitude des populations locales.



Politik-Ökonomie-Technologie-Strategie.

Vier voneinander abhängige Variablen, von Vittorio Barbatì (s. 2).

Die westlichen Industrieländer, Rußland und Japan haben ein fortgeschrittenes technologisches Niveau erreicht, aber es ist ihnen nicht gelungen, vor allem auf dem Gebiet der Außen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, zeitgemäße Strategien zu entwickeln. Die Schwierigkeiten sind der engen Interdependenz von Politik, Wirtschaft, Technologie und Strategie zuzuschreiben: vier Variablen, deren Harmonisierung hauptsächlich von wechselhaften internationalen Bedingungen abhängt.

Griechenland.

Die neuen Streitkräfte. Interview mit Generalleutnant Manoussos Paragioudakis, von Enrico Magnani (s. 10).

Die griechischen Streitkräfte sind auf eine radikale Modernisierung der Fahrzeuge, des Materials und der Ausrüstung ausgerichtet. Um die operative Einsatzbereitschaft zu erhöhen und um die NATO-Standards zu erfüllen, ist die Brigade zur ersten operativen Einheit hochgestuft worden, ist eine immediate reaction force auf Armeeebene eingeführt worden, und in den nächsten Monaten wird das Alliierte Hauptquartier in Larissa aktiviert werden. Derzeit können als combat ready bezeichnet werden: die motorisierte Infanteriedivision, die dem ARRC zugewiesen worden ist, sowie die lufttransportable Artilleriebatterie, die der AMF zugeordnet wurde (L). Nachdem Griechenland sowohl an IFOR als auch an SFOR teilgenommen hat, wird es sich auch in der dritten Phase der Mission in Bosnien-Herzegowina einsetzen.

Die Tschechische Republik. Die neuen Streitkräfte. Interview mit Generalmajor Frantisek Hrabal, geführt von Enrico Magnani (s. 16).

Die tschechischen Streitkräfte haben sich, auch angesichts des jüngst erfolgten Beitritts zur Allianz, auf einen Weg der schnellen und gründlichen strukturellen und operativen Erneuerung begeben. Die Kriterien für Ausbildung und Übung des Personals sind „neu gedacht“ worden, während die Programme zum Erwerb moderner Kommunikations- und Informationsmittel in der

Definitionsphase stehen.

In den nächsten Jahren werden alle Einheiten der Streitkräfte aus Freiwilligen bestehen, mit dem starken Zuwachs weiblicher Soldaten. Innerhalb von zwei Jahren wird das motorisierte Fallschirmspringerbataillon bereitstehen, bis zum Jahre 2003 wird eine Schnelleinsatzbrigade bereit stehen.

Die Atlantische Allianz und ihre Rolle für die Stabilität in Europa, von Giovanni Marizza (s. 22).

Die NATO ist im April letzten Jahres 50 Jahre alt geworden. Dieser Zeitraum hat für Europa die längste Friedensperiode seiner Geschichte bedeutet. Nach einer Zusammenfassung der Konflikte der Vergangenheit, in denen heute verbündete Länder gegeneinander gekämpft haben, wird in der Arbeit das große Verdienst der Allianz hervorgehoben: den inneren Zusammenhalt und den Frieden garantiert zu haben. Aus dieser positiven Bilanz entspringt das Bedürfnis nach einer Erweiterung der Allianz in Richtung der Länder Südosteuropas. Slowenien, Rumänien und Bulgarien haben seit einiger Zeit ihre Kandidatur vorgebracht, und ein positiver Bescheid ist wünschenswert.


Die Rolle der italienischen Streitkräfte nach dem Ende der bipolaren Weltordnung, von Giovanni Buccioli (s. 28).

Mit dem Ende der bipolaren Weltordnung hat sich die Rolle des Militärs als Einsatzmittel gewandelt. Die Streitkräfte im neuen Jahrtausend sind gefordert, ihre Präsenz auf nationaler und europäischer Ebene, auf NATO- und UN-Ebene auszuüben. Dafür müssen sie sich mit Einheiten ausstatten, die vielfache Rollen einnehmen können, die leistungsstark, effizient und überall in kürzester Zeit einsetzbar sind. Die Arbeit ist als zweitbeste Arbeit im landesweiten «Wettbewerb für Themen militärischer Bildung» eingestuft worden.

Neue Strategien der Verteidigungsindustrie, von Franco Baldi (s. 40).

Um zu akzeptablen Kosten effiziente Streitkräfte zu haben und um die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit auf dem internationalen Rüstungsmarkt zu erhalten, ist eine starke Kooperation

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zwischen den verschiedenen Regierungen sowie eine fruchtbare industrielle Zusammenarbeit zwischen den im Militärssektor tätigen Unternehmen nötig.

Um dieses Ziel erreichen zu können, muß jedoch die jeweils länderspezifische Gesetzgebung integriert werden, und es ist nötig, einen immer regeren Informationsaustausch zu entwickeln, wobei daran sowohl mehr Firmen, als auch mehr Streitkräfte als bisher teilnehmen sollten.

Die italienische Regierung erweist sich als der Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Ländern zugetan: im vergangenen Jahr hat sie zusammen mit Frankreich, Deutschland, Spanien, der Schweiz und Großbritannien einen Prozeß der Umstrukturierung der Verteidigungsindustrie in Europa in die Wege geleitet.

Internationale Kooperation, von Ornella Rota (s. 44).

Nach dem Fall der Berliner Mauer hat ein Prozeß der Globalisierung begonnen, der sämtliche Aspekte unseres Lebens betrifft.

Insbesondere hat sich die Wirtschaft in Richtung eines freien Marktes entwickelt, die Technologie hat eine immer größere Bedeutung, und lokale Konflikte haben sich vermehrt und verschärft.

Es besteht inzwischen ein genereller Konsens, daß die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung grundlegend ist für die Beseitigung der Ungleichgewichte, die das zivile Zusammenleben bedrohen. Es ist also nötig, die Wirtschaft zum wachsen zu bringen und gleichzeitig Armut und Arbeitslosigkeit zu begrenzen, und zwar durch eine Methode der dezentralisierten Entwicklung, deren Angelpunkt die Gemeinden sind - all dies im Rahmen eines Schutzes der Sicherheit und der Menschenrechte.

Das Heer der Zukunft. Entwicklungsplan.

Das Projekt: Ein Heer für Europa, von Claudio Graziano (s. 52).

Auf welches Konzept sollen sich unsere Streitkräfte berufen, um in voller Gleichberechtigung die schwierige Rolle größtmöglicher Kontrolle der Stabilität und des Friedens im Balkan-Mittelmeerraum ausfüllen zu können? Der Artikel liefert genaue Antworten: er illustriert die Eigenschaften combat

approach, task oriented und Multinationalität in der in Wandlung begriffenen Entwicklung der Streitkräfte. Dargestellt werden auch das französische Modell und das neue «operative Konzept der italienischen Streitkräfte», indem besonders auf das ungelöste Problem von Kommando und Kontrolle hingewiesen wird.

Die neue begleitende Logistik, von Claudio Graziano (s. 66).

Der Artikel bringt eine Analyse der neuen Rahmenbedingungen der Logistik, indem der Schwerpunkt auf vier Prinzipien liegt, die der Unterstützung von Einheiten dient, die außerhalb des nationalen Territoriums operieren: Die Hauptbasis, Kommando und Kontrolle, die Programmierung der Tätigkeiten und die Spezialisierung der Gremien.

Der Fehler als Ressource

Der Zyklus gelernter Lektionen, von Pierluigi Monteduro und Michele Risi (s. 84).

Der «Zyklus gelernter Lektionen», vom italienischen Heeresstabschef im Juni 1997 eingeführt, hat als Ziel die Analyse der Fehler, die in den wichtigsten Militäroperationen in der Geschichte gemacht worden sind, um daraus nützliche Lehren für die Zukunft zu ziehen.

Der Unterrichtszyklus hat folgenden Ablauf: Seminar, Textabfassung, Bewertung und Überprüfung desselben durch die Kommandos und die zuständigen Ämter des Heeresstabes, Bekanntgabe der Ergebnisse an die Wehrschulinspektion. Einige Ergebnisse der bisher «gelernten Lektionen» sind die im Bereich von Befehl und Kontrolle, der Aufklärung, dem Waffeneinsatz und der Logistik festgestellten Mängel.

Italian Cimic Unit. Der Einsatz der Offiziere und Unteroffiziere der Pioniere in Bosnien (s. 98).

Seit Juni letzten Jahres operiert in Bosnien die Italian Cimic Unit, die auf Anregung des NATO-Kommandos zum Zweck geschaffen wurde, die mit dem Wiederaufbau zusammenhängenden Probleme zu lösen. Die neue Struktur beschäftigt sich mit der „Projektierung“ und Leitung der öffentlichen Bauvorhaben und besteht aus Offizieren, die sämtlich einen Universitätsabschluß im Ingenieurwesen haben, sowie aus

Pionierunteroffizieren.

In wenigen Monaten haben die italienischen Fachleute Projekte von ersterangiger Bedeutung entwickelt und in die Wege geleitet, und sich damit die Achtung und die Dankbarkeit der Bevölkerung verdient.



Política - economía - tecnología - estrategia. Cuatro variables atadas, de Vittorio Barbatì (p. 2).

Los Países industrializados del Occidente, la Rusia y el Japón han llegado a niveles tecnológicos avanzados pero no han sido capaces a poner en acto, sobre todo en los sectores de la política exterior, de la defensa y de la seguridad, estrategias capaces de ser actuales. Las dificultades salen de la estrecha interconexión que ata la política, la economía, la tecnología y la estrategia: cuatro variables, cuya armonización depende en primer lugar de mutévoles factores internacionales.

Grecia. El nuevo Ejército. Entrevista al Ten. Gen. Manoyssos Paragioudakis, de Enrico Magnani (p. 10).

El Ejército griego está proyectado hacia una radical modernización de los medios, de los materiales y de los equipajes. Para mejorar la eficiencia operativa y de satisfacer los «standards» OTAN: se ha elevado la Brigada a primera unidad operativa; se ha instituido una Fuerza de reacción inmediata como un Cuerpo de Armada; en los próximos meses será activado el Quartier General Aliado en Larissa. Actualmente pueden considerarse «combat ready» la División de Infantería mecanizada asignada a ARRC y la Artillería aerotransportable asignada a AMF(L). La Grecia después de haber sido parte de IFOR y SFOR, será empleada también en la tercera parte de la misión en Bosnia-Herzegovina.

República checoslovaca. El nuevo Ejército. Entrevista al Mayor General



SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN

Frantisek Hrabal, de Enrico Magnani (p. 16).

El Ejército checoslovaco con el reciente ingreso en la Alianza, está procediendo hacia una rápida y funda renovación estructural y operativa. Han sido repensados los criterios de formación y adiestramiento del personal mientras están para ser definidos los programas de adquisición de los modernos sistemas de comunicación y información. En los próximos años todas las Unidades de las Fuerzas Armadas serán constituidas de voluntarios con un fuerte incremento de personal femenino. Dentro de dos años será listo el Batallón mecanizado paracadista, para el 2003 será operativa una Brigada de pronto intervento.

La Alianza Atlántica y el papel de estabilización, de Giovanni Marizza (p. 22).

El OTAN, en el abril pasado, ha cumplido 50 años, un periodo que por Europa representa la paz más larga de su historia. Después de una llamada de atención a los conflictos del pasado que han visto como protagonistas los Países hoy aliados, se evidencia el grande mérito de la Alianza: haber sido capaz de garantizar la cohesión interior y la paz. De éste positivo balance nace la exigencia de un ensanchamiento ulterior de OTAN hacia los Países del Sur-Este europeo. Slovenia, Rumanía y Bulgaria han avanzado desde hace mucho tiempo su candidatura, y es deseable un éxito favorable.

El papel de las Fuerzas Armadas italianas después del bipolarismo, de Giovanni Bucciol (p. 28).

Con la fin del bipolarismo se ha mudado el papel del instrumento militar. Las Fuerzas Armadas del 2000 han sido llamadas para ejercer su presencia en campo nacional, europeo, OTAN y ONU, para que tendrán que dotarse de unidades multiroles, competitivas, eficientes y empleables en cada lugar y en breve tiempo. El trabajo ha llegado al segundo puesto a la Competición Nacional para artículos sobre argumentos de cultura militar.

Las nuevas estrategias del industria de la Defensa, de Franco Baldi (p. 40).

Para tener Fuerzas Armadas eficientes con gastos aceptables y mantener vital

la competitividad en el mercado internacional de los armamentos, se necesita una fuerte cooperación entre Gobiernos y una feconda colaboración industrial entre las empresas que operan en el sector de la Defensa. Para conseguir esta finalidad se necesita integrar las leyes nacionales y desarrollar un más fuerte trueque de informaciones entre muchas empresas y muchos ejércitos. El Gobierno italiano está favorable a la cooperación con otros Países: el año pasado ha aviado, con Francia, Alemania, España, Suiza y Reino Unido, un proceso de restructuración de la industria para la defensa en Europa.

La cooperación internacional, de Ornella Rota (p. 44).

Después de la caída del Muro de Berlín ha sido cebado un proceso de globalización que ha investido todos los aspectos de nuestra realidad. En particular, la economía se ha dirigido hacia el libre mercado, la tecnología ha adquirido una siempre mayor importancia y las guerrillas locales se han accentuado siempre más. Hay un consenso general que el desarrollo social sea necesario para la eliminación de los equilibrios que amenazan la convivencia civil. Es necesario, pues, hacer en modo que crezca la economía, limitando al mismo tiempo la pobreza y el desempleo, gracias a una metodología de desarrollo decentrado que vea como personajes importantes las comunidades locales. Todo está en un cuadro de tutela de la seguridad y de los derechos humanos.

Ejército futuro. Plan de desarrollo. El proyecto Ejército para Europa, de Claudio Graziano (p. 52).

¿A cuales parámetros conceptuales tiene que referirse nuestro Ejército para desarrollar plenamente el difícil papel de máximo presidio para la estabilidad y la paz balcánico-mediterránea? El artículo nos da precisas respuestas a la pregunta: ilustra la función del «Combat Approach», de la multinacionalidad y del «Task oriented» en la mutación actual; pues hace referencia al modelo francés y al nuevo «concepto operativo del Ejército italiano» reservando particular atención al no solucionado problema del Mando y Control.

La nueva logística de aderenza,

de Claudio Graziano (p. 66).



El artículo nos da un cuadro analítico del nuevo contexto logístico de referencia, poniendo el accento sobre los cuatro principios en los que se basa el sostén de formaciones operantes fuera del territorio nacional: la Grande Base; el Mando y Control; la programación de los actividades y la especialización de los organos.

El error como recurso. El ciclo de las lecciones aprendidas, de Pierluigi Monteduro y Michele Risi (p. 84).







El ciclo de las lecciones aprendidas, decidido por el Jefe de Estado Mayor del Ejército en el junio '97, tiene como objetivo el análisis de los errores cometidos en las principales operaciones y actividades de las Fuerzas Armadas, para traer utiles amaestramientos para el futuro. El ciclo se desarrolla a través de los siguientes fases: seminario; estensivo del documento; valutazione y verificación del mismo por los Comandos y las Oficinas del Estado Mayor del Ejército; notificación de las resultancias al Inspektorado de las Escuelas. Una lección aprendida en las «lecciones encontradas» consiste en las carencias encontradas en los ambitos del Mando y Control, de la inteligencia, del empleo de las Armas y de la logística.

Italian Cimic Unit. El impegno de los Oficiales y Suboficiales del Genio en Bosnia(p. 98).

De junio del año pasado se obrante en Bosnia el Italian Cimic Unit, constituida sobre «input» del Comando OTAN para resolver los problemas de la reconstrucción. La nueva estructura se ocupa de la proyectación y dirección de los trabajos públicos y está compuesta por Oficiales, todos licenciados en ingeniería, y Suboficiales del Genio. En pocos meses los técnicos italianos han aviado y desarrollado proyectos de primaria importancia, conquistando la estima y la gratitud de las poblaciones.



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
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
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THE ITALIAN ARMY ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21st CENTURY

The project for the adaptation of the land instrument to the integrated planning model

Presentation by the Chief of Staff of the Army at the Centre for High Defence Studies
(Palazzo Salviati, June 21, 1999)

Last year, on the occasion of the traditional conference held in this Centre, I deemed it appropriate to frame my presentation within a systematic examination of the elements which characterize the reference operational scenarios, and therefore of the conceptual elements under study at the Army General Staff in order to define, in general terms, the policy which would condition the organizational evolution of the land military instrument in the early 2000s.

Today, we see a confirmation of the general situation described last year, that can be summarized as follows:

- revaluation of the Army and, in more general terms, of the military instrument, as a concrete expression of the Country's willingness to participate in the construction of a **European project of security and defence**;
- awareness of the validity of the **"combat-approach" criterion** in devising and preparing the operational instrument, as well as in defence of the national interests, wherever threatened;
- need to pursue, in a more and more determined way, the capability of integration of the instrument, from both the joint and the multinational point of view;
- necessity of choosing - considering the lack of a threat definable in advance and the presence of diffused risks - the planning and organizational "task oriented" criterion;
- more and more widespread consensus, at politico-institutional level, for a totally professional Defence Model.

In view of this, today's presentation intends, in particular, to concretely illustrate - albeit in a broad outline - the **project for adapting the instrument to the integrated planning model**, a model recently approved by the Defence Minister, which in substance outlines the general architecture of the Army in the 21st century.

The project, on the other hand, is susceptible of adjustments, in relation to the developments of other projects, such as:

- the measures for the replenishment of the units, considering the reductions in the number of conscripts in some regions, with indications on the desirable introduction of the figure of the one-year volunteer;
- the possible evolution of the project into a totally professional organization, even with the "minimum-option model", meant as the last dimensional evolution of the integrated model, still capable of ensuring the performance of the tasks assigned as well as maintaining the structures envisaged by the model.
- **The project for the adaptation of the land instrument to the integrated planning model** is a further step in the process, started in 1997, of redefinition - in conceptual and organizational terms - of the Service and its different components, known as "Operational capability packages", and is the natural development of the "Service Directive on the planning objectives up to 2005 and the programming objectives for 1999-2001" which, based on the general planning objectives described by the "Reference document for planning" (1998 ed.) of the Defence General Staff, fixed the Army's medium- and long-term planning objectives, defining the programmatic objectives that are the intermediate targets of the entire process.

Therefore, the project pursues objectives which are in line with the DGS document, the 1999 Ministerial Directive as well as with the Government's recent bill on the constitution of **entirely professional** Armed Forces.

In particular, the general objectives of the project for the adaptation of the Service to the integrated planning model are:

- **1st objective:** realization of a "mixed model" based on 137,000 men, with the necessary flexibility, considering its

possible evolution, within 5-7 years, to an "entirely professional model" of about 128,000 men; this could be achieved through the **reduction of the structures now dealing with the recruitment and training of conscripts**, leaving unchanged the strictly operational component;

- **2nd objective:** attribution to the forces of the operational capabilities envisaged by the "Capability-packages project" and realization of the relevant organizational structure, whose characteristics are:
 - **flexibility**, obtained through the application of the "task organization" concept;
 - **sustainability**, achieved through the realization of "capability reservoirs", consisting of basic "employment modules" capable of carrying out specific operational functions, which provide the elements for the assembly of the necessary formations;
- **3rd objective:** rationalization of the general support components, in order to increase their effectiveness and achieve an adequate ratio between the operational component and the mere structure of general and administrative support.

In short, the purpose is to define and detail the concrete measures necessary for achieving of the planning objectives just described, envisaging an employment of resources compatible with the model of "integrated planning (137,000 men of the mixed model), which could also permit - without further project studies, but rather with programmed reductions - the transition to the professional model of **128,000 men**.

More in detail, in terms of personnel, the resources made available for the Army by the mixed model amount to 137,000 men, subdivided as follows:

- 12,050 Officers;
- 27,500 NCOs;
- 97,450 enlisted men (47,470 volunteers, the others conscripts)

In the "**professional**" model, instead, they amount to 128,000 men, subdivided as follows:

- 12,000 Officers;
- 26,000 NCOs;
- 90,000 enlisted men (45,000 professionals, the rest three-year or one-year volunteers).

The illustration of the project will be conducted with reference to the well-known functional areas: **operational, school/training, logistic support and territorial area**.

The last three areas, which constitute the Army component in charge of the general support to the operational forces (the "superstructure"), will be examined within a unitary picture, aimed at achieving both more rationalizations (and, as a consequence, saving of personnel) and a greater streamlining of the Service's top-level organization.

Let's start with the operational forces.

The conceptual framework for their determination is provided, as previously mentioned, by the document on "Operational capability-packages" which, together with the "Army operational concept" fixes:

- operational activities;
- categorization of the forces;
- priorities of the forces in view of their preparation.

As far as the operational activities are concerned, they can be summarized in the tasks deriving from:

- participation in the common security system within the **1st and 2nd joint missions** (i.e. defence of the national territory, of the air/maritime lines of communication and collective defence of the Atlantic Alliance);
- contribution to international security and stability within the **3rd joint mission** (i.e. participation in multinational operations in support of peace and collective security);
- presence and surveillance on the national territory within the **4th and 5th joint missions** (i.e. contribution to the safeguard of the free institutions and the welfare of the population in case of disasters).

In relation to their categorization, the operational forces have been divided as follows:

- **projection forces** (2 division-level headquarters, 4 Brigades and relevant tactical-logistic support units, whose priority tasks are at present connected with peace-support operations, but are capable of conducting traditional operations: these same forces are also suitable for the Italian participation in the construction of common defence and security in Europe ("European defence identity" or "European pillar" of NATO);
- **reaction forces** for NATO's "Immediate Reaction Forces" (IRF) and "Rapid Reaction Forces" (RRF), quantifiable in a division-level headquarter, 5 Brigades (two of which included in the projection forces, a manoeuvre group and relevant tactical-logistic support units, for the conduct of traditional operations);
- **presence and surveillance forces**, which comprise the two remaining Intermediate Operational Commands, 5 more Brigades and relevant support units, for the defence of the national territory.

As regards preparation, sustainance and allotment of resources, the following priorities have been assigned:

- 1 to the projection forces;
- 2 to the reaction forces;
- 3 to the presence and surveillance forces.

As regards the **projection and reaction forces**, it should be underlined that they are a fundamentally homogeneous whole in their composition and characteristics and therefore destined, with time, to constitute a single block of forces, in relation to the progressive replenishment of the projection forces, and subsequently of the reaction forces,

with volunteer personnel. The size of the Commands and Units produces an important reference concept for planning the operational forces, the so-called "**Division for Europe**", whose denomination means that they are forces - as I just mentioned - that can be put at Europe's disposal, as Italian contribution to the policy of common security.

Of course, "Division for Europe" is not the name of an organic unit, but rather the expression of a "concept" which takes concrete form in the general availability of a body of forces able to set up a division-level contingent (2 Brigades plus support units), sufficiently flexible in relation to the scenario (1 or 2 theatres with different environmental and operational characteristics) and sustainable for long periods of time (capability of rotation), i.e.: capable of meeting any security requirement outside the national borders.

The "Division for Europe", therefore, is the concept which materializes the Army's choice of the "task oriented" system, as is the case in the other European Nations: this is proved by the missions of the recent years in the Balkans.

The "Division for Europe", which as a whole will be able to draw, in the present transition period, from a reservoir of established forces consisting of 2 Intermediate Operational Commands, 8 Brigades and support units, is therefore the "hard core" of the Army's operational component, able of meeting any foreseeable option of employment.

Considering that the operational component consists at the present time of **110,600 men**, in order to reach the troop strength mentioned earlier (97,000 - 90,000 men) it is necessary to plan the reduction of about 20,000 organic positions, since this permits to maintain a ratio, between the operational forces and the remaining areas, almost near to the present one (approx. 2:1).

Evidently, in order to make a reduction of this magnitude in the operational forces it is not sufficient to proceed to the requalification and rationalization of the units, but we will have to proceed also to a further harmonization of the various components and consequent streamlining of a certain number of organizations, **mainly support units** which, no more compatible with the "mixed" model of the Army (**137,000 men**), in the general economy of the Service appear to be less important, in order not to jeopardize the overall capability of the instrument of performing its tasks.

In detail, in both the mixed model (137,000 men) and the professional model (**128,000 men**) the **13 Brigades** are the present ones, **9** of which (1 armoured, 2 alpine, 1 cavalry, 1 paratroop, 1 airmobile, 3 mechanized) are manned by professionals and 4 (1 alpine, 1 mechanized, 2 armoured) by conscripts. As a whole, it is a sufficiently balanced and harmonic instrument, which should be improved in its armoured component, now reduced to the essential.

The reference principles for the reduction of the operational component, which in practice reflect what has been discussed so far, can be summarized in the pursuit of the following criteria:

- confirmation of the validity of the "Army's Operational concept" for the general planning of the land military instrument;
- preservation for general employment of the complex of forces included in the "Division for Europe" concept and in the Basic-Branch manoeuvre Regiments;
- conferment of flexibility and freedom of action to the operational area, in order to absorb the possible transition to the professional model;
- adoption at all levels of the modularity concept in the preparation and employment of the forces.

The same considerations are true for the criteria that the Service intends to adopt for a harmonic reduction of the operational area, which ensue from the following measures:

- rationalization of the organization of Commands and Units, with a complete revision of the organic structures;
- centralized organization of tactical and logistic supports;
- availability of C2 resources without restraints, through the constitution of Planning Commands; this concept will be better clarified later;
- resort to the activities of replenishment of the existing units;
- maintenance of the already professional units;
- pursuance of a harmonic distributions of the units on the territory, taking into account the possible recruitment areas.

After having mentioned the restraints imposed on the development of the concept, let's proceed with the analysis of the individual components of the operational area, starting with the command and control structure (C2).

At the present time, when we see more and more often situations of employment characterized by the use of "framework" and multinational formations, the C2 capability becomes the most critical one. In fact, the Force Commands are increasingly employed with only a part of their own "manoeuvre" units, and are complemented with units of other contributing Nations.

Therefore also in line with the often-mentioned "task oriented" principle, one should create a permanent capability of assuming the direction of the non-national forces participating in multinational operations.

A further reason confirms the need to have at one's disposal C2 capabilities greater than those strictly necessary for an exclusively national instrument, i.e. the usefulness of having a fly-wheel of resources, in order to absorb possible

"peaks" of operational activity that could occur owing to particular and unforeseeable international situations, such as the present one, where the Service is engaged with Brigade-level headquarters in three different operations in the Balkan theatre and, at a lesser level, in a fourth theatre (Middle East: UNIFIL).

As we said, at conceptual level it would be useful that the C2 capabilities be free from the normal attributions connected with the ordinary management of the subordinate units, thus permitting a high flexibility of employment - at full-staff, functional-cell or individual-element level - envisaging the constitution of division-level Planning Commands, which we shall call Operational Projection-Commands, with no dependent units in normal situations, therefore free from the duties connected with the preparation of the forces, charged with the planning and conduct of operations outside the national borders.

These "pure-employment" Staffs would be adequately supplied, when needed, with modules of Operational Forces of various types, drawn from the reservoirs containing the necessary capabilities (principle of "task organization"),

This solution has been fully adopted by the French Army and is now under study in other NATO Armies.

The solution proposed now is therefore a conceptual trend which must be gradually transformed into organizational solutions, also in the light of the organizational decisions made or to be made by the allied Nations, with which, at this point, we are called to operate at permanent level.

Hence the Command and Control development lines of the Army's Operational Forces based on the abovementioned criteria, envisage at short/medium term, an organization based on:

- 1 Operational-Forces Command;
- 2 Projection-Forces Commands, only for planning and conducting operations outside the national borders, with no directly dependent forces;
- 2 Defence Commands, for the preparation of the forces and their employment on the national territory; the 13 Brigades, more evenly stationed on the national territory, will be subordinate to them;
- 1 Support Command, for the demultiplication of the Command and Control activities with, as subordinate units, 5 tactical-support Groups, (land artillery, A/A artillery, engineers, C4IEW and Air Cavalry) and a CSS Group which aggregates the adherence logistic support elements.

In practice, compared with the present situation, the evolution would involve the constitution of two Planning Commands - obtained through the transformation of two existing Intermediate Operational Commands - and the redistribution of the subordinate Brigades between the two Defence Commands, respectively located in the northern and southern part of the Italian peninsula.

As regards C4 support (command, control, communications and computers), the capabilities devoted to the projections for long-distance connections between the home country and the operation theatres will be concentrated in **2 signal Regiments in support of the projection**; those destined to the realization of the area communication networks (network support) will be concentrated in **2 signal Regiments of tactical network**, while the **infrastructural** ones will be joined in **3 infrastructural Regiments** (North, Centre and South), with areal responsibilities.

The C4 support area will also include the "TLC works" sector, which will be rationalized envisaging a structure organized on:

- a National Agency in charge of the unitary management of the "**TLC works**" branch, included in the C4IEW Command;
- peripheral organs of control and verification.

All these units will be subordinate to the **C4IEW Command**.

The "**manoeuvre forces**" and **RSTA** components will not undergo substantial changes in the number of Regiments (41 "manoeuvre" and 5 RSTA) compared to the present situation.

On the other hand, the utility of redistributing units from north to south, in line with the criterion of harmonic distribution of the units on the national territory, makes it expedient to envisage the change of garrison for 3 Regiments from north to south and the transformation of 2 Recruit Training Regiments into wholly professional manoeuvre-Regiments.

The **Special Forces** component will be subjected to organizational measures aimed at achieving an increase in the Army's capabilities in this sector, which has become particularly sensitive in the light of the lessons the Service has learned during the numerous international missions carried out in the last decade.

The theory currently under study envisages the following general measures:

- organic adaptation of the "Col Moschin" 9th Assault Paratroop Regiment, in order to give this unit the capability of originating the Hq of a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF);
- training and operational transformation of the "Monte Cervino" Alpini Paratroop Battalion into a "Rangers" Battalion;
- organizational transformation of the 185th Artillery Paratroop Regiment into a "target acquisition" Regiment.

The **land-artillery** component will undergo upgrading and reduction measures which take into account the capabilities made indispensable by the new scenarios such as, for example, the growing need of specialistic capabilities of NBC defence against the threat posed by the arms of mass destruction, as well as of "target acquisition" capabilities

for the execution of in-depth precision attacks.

The "land artillery" instrument will include 13 Regiments, in part subordinate to the **Artillery Group Command** of the Land Forces for the tasks of general support, and in part **included in the Brigades**, for direct-support tasks.

As regards the **antiaircraft artillery**, its reorganization will be centred on the availability of an efficient C2 system, capable of directing the employment of A/A systems with different capabilities (integrated defence at very low, low and medium altitudes) according to the modern "cluster" concept, or to that of the A/A Artillery Tactical Group, integrable, when necessary, with Command and Control systems of another Service or Nation.

In relation to this, the "HAWK" antiaircraft Regiments have already the necessary C2 capability for the management of antiaircraft clusters, availing themselves of Command Posts employing a valid system for air-space control.

As regards the A/A component, a centralized organization is being adopted, putting all the resources necessary to meet the reference operational assumption under a single organization, i.e. the Antiaircraft Artillery Command of the Land Forces.

The **Engineers component** ensures a capability that, in the modern operational scenarios, with particular reference to "other-than-war military operations", assumes a greater importance; its tasks are enlarged and comprise activities which go beyond the normal support to military units and are directed towards the population, including, for example, mine-clearing, restoration of civilian infrastructure and assistance to civilians.

Hence the need to adopt a new organization, permitting the transformation and, in general, the better use of resources, intervening especially in the sector of command and control capabilities.

The organizational solution adopted is, on the whole, that of centralization, placing:

- the resources for specialistic support (railway men and pontoneers) and general support (pioneers) included in the **Engineers Group Command** at Operational Forces Command level;
- the resources for direct support (sappers) at Defence Operational Forces Command level.

One sector where reductions are not envisaged, compared to what has already been carried out with the recent constitution of the airborne Brigade, is that of the Army Aviation (today's Air Cavalry).

In the field of air mobility, with the establishment of units of different levels (Brigade, Regiment, company) the integration of the capabilities of the "manoeuvre" forces with the general-support helicopter component is increasingly required, especially as regards the heaviest units.

The **Air Cavalry**, therefore, is only partially centralized, in order to better meet the abovementioned requirements of integration. It is a complex of units that by 2015 will include about 260 aircraft (between airplanes and helicopters), many of which very modern, such as the A-129, NH-90 and the machines under study for replacing the AB-206, AB-412, A-109 in the ESC role and CH-47 in the ETM role.

Another sector which does not undergo substantial reductions is that of "**information and electronic warfare**", which takes on a particular importance owing to the "efficacy multiplier" of this capability on the entire spectrum of military operations.

The organization of this component will be strengthened through rationalizations and transformations of existing units which, because of their high specialization, will be centrally managed by the C4IEW Command.

On the other hand - in order to meet the operational requirements under study, aimed at giving the cavalry Brigade better RSTA capabilities, not only at tactical-reconnaissance level but also in the electronic dimension and in the in-depth reconnaissance with drones and RPVs - in the future the subordination of some of these formations and helicopter units could be reconsidered.

Moving to the logistic sector, the new logistic organization of the Service results from the recent application of the new criteria relevant to the adoption of the "**Reference Logistic Concept**" whose basic elements are:

- realization of a model of unitary management of the logistic resources necessary to replenish and sustain, for relatively long periods, the projection of the Forces outside the borders, through the application of the concept of the logistic "Great Base", whose cornerstone is the physical and logical connection between the Operations Rooms of the support and adherence logistics located at home which should be logically connected with the equivalent elements deployed in the Theatre;
- careful planning of the logistic activities at the various levels;
- marked specialization of the logistic organs only in sectors where this is deemed necessary and profitable, together with ample recourse to commercial services when possible.

It is worth remembering that the new logistic organization provides for an instrument established on two levels:

- support logistics, subordinate to the Logistic Inspector;
- adherence logistics, under the Commander of the Operational Land Forces.

In particular, since at adherence-level the various logistic units carry out activities of equal complexity, the existence of intermediate command-level - such as the Intermediate Operational Command and the Brigade - is now considered functionally unjustified, unless they are used as reservoirs of resources, necessary to adapt to the mission the capabilities of the units of a specific formation, according to the often-mentioned "task organization" principle.

Hence the advisability to **centralize the logistic resources of adherence**, adjusting their overall capabilities to the reference operational hypothesis.

Other measures concerning the operational area are connected with the rationalization of the in-garrison units,

through extensive recourse to catering for victuals and to external contractors for cleaning and maintaining, also in emergencies, the infrastructure and the relevant technologic systems.

In short, as a whole, the operational instrument envisaged for the integrated model, in its two variants, mixed (137,000 men) and professional (128,000 men) is as follows:

- 1 Operational Forces Command;
- 2 Projection Operational Commands;
- 2 Defence Operational Commands;
- 1 Support Command;
- 13 Brigade Headquarters;
- 5 "Combat Support" Group Commands (Land Artillery, A/A Artillery, Engineers, AVES; C4IEW);
- 1 "Combat Service Support" for adherence logistics;
- 102 Regiments/Independent Battalions (46 for "Combat/RSTA", 47 for "Combat Support", 9 for "Combat Service Support").

The objective of the reorganization of this area, which was already remarkably curtailed, is a reduction of approximately **2,500 men** (to **46,500**), equal to 34% of the total volume of the mixed integrated model, in line with the standards adopted by most NATO Armies.

The reductions will be made through the simplification of the structures, after determining the homogeneous functional areas that can be put under a single management for the whole Service.

A delicate aspect of the reorganization of the superstructure will be the qualitative reduction of about **4,800 Officers and NCOs**. This can be partially offset by employing regular volunteers, especially within the school/training structures.

At the summit organization of the Army, subordinate to the Chief of Staff, there are 4 Commanders/Inspectors (Operational Forces' Commander, School-, Branches-, Logistics- Inspectors), responsible for specific sectors, and 3 Commanders, with similar responsibilities, distributed on the territory (Northern, Central and Southern Military Regions).

With reference to the first sector, it is possible to simplify the two areas in charge of the preparation of personnel (Schools Inspectorate and Branches Inspectorate), by unifying them. Actually these sectors carry out different but complementary functions.

As regards the Military Region Commands, some of their purely logistic functions in the medical and administrative sector could be assembled in the Logistic Inspectorate and some others, as we shall see, could be homogeneously grouped in areas more fitting to the organization of the forces.

The **school/training** sector, as I mentioned, will be simplified and rationalized, envisaging the constitution of a sole organization for the management of the sector (called, for the time being **School/Branches Inspectorate**), which will include the two preexisting Inspectorates and will carry out the following functions:

- training of personnel;
- formulations of norms and procedures of employment;
- experimentation of procedures of employment and new materials/equipment/weapon systems;
- simulation and validation of the operational capabilities of Commands and Units;
- contribution to the development of new weapon systems and materials.

The school structures will be optimized by establishing, when possible and suitable, "logistic-administrative support poles", obtained through the union of preexisting bodies. All Schools and Training Centres will be subordinate to the Inspector and grouped according to their functions.

Still in the school/training area, the increasing professionalism of the Service will most likely necessitate the constitution of another Volunteer Training Regiment in addition to the present five. This will be made necessary by the suppression of the units in charge of the incorporation and initial training of conscripts - such as the Conscripts Incorporation Centres and Recruits Training Regiments - with the ensuing reduction of about 4,000 positions.

The **logistic support area** will be included in the process of simplification of the territorial area in terms of assumption of executive responsibilities in the medical and administrative sectors, which at present are subordinate to the Military Regions.

In the administration sector, the objective is to establish a **National Administration Directorate** - directly subordinate to the Logistic Inspector - responsible for all the activities whose centralization is considered possible and convenient.

In the medical sector, the objective is to have a structure which, compatibly with the availability of personnel (doctors and paramedics in particular), can ensure the activities of:

- basic and preventive medicine at the units;
- legal medicine on the territory;

- specialistic medicine, hospitalization and treatment;
- contribution to the selection and recruitment of personnel.

For organizational purposes, the managerial and executive organs of the Medical Service will depend on the Area Logistic Commands. Prerequisites of the new organization are an increase in the decision-making autonomy of the Medical Service Officers at the units, as well as an ample recourse, when possible, to the structures of the National Health Service.

Another measure for the rationalization of the support-logistics area could be the outcome of a project, just being defined by the Logistic Inspectorate, which in substance provides for:

- centralization at the Maintenance Poles of all the relevant activities, carried out making use also of the capabilities of the AVES and TLC Support Regiments and CERIMANTS;
- reduction of the supply bodies and simultaneous efforts to cut down stocks, also through their automated management.

In substance, the new logistic instrument will be organized as follows:

- in the **experimentation area**: 1 multifunctional Centre;
- in the **maintenance area**: 4 Maintenance Poles and TLC Support and Air-Cavalry Support-Regiments;
- in the **supply area**: 3 yards for vehicles and materials, 2 supply and maintenance Centres (CERIMANT), 2 commissary supply Centres (CERICO), 2 POL depots (large capacity), a limited number of ammunition depots.

Within the abovementioned process of simplification, as far as the territorial area is concerned the objective is to assign the residual functions (infrastructure and State property; conscription / recruitment / mobilization, relation with civil authorities and administrations, contacts with the media, promotional and presidial activities) to **2 National Authorities** - subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Army - whose responsibility extends over the whole national territory.

In particular, the structure dealing with **infrastructure and State property** will have, besides the responsibility for the maintenance and development of the infrastructure and State-property yard of the Service, also that of the direct management of the infrastructure no longer in use. This direct responsibility will gradually be extended to all infrastructure, taking this task away from the Commanders for good. The dimension of this structure is strongly conditioned by the high number of the infrastructural elements no longer necessary, but still managed by the Service. The solution of this age-old problem will permit further and more radical simplifications of the area.

The structure, in its final configuration envisages:

- an **Infrastructure Inspectorate**, created through the transformation of a Military Region Command;
- **Areal Infrastructure Commands and Infrastructure Commands**, obtained through the transformation and rationalization of bodies already existing in the infrastructure sector.

The second national-level structure will deal - as I said - with selection, conscription, recruitment, mobilization, relations with civil authorities and administrations, contacts with the media, promotional and presidial activities.

The organization will be realized by making recourse to the structures of the existing Military Districts and Regional Military Commands, with remarkable savings in the support elements.

The final configuration will be:

- one **Inspectorate for Recruitment and Mobilization Forces**, obtained through the transformation of a Regional Military Command;
- **interregional and regional Recruitment and Mobilization Commands**, obtained through the transformation and rationalization of existing Bodies.

A number of measures concerning the employment of personnel, mainly conscripts, are made necessary in order to adapt the land instrument to the integrated-planning model just described.

These measures are needed to cope with the shortage of conscripts due to the effects of the law on conscientious objectors, to the norms providing for the employment of conscripts within their region (max.100 km from home), to the provisions in favour of the areas hit by earthquakes or floods, to the too-preclusive use of medical profiles, to the confirmation of the requirement of strong contingents of auxiliaries for the Police Forces (constantly growing, especially for the Carabinieri). All this, in addition to the sharp drop in the birth-rate, typical of our society, and the consequent keen competition among the Armed Corps for the recruitment of young conscripts.

As a matter of fact, the shortage of conscripts in the northern and central regions - due to the reasons listed above - together with their redundancy in the south, cause an unbalanced situation between the needs and the possibility of filling the units in the north. Presumably, this imbalance will become worse with time.

At the same time, it is necessary to optimize the employment of the available volunteers, both to offset the shortages and to permit the (possible) transition to the professional model, taking also into account the present unavailability of the expected number of volunteers, due to the reduced number of "vocations" and to the not-so-fast replenishment of the Regular Volunteer contingent, in order to avoid the premature ageing of the personnel entrusted with operational tasks.

A possible corrective measure could be that of replenishing differently, the conscript units destined to professionalization and the conscript units envisaged only within the mixed "137,000 model". In practice, the purpose is to concentrate the growing shortages in some units, reducing to the minimum the loss in the overall operational capability of the Service.

Therefore, we will have units capable of expressing operational capabilities, and others generally unable to do so.

Some of these measures will imply the adoption of temporary solutions of employment of the Officers and NCOs of the "under-replenished" units, in order to avoid the risk of their underemployment and demotivation.

With regard to this, two different solutions have been singled out:

- **as concerns the units not oriented to express significant operational capabilities**, the Officers and NCOs not employed will be included in "out-of-area employment packages" for PSOs, as staff elements and observers or, as an alternative, in "instructor packages", for the employment at Schools and Volunteers Training Regiments;
- **as regards the units destined to express operational capabilities**, albeit limited, and subsequently to be largely professionalized (not less than 60%), the Officers and NCOs not engaged in the training of the active elements of the Unit will attend refresher and updating courses.

As regards the employment of volunteers, it is essential to achieve the objective of completing the **projection package** by the year 2000, the **reaction package** by 2005 and, afterwards, the progressive replenishment of the general support areas.

The proposals made by the Service on the institution of the "**one-year Volunteer**" fit into this picture. This possibility will concern, when it becomes a fact, the young people willing to perform a qualifying duty without committing themselves for a considerable length of time, as would be the case with the three-year term.

The one-year volunteer, in substance, is a conscript willing to serve for 12 months, without restraints about destination and employment, and his pay will be equal to 50% of the salary of the short-term volunteers.

This kind of enlistment should permit to partially offset the shortage of conscripts and, mainly, to achieve a natural progression in the completion of the volunteer rolls.

Now, let's come to the conclusions.

The different measures described will enable the Army to continue the gradual process of rationalization conceptually commenced in 1997 with the purpose of achieving - albeit in a framework of ever decreasing resources, particularly in terms of personnel - the objectives of operational capability fixed by the "Reference Document for Planning" ('98 ed.) issued by the Defence General Staff, and deriving from the tasks required by both the international and national situation.

As concerns times, the measures for the reorganization of the units will have to be applied as from the beginning of 2000, and take concrete form:

- **for the operational area:** by the end of **2001** (not considering the transfers of garrisons, which will take place when the infrastructural conditions are suitable);
- **for the general-support areas:** by the end of **2003**.

I would like to underline the incidence of this transformation on the tissue of the Army. In terms of positions, the adoption of the **137,000-men mixed model** produces a reduction of approximately 22,600 men (14% of the present strength) roughly subdivided as follows:

- 11,200 between Officers and NCOs;
- 11,400 enlisted men.

The reduction, after the passage to the **128,000-men professional model**, would be of 31,600 men (20% of the present strength), subdivided as follows:

- 12,700 between Officers and NCOs;
- 18,900 enlisted men.

Although some of these positions do not correspond exactly to physical persons, clearly the dimensions of the reduction are such that its impact on the organizational structure and the individual components of the Service is very strong.

For this reason, a convinced and active participation of all members of the Army, Commanders at all levels and privates, appears absolutely necessary in order that this further significant transformation takes place at the times and in the manners appointed, so that the Army of the 21st Century is timely and fully capable of meeting the challenges and carrying out the role entrusted to it by the Nation.


The Army needs the collaboration of all.

I trust in it.

Lieutenant General Francesco Cervoni

HUNGARY

The meeting enabled us to acquire a good deal of information on the efforts made for the structural and operational reorganization of the Hungarian military land instrument.



by Enrico Magnani *

THE NEW ARMY

Interview with General Ambrus Preininger Chief of the Army General Staff

technical transformation has been started; we commenced the elaboration of the doctrine for the land forces and the draft of the new regulations; we take an active part in the military programmes of the PFP, which are a remarkable help to our integration process.

What are the priorities of the Hungarian Army in order to achieve interoperability with the allied units?

Before starting a job, a

General, Hungary has become an official member of the Atlantic Alliance. Could you summarize the programmes under way for the integration of the Hungarian Army into NATO?

One of the main foreign-policy objectives of the Republic of Hungary is the integration within Europe, and in particular the adhesion to the European Union and NATO. The organization I lead certainly has a role and very important tasks in this field. It is necessary to give military substance to the integration measures.

Conforming to military practice, I prefer to expound concrete data and summarize the measures adopted so far. Taking the NATO structures as models, we have reorganized the Army Staff - which is now able to communicate and cooperate with the Staffs of the other member Countries - as well as our command system and minor units.

As regards the latter, a rather long process of structural and



Commander fixes a priority order, pointing out the most urgent tasks and the ones that can be carried out at a later time. Clearly, in the present conditions of peace, we cannot overburden the economy of our countries, but it is also clear that the great number of tasks require a certain caution. I believe that NATO is perfectly aware of the situation: during the various meetings among NATO partners, the fact that integration is a long process has always been underlined. It is a process in which it is necessary to establish a priority order of the tasks to be carried out.

Such an order permits to take a maximum advantage of the resources available, and helps the operators, charged with a quantity of urgent problems in the performance of their duties.

I must plan the work for the best use of the human resources. Therefore, we need to draft a real list of priorities. For example:

- to realize intellectual and technical compatibility (this is the most difficult part, because we do not deal with machines or tools, but with military men who, as individuals, think in different ways and express different interests);
- improve the knowledge of languages;
- obtain the national support;
- organize a high-level command-control-communications system;
- integrate the antiaircraft defence with NATO;
- set up ready-intervention land forces and rapid-intervention forces;
- organize the exchange of information.


Nowadays many allied armies give great importance to the participation in peace-support operations. What are the present engagements of the Hungarian Army in this sector?

This is a pertinent and topical question, but I would like to

complete it, stating that not only the Alliance, but every progressive country, and Hungary among them, attributes a great significance to the peace missions.

Hungary wants to participate in the strengthening of the European security, and our Army takes part, in proportion to our means, in the peace missions of the UN, NATO and OSCE.

At the beginning, we participated in the UN missions only as observers. A great step forward was made in 1985, when we sent a basic unit to Cyprus, in the framework of the UNFICYP mission. The Austro-Hungarian collaboration of the successive years put us in the present condition of sending on a mission a company-level unit (107 men). Another significant result was achieved in 1995, when Hungary was assigned military police tasks,





Above.
Russian-made 122 mm 2S1 "Gvodizka" self-propelled guns.

Facing page.
Acrobatic paratroop-drop with "wing profile" parachute.

carried out by 38 elements specialized in this sector.

One of the greatest challenges of the past years was the participation in the IFOR-SFOR mission, organized and conducted by NATO under the UN aegis.

In that mission, the Hungarian Armed Forces, and the Army in particular, proved their capability of working under NATO guidance, successfully carrying out their tasks.

All these missions involved the participation of hundreds of Officers and NCOs.

One of your Engineer battalions is playing a very important role in the NATO Multinational Force in Bosnia. Do you envisage further foreseeable engagements,

possibly in defence of peace and stability?

To give you an answer, I would further subdivide the question: what could be the tasks of an Engineer battalion? What tasks can be assigned to the Army?

In the future, the economy of the resources and the operational rationality of NATO will lead us to tackle new tasks, whose nature will be established by the Government.

I can assure that we are getting ready to meet all the new challenges, which will not be only the technical ones.

Our main purpose remains that of proving, with the performance of professional tasks, that we are able to cooperate with the NATO Nations.

For instance, the Hungarian technical contingent, stationed at Okucani, Croatia, is included in the SFOR mission, and is showing its capability of carrying out, together with the Allies, its Peace-keeping assignments.

We want to express our will without assuming a provocative

attitude but with determination.

For peace we are ready to take on an active role, even at the cost of making sacrifices if necessary, in this area of Europe where conditions are so difficult.

We expect similar professional challenges also in the future. At present, the Engineer battalion is engaged in the construction and maintenance of bridges, in particular on the Sava and Bosna rivers, not only for the requirements of SFOR, but also for the civilian population.

The technical battalion takes care also of the maintenance of a pontoon-bridge, and is building another in the Doboï area. In the immediate future we will have to put back in operation several military bridges built in 1996, which are in need of technical overhaul because of the heavy traffic.

Our battalion is directly subordinate to the Corps, and one of its tasks is that of assuring at all times, winter included, the practicability of the roads assigned. Such a job, in the Bosnian mountains, can last for months.


Besides the technical tasks just mentioned, the Hungarian battalion is also engaged in removing the debris of destroyed buildings, thus contributing to the reconstruction of the Country.

Hungary, together with Italy and Slovenia, is preparing a new multinational force, whose Headquarters will be in Udine, Italy. Although not yet assigned to NATO - since Ljubljana is a partner of PfP, but not a full member of the Alliance - do you believe that this force will strengthen the solidarity among the Nations close to NATO, in a region where there are still elements of instability?

The accord on the creation of an Italian-Slovenian-Hungarian multinational force was born at a meeting in Budapest on September 21-23, 1998. On that occasion the executive agreement was reached, and was at the basis of the trilateral agreement signed by the Defence Minister of the three Countries in November 1998.

The next steps of this work will be aimed at preparing the participating forces, with exercises that will take place each time in a different Country. This is in itself already a form of collaboration. The trilateral force does not belong to NATO, but this does not make its role less important. Suffice it to think that also within the PfP, as shown by the tasks and exercises carried out so far, everything depends on the cooperation among the participants. Collaboration in the performance of the duties is the base of success.

My direct answer to your question is: yes, I believe that the Trilateral Headquarters can strengthen the cooperation between NATO and the bordering Nations. It is a plain answer, typical of a soldier; but I have a question for you too: what could be the ultimate purpose of the collaboration between NATO and a group of Nations, partners of the



Alliance, whose aim is the strengthening of European security, if it isn't the reinforcement of world security? Our relations can only be improved not by preparing ourselves to fight against each other but, on the contrary, by continuing our exercises, in order to achieve the best cooperation in maintaining peace and security.

Within the concept of the "capability packages" of a Service, the new doctrine gives a growing importance to the surveillance of the battlefield, the acquisition of data and information. What is the situation of the Hungarian Army in this area?

The new doctrine describes the





Above.
Historical uniforms.

Facing page.
Army female personnel at the end of a peacekeeping exercise.

Below.
122 mm artillery piece.



road that through dialogue, collaboration and collective defence capabilities, leads to security, combining the political and military elements of NATO's policy. This doctrine is an integral part of the Alliance's strategy, and offers forms of cooperation to the Central European nations on their way to democratization.

In the changed conditions of security, the new military strategy describes not only the existing challenges and risks, but also the potential ones.

The capability of rapid reaction in case of crises or risk situations is determined, among other things, by the effectiveness of the reconnaissance activity. In order to meet this requirement, the members of the Alliance need a unitary and sound system for the acquisition of data and information.

Clearly the other members of NATO are much more advanced than we are, since they can avail themselves of both the national and the NATO systems. Linking up with various great-capacity

data banks they can gather precise information and electronically transmit them to Commands at all levels, both in peacetime and in the course of crisis or war.

The Hungarian Supreme Military Command is aware of the high priority attributed to reconnaissance within the "capability packages" and has already taken the measures necessary to implement the directives of compatibility and interoperability (it is a question of learning and adopting NATO's reconnaissance bases and procedures, using the computer and transmission systems, updating the information acquisition system, making systems and procedures compatible in order to connect them with each other, and setting up the elements necessary for the forecast and warning system).

Our commitment has been underlined also by the Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Armed Forces in his presentation on the occasion of the meeting of the NATO Military Committee in May 1998, to which also the three Chiefs of Staff of the Nations in

the adhesion phase were invited for the first time.

What changes will be produced by the adhesion to NATO?

We have analyzed with care our present capabilities, and made proposals for the modernization of structures, equipment, technical instruments and elements for the acquisition of data and information of the Army Staff, in order to be able to work well also in the changed security conditions, both nationally and within the Alliance, as well as in cooperation with other organizations of the member Nations.

We have no shortage of human resources. The professional preparation is constant, in particular as concerns the reconnaissance forces. In 1999 we have commenced the preparation of the information-reconnaissance system by creating the conditions of compatibility with the corresponding NATO systems; this phase of the process will be

concluded by the end of the year 2000. Taking into account the financial problems, we shall concentrate our attention mainly on the modernization of the equipment and techno-scientific instruments already in our inventory. We will probably deal with the units after 2003.

Which are the elite units of the Hungarian Army?

There is never been a distinction of this kind amongst the troops of the Hungarian Armed Forces although, with the performance of different tasks, a healthy spirit of competition exists among the units. In any case a special mention is deserved by the 34th Recce Battalion, the 88th Rapid Intervention Battalion and the 25th Mechanized-Artillery Brigade which, in the last years, has proved many times its capability of cooperating also with Czech and Polish units.

In this perspective, I can say that



Above.
Air-cooperation exercise with an Air Force M17 "Hip" helicopter.

Left.
Training with a D44 85 mm antitank gun.

all the formations earmarked for the multinational contingents are elite units.

How long have female personnel been in the Army?



What are the roles assigned to women? What problems were caused by their inclusion in the Service?

The Army, because of its special commitments of a moral, physical and psychological nature, is a traditionally male institution. Throughout history, women's main task has been that of taking care of children and the household. With time, separate professions have thus taken shape: if a woman chose

a typically masculine job, she was considered with bewilderment, almost as a kind of witch. This was true also for the Army.

On the other hand, women have taken up arms in many critical moments of Hungarian history: for example, Katica Dobó and the women of Eger castle in 1552, Ilona Zrínyi, who for three years (1685-1688) defended Munkács castle, "Lieutenant Maria" who, disguised as a man, fought bravely during the liberation war

(1848-49), etc.

Anyway, the tragic human losses suffered during the two World Wars, modernization and the democratization process have modified the conception of fighter and soldier. This occurred also in Hungary. Not only physical qualities have acquired importance, but also the intellectual capabilities. This, in the Army, has produced jobs that can be carried out by men and women alike. I refer to Medical Service,

Education, Administration and Personnel.

Therefore we had to review the entire mobilization system, in order to make up for the losses suffered in the two wars.

The military service for women is regulated by laws which specify what tasks they can carry out, both in peacetime and in time of war.

Women have always been present in the Hungarian Armed Forces albeit, up to WWII, in a limited number.

The transformations in the Armed Forces laid the foundations for a new economy of human resources. Following the example of NATO, the ratio between Officers and NCOs has changed, and voluntary service has been introduced. The Constitution and the new Regulations provide the legal framework for these changes.

Since the end of 1995, the



Above.
Mechanized infantry with BMP1.



Left.
Military ceremony at an infantry unit. Since 1989 the old military traditions have been rediscovered.

number of women in the Army has increased remarkably. Many serve in Headquarters as non-commissioned officers.

At the operational units manned by volunteers, women often carry out typically male jobs (i.e. in antitank, missile or machine gun units). Many women apply for posts in technical contingents or peace missions.

The female personnel in the Army works with honesty and precision. They want to prove their worth and are as reliable as the men. A problem is posed by female NCOs introduced into the units without an adequate military preparation, be it basic or specialistic; sometimes physical characteristics could be a problem as regards, for example, physical-training tests.

The employment of women in the Armed Forces does not follow,

as yet, precise rules. Often it happens that a female NCO obtains more than a male colleague, since she does not have the same professional obligations: the fact that she is a woman is considered more important than her rank or her position.

In several cases the recruitment of women is not possible for financial reasons (quarters, sanitary and recreation facilities etc). Frequently, women decide to join the Armed Forces because of social coercion.

In the future, we will have to:

- eliminate the difficulties connected with the increasing number of women, providing the opportunities fixed by law, so that they can have the same rights and duties as the men;
- specifically qualify the female personnel assigned to NATO.

Are there plans for the future assignment of Hungarian units to other allied operational Commands, such as ARRC and AMF-L? Is a contribution to the main defence forces envisaged?

As is known, in July 1997 Hungary was invited to join the political and military organization of NATO. This means that, once we become full members of the Alliance, we'll participate in its political and military organization, with all the resulting rights and duties. My job is just that of preparing the Army for its integration with the Allied Commands.

I am not really disclosing any secret if I say that there are intense negotiations on the times and ways of the integration. This will be our next target.

Can the "Balaton '97" exercise be considered a test for the improvement of interoperability between Hungarian and Allied land forces? What were the "lessons learned" in this type of exercise?

Exercise "Balaton '97" included



the participation of the Italian "Centauro" Brigade, a Hungarian mechanized platoon from the 25th "Klapka Gyrgy" Brigade and an artillery battery from Szigetvár's 101st "Zrínyi Miklós" Brigade.

Interoperability was extremely good: the Hungarian units adjusted well to the working system of the Italians, and performed their tasks without problems.

The Italian Command commented with satisfaction the cooperation with the Hungarian units.

The international scenario has brought about remarkable reductions in the Hungarian Army, as in many others, especially as regards personnel. What were the guidelines followed in the realization of these programmes?

The main purpose is that of

Fire training with "Spigot" A/T missile system.

creating Armed Forces based on national traditions in the spirit of democratic institutions, capable of meeting the requirements typical of the end of the 20th century. In this transformation process, it is important to establish a military organization open to future developments, founded on up-to-date intellectual and technical capabilities. One of the elements of these modern Armed Forces is precisely the Army. The international and internal changes occurred in the '90s, as well as the radical transformations on the scene of European security have forced - and made possible - the restructuring of the Armed Forces.

First of all, we transformed the military instrument into an "organization for defence". The

objective was the creation of a force capable of expressing the Country's capabilities, smaller compared to the past, but more modern and more credible. A force able to safeguard the national institutions and interests, to manage low-intensity conflicts, crisis situations and to intervene in case of disasters, to fulfill the obligations connected with the international treaties and capable of easy integration within the NATO structures.

Applying the appropriate legislative measures, Hungary established a mixed system of conscripts and volunteers, dividing its land forces into the following structural elements, which meet the modern requirements:

- reaction forces;
- main defence forces;
- territorial-defence forces and reserve.

The reaction forces are constituted by troops on alert status and by rapid-intervention troops, consisting largely of professionals and contract volunteers.

The main defence forces include the mobilization combat troops as well as those in support.

Among the tasks of the territorial-defence forces are the defence of the rearlines and the various services, while the reserve forces replace the losses.

As regards the future, the tasks of the Hungarian Armed Forces, and of the Army in particular, can be summarized as follows:

- safeguard of free institutions and national security, with a deterrent power;
- participation in regional conflicts and management of crisis situations both within and without the territory of the Allied countries;
- reaction to attacks against NATO countries.

All this can be included in the



following tasks:

- collective defence;
- strengthening of peace;
- national security (non-war military operations such as the prevention of disasters, search and rescue, fight against terrorism, etc.).

The Italian Army is increasing its professional component, and the conscription time has recently been reduced to 10

Preparation for fire training with automatic weapons.

months. What is the situation in Hungary in relation to the professionalization of the Army? Will conscription remain in force?

Reduction of conscription and voluntary service are an international trend, which shows

the will to create Armed Forces smaller in size, but more efficient and on an almost completely professional basis.

Also in Hungary there is a strong tendency towards the elimination of conscription and the reduction of its length.

As far as the Army is concerned, in 1997, after the conclusion of the qualitative modifications, a nine-month conscription was introduced, while basic and specialized training centres for conscripts were established. Conscription is based on three-month echelons, which guarantee a regular and continuous flow of soldiers to the operational units. This system permits to distribute the engagements in a balanced way, as well as to envisage a reserve, necessary in case of mobilization, and periodic call-ups for training.

At the present time, the Army consists of 14,388 conscripts and 3,238 contract volunteers, for a total of 17,626 elements, of which 6,581 are on training at the various Centres.

The conscripts of the different Branches now on duty at the operational units are 7,537; they mix well with the volunteers, and assure the operativeness of the units.

The replacement of conscripts with volunteers, or soldiers belonging to other categories, would increase the operational capability of the units, but would entail considerable costs.

In order to achieve this, it is necessary, first of all, to define the ratios of the Armed Forces' personnel, both in the medium and in the long term. As regards the first phase, i.e. within 2003, we envisage the introduction of about 10,000 volunteers.

The institution of the so-called "contract conscription" depends on the political will. This change would influence all the structures of the Armed Forces, including the reserve service. Last but not least, doubts could arise about the social usefulness of

Lieutenant General Ambrus Preininger was born in Budapest in 1944.

In 1966 he completed his studies at the Armoured Troops Unified Officer School, and for seven years has been Commander of several minor units.

After attending the inter-branch course at the Zrinyi Miklós Military Academy, in 1976 was assigned to the Nagyatad Armoured Regiment, where he held the positions of Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander and Commander.

From 1986 to 1988 he attended the General Staff Course in Moscow and, on his return to Hungary, was appointed Chief, Operational Training Section at the 5th Army Headquarters. The following year Gen. Preininger became Commander of the 2nd Mechanized Corps, in 1991 Commander of the 2nd Military District and, in 1994, Commander of the Land Forces. In 1997 was appointed Chief of the Army General Staff.

Lt.Gen. Ambrus Preininger has been awarded the Officer Cross of the Order of Merit, is married and has two children.

maintaining conscription. The decisions in this sector will affect the future of the Armed Forces, and that of the Army in particular. But radical changes should be introduced also in other professional fields.

It must be specified that conscripts cannot be employed in immediate and rapid intervention forces, and that volunteers assure a better performance also in peacetime.

With a system based on volunteers - disregarding numbers - we would have full-strength units, operational at all times. An Army no more based on conscription can be gradually realized in the space of 10-15 years, if the government guarantees the appropriate economic resources.

In fact, the transformations we

are discussing depend on the economic situation of the Country, the labour market, the completion of the integration process, the legislative changes, the technical and infrastructural modernization process, the training and specialization system, the career opportunities, the organizational structures, the autonomous organization of recruitment, the rise of professionalism.

We can gradually and successfully obtain a professional military force, only if, on the labour market, we are able to guarantee high-level salaries, equipment and careers, also in comparison to the civilian world.


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**Journalist*



The new threats that the international community is called to face, such as regional crises, ethnic conflicts and the uncontrolled flow of immigrants, require from all those who work, with different responsibilities, within the peace missions, a greater and more coordinated commitment promoting stability and security. In fact, lacking adequate coordination, the system of the relations between military and civilian bodies (both governmental and non-governmental) could prove very complex and dispersive and seriously damage the results of the entire operation.

THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS



A REALITY TO EXPLORE

by Massimo Panizzi *

The Kosovo crisis, with all its ensuing tragic reflections, has been emblematic in highlighting the issue of humanitarian aid to the populations suffering the consequences of modern conflicts. The threats that, at present, the international community is called to face, such as regional crises, ethnic conflicts and the uncontrolled flow of immigrants require from all those who, with different responsibilities, work in the context of peace missions a greater and more coordinated commitment in promoting stability and security. For this reason, it becomes more and more necessary that the military and civilian bodies (both governmental and non-governmental) acquire the habit of cooperating in international environments. In fact, lacking adequate coordination, the context in which they operate could become uncontrollable and chaotic. Furthermore, without precise rules aimed at rationalizing the functioning of the whole system of relations, even the most commendable humanitarian initiatives run the risk of being not only unproductive but indeed counterproductive. Which could jeopardize the result of the entire operation.

Therefore, the civilian and military authorities engaged in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) should have a common goal and,

respecting their particular mandates, pursue complementary objectives, within the framework of a harmonic and exhaustive project. The necessary precondition for achieving this is the mutual knowledge and collaboration of the various actors present on the scene, as regards objectives, roles and working procedures of the bodies involved, getting rid of the propensity to see things unilaterally, which is often the modus operandi of institutions, organizations and agencies. As regards the Armed Forces, although the presence of civilian organizations in the operations theatre is not an absolute novelty, much can be done in order to adjust the necessary coordination activities.

This contribution stems from the awareness that the capability of cooperating with the so-called humanitarian organizations is a very important factor of success that a military Commander must take into account when planning and conducting a missions. The contribution derives also from the experience gained during the recent Peacekeeping missions in which the Italian contingents were protagonist, and had to face the difficulties due to the scarce mutual knowledge of military and civilian operators. The object of this study is to help improve the military personnel's knowledge of the international and non-governmental Organizations' complex reality. In order to permit a closer approach to the recent developments of the problem, it was useful to contact directly some representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the UN Information Centre in Rome, the Federation of Christian Agencies for International Voluntary Service (F.O.C.S.I.V.), the CNR Institute of Legal Studies on the International Community and the St. Egidio Community. Furthermore, the

A 6614 armoured car during the SFOR mission.

SIMPLIFIED SCHEME OF THE TYPICAL ELEMENTS OF A PSO




Fig. 1

collection and consultation of the most updated documents on this subject was made easier by the use of the Internet.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS

The typical scenario of Peace

Support Operations (PSOs) includes very different actors, as well as a complex of activities which have some elements in common, while others are very specific to each branch/organization as can be seen in the simplified diagram at Fig.1. Among the protagonists of these operations we generally find:

- national and local authorities;



GLOSSARY

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

An international organization is a voluntary association of internationally acknowledged subjects, constituted through international acts and regulated, as regards the relations among the parties, by norms of international law. It is a stable body, with its own legal organization, agencies and institutes, through which it pursues the common ends of the associates, carrying out particular functions and exercising the powers conferred to it.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

They are envisaged by Articles 52 and 54 of the UN Charter, with universal vocation as regards their functions (therefore, of a political nature). The regional organizations aim at ensuring the maintenance of peace and international security in a determined geographical area. They are institutionalized groups of States, created with general purposes of cooperation, which include procedures for the peaceful solution of disputes and a system of common defence towards the exterior.

SPECIALIZED INSTITUTES

Monofunctional, mainly technical organizations, constituted through intergovernmental agreements. They cooperate with the UN on the basis of Articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter and, in conformity with their statutes, can carry out far-reaching international tasks in many sectors: economic, social, cultural, educational, medical, etc.

UN SUBSIDIARY BODIES

Special bodies instituted in order to manage specific functions included in the activity of the Organization. They are established by a unilateral act of the main body, and are an integral part of the UN structure, from both the financial and the administrative point of view.

NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The non-governmental organizations are associations of private citizens from different Nations and, although they carry out an activity of a transnational character, they are governed by the internal laws of the home State. They are unconnected from the point of view of international law. They enjoy a "consultative status" with the UN, the specialized institutions, the European Council, the OAS and other governmental organizations.

The NGOs can be structured either on regional or on global bases; they are modeled in conformity with the pattern of the governmental organizations.

They are financed by private contributions; the allowed percentage of public contributions generally does not exceed a determined ceiling, in order to safeguard the independence of the organization. As regards cooperation-to-development, the NGOs are national or international organizations, characterized by the common commitment to support the development, by the lack of institutional ties vis-à-vis the governments and their policies and, above all, by their non-profit nature.

- former belligerent factions and forces;
- intervention Force, with its more-or-less complex Command and Control structure;
- international governmental and non-governmental Organizations.

As regards the latter, it is not easy to see things clearly without having first understood the differences between the various organizations, assigning each of them to the "family" it belongs to. As a matter of fact, it is possible to hear inappropriate and indistinct talks about international and humanitarian organizations, volunteer groups, governmental, non-governmental, regional, religious organizations and agencies, etc. It is useful, therefore, to call the organizations using the name of their "category", in order to put them in the appropriate legal and institutional context, knowing in advance what is their role, task and mandate in the operational theatre in which they operate. It is also important to be clear about terminology: to this end, the most recurrent terms used in the present study are listed at left, together with their definitions.

THE "ACTUAL" INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

From the term "international" can be inferred that the fundamental characteristic of the organizations is the institutional cooperation among Nations through the creation of one or more bodies. These bodies are deputed by the Nations to represent and manage the common interests that they have defined and wish to pursue by establishing an international organizations. The fact that the International organizations manage the collective interests of several members of the international community rather than individual interests, implies that they perform

Fig. 2

Main Subsidiary Bodies established by the UN General Assembly		
DENOMINATION	ACTIVITY	LOCATION
UNCTAD (Conference on Trade and Development)	Promotion of international trade	GENEVA
UNDP (Development program)	Technical assistance to developing Countries	NEW YORK
UNHCR (High Commissioner for Refugees)	Assistance to refugees	GENEVA
UNICEF (Children Fund)	Protection of children	NEW YORK
UNEP (Environment Program)	Protection of the Environment	NAIROBI
UNITAR (Institute for Training and Research)	Training of officials of developing Countries	NEW YORK
WFP (World Food Program)	Promotion of development of food-aid programs	ROME

Therefore the UN is concerned with all the world political questions that could endanger world peace. To perform its functions, the UN can establish the Subsidiary Bodies that are deemed necessary. This possibility is provided for in Articles 7 and 22 of the Charter.

These are special organs, constituted with the purpose of managing special functions that pertain to the organization; they are an integral part of its structure, both from the financial and the administrative points of view. This characteristic distinguishes them from the Specialized Institutes which, instead, are born as intergovernmental organizations, operate in specific sectors, and

Italian soldiers distributing comfort goods to some Bosnian children.

a public function. In other words, the international Organizations perform an international public service.

Therefore, the international organization replaces the member States in the management of the unitary interest and, in consenting to this, the States implicitly accept the possibility that this replacement be to the detriment of their particular interests which might possibly clash with the unitary interests.

As regards structure and operation of the International Organizations, there are no international laws concerning their structure, so that in practice there is great variety of bodies. Since they are functional, and not territorial, their structures are very different as they reflect the variety and diversity of the functions entrusted to them, on a case-by-case basis, by the member States.

The UN and the Subsidiary Bodies

The UN is an international political body with specific responsibilities, institutes and organs for maintaining international peace and security, since it has adopted the repudiation of force as a means for solving unnecessary disputes, promotion of human rights etc.

Therefore the UN constitutes the foremost international organization, for it is the concrete expression of the universal will to renounce the employment of force to solve the controversies among the states.




Fig. 3

UN Specialized Institutes		
INSTITUTE	LOCATION	TASKS
FAO (Food & Agriculture Organization)	ROME	Improve human alimentation and promote agricultural production
UNESCO (UN Education, Science and Culture Organization)	PARIS	Strengthen collaboration among States through culture, science and education
WHO (World Health Organization)	GENEVA	Promote international cooperation in the medical sector
IMF (International Monetary Fund)	WASHINGTON	Foster international monetary cooperation, expansion of international trade and stability of exchange rates
IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)	WASHINGTON	Grant loans for productive investments and promote the expansion of international trade
UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organization)	VIENNA	Promote industrial growth of developing countries

subsequently establish a connection with the UN.

Some organs instituted by the General Assembly have acquired a remarkable importance, owing both to the scope of their activities and to the large resources at their disposal. Fig.2 shows a list of some of the main Subsidiary Bodies created within the UN.

The Specialized Institutes

They are international, intergovernmental bodies with well defined tasks, created by some Nations - independent of the UN - in order to reach common objectives.

Although they are not members of the UN, these bodies maintain close relations with it, as provided for by Articles 57, 58, and 63 of the Charter.

Considering the Institutes' and the UN's common interests, it was deemed expedient to increase the coordination of their action by liaison agreements of the single organizations with the United Nations.

As regards the structure of these Institutes, it should be noted that, in general, they envisage an Assembly (or Conference) of the representatives of all member States, a restricted executive body (Council, Administrative or


Executive Council), and an organ with representative and coordinative functions (Secretariat, International Bureau etc.).

Therefore, it can be concluded that, despite their being autonomous organizations, born of accords made by Nations outside the Charter, also the Specialized Institutes - like the Regional Organizations, which will be discussed later - function as decentralized bodies of the UN. In fact, the liaison agreements in

Art. 57 envisage that the Specialized Institutes be subjected to the United Nations' power of coordination and control. This power consists essentially in the issue of non-binding norms by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN, as well as in the Institutes' obligations to submit regular reports to ECOSOC, according to the proviso of Art. 64. Furthermore, according to Art. 17, the General Assembly should examine and approve all the financial and budgetary agreements made with the Specialized Institutes listed in Art. 57, as well as the budgets of the same Institutes, in order to make the necessary recommendations.

As concerns the actual activity of the Specialized Institutes, the Charter only makes a general reference at international tasks in the "economic, social, cultural, educational, medical and similar sectors". The Institutes carry out also operational and auxiliary activities, aimed at fostering and promoting cooperation and development. In particular, the

Fig. 4



CONSIDERATIONS ON THE FILM

"The Thin Red Line"

It may happen sometimes to see films which, although stirring contradictory feelings, leave you with the sensation of having witnessed a great performance, even if imperfect in some parts.

This is what happens with "the Thin Red Line", Terrence Malick's latest work. This highly suggestive film, ambitious in its inspiring project, original in contents and form, strong in its emotional impact, surely will not leave the audience indifferent.

Catalogued among war-movies, which lengthens the already long list of war-genre films, likened to and compared (as could be expected) with Spielberg's recent "Saving Private Ryan", it definitely differs from it, and not only for the different war event it represents (the American landing at Guadalcanal, in the Pacific, in 1942) but, above all, for the director's objective. In fact, Malick neither simply wants to narrate a tragic page of history, nor seems particularly worried about faithfully reconstructing an important episode of the American war history; his is a war-movie but not precisely a movie on war. Actually, in scene after scene, war increasingly appears instrumental to the director, so that he can transmit his personal message: the incomprehensible coexistence of Good and Evil in the history of mankind, among man's communities and in the human soul.

In this sense the conflict that opposed Americans and Japanese in South Pacific seems to answer the philosopher-director's spiritual need, in that war represents total degeneration, an insane break of the harmony which the Great Engineer of Creation had wanted and been able to construct from its origins. "The Thin Red Line" (the line that, according to some, represents the imperceptible boundary between Good and Evil) becomes then a film on life, on mankind. Mankind which along the centuries, so often, interrupted the natural course of events with fratricidal fights and tremendous conflicts. Such irrational fracture is shown as an inexplicable physiological necessity that emerges - its hows, whys and wherefores unknown - but it emerges powerfully. The epic of Guadalcanal - where the effects of man's stupidity were so devastating and violent so as to make one lose his sense of life - can become a symbol of all wars. The human bloodbath of the Second World War, the harshness of combat and the destructive violence of the weapons employed are, for the film's director, the ultimate stage of a self-destructive folly, which has too often characterized the history of the world.

The film's overture is one that cannot be easily forgotten. A panoramic look on the natural environment (the film's coprotagonist) which, accompanied by a suggestive music (Paradise, from Fauré's Requiem) and by the off-screen words of a deep, oracular voice (at times even too oracular), is the extraordinary introduction to the drama that will develop in the successive scenes, through the actions of the American soldiers that throw themselves and die in conquering the island's hills. War as extreme expression of the fracture between Good and Evil, therefore. But the rupture occurs also among the fighting groups and within the soul of each protagonist. The military world offers the director the instruments he needs to show all the Good and all the Evil man is capable of. Among the military we find the Battalion Commander, frustrated by the disappointments of a long unsuccessful career (an outstanding Nick Nolte) who, in the Guadalcanal landing encounters his last real chance of emerging and making up for the disappointments suffered until then; at that point, his unbridled ambition comes to light and he is inexorably led to utter insensibility towards the destiny of his soldiers sent to death. Lt.Col. Tall, in this sense, represents a part of the military "logic", where the strict application of the military rules and the degenerations deriving from the abuse of authority lead to absurd, catastrophic decisions; but then we also find the courage and the most typical values of the military; among which the self-denial and gratuitousness, the will to surpass one's limits, of Sergeant Welsh (played by a great Sean Penn) and Captain Gaff's heroism. Capt. Gaff (John Cusack), is an emblem of the everlasting appeal of the true military leader. In the same action the director transmits to the audience fear, sacrifice, rage, pain, hate and compassion for the enemy, all enclosed within a single, wide picture; and the sensation one feels when Gaff, defeated, shows the same human features and weaknesses of the soldiers mown down by the hundred by the mortars' and machine guns' defensive crossfire of the Japanese. The reconstruction of the battle - although imperfect, as it sometimes appears - offers moments of remarkable visual and emotional impact and reaches its maximum narrative intensity in the masterly scenes of the assault on the hill by the "team of heroes".

The military universe, which is revealed through the numerous actors cast by Malick, offers once more the opportunity to penetrate into some dimensions of living which have always characterized a soldier's life, such as being away from home, the aching and exalting memories of the loved one, the longing for a letter that helps to revive the only sensations that can make up for the sacrifices of the moment; and then like an ineluctable destiny, the despair that follows desertion.

There, on one of the splendid Solomon islands, all mankind is present, with its past, present and future histories. The object of discussion is not so much war in itself but the extraordinary complexity of the human soul, so many-sided and full of foreseeable and unforeseeable manifestations.

Malick gives us a great picture of the men and of the nature that surrounds them (the particularly luxuriant and suggestive nature of the tropical island). Human beings in harmony with Creation and with themselves at the beginning, other human beings at war, afterwards. The director's expert eye penetrates into the heart of the problem, looking for an answer to the Good-Evil dilemma, yearning for Truth. But there is no certain answer, because in the human situations represented and in the characters of the soldiers the two poles meet and superimpose on each other without any logic. The old artist makes his journey through the eyes of private Witt (Jim Caviezel), the idealist, who first deserts and then decides to throw himself headlong in the desperate action of his battalion. What urges him is his longing to know and experience all human situations, in the vast range of sensations between joy and pain. Through the eyes of this soldier we seem sometimes to perceive God's eye bent on his creatures, who are really capable of anything. The merciful eye of a Father, that sees everything and does not judge, transmitting us the hope of redemption and the inmost feeling that, after catharsis, everything could return to the bosom of Mother Nature and to the harmony of the primeval Design.

An ambitious project, as we said, but fascinating: never, perhaps, had an artist - through the cinema - dared to condense in a single work the complexity of human life, synthesizing in almost three hours of film some of the most significant events, situations and sensations that a man may experience: the purity and the essentiality of life in the heart of uncontaminated nature, the grace of femininity and the sweetness of the moments of love, the peace of God and, by contrast, war, competition, desertion, violent death, and finally, the annihilation of human beings.

Moments of great cinema, where war images and panoramic shots on the radiant nature of the island, music and words melt into a "unicum" of extraordinary intensity and alternate with others in which the rhythm of the story is excessively slow, the idea does not come out, the introspective research appears excessive and the words of the off-screen voice seem overflowing, superimposing on the images and depriving them of some of their force. But it is a film really unique in its kind, which, safeguarding some positive aspects of military life, repropose a reflection on the past and present role of the Armed Forces and which stands out for some extraordinary intuitions and the ability to transmit a timeless message.



This emblematic picture bears witness of the humanitarian activity of our soldiers.

Specialized Institutes can decide and provide technical assistance, loans and aid programmes.

Finally, Art. 59 of the Charter establishes that the UN can promote negotiations, among the Nations concerned, in order to create new Institutes for the achievement of the goals pursued by the economic and social cooperation, as pointed out in Art. 55 of the Charter. Fig. 3 shows a list of some of the best known

Specialized Institutes.

The regional Organizations and OSCE (Fig.4)

Article 52 of the Charter envisages the possibility of establishing regional organization to tackle the questions concerning peacekeeping and international security, provided they conform to the purposes and principles of the UN. In particular, the Security Council encourages the development of peaceful solutions of local disputes, through regional organizations and agreements:


- on the initiative of the Nations

concerned;

- on entrustment from the Security Council.

In short, these organizations are institutional groups of States, created with general purposes of cooperation, including procedures for the peaceful solution of disputes and system of common defence against foreign threats.

A regional organization is normally characterized by a treaty which establishes permanent institutions with a legal international personality. The employment of Regional Organizations is envisaged by the Charter at para VIII Art. 52.



the moment the role of the organization in Peacekeeping Operations is only theoretic as regards operations and sponsor.

THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs) (Fig.5)

The NGOs' role in the present-day context.

The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are at present an evolving sector and therefore interesting to investigate. As a matter of fact, the recent peace operations have been characterized by an evergrowing presence of NGOs; their activity is closely connected with the governmental ones; moreover, as they are not within the UN's or other renowned international organization's jurisdiction, they are neither known (but for their name) nor their role is easily identified. The reason is that the action of these solidaristic voluntary associations is not coordinated, for this is not provided for by international law (even through their employment in crisis areas must obtain the agreement of the host Country). Nevertheless, for the military authorities to underestimate their existence and their importance would be a great mistake, especially considering the more and more important role played in the cooperation to development, which is a fundamental part of a country's foreign policy. In addition, one should emphasize that, vis-a-vis the governmental organizations, NGOs often have the advantage of being able to work with greater flexibility.

The General Assembly of the UN, with a 1988 resolution, has exhorted all nations to facilitate the access to their territory of all NGOs working in the humanitarian field, such as *Medecins Sans Frontières*. Also other Organizations are noteworthy, for they carry out important actions (*Amnesty International* in the field of human

There are several organizations capable of meeting the requirements mentioned above: in the American continent, OAS (Organization of American States), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement); in South-East Asia, ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations); in Europe, among others, EU, OSCE, WEU, NATO. The growing role of the Regional Organizations could lead to their representation at the UN Security Council, where they would substitute the non-permanent members, which are now striving to give expression to the various geopolitical regions.

Examining the Regional Organizations, one can see the differences existing among them, as regards their structure and the tasks they are called to carry out. In particular and although it has "lost" part of its original role, NATO has at its disposal forces and structures which can be employed for new tasks. Other organizations, such as EU, OSCE, WEU, although having been assigned specific tasks, up to now have not had the forces and the structures needed to perform

them in full.

OSCE, in particular, deserves a closer look, since in Bosnia it has played (and still plays) a decisive role, especially in the management of the electoral process. This Organization, in fact, could take upon itself the management of peacekeeping missions on behalf of the UN. As a matter of fact, its objective is not so much collective security but, rather, global security, considered from the viewpoint of the interdependence of its economic, environmental, humanitarian, political and military dimensions. The particular characteristic of globality is well shown by its three main functions, namely:

- issue of norms on international law, human rights, minorities' rights, democracy, market economy;
- process of armaments control in Europe;
- warning signals, prevention of conflicts and peaceful solution of disputes.

Nevertheless, as was recently underlined by Amb. Aragona, Secretary General of OSCE, at

rights, *Greenpeace* and *WWF* which work for the environment and *Transparency International* which fights against international corruption) and have relations with the governments' international organizations which promote similar initiatives (the UN, first of all, and the Specialized Institutes). As for the International Red Cross (one of the most important non-governmental organizations, constituted by the various national Red Cross societies, the League of the Red Cross societies and the Red Cross International Committee), the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on international humanitarian law contemplate its functions, which must be respected internationally by all countries.

Recently, during the Gulf crisis, in Somalia and former Yugoslavia, the NGOs representatives have always been present next to the international officials, helping to alleviate the crisis situations.

Today's feeling is that the international importance of NGOs ought to be revalued also from a strictly juridical point of view. Therefore it seems appropriate to tackle this subject in order to clarify the institutional foundations of these organizations, outlining their limits and scopes within the PSOs.

NGOs and UN (Fig.6).

NGOs are associations created on the initiative of private persons with the purpose of setting up transnational ties among individuals or bodies of different nationalities.

The distinctive element is that they are associations of private bodies belonging to different nations, which feel they need an international-level coordination of their activity. They are also distinguished by the fact that they seek no profit; apart from that, they may pursue the most different goals, among which:

- a religious aim, like the

Fig. 6

THE NGOs AND THE UN

•ART.71, UN CHARTER: ECOSOC CAN CONSULT NGOs ON ISSUES WITHIN ITS RESPONSIBILITY

•1946 AND 1950 RESOLUTIONS: DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN NGOs, BASED ON THEIR RELATIONS WITH ECOSOC ACTIVITIES

•1988 RESOLUTION: EXHORT NATIONS TO FACILITATE THE ENTRANCE OF NGOs FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES

•EMERGENCY INTERVENTIONS abroad: they contact:

- OCHA (UN)
- ECHO (EU)
- DGCS (FOR MIN)

Fig. 7

NGOs IN ITALY

•ASSOCIATIONS OF COOPERATING VOLUNTEERS AND TECHNICIANS PROVIDING USEFUL SERVICES FOR THE COMMUNITY

•SAFEGUARDED BY THE CONSTITUTION (ART.18)

•OPERATE WITHIN THE NATION AND IN PEACE MISSIONS

•CONTRIBUTIONS BY: Government, Public Bodies and Institutions, International organizations, donations and inheritances, commercial activities (congruous with the Organizations' purposes)

Ecumenical Council of Churches;

- a humanitarian aim, like the *International Red Cross*;
- a scientific goal, like the *Institute of International Law*;
- a social aim, like *Greenpeace*;
- an economic goal, like the professional organizations.

According to the provisions of Art. 71 of the Charter, ECOSOC can make the necessary arrangements to consult the non-governmental organization concerned with the issues that may be within its jurisdiction.



The agreements can be made with international or national organizations, upon consultation of the concerned UN partner. The UN resolutions of June 21, 1946 and February 27, 1950, implemented what the abovesaid article provided for. In the two resolutions there is a distinction between:

- organizations that have an interest in most activities of the Economic Council;
- organizations that operate only in some sectors of ECOSOC activity;
- organizations that have only a consultive status and may be consulted by ECOSOC as regards particular aspects of the latter's activity.

NGOs in Italy (Fig.7 and 8)

Having stated that NGOs are associations which deliver services useful to the collectivity and perform a function of support and stimulus to the Institutions, one can add that in Italy they are guaranteed by our Constitution (Art.18), precisely because of their

status, and acknowledged as legal subjects, in a position to receive funds from the state and from private individuals. Generally the organizations are constituted by religious, religious and lay, only-lay persons or by volunteers and technical cooperators. They work within the Nations and in peace missions. The implementation of the NGO projects and interventions in the developing Countries is based on Art.49 of the Law of February 26, 1987 which regulates Italy's cooperation with the developing Countries and constitutes the instrument through which the Italian government can make up for the lack of a Ministry for Cooperation to Development. As regards financial resources, the NGOs, according to Art.288 of the Law of August 11, 1991 on voluntary organizations, draw their resources from contributions from the State and other private and public bodies, which support exclusively specific and documented interventions and projects; from contributions from international bodies, donations and testamentary legacies, refunds derived from commercial and

secondary productive activities (with purposes consistent with the statute of the organizations). The voluntary organizations are entered in the registers of Regions and Autonomous Provinces and have a National Observatory which attends to their census and social promotion. For emergency interventions abroad the NGOs refer to the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (O.C.H.A.) and the European Community Humanitarian Office (E.C.H.O.). In Italy they refer to the General Direction for the Cooperation to Development (D.G.C.S.) constituted at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to the mentioned Law no. 49. Within the DGCS of the Foreign Ministry, two offices are entrusted with the management of NGO peace missions: Office XI and Office XIV (Emergencies) which avail themselves of the contributions of the Foreign Ministry's Crisis Unit and of Civil Defence. Office XIV manages the humanitarian resources.

The Italian NGOs currently acknowledged by the Foreign Ministry as qualified are 129, grouped in federations and coordination centres:

- FOCSIV (Federation of Christian Organizations for International Voluntary Services) which coordinates the catholic Organizations and operates through volunteers and technical contract-cooperators;
- COCIS (Coordination of Organizations for International Cooperation and Development) which coordinates lay organizations;
- CIPSI (Coordination of Popular Initiatives for International Solidarity), which coordinates small lay-organizations, fostering on-the-spot activities.

There are, moreover, other NGOs which work outside the Federations and the UN Volunteer Associations, a special corps not provided for by Law 49. Lastly, we

Fig. 9

EXAMPLES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN CRISIS ZONES IN THE BALKAN AREA	
N G O	SECTORS OF INTERVENTION
ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM	Food distribution: (powdered milk, biscuits, etc.)
EMERGENCY	Emergency medical assistance
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL	Gathering information of violations of human rights
BEATI I COSTRUTTORI DI PACE	Food, medical assistance, social services, human rights
CARITAS INTERNATIONALIS	Food transport, clothing for children
FEED THE CHILDREN	Special food for babies and children
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE RED CROSS	Medical assistance, social services, education, food
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES	Information, cooperation, coordination
MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES	Food distribution, medical assistance
SALVATION ARMY	Social services, construction, infrastructure, food
SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND FEDERATION	Psychological assistance and education

cannot avoid mentioning a particular NGO, ever present in conflict areas: Caritas, an organism that coordinates the Christian groups and movements, headed by Caritas International (a federation of all national Caritas Organizations, with its own permanent observer at the UN, constituted by the Italian Episcopal Conference). The programmes managed by the NGOs may have been entrusted to them or promoted by them. A programme is considered "entrusted" when it is planned by the DGCS of the Foreign Ministry but carried out by one or more NGOs according to its mandate. A programme is called "promoted" when the NGO itself defines the project and submits it to the Foreign Ministry's approval. In the first instance the programmes are usually financed by the Foreign Ministry and the NGOs perform a kind of government function, behaving as executory societies; in the second instance the NGOs operate as autonomous agents of the cooperation, although with the Foreign Ministry financial support

which may amount to 70%. Through the mentioned programmes, the NGOs have managed an average of 150 billion lire until 1994 (approx 3% of the amount allotted to cooperation by Law 49). Contrary to what happens in some countries, the

Italian NGOs receive no public funds apart from what we have just seen. Fig. 9 shows a list of NGOs which operated during the crises in the Balkan area. Three more trade-union NGOs have the Foreign Ministry's qualification - ISCOS, Project Development and Project South, which are the direct issue of the major Italian labour federations - and organizations like Caritas and Unicef-Italia, which have a quite particular identity. The three federations, and the non-associated NGOs, since 1988 have been meeting in a general assembly at least once a year to examine their positions and define a common policy in their relations with the institutions.

The picture of the NGOs is completed by the "private" ones, among which we can mention the "Comunità di Sant'Egidio" - engaged also in the Kosovo area - and the branches of the foreign organizations which have their headquarters abroad and seats in various nations, Italy included. The logos of some of these NGOs (Amnesty International, WWF, Greenpeace, etc) are represented at Fig. 10.

ONGs - SOME OF THE BEST-KNOWN EXAMPLES

Fig. 10



amnesty international

Comunità di
SANT'EGIDIO

 **CARITAS INTERNATIONALIS**



NGO's SECTORS OF INTERVENTION IN PEACE MISSIONS		Fig.11
SECTOR	TYPE OF INTERVENTION	
EMERGENCY	SOCIO-MEDICAL (REALIZATION AND ORGANIZATION OF STRUCTURES, TRAINING OF DOCTORS, SUPPLY OF MEDICINES, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, VACCINATION CAMPAIGNS, HEALTH EDUCATION)	
	INFRASTRUCTURAL (URGENT SHELTER FOR EVACUEES AND REFUGEES)	
	FOOD	
	PROGRAMMATIC/ADDITIONAL (FOR SOCIO-MEDICAL, VETERINARY, AGRICULTURAL, WATER-SUPPLY AND HYGIENIC ACTIVITIES)	
	HYGIENIC/ENVIRONMENTAL (WATER, ENERGY)	
DEVELOPMENT	LOGISTIC (WITH ARMED FORCES' PARTICIPATION)	
	CONSTRUCTION OF PLANTS AND INFRASTRUCTURE	
	PROVISION OF SERVICES AND EQUIPMENT (SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, ETC.)	
	CONTROL OF RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS	
	CONTROL OF REGULARITY OF ELECTIONS	

performance of their delicate task. Since they are normally present in the intervention area before the deployment of the military units, they can realize the initial interface between the military Contingent and the local population (Fig.12). Thanks to this, it can be easier to establish, between the two components, a climate of confidence based on the evolution of the civilian needs and on a bilateral flow of information. The introduction of the G5 and the relevant civil-military cooperation in the headquarters of the Major Units, can permit a better penetration of the military

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE ORGANIZATIONS.

NGOs may need the military forces' protection when transporting relief goods, to escort city convoys, to defend distribution centres, for the medical assistance that entails the employment of helicopters, etc. The interventions offered by social-assistance organizations include a very large number of services both inside and outside the contrary. The NGOs interventions in peace mission can be grouped in two sectors: emergency and development. Figure 11 shows a list of some typical NGOs interventions in peace missions. The NGOs implicit impossibility of obtaining a solid structure implies that they find it difficult to operate by themselves in emergency situations. It is also for this reason that in the crisis theatres a kind of triangular system prevails, whose protagonists are - for different reasons and with different functions - the Italian Cooperation of the Foreign Ministry, the Armed Forces and the NGOs. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the humanitarian organizations, and the NGOs in particular, can be precious sources of information on the local situation and therefore can assist the military forces in the





Fig. 13



Children are the first to suffer the negative effects of conflict situations.

organization in the existing situation, giving - if possible and required - concrete support to the organizations present in the area. In order to realize the best possible coordination and synergy of efforts between military and civilian organizations, some forms of intervention have been determined, deriving from solutions expanded in a DGS study on civil-military cooperation in humanitarian-aid operations (Fig.13):

- stipulation of a preliminary agreement on responsibilities and objectives (a Memorandum

of Understanding (MoU) would be advisable);

- determination of common areas of responsibility;
- liaison, to be achieved through the exchange of liaison officers;
- meeting of the organizations concerned;
- constitution of Civil-Military Operational Centres (CMOCs), Joint Commissions (JCs) and Joint Military Commissions (JMCs).

On the other hand, it is evident that the coexistence of military and civil organizations could produce problems. The differences in mentality and approach to the problems have sometimes become incomprehensions on the field. The results of some surveys show that the NGOs accuse the military of a poor knowledge of the ground and a too fast and superficial approach to the political and social system of the host Countries. Furthermore, according to some NGOs, the military, with their presence, would cause the hostility of the operational environment, reducing in a certain sense the sovereignty of the host Country (with negative repercussions on the NGOs possibility to operate). Finally, it may seem that the military interventions in

Fig. 14

CRITICISM to the Military





Fig. 15



the beneficiaries to standards which could not be maintained after the end of the operational mandate. The military, on their part, criticize the NGOs for their tendency to move in a manner often incompatible with the security requirements, their reluctance to submit to some form of discipline, and a general distrust vis-à-vis the military organization in itself (Fig.15). The operations conducted by IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and by the multinational Force engaged in Albania have anyway confirmed the considerable progress made, in the field of cooperation, by both civil and military organizations. In particular, both actors have made remarkable efforts in order to better understand each other's concept of "humanitarian relief".


humanitarian missions "subtract" money from cooperation (Fig. 14). According to a researcher who refers to military interventions in a broad sense, *"by distributing large quantities of food, repairing and restoring infrastructure according to Western standards, the Armed Forces realize highly visible interventions, which increase the approval of their operations by the internal public opinion, but have no prospect of continuing after their withdrawal"*. On the other hand, NGOs recognize the positivity of employing the military instrument in case of serious security and logistic problems and, generally, in emergency situations. In Somalia, where with time the relations between NGOs and military Force have progressively increased and mutual confidence improved, the NGOs were reluctant to accept the necessity to entrust the military with the distribution of part of the aid, insisting that they had a better knowledge of the Somalis. In similar circumstances, it was stressed that the methods of intervention followed by the

military were based on quantity, and conditioned by the fact that they had a relatively limited horizon. In that particular case, it was noted that the Italian Contingent, with its restructuring activities, would have accustomed

PROPOSALS FOR BETTER COORDINATION (Figures 16 and 17)

In the light of the experience gained during the recent PSOs, of the most important "lesson learned" and

Fig. 16






Fig. 17

considering that civil-military operations are an important function within the "Capability Packages" of the Italian Army, it would seem suitable for the Armed Forces to give a further boost to the activities aimed at improving the contacts between the military and the civil organizations. Apart from the proposals made by the Commands concerned (many of which have already been put into practice) and apart from the consideration that, as regards the UN-sponsored missions, the Humanitarian Affairs Office should be entrusted with the determination of the overall strategy of the intervention in any case, it would be advisable to take initiative in order to:

- foster the knowledge of the International and Non-Governmental Organizations' reality, through a greater openness of the Armed Forces towards the exterior including, in the civil-military cooperation courses, lessons held by representatives of the Foreign Ministry and of the International and Non-Governmental Organizations;
- organize periodical conferences

down to Brigade level (in the garrisons) inviting as lecturers important representatives of those Organizations;

- inform the Organizations of the Armed Forces' willingness to illustrate the procedures and methods of the military Contingents employed in PSOs, through meetings promoted upon agreements of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs;
- establish a constantly updated data-bank on the Organizations, at General Staff level, with the most useful contact points, in order to maintain close relations already before possible operational employments;
- realize, in conclusion, a culture of cooperation not limited to a prospect of humanitarian interventions, but rooted in the operators' common awareness of playing a key role in the foreign and security policy of the Nation.

CONCLUSIONS

It may happen that, through the

cooperation to development, interests different from those concerning the national security determine foreign-policy commitments which could cause successive military interventions, as it occurred in Mozambique. This is why, in Italy and in other Countries, it is possible to decide the employment of the Armed Forces in areas of no preeminent strategic interest. Therefore we can deduce that the relationship between Armed Forces and NGOs in the theatres of crisis is one aspect of the complex relations existing between the cooperation and the defence policies, as well as between the different state and non-state sources of foreign policy.

We can conclude, therefore, that the policy of cooperation to development will continue to be a fundamental aspect of the Italian security policy, with a more and more diversified and flexible employment of the military; in this sense, it could seem appropriate that, at central level, the roles of the civil and military organizations in PSOs be determined in advance as regards cooperation to development and, in general, humanitarian relief, in order to waste no resources.

In some recent NATO exercises, such as "Dynamic Mix 98", the operational assumption consisted of scenarios where the humanitarian and military aspects were closely interconnected. Most social indicators point to the possibility of crisis situations where the joint employment of military contingents and civil organizations could be one of their distinctive characters. It would be highly desirable that the culture of cooperation and integration could become an integral part of the preparation of the Cadres of the Armed Forces and of the leaders of the Organizations, irrespective of their characteristics.

□

**Lieut. Colonel,
Army General Staff*





BERSAGLIERI FOR PEACE

The «Garibaldi» Brigade in Kosovo



Since last December the Garibaldi Brigade has been committed to the Balkans. Soldiers from the Garibaldi Brigade have been delivering humanitarian aid to refugees from Kosovo in Macedonia under a general consensus by the international observers. On the 10th of June soldiers from the Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Argentinean armies arrived in Pec, which was considered to be the most dangerous area, and started their difficult mission. Once again the Italian soldiers have proved their vocation for peace, justice and solidarity to suffering peoples.





Corporal 1st Class Antonello Manca on the Cover of Time magazine.

charge of monitoring Serb units.

Let's make a brief history: the ethnic Albanians had been cruelly treated in Kosovo since long time and the international community knew it.

The ethnic male Albanians could join the Kosovo Liberation Army and that is why the Serb illegal troops imprisoned them. Those who had carried out atrocities in Sarajevo and Srebrenica belonged to the illegal troops.

Ethnic Albanians were imprisoned, tortured and finally killed. Women were raped, humiliated and set free in order to let everybody know what was the destiny of ethnic Albanians.

The international community did not pay attention to the war in Bosnia and decided to commit a number of observers from OSCE to Kosovo who were tasked to check whether the Serbs had really made the atrocities they were accused of by the international media and by the Kosovars fleeing the country.

On this occasion those who worked for the media proved they had become aware of the tragedy that was taking place in Kosovo. The media managed to focus on it and asked the international community to do the same.

The OSCE observers began their mission in Kosovo and a NATO multinational force from the Joint Guarantor Operation was ready to evacuate them in case of troubles.

The Italian Army took part in it with 250 soldiers from the Garibaldi Brigade who, as internationally agreed, were committed to Skopje, Macedonia. There were few of them but they were of basic importance to the mission: there were a Battalion Command Post and mechanised

In the month of December 1995, after the Dayton Accord had been signed and the war in Bosnia came to an end, Bersaglieri from the Garibaldi brigade arrived in Sarajevo. The city had been totally destroyed by the war between Serb and Muslim parties and Bersaglieri got control over an area where the horrible crimes requiring the involvement of the international community had been committed.

The Italian Army volunteers were at their first mission and managed to perfectly balance the opposing parties who had laid down their arms reluctantly. They showed the world the smiling face

of their country and at the same time fulfilled their mission.

The Garibaldi brigade was successful basically because it realised that during the peace Keeping missions soldiers must focus on human beings, on those who have suffered the horrors of the war.

The Italian volunteers were as successful as the Italian Army which has been modernising itself and played an increasingly important role within the NATO missions in the Balkans.

In the month of December 1998 the Bersaglieri were given another task: they had to protect the OSCE observers who were in

companies from the 8th Bersaglieri Regiment which had been reinforced with some armoured vehicles, engineer units and helicopters.

The Italian Army Volunteers proved to be professional soldiers who carefully looked after people suffering from the war as it had already happened in Bosnia.

They were calm, well trained and ready to face the most dangerous situations. The Italian Bersaglieri were appreciated by the people in Macedonia, also because of their behaviour as human beings. They were also highly appreciated by the commander of the International Contingent.

There was not much time and they learned to patrol that country, which would turn out to be very important during the second phase of the operation when the Italian contingent was committed to Kosovo.

In the meanwhile the OSCE observers found evidences of the horrible crimes against ethnic Albanians. The observers discovered many graves and the Serb authorities were becoming ever more hostile to them. The observers were partly deprived of their freedom to move within the country



*Above and Below.
Bersaglieri patrolling the territory.*

and were also threatened. Finally the observers left the country.

Since that moment there was an escalation of the war which ended with NATO bombing military

targets in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Italian soldiers were moved along the boundary line between Serbia and Macedonia where they supported and gave security to thousands of Albanians who had fled the regime and persecution. The Italian contingent was increased up to 1,100 men mostly belonging to the Garibaldi Brigade and equipped with modern weapons.

The Italian contingent was equipped with modern vehicles such as the armoured VCC1, M 113, M 106, Leopard, light armoured vehicles, Centauro and the wheeled VM 90 to carry personnel.

The war increased and at the same time diplomacy tried to establish a dialog with Belgrade but at that time the Kosovars had already fled to Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro where the refugee camps did not become lagers only thanks to the Italian support.

Diplomacy and military actions did their job. The International public opinion, including the Italian one, thought a ground troops invasion was inevitable.




But it was thought a UN resolution was necessary for the refugees return to Kosovo and also to have the United Nations back to the role of guardian of international security.

Russian diplomacy and NATO resoluteness allowed the international community to understand whether Belgrade was really going to decide for peace and accept both the G8 conditions and the UN-resolution.

Yugoslavia was asked to stop the violence in Kosovo and withdraw the troops from the region. NATO would stop bombing under these conditions.

Finally Belgrade accepted the conditions set by the international community allowing ethnic Albanians to return to Kosovo within a security frame by a NATO-led international force. 48,000 soldiers will take part in the Joint Guardian Operation.

So, the Serb Military officials signed an accord that would bring peace to the region. They were in a tent on the border between Kosovo and Macedonia and General Del Vecchio, commander of the Garibaldi Brigade, was there too. The Serb troops agreed to withdraw within 11 days and the KFOR was ready to enter the



region. The Italian contingent commanded by Brigadier Del Vecchio played an important role within KFOR.

During the first phase of the Operation the Italian soldiers were tasked to reconstruct roads and bridges, to clear a 20-km-long strip from mines and booby-traps.


Since we knew the Serb troops had posed mines along the border before withdrawing, the Serb military officials were

asked to give the maps of the minefields in order to make our job easier. As it had happened in Bosnia, we found that homes and trees had been booby-trapped after the Warsaw Pact techniques. The mine clearing allowed refugees to return home and it was carried out by the Italian BOE special forces, the Italian world-famous mine-clearing specialists who had already worked in Bosnia and Afghanistan in the past. First of all they cleared the main roads in order to allow aid to be delivered.

The Italian troops managed to disarm also the UCK troops who were unwilling to accept an accord which did not mention Kosovo's independence. This was an important and difficult job.

The Italian troops prepared hundreds of shelters for the refugees returning home from the camps in Albania and Macedonia.

As it had happened in Bosnia, the Italians were assigned the most dangerous sector, the Pec



Left, Above and Right.
Bersaglieri from the Garibaldi Brigade in Kosovo, a very insidious place.



region in the North of Kosovo where few hours before the parties had been fiercely fighting against each other.

As many as 6,000 men from Italy are taking part in the greatest mission since World War II. They belong to the Garibaldi Brigade, to the 152nd mechanised infantry Sassari Regiment and to the 3rd Alpini Regiment. But also A 129 Mangusta helicopters, engineer, NBC and signal units make up the Italian contingent.


The Italian contingent, along with the forces from other countries, has the great responsibility to bring a devastated country back to civil life.

It is perhaps a good omen, in view of the difficult tasks ahead, that "Time" magazine put 1st. cpl. Antonello Manca –a "Bersagliere"– on its cover, almost as a testimony of the importance of our Country's role in the Balkans and of the culture of legality and tolerance shown by our soldiers, capable of putting force at the service of peace and justice.



After the fall of the Berlin wall

Ten years have passed since the Brandenburg Gate was opened in Berlin, which was cheered all over the world. The cold war came to its end and it seemed a new era made of peace, progress and stability was to start. But we were wrong because there are thousands of wars, massacres, atrocities and deportations still taking place in the world. How can we prevent a general catastrophe?



Ten years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall and our planet is still tension-stricken. In this respect we can make some general remarks. First, as there are no more wars between states we can assume that Democracies do not fight against each other. Second, there are a number of national

conflicts taking place. Third, such a fierce violence is caused by simultaneous globalisation and fragmentation which have been taking place since the cold war came to its end.

This friction may pose a threat to great powers and states as well, also because of economic reasons and criminal



by Ornella Rota *

THERE ARE STILL WARS IN THE WORLD




organisations claiming their interests.

Contrary to the past the victims of today's wars are civilians and deportations can be considered as the original cause rather than the consequence of wars. Ethnic cleansing is the horrible keyword of contemporary world, as Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for refugees, said.

Most of the times soldiers brutalise civilians by means of systematic rapes, atrocities, by depriving them of staples, destroying religious and historical


The 1998/1999 Military Balance released by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London reports that the international trade of weapons has increased by 36% from 1995 to 1997, basically due to procurements from Nations in the Persian Gulf. Weapons are mainly produced and exported by the USA (45% of the global market), the UK, France and Israel. During the same period, the report says, sales of Russian weapons have decreased because of the Asia Crisis and the increasing competitiveness of Ukraine and Belorussia on the weapons market. In 1997 weapons were mostly exported to Saudi Arabia and Taiwan (USD 11 and USD 7 billion, respectively).



monuments, bombing hospitals and markets and mining large areas in order to prevent them from being inhabited (M. Kaldor, *A Cosmopolitan Response to New Wars*, *Peace Review* 8, 4, 1996).

Europeans can easily make a link to Bosnia or Kosovo, which go far beyond the tribal violence many people have been speaking

of. The wars taking place in Africa or Asia are far away, but only geographically. They are made up of dead bodies, mutilated corpses, youth people fighting against civilians in the cities, desperately struggling dictators, women cancelled in the name of Koran, derelicts illegally smuggled to Western Countries by the new generation





Also Caucasus (above) and Laos (left) have been affected by wars.

of slave traffickers.

Under these conditions we cannot say the National Sovereignty must be respected. It is as if we heard someone screaming in a house and did not knock on the door just because every one has the right to do whatever he wants in his house.

In 1951 the UN General Assembly decided the High Commissioner for Refugees would assist few hundred thousands people who, after the world war had finished, were still away from their respective countries. Everybody thought that said Commissioner would be useless in the future because the world had learnt the devastating effects of wars.

Unfortunately it was not so and this Commissioner has become one of the most powerful agencies of the United Nations. In 1954 and in 1981 it was awarded the Peace Nobel Prize and today is assisting more than 22 million people (without including those from Kosovo).

Today there are as many as 12 million refugees. The refugee status is denied to those who committed serious crimes, war crimes and crimes against human beings. Moreover those who are given the status of refugee must comply with the laws of the host nation. Recently other categories have been included in the field of the High Commissioner for refugees such as those who have been evacuated (there are 6 million people who left their homes and remained in their countries), those who claim for asylum (about 900,000 hosted by several countries and who are waiting to be given the status of refugee), those who have been repatriated (3,5 million, including refugees and evacuated people who were repatriated and still need help from the international community), those who are stateless and those whose nationality is uncertain (tens of thousands). Since 1989 refugees have been decreasing and those belonging to other categories have been increasing.

The High Commissioner for refugees, as the rest of the UN Agencies, is voluntarily subsidised by the governments. This implies on the one hand the need to comply with all the national political and economic guidelines and on the other makes it impossible to face crisis deriving from a forced exodus as it happened with the Kosovars, the Hutus and the Tutsi.

Moreover the High Commissioner for refugees receives donations from NGOs and citizens. The UN only pays for running costs.

In Geneva there is a 858-person-staff while 4,670 people work at the detached offices in 118 countries.

Globalisation and fragmentation are forcing many States to disgregate as it already happened in the former Soviet Union. These forces started with the fall of the Berlin Wall and will last for many


years allowing to go beyond the inviolability of frontiers or the national sovereignty.

For example by means of Internet and parabolic antennas images, news and ideas are

circulated all over the world and this makes people aware of the kind of political systems they live in, they understand whether the political system is corrupted or whether the economy works good or not, especially where there is no democracy, finally leading to

insurrection.

In this respect we can say that in the past violence was considered a way to split the old European colonial empires or the Soviet Union. Today we realise that violence leads to tragedies as it happened in the former



The Commission of Global Governance, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the United Nations Development Programme and several European and US Universities report that the concept of security has been widening, including the human being's conditions of life.

Before the fall of the Berlin Wall the attention was focused on the military balance between the states and the alliances and on the respective capabilities to defend their national sovereignties.

After the cold war we understood that human beings could be threatened not only by wars but also by national tensions, social violence, unemployment, organised crime, terrorism, migration, exodus and catastrophes. At the same time humanitarian problems have been gaining importance in the international arena.

This trend is welcomed by the highest authorities: in January 1992 the UN Security Council approved a declaration which clearly defines the non-military sources of instability, including economic, social and environmental problems which pose a threat to peace and security. At times more than one factor is present, writes L. Rosenblatt (The Challenges of Humanitarian Relief, The Washington Times, December 30, 1996): terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and environmental degradation increase when there is a civil war going on or when an ethnic cleansing takes place because people are deprived of their hopes or of their legal jobs.


So there is a clear relation between the security of a State and the welfare of its citizens. A State which is powerful from the military and the strategic point of view is not necessarily a stable one. This is the case of the former Soviet Union: the powerful Red Army could not prevent the disruption from taking place because there were miserable conditions of life (as we can easily learn from history).

The widened concept of security was the consequence and at the same time prompted international co-operation. Today almost everybody is aware that the transnational threat to security can only be faced by the international community as a whole. Notwithstanding the political and ideological differences, international co-operation is on the rise, also thanks to the fall of the Berlin Wall. The key-word is Multilateralism. For example, let's focus on the steps made by OSCE, SADC, ASEAN during international conferences and referred to human rights, equal opportunities, environment, demography and social development. In this respect it is important to emphasise that the member countries of the UN Security Council have exercised their veto seldom. On the other hand it is worth noting that Non Governmental Organisations often merge their resources, regionally and



Above.
Kosovars fleeing to Macedonia.

Right.
A water delivery point organised in Mostar by the International Red Cross.



organised crime aiming at wealth.

During the last ten years, for example, in Afghanistan poppy crops have doubled. In Angola, Cambodia, Liberia, Myanmar and Sierra Leone, both armed groups and government officials have gained wealth through their respective countries' natural resources. Within this framework some Multinational Companies of no scruples sign agreements with the fighting parties in order to have their natural resources. Then the fighting parties use the

Yugoslavia, Sudan, Indonesia, Caucasus, only to say a few.

In almost all the violence-stricken countries it is hard to understand the line between politics and crime, which remind us of the situation existing five centuries ago when modern states were born in order to make things clear, to prevent chaos from happening.

Most of the ethnic conflicts have economic grounds. And the ethnic reason is then demagogically used by those who take advantage from the violence going on. There is a sort of war economy supported both by government officials and

money to legally or illegally buy weapons on the international market. Some times violence is supported by expatriates from all over the world as it happened in the former Yugoslavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Sri Lanka.


Often the parties involved in the struggles require money from the population or even plunder civilians, which paves the way to a widespread anarchy also thanks to the low-price portable weapons and mines.

We should wonder if government officials use criminals to carry out

dirty jobs not to lose their reputation on the international scene. For example, OSCE reports that in Bosnia and Kosovo there were tens of criminal gangs (there were 45 of them).

Recent experiences prove that civil wars do not always end when deprived of the external support or when it is reduced. And they do not come to an end when an ethnic cleansing has been carried out. On the contrary, they go on latently.

There was a time when all the interest was focused on the Cold





Above.
Rwanda Refugees fleeing to Zaire.

Left.
Bosnia devastated by the long-lasting war.

War but we never came to a war and the East-West opposition finally reminded us of the

British-Russian confrontation which took place in Asia in 1800. Finally, somehow, the West won.

After 1989 there was the most difficult part because the West had to manage the victory.

When the Cold War finished we hoped that the United Nations could find a solution to old conflicts and prevent others from taking place. The right to

interfere (a must, as Mitterand said) into national affairs is itself the *raison d'être* of the UNO. But the states of the world have to make it possible by not exercising their veto and by not deferring the payment of their shares.

□

** Journalist,
Contributor to "La Stampa"*

THE ARMY OF



DIEMELO

THE FUTURE


Going ahead with the illustration of the difficult doctrinal and operational rationalization process of the Service, in this fifth installment we present the article "Operational modules of the manoeuvre forces. The Combat function", by Col. Claudio Graziano.

The work is centred on the organizational concept on which the modules and - by successive aggregations, the organization of the various units - are based, with a particular consideration for the Infantry Regiment.

IMPLEMENT PLAN

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

by Claudio Graziano *



«OPERATIONAL MODULES» OF THE MANOEUVRE FORCES

THE COMBAT FUNCTION

The studies developed by the Army Staff within the "capability packages" project, have made possible to define the organization of the various functional components of the land military instrument. After this activity which was crucial for building credible bases for the development of the Army project as a whole, and having defined the fundamental concepts of "task organization" and "task oriented" as reference concepts for assembling the operational modules in order to produce "framework formations"(1), now the time has come to translate concepts into executive projects, aimed at optimizing the resources - first of all personnel, the most precious one - within the different operational modules of the Service.

This is the basis for an important activity that the military planners must undertake in order to transform the Army from a basically static to a greatly dynamic instrument. In this sense, even if the necessity of reshaping the modules derives essentially and mainly from operational requirements - i.e. the outcome of the definition and analysis of the operational functions, which, in their turn, are conducted in the light of the doctrine of employment - one should not disregard the need to achieve savings in personnel, obtained through the rationalization of structures and procedures and thanks to computerization, in order to make the operational forces compatible with the resources assigned to the Army (Mixed Model: 137,000 men altogether, which, at the moment is the medium-term general planning-objective of the Service). On the other hand - and this was a basic point of the study - the present modules retain their validity also in case of transition to completely professional forces, since, in the last analysis, they were realized precisely for that



kind of forces.

The present article, therefore, intends to synthesize the abovesaid rationalization process, sketching the general criteria followed in composing the various operational modules - basic elements of force planning - and emphasizing, in particular, the criteria relevant to the manoeuvre forces (combat function), owing to the fact that the general principles are valid for all modules, both in use or under experiment.

In substance, it was a matter of working out the organizational concept on which the modules and, by successive aggregations, the organization of the various units are based. The methodological process was developed according to the following stages:

- definition of the basic requirements

Volunteer of the Italian contingent in Bosnia distributing food to the population.

- for structuring the modules;
- determination of "modules" and standards for their functional assemblage;
- configuration of the Infantry Regiment: modules and aggregations.

BASIC REQUIREMENTS

The study is founded on basic requirements concerning reference scenarios, employment norms, personnel, forces, equipment and materials.

Reference scenarios


In a post-bipolar world, the high-intensity or actually

conflictual operations have changed their nature, causing the need for equally significant doctrinal and organizational transformations of the military instrument. Furthermore, the new Armies must appear as tools of the national and collective security policy much more often than in the past. These requirements are already included in the new "Strategic Concept of the Atlantic Alliance", and find their expression in the remote control of conflict situations and in the active prevention of crises within the framework of collective defence and security. With an extreme simplification, we can say that PSOs (Peace Support Operations) appear, at least in a long-term perspective, the most probable forms of military intervention - even if not necessarily the only or most important ones - of the new policy of international security and of the relevant military formations.

The spectrum of the employment situations is therefore very wide, with possible operational engagements both in classic conflicts and in MOOTWs (Military Operations Other Than War). In view of this, the national land-instrument must be structured in such a way as to express operational capabilities credible as regards deterrence and concretely employable in MOOTWs, also when they are of a conflictual character.

These latter operations are placed within the out-of-the-border missions as "defence of external interests and contribution to international security" and as "presence and surveillance" on the national territory (Fig.1).


With a view to this, the prevailing scenarios will be characterized by spaced-out formations and highly urbanized environments. Operations could have low intensity but long duration (as was the case in Bosnia and like the national



operations of territorial control).

From these simple but well founded basic elements, one can get clear indications on the configuration of the forces: modular units, highly versatile from the operational point of view, supported by flexible, reactive, efficient and relatively light logistic instruments, capable of expressing high flexibility of employment.

With special regard to operational versatility, the modular organization is the basic prerequisite for applying at all levels the "Task Organization" concept which, as is well known by now, is the organizational supporting framework of the Operational Forces of the new Army, i.e. the operational and organizational choice for the forces of the 2000s.



Besides, the thinning out of the deployments and the widening of the spaces will force us to operate by "operational islands", even very distant from each other, which require a "diffused leadership" as well as the capability of proceeding in a practically autonomous way and with employment units of reduced size (Fig.2).

Rules of employment

Naturally, the employment procedures are continuously evolving, but this is not the proper occasion for a detailed scrutiny. The most updated reference is the NATO ATP 35/B publication, whose basic elements are included in the national "New Doctrine Guidelines of the Italian Army".

As a summary, and with reference to the Army Staff publications for a closer study, Table A shows a synthesis of the tactical operations conducted by the units, minor ones included, taken from the reference norms.

Personnel

Personnel is the most valuable resource available to the Service (Fig.3). Its full utilization is a primary objective, which was taken into account in the composition of

the modules. On account of this, preparation and training have been revised in line with the concept of permanent training, outlining qualification, specialization and professionalization itineraries

which precede the fundamental stages of the employment, in order to equip the personnel with the knowledge and capabilities indispensable for being able to do.

The basic concept of the new training aims at the full integration within the organization of the Army - therefore with the optimal employment in the modules - of the new professional figures - NCOs (Marshals and Sergeants, Volunteers) - in order to raise the global efficiency of the system through the best use of each component.

For the NCOs, in fact, different rolls have been established:

- the Marshals roll, directly recruited from civilians among the youth with a secondary-school diploma, or from Sergeants and regular Volunteers; this personnel is mainly employed in command functions or in jobs requiring continuity of employment and high specialization;

Fig. 3



RANK	JOB
ADJUTANT	• Staff specialist-assistant • Operator in administrative or highly specialized technical areas
MARSHAL	• Platoon leader • Operator in administrative or highly specialized technical areas
SERGEANT	• System operator, deputy platoon-leader • System repairer • Leader/Operator of Operational Team • Instructor (*) • Adm and Tech Operator (*)
Regular	
Volunteer	

(*) After 10-15 years as Leader and Operator of an Operational Team

TYPICAL PSO ACTIONS

Table A

REGIMENT	1. CONTROL OF VIOLATIONS • observe armistice or cease-fire lines; • patrol demarcation lines; • planned interposition; • supervision of elections and referendums.	2. UNPLANNED INTERPOSITION EMERGENCY OPERATIONS	3. HUMANITARIAN AID • organization of refugee camps; • distribution of aid and medical assistance; • protection of convoys and refugee camps; • search and recovery of personnel; • mine-clearing.	4. HUMANITARIAN RESCUE • rescue and evacuation of threatened communities; • management of a security corridor.
COMPANY	Control (mainly linear) in case of: • surveillance of cease-fire or demarcation lines; • realization of interposition areas, surveillance of borders; • supervision of separation of opposing forces. Control (mainly areal) in case of: • supervision of cease-fire; • surveillance of deployment of military forces or installations; • supervision of withdrawals from appointed areas; • supervision of evacuation of a territory; • supervision of plebiscites or elections. Control (mainly "point") in case of: • management of movement of civilians through warring Countries; • supervision of exchange of prisoners of war or hostages; • surveillance of refugee camps.	• realize contact with opposing forces; • ensure the separation of contenders; • interposition; • materialization of cease-fire line; • push back the opposing parties.	• occupation and organization of a sector against conventional threats; • vigilance over a sector; • search and recovery of refugees; • security of refugee or material convoys; • distribution of aid.	• control of a sector; • organization of a recovery Centre; • security of the evacuation Centre; • control of an external sector; • control of an internal sector; • control of a built-up area; • part of the reserve of the Command responsible for the operation.
PLATOON	Activation: • bases; • permanent surveillance posts; • temporary surveillance posts; • permanent control posts; • patrols; • rapid-reaction platoon.	Activation: • blocking posts; • bases; • permanent surveillance posts; • temporary surveillance posts; • permanent control posts; • patrols; • reserve platoon.	Activation: • blocking posts; • bases; • permanent surveillance posts; • temporary surveillance posts; • permanent control posts; • mobile control posts; • patrols.	Activation: • blocking posts; • bases; • permanent surveillance posts; • temporary surveillance posts; • permanent control posts; • mobile control posts; • patrols.
SQUAD	Activation: • Surveillance and warning post; • external security team; • security and blocking team; • reconnaissance team; • mobile control posts.	Activation: • Surveillance and warning post; • external security team; • security and blocking team; • reconnaissance team; • mobile control posts.	Activation: • Surveillance and warning post; • external security team; • security and blocking team; • reconnaissance team; • mobile control posts.	Activation: • Surveillance and warning post; • external security team; • security and blocking team; • reconnaissance team; • mobile control posts.



M-113 APCs during an exercise.

- the Sergeants roll, manned only with Regular Volunteers. They are already experienced in the operational field, and are assigned to the employment areas called "system operator" and "system repairer". It should be specified that the system operator is the leader of a team, able to operate a complex weapon system, while the system repairer is a specialized element, capable of keeping complex systems in good working order.

Volunteers are divided into two groups:

- Short-Term Volunteers, who are expected to attend an initial basic training at the Volunteer Training Regiments, a specialization training at the Branch Schools

and then complete their preparation and maintain their operational capabilities at the employment units;

- Regular Volunteers, recruited from the Short-Term ones. Considering their three-year experience, they attend specialization, refresher and possibly requalification courses.

On the other hand, in the personnel sector the activity for the best use of resources does not stop after training, since the "force multipliers" of the human element, i.e. leadership and motivation, hold an at least equal importance.


As we said, the "pulverization" of the deployments and the extreme diffusion of information in the modern operational scenarios, tend to shift towards the minor levels the decisional moments and centres in the

employment area. This implies the development of a so-called "diffused leadership" which, although in a position to employ advanced close-net control systems, requires highly qualified personnel, mature and well prepared, both technically and psychologically.

The second "force multiplier", closely connected with the first, is motivation.

Motivation stems from firm belief, enthusiasm and passion, but it also requires faith and solid values. It is a *conditio sine qua non* for success.

Motivation is an essentially spiritual factors, but is also rooted in reason and professionalism. Rational motivation derives from a full awareness and sharing of the task, from the feeling of being really capable of performing it and



operational capabilities (Fig.5).

From this viewpoint, the conceptual distinction between the organizational configuration for preparing the instrument and the organization for employing it - particularly evident at levels higher than regiment - already asserted with the task organization concept, will be further emphasized.

The integration of the operational capabilities will cease to be guaranteed by the traditional bonds of the past organization but it will have to be attained through excellent command and control capabilities, tested on the field in carefully planned exercises, according to realistic assumptions and conducted also with the support of advanced simulation systems.

Among the capabilities requested of the units of the Service in general, and the manoeuvre units in particular, "projectability" has a priority role. It is a capability that, especially at regimental level, requires of the permanent garrisons an organization apt to ensure the management of the infrastructure, prescinding from the presence of the operational component (hotel/barracks concept). This organization,

in possession of the necessary resources and of the appropriate expertise.

The motivation level is also sustained by logistic support, good equipment and quality of the environment where the man (Fig.4):


- operates, with the need to achieve the maximum performance of the weapon system;
- lives, as regards quarters, messes, recreation facilities (better quality of life).

Forces

The subdivision of the operational components into force packages primarily assigned to one of the missions of the Army, is one of the cornerstones of the Army's transition phase.

This organization meets the need to proceed to the reconfiguration of the instrument according to precise criteria of priority. With resources not unlimited and only gradually available, it is necessary, in fact, to proceed step by step, with projects directed towards the realization of complete capabilities, operationally employable in every phase of the programme.

In a medium-term perspective and expecting a further reduction (and possible disappearance) of the conscription component, the conceptual approach to the construction of the instrument will be revised, in order to achieve a marked operational versatility, by increasing the recourse to professionalism, to technology and to the modularity of the



integrable by the support structure of the operational component, when present (Fig. 6), but equipped with remarkable techno/administrative autonomy, can be staffed with civilian personnel, trying to find a not-so-easy solution for the mobility of the personnel, (conscripts until they are available, as is the case in the Air Force, Regular Volunteers at the end of the period of intense operational activity (10-15 years).

Equipment and materials

Equipment and materials are an essential reference for the composition of the basic modules. This means that the introduction of new systems can require a further readjustment of the modules, just as doctrine and technology are mutually interrelated.

Weapon systems and technology are the fundamental elements that give shape, in terms of quantity and quality, to the teams entrusted with the employment of the systems.

In short, it can be said that the equipment and materials representing the operational capabilities are divided into two categories, respectively destined to:

- direct employment by the modules (individual equipment, systems and equipment of the modules);
- sustainability of the modules during training and operational activities (equipment or reserves for support).

The equipment and materials to be employed are quantitatively and qualitatively determined on the basis of the operational capabilities that must be expressed and of the operational scenario to which they are primarily destined.

The present organizational standard envisages their complete distribution to all units.

As regards the second category of equipment and materials (sustainability), the solution of




Fig. 6

the problem depends on the availability of the basic data necessary to solve the problem of gauging the logistic support in relation to the units' autonomy and the effectiveness of equipment and systems. Until recently, autonomy was fixed at 30 days; this reference has not yet been formally abolished, while there are no univocal indications on the efficiency levels to maintain (2).

The logistic support was therefore geared - at least in a doctrinal sense - for sustaining the whole instrument and on the basis of the maximum effort connected with a conflict directly involving the national territory. The reference logistic concept, already well-established, envisages instead that the equivalent Regiments (those with their own executive Adherence bodies) have a logistic autonomy, defined with mathematical and empirical models, to be adjusted and completed each time according to the mission. No "a-priori" redundancy, then, but rather a modular logistic instrument, light and flexible, capable of dynamically adapting, in a short


period of time, to any possible mission.

The operational scenarios summarily outlined could permit the introduction of substantial changes in the present organization. A possible solution could envisage that:

- the distribution of the main equipment and materials;
- the level of autonomy;
- the stocks for the maintenance of equipment and systems, be gauged not on the organic strength of the instrument, but on the size of the forces realistically employable simultaneously in the appointed operational scenarios (Fig.7).

In this case, a balanced and economical configuration of the necessary materials could stem from a realistic planning of the maximum effort expressible by the Service in a medium- and long-term prospect (Operational Concept). The stocking of equipment and materials would therefore be programmed on that basis.

It is certainly a daring Command decision, but it could become indispensable and sound so as to permit a balanced growth of the



Service, consistent with its commitments, as long as the risk of an aggression to the sovereignty of the Nation can be considered unrealistic for the next 15 years.

MODULES AND CRITERIA OF AGGREGATION

In practice, the method followed for defining the elementary modules and their aggregation into formations was:

- exact definition of the module and the successive aggregations, making as clear as possible the capabilities they must express;
- describe in detail those capabilities and the modalities for their achievement, as well as the specifications that the module or the aggregation must meet.

With reference to the latter aspect, the capabilities must be defined in terms of:

- autonomy, which represents the intrinsic sustainability of the module in relation to the operational capability it is called to express;
- necessary training level, in relation to the individual preparation, basic and advanced training, employment exercises;
- leadership, with particular

reference to the rank and experience of the Commander and to his hierarchical position in the Command and Control structure of the unit;

- vertical, horizontal and internal connections/interactions.

The composition of the units' organizational structures must therefore begin with the elementary module and then, starting from this and by successive aggregations, build the first complete operational modules (platoons), the basic mono-function employment units (companies), arriving at the regimental operational module, which is the fundamental element of the "Army System". In fact, above this unit, the command levels must essentially be able to express command and control capabilities without being concerned with the different regimental modules assembled in the Brigades, in relation to the real operational requirements.

The elementary module (squad, team, tank, etc.) consists of a weapon system and a very small number of personnel - with their own leader - trained and equipped to make the system operational. It is structured in order to carry out an elementary action within an operational

module: the platoon. The composition of the elementary module depends, first of all, on the characteristics of the weapon system and on its function. It expresses partial operational capabilities, therefore it is unsuited to autonomous operations, with the exception of activities of little operational value and in special operational environments.

The operational module (platoon) originates from the aggregation of two or more elementary modules - also if they are non-homogeneous - complementary with each other. It is structured to develop tactical actions limited in time and space, and to repeat cyclic tactical actions.

The aggregation of several operational modules originates the basic employment-unit: the company. It is a mono-function unit, which can be organized in different ways according to the task, and it constitutes the first level of application of the "Task Organization" concept on a modular base.

The company can be employed in:

- limited-time activities, conducted with the simultaneous employment of all the operational modules available; the most evident case is that of high-intensity combat, during which the unit expends its operational capability, and after which it can normally be reemployed only after its reorganization;
- protracted activities, conducted by taking turns with similar units or rotating its own operational modules. These are low-intensity engagements, during which the unit does not exhaust its capabilities, but wears them out; therefore it should be replaced after 4-6 months and reemployed only after reconditioning (3-4 months) and training (4-6 months). But this is an optimal



but rather optimistic theory.

The company-level employment unit does not have logistic capability of its own, but its Command and Control organization can manage those that can be assigned "ad hoc", in particular medical and victualling elements.

The Command and Control of more than one company can be entrusted to a battalion, whose Command structure can have tactical control of those units, employed on the basis of plans/programmes worked out by the Regiment's staff.

Last, the Regiment. It is an employment unit capable of

carrying out a complete and specific operational function. It has Command, Control, Communications and logistic support capabilities adequate to its functions. Its capabilities could therefore become redundant in certain situations considering that a regiment is conceived in such a way as to be able to manage more resources than those envisaged for its own organization: eventually and if necessary, even several battalions.

THE MANOEUVRE REGIMENT

The Infantry Regiment and the Cavalry Regiment are the

Ranger during an exercise in a wooded area.

fundamental units for the "master" operational function: the combat function.

The composition of the modules of the manoeuvre forces depend on the types of units determined by the study on the capability packages - combat function:

- light, with VM90s and VBL Pumas;
- mechanized, with wheeled and tracked vehicles;
- armoured, with armoured cars or tanks.

The configuration of the

elementary modules was therefore adapted to the type of vehicles available to the units. With a view to this, the light and mechanized units need different and complementary elementary modules, in relation to the complexity of the tactical actions. In particular, there will be the following four types of elementary modules:

- riflemen, with fire capability against personnel, high-angle fire support capability up to 1200 metres, short-range antitank capability (the modules make up the three rifle companies);
- riflemen, with main antitank capability at medium and long range; the question is to exploit to the maximum the coexisting capabilities, which can be expressed separately or in an integrated manner (included in the antitank company);
- mortars, with high-angle capability up to 6000 metres and more, with the already sanctioned introduction of the rifled-bore 120mm mortars (in the mortar company);
- mortars' fire control (in the mortar company).

For the cavalry units on tanks or armoured cars, instead, the elementary module is only one, since the tactical actions of these units entail a preeminent capability, thrust, expressed both autonomously or in an integrated context with the other manoeuvre forces.

The successive aggregation of the elementary modules into operational modules must meet two basic requirements:

- effectiveness, in view of the tactical actions to be carried out;
- simplicity of control (meant as direction, guidance, verification of results, correction) by the module's Commander.

On the basis of the first requirement, there should be a

maximum number of elementary modules, while on the basis of the second the number should be minimum.

The balance between the two different requirements has been considered to be 3 squad-level elementary modules for light and mechanized units and 4 combat systems for armoured units.

The company (basic employment unit) is a mono-functional unit which can be employed either homogeneously or reorganized by modules, depending on task and situation. Therefore, this is the level where the organizational coincidence between composition and employment is fully realized, although different configurations cannot be excluded, albeit within the same operational function.


The most frequent case can be represented by the increase of antitank fire at the longest range, obtained by drawing platoon-level antitank modules from rifle/antitank companies. In high-intensity conventional operations, a very probable solution could be the reorganization into four homogeneous complexes, - polifunctional at this point - obtained by attaching antitank platoons to all rifle companies and

some rifle platoons to the antitank company. Therefore, still with reference to the Task Organization principle, the Regiment, in practice, has at its disposal four command and control capabilities, of manoeuvre-management level, that can be employed with the greatest flexibility, according to the task. These requirements do not exist, or exist at a much lower level for PSOs, where the four company-level modules will mainly be called to operate as rifle units.

Lastly, one should point out the constitution of the rifle company on a quaternary basis, connected both to the availability of weapon system and to the higher operational flexibility of the formula as well as, finally, to the selection of reduced-size platoons, albeit equipped with numerous weapon systems.

As is the case for the other functional components, the infantry battalion is an extra capability for exercising tactical control on the employment units. On the other hand, it should be considered that, although it is a valuable resource at the Regiment Commander's disposal, its employment in this function would nevertheless be decided on

Fig. 8




a case-by-case basis including, among the various possible options, that of not employing it autonomously.

The regiment has complete operational capabilities for performing the combat function. It is called to operate in rather wide contexts, and its capabilities are normally integrated with those expressed by other functional components (combat support, reconnaissance, combat service support, etc.). Other capabilities can be added to the regiment (recce units, engineers, artillery, etc.) for the accomplishment of an autonomous task within one of the "operational islands" or for the development of PSO missions. These are possibilities to be considered as normal, since they are required by the modern scenarios and envisaged as a capability of adapting the structure to the changing situations. In other words, the new configuration of the regiment modules takes for granted the impossibility of pre-structuring the organization in expectation of an average case of employment, which is now impossible to foretell; the structure is therefore only a rational assemblage of fundamental capabilities, to be completed according to the circumstances.

THE OPERATIONAL CYCLE OF THE MANOEUVRE REGIMENT

As we repeatedly mentioned before, the units' employment in Peace Support operations that have a low level of conflict (therefore excluding Peace Enforcement) does not exhaust them but wears their operational capabilities. The operational cycle of a regiment-level unit consists of three phases, i.e. preparation, employment and reconditioning (fig.8). This consideration becomes important for defining



both the duration capabilities of the Regiment's Command and Control organization and the Army's operational concept, in order to assess the maximum operational effort, expressed in terms of number of regiments, and to communicate it to the Political Authorities.

CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE TO THE REGIMENT


The regiment, besides the

manoeuvre and combat capabilities described above, has also "redundant" capabilities in the sectors of Command, Control, Communications (Fig.9) and logistic support, also in order to be in a position to meet the constitutive principles of the projection forces, with reference to their ability to expand and integrate.

These capabilities pertain to:

- the Regiment staff (S1, S2/S3, S4, S5, Advance Command Post);
- the Logistic-Support and

Fig. 10



Command Company (C3 Module; Combat Service Support modules: medical, victuals and supplies, Trammat).

The standard configuration of the Regiment Headquarters is based on the establishment of two Command Posts for the management of the whole manoeuvre. They work within the same C2 system, and are in a position to share information and situation picture:

- a mobile tactical Command Post, sheltered if possible, normally projected near the manoeuvre forces, from which the Commander can give his orders, either directly or through his main Command Post;
- a traditional Command Post, sheltered, where the staff controls the operation, on the basis of the Commander's directives.

The Logistic-Support and Command Company will be functionally organized in such a way as to entrust the most specialized logistic sectors to skilled and competent personnel that will be fully responsible before the Commander for the logistic branch entrusted to them.

In particular, the Logistic-Support and Command Company

is organized with the following components (Fig.10):

- Command, Control and Communications (Hq. platoon and signal platoon), where the necessary capabilities and resources are concentrated;
- logistic support, consisting of the following elements:
 - medical service, entrusted to a Director, who avails himself of a highly specialized executive staff (medical platoon);
 - victuals and supplies, entrusted to the Chief of the Commissary Service, who avails himself of two bodies, one for victuals and the other for clothing, equipment and furniture/fitings; the Service Chief is responsible, before the Commander, for all the activities of the specific branch;
 - transport and materials, entrusted to a TRAMAT officer, responsible for maintenance, transport and materials.

As we mentioned in the general part of this article, a capability which takes on a growing value, especially for the regiments of the Basic Branch, is "projectability".

During the bipolar confrontation, each regiment was practically destined to operate in a specific

sector of responsibility, within which it performed its task. Also garrisons were selected according to the geographic location of the employment sector, compatibly with the availability of infrastructure. This explains why most operational forces are stationed in the Northeast.

On the other hand, the only assumption of actual employment derived from a possible aggression on the national borders. On the basis of this assumption, several activities were planned - marked by the different measures introduced in the alert plan - which envisaged, among other things, to attain first the decentralized zones and then the employment areas, abandoning the garrisons at the same time.

The Commander's attention had to be focused on his operational task, and he could be only marginally concerned with the destiny of his barracks. On the other hand, in such a contingency the national interest would be at stake, and therefore the fate of the barracks would be a decidedly secondary problem.

Today the employment of units for from their garrisons is a normal occurrence. Projectability is therefore an indispensable capability, especially for those units, as the manoeuvre units, which are generally employed in their full configuration. The units conducting other operational functions (combat support, RSTA, recce, combat service support), on the contrary, could also be employed by simple basic employment modules (companies).

Therefore for the units of the manoeuvre forces projectability is a primary capability which does not refer only to out-of-quarters operations, but also to the continuity in the management of the home quarters.

As regards this aspect, it is a question of revising the

Italian soldier of the SFOR contingent on surveillance duty in Bosnia.

organization of the in-garrison unit, in order to free the operational component, and the Commander in particular, from the responsibility of managing the infrastructure, especially - but not only - during the operational and training activities conducted both inside and outside the national territory. Theoretically, the operational unit should have no residual connection with the home infrastructure, which means that it should not have to take any management measure after the unit leaves the barracks for operations or training. To put it simply, the regiment can leave with its complete organization.

In view of this, the organization of the in-garrison unit must be able to meet three main requirements:

- security, especially as regards surveillance of entrances and critical areas;
- management of the infrastructure and relevant materials (furniture, fittings, messes, recreation equipment, etc.);
- operation of the general services,



including communications (telephone exchange).

The integration of the

capabilities necessary to meet the abovesaid requirements can be appropriately ensured by an autonomous and streamlined Command structure, which envisages the essential branches for fulfilling the functions assigned to the unit.

Fig.11 shows the scheme "by blocks" of an in-garrison unit.

Some additional capabilities are also concentrated at regiment level. They are destined to meet specific operational requirements connected with particular conditions of employment. We refer to:

- precision fire, realized by equipping with precision rifles (6 cal 8,6x70) a team of sharpshooters, formed by dual-job personnel, capable of operating with great autonomy and effectiveness against




Fig. 11




Fig. 12

support) and, at the end of adequate experimentations - which, as regards the manoeuvre modules have already been concluded - the relevant organization charts will be issued consequently. Within a year, therefore, all the Regiments of the Italian Army will undergo significant changes (Fig.13), entailing hard work by all ranks. Within this framework, the infantry Regiment is the most significant example from the viewpoint of the application of the Army's operational concept, since it is the mission's basic unit, and the forces at its disposal can be adjusted or reconditioned if necessary.

Within the general reorganization picture, the new composition of the operational modules of the Combat function has permitted, among other things:

- the complete computerization of the forces' organization, both in the preparation phase - with preset digital cards - and, at the moment of need, for the construction of the task forces;
- the availability of the updated numerical situation of personnel and equipment, based on actual resources.

The changes introduced with the new operational modules are very important and, as we mentioned, will require a great

objectives of high operational value;

- determination of position data, which will be achieved by distributing to all the fifteen squads of a company the Ground Position System (GPS) in operational situations requiring a continuous knowledge of the position of all the elements engaged.

Another capability indispensable for operating in the modern scenarios, is "visualization". This component, for the manoeuvre forces, has a direct impact on the three peculiar and fundamental capabilities of the combat units: mobility, fire power and protection. It is easy to understand that these three elements affect each other because a positive change in one influences negatively the others and vice versa. Suffice it to think, in fact, that an increase in protection or fire power inevitably reduces mobility.

Introducing a fourth parameter (Fig.12), i.e. visualization, it is possible to achieve superiority, or at least an adequate ability to find the objective, with easily intuitable advantages, both for the possibility of striking first and,

consequently, for a better survivability. We are therefore discussing an incremental factor of the general capabilities of the manoeuvre Regiment, a factor able to affect the positive values of all capabilities.

CONCLUSIONS

The reorganization of the operational modules concerns all functions (combat, reconnaissance, combat support, adherence




Fig. 13



Training of an M-113 APC over muddy terrain.

professional flexibility of Cadres and troops, together with the personal will of fully living the transformations in progress. Of course the present experimentations will never be an exhaustive test-bench for removing all possible faults: only a long application on the field, and the availability of new technologies, which are only envisaged at the present time, will permit to validate the "system" for good, increasing the Regiment's stability, which is a characteristic strongly needed in the operational units.

It should not be forgotten that the module project is based on a well-established long-term plan; therefore, for example, until the platoon-leader Marshals are not available in the expected number, certain temporary measures will be necessary. In a similar way, the elementary modules' capability of fulfilling their mission, thanks to the mobility of the "Puma", will have to be confirmed in practice when these Pumas start operating. Our hope is that the programme responds well to all situations and that it will be possible to adjust it to the elements of the transition phase: new organization, incompletely renewed equipment, personnel roles not in the

proportions envisaged for the final organization.

□

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Army General Staff*

NOTES

(1) Rivista Militare, Eng. ed. no.1/99, "Planning Tomorrow", and no.2/99 "The Army Project for Europe. Task Oriented".

(2) Rivista Militare, Eng. ed. no.2/99, "The Operational Modules of Adherence Logistics".

PEACEBUILDING OPERATIONS

Concepts, considerations, lessons learned

by Pier Giorgio Segala *

The concept of peacebuilding appeared for the first time in the "Agenda for Peace", issued in 1992 by the Secretary General of the UN; it was later developed in the "Supplement to the Agenda for Peace" of 1995. Both documents underline the principle that peacebuilding is a complex process, "requiring integrated actions and negotiations between the United Nations and the conflicting parties". The following notes are meant as a contribution to the study and evaluation of some of the problems encountered during the recent missions conducted out-of-area.





The purpose of peacebuilding operations is to end conflicts and to avoid their recurrence, in order to create the prerequisites for development, necessary to society for the non-violent solution of its internal tensions.

The essence of peacebuilding is basically of a political nature, but it includes also aspects such as cooperation for development, humanitarian aid, respect of human rights, reconstruction of political

and social institutions.

Peacebuilding differs from cooperation for development in that it includes, among other things, emergency aid, demobilization and re-employment of the fighting forces, restoration of order and public safety.

Unlike cooperation, whose process can only be developed in the long term, peacebuilding operates over short and medium periods.

Lack of time is, therefore, a ty-

pical characteristic of peacebuilding operations.

Peacebuilding, if one considers its purposes, could appear to a superficial observer as a variant of the diplomatic process. Actually, the starting point is very different. Peacebuilding intervenes in situations where the worst (the conflict) has already happened, and it inherits wounds to heal, minefields to clear, fighters to disarm, refugees to repatriate and reintegrate, and all this in a so-

CONTENTS OF A PEACE AGREEMENT

1) Basic Principles

- Recognition of the Government's legitimacy
- Legitimate recognition of the partners
- Establishment of a Body for Supervision and Control

2) Political Principles

- Multi-party democracy
- Transformation of armed movements into political parties

3) Principles of the Electoral Law

- Freedom of the press and access to the media
- Freedom of association, expression and propaganda
- Repatriation of refugees, resettlement of the population and social reintegration
- Elections, international control of the electoral process

4) Military Problems

- Procedures for the cessation of the armed conflict
- Control of armed groups
- Withdrawal of foreign occupation-troops, if any
- Concentration of the forces in prearranged areas
- Demobilization of the forces
- Collection of arms and combat equipment
- Census and disbandment of private and irregular armed groups
- Release of prisoners
- Control of the security services
- Economic and social reintegration
- Clearance of mined areas

5) Security-Organization Problems

- Reorganization of Police Forces
- Constitution of new Armed Forces

6) Humanitarian Aid

- Free circulation of aid
- Determination of priority areas for aid
- Rehabilitation of medical structures
- Reunion of families
- Safeguard of human rights

7) Financial Support

- Financial support of the electoral process, and of the programmes for assistance, emergencies and reintegration of civilians and military
- Financial support of political parties in relation to the electoral process.

ciety that needs to be reconstructed both morally and materially.

THE TIME/MANDATE FACTOR

The experience gained in Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti, Angola, Rwanda and, more recently, in former Yugoslavia, prove the importance and the need of a timely start of the operations.

One of the reasons why the UNAMIR mission failed - besides the fact that it was unable to prevent genocide - was that it did not commence with the timeliness necessary to show the government and people of Rwanda that it could be a tangible contribution to the reconstruction of the country.

Many believe that the peacebuilding process may begin only after a cease-fire agreement has been reached. Facts show the convenience of moving early, in order to limit the damages caused by the conflict and to lay the foundations of the peace process.

On the other hand, especially in the developing countries, there is the strong worry that peacebuilding operations, if started during a conflict, could turn into interventions by the international community.

One way to dispel these concerns could be the early start of negotiations among all protagonists, both internal and external to the conflict, on the schedule of the intervention. It is also necessary to examine and solve, in the same framework, the problem of the duration of the operation.

The practice of considering elections as the objective-date for the conclusion of the peacebuilding activities, appears to be questionable.

The early designing and planning of the operations is an imperative element to ensure their timely beginning. The cases of Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and recently Angola (UNAVEM III) show very clearly that the planning of the operations

must start at the very beginning of the peace negotiations.



The agreements and mandates of the peace missions must include all the elements necessary to frame the conduct of the operations, leaving a certain flexibility of interpretation and implementation, in relation to the prevailing situation.

All this is certainly more easily said than done; on the one hand, there is the danger of overburdening the peace negotiations with too many techno/operational elements and, on the other, that of not fixing in detail the elements of verification and respect by which everybody, opponents and controllers, must abide during the course of the mission.

A mandate expressed on political aspects only is almost never fully effective. Without endangering its essentially political dimension, the document should consider also the military implications and repercussions, as well as the legal, administrative, social and temporal ones deriving from the implementation of the peace agreements.

THE COORDINATION FACTOR

Peace operations must take into account, from their beginning, the non-governmental international organizations (NGOs) active in the field. Their presence, although potentially useful in the peace process, could make even more complicate a situation where the control of the internal protagonists is already rather difficult. During the moments of crisis, which inevitably occur along the peacebuilding process, the different operational cultures of the various organizations become visible. Tensions are a natural consequence of the different structures and strategies guiding the individual organizations and, also from the behavioural point of view, of the role played before and during the conflict, as well as of their possi-



ble role after the conclusion of the mission. In principle, the activity of different non-governmental organizations offers great opportunities in terms of distribution of responsibilities and cooperation, as long as there is a marked coordination and collaboration towards an integrated approach to the efforts.

Individual outlooks and interests should not endanger the achievement of the final common objective.

The diffusion of information to

all parties involved in the operation is the best way to reach unity, not only in intentions, but in strategy and actions as well.

Other ways to improve the unity of action can be found in a joint pre-mission training, conducted through the time, in the regular exchange of experiences and in a constant monitoring of the activities.

In the case of UNMIH, a week-long training course for all members of the mission was held at Port-au-Prince, and was attended by

FACTORS

1) Anthropological factors

- Position of the population towards peace/war
- Role of the male in society
- Tribe/family as basic social nucleus
- Characterization of society: individual/social

ACTION

- Separate population from warring parties
- Find a new role for former combatants
- Exalt the concept of social aggregation
- Aim at peace and welfare
- Make the most of individual and collective ingenuity

OBJECTIVE

- Annul control (pressure) of the Parties on the population and on the Parties' followers (dissociation)

2) Social factors

- Usages, customs, behaviour, beliefs

ACTION

- Full respect of the local reality
- Integration of UN operators in the local reality

OBJECTIVE

- Gain confidence of the population and Parties' followers

3) Mass media

- Population's yearning for peace
- Encouragement by the international community

ACTION

- Use of communication systems to inform

OBJECTIVE

- Inform the internal and external front on the development of the process (good guys and bad guys)
- Put pressure on the Parties' hawks through combination of internal (people) and external (international community) actions

4) Political factor

- Impartiality towards Parties
- Equal importance of Parties
- Fulfillment of mandate
- Overcoming mutual distrust
- Continuous support by the international community

ACTION

- Flexibility in interpreting the agreements
- Bilateral diplomatic actions
- Mediation in bilateral solutions
- Enforcement of the feasible solution

OBJECTIVE

- Fulfillment of the mandate
- Credibility of the mission at internal and external level

5) Military-Humanitarian factor

- Close interdependence between military and humanitarian interventions

ACTION

- Determination, resolve, immediacy and selectivity of military interventions
- Adherence of humanitarian interventions to the development of the demobilization process

OBJECTIVE

- Demobilization and reintegration of forces
- Support to the population
- Credibility of the mission

6) Functional factor

- Rationalization of the international "machine"
- "Debureaucratization" of procedures
- Timeliness of decisions and interventions

ACTION

- Managerial organization of structures
- Decentralization of the technical decision-making autonomy

OBJECTIVE

- Adherence of the instrument to the evolution of the process
- Rationalization of resources
- Credibility of the mission

7) Financial factor

- Immediate availability of financial resources and assets
- "Debureaucratization" of the employment of resources and assets

ACTION

- Constitution of a trust fund

OBJECTIVE

- Financial support for the constitution of political parties; support to the "good guys".

all members of the mission, including staff personnel, representatives of the various military police contingents and members of the NGOs.

A joint structure for the analysis of the problems connected with the decision-making process, and an executive mechanism for carrying out the activities at local level are, for the political leadership responsible of the mission, instruments capable of guaranteeing a univocal course to the large number of protagonists concerned.

An important lesson learned from past peace missions was the so-called "emergency to relief to development continuum", which became very popular in many communities involved in the peace process.

For example, the immediate need to prevent the factions from taking up arms again cannot interfere with the long-term development objectives pursued by the NGOs. Disarming must be accompanied by the social process of integrating the former combatants in productive activities, following necessarily cadenced times. Emergency, aid and development activities need immediate and simultaneous actions, conducted with integrated engagements.

In principle, short-term requirements should never interfere with long-term objectives.

THE LEADERSHIP FACTOR

Coordination requires the presence of an effective leadership. The role of the "head of the family" must be clearly defined, and the general rules concerning the responsibilities of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), as well as those of the individual Agencies, must be clearly established.

Lack of a strong leadership gives rise to the risk that the parties involved in the struggle, artfully or not, put the various international actors in conflict with each other.

The establishment of a management structure permits to limit the danger of an always possible failu-

"Centauro" armoured car speeding over muddy ground.

re. Each area and each conflict has its specific characteristics and cannot be dealt with by pre-arranged structures. Different conflicts and missions need different responses. What was done in the Mozambique mission could be a good opportunity for reflection.

The professional qualities of the personnel in charge of a peace mission are of crucial importance; this aspect was sometimes overlooked in the past. The recent tendency is to attribute more importance to human and professional qualities, rather than to the cultural background. Many believe that the negotiator of the peace agreement should be also the SRSG of the subsequent peace-mission. The double responsibility - mediator first, and then "realizer" of the peace agreement - makes it extremely important that the terms of the agreement be laid down with the greatest care, since they will have to be applied by the same authority. Also, the selection of the leadership of a mission cannot be made only on the basis of self-declared authority.

THE INTERNAL FACTOR

The partners

One of the most difficult decisions that those in charge of a peace mission must make is the selection of the internal protagonists they can accept as partners. Can the former warring centres of power be considered the only references in the solution of the conflict?

Will they be willing and capable of playing this role?

Inevitably, at the beginning of the peacebuilding operations, the concern about the achievement of a positive result suggests to collaborate with all the centres of power (economic, social, political, religious), including those not directly involved in the conflict phase. This helps



to increase the prestige and authority of all parties, making more difficult a future political emergence of only the former opponents.

In a longer-term perspective, connected with the achievement of the final result, the doubt inevitably arises about the international community having enough authority to assert its authority on all parties. One way is that of rewarding the factions which really cooperate, chastising those which don't. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to supply the SRSG with a special "trust fund". It is unrealistic to imagine to cooperate with all the parties concerned. Sometimes it becomes necessary to make the ethically difficult decision of concentrating the efforts on the strong groups, excluding the weak and vulnerable ones. Obviously, this principle is not always in keeping with that of humanitarian aid.

In the Mozambique operation, which ended with success, large groups of the local society were excluded from the peace process.

The role of society

In building the peace process

several universal factors must be taken into consideration. To each factor must correspond an action to be conducted or an objective to be reached.

The role of women

Women are a strategic factor for peace and for the democratization process even if, in a society torn by war, they are often assigned a marginal role.

In post-conflict situations, where it is difficult to distinguish friend from foe, women are potentially the best allies in the realization of peacebuilding programmes. They pay the highest price, and are therefore most willing to operate in the peace process.

In the traditional African society, for instance, women play a pacification role due to the double kinship deriving from marriage: they are loyal to both the original clan and to the acquired one to which their children belong.

In El Salvador the "Patriotic Movement Against Crime" (MPDC), was founded by a group of women in November 1995. Its important



contribution in disarming El Salvador's society and in reestablishing peaceful and civilized conditions in the Country have already been acknowledged by the UN Secretary General. In November 1996 the peace agreement in Sierra Leone was signed by the international community and the Government. The accord failed. Elections did not take place. The campaigns of public education and civil resistance, organized by the women all over the Country, were decisive for ensuring the elections and for the return of Sierra Leone on the road to democracy.

THE DISARMAMENT FACTOR: A KEY FOR SUCCESS AND

CREDIBILITY

Disarmament, control of arms, demobilization and reemployment of the former combatants are the key for an actual solution of the conflict, for the correct conduct of the operations and for the implementation of a lasting peace. The lessons learned in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Guatemala, El Salvador and Haiti are, for better or worse, examples which confirm this proposition.

In Somalia, the opinion prevailed that it was not worth running risks in order to complete the disarmament of the warring parties. In Mozambique, on the contrary, the disarmament was possible precisely because of the deter-

mination with which the process was conducted.

There are three impelling reasons for this course:

- the requisition of arms contributes to increase the credibility of the mission;
- the non-requisition of weapons is a potential danger also for the international operators (both civilian and military);
- the lack of control and non-destruction of arms is a potential danger for the stability and internal security of the Country after the end of the operation.

In order to be effective, planning and execution of the disarmament must be an integral part of the strengthening of peace,



combining collection/destruction of arms and demobilization with the start of the reemployment programmes. Contrary to what has often happened in the past, the reconstruction and reemployment programmes must proceed at the same rate as the disarmament process.

There is therefore an interaction between the strengthening of peace and the progress - or non-progress - of the operations of disarmament,

Left.

VCC-1 armoured personnel carrier at a checkpoint of the Italian contingent in Bosnia.

Below.

Italian soldier on patrol in Bosnia.



demobilization and reemployment of the former combatants. It is important to understand the different perception of the "economy of violence": the international community perceives the conflict as an irrational situation; in western societies the notion prevails that "violence does not pay"; in the developing world, violence is a "means for survival and achievement".

Coercive disarmament is risky. The strategies based on consent, aimed at reducing the "value" of arms, should have priority over the attempts to eliminate all weapons at the same time.

Clearly, the need of consent does not mean pursuit of consensus, but should rather create and promote the local or individual interest in the "advantage" of handing in the weapons. Particular attention, therefore, must be attributed to the social and economic impact of the reemployment programmes. The chances of success increase in proportion to the adoption of solutions capable of fostering the productive capabilities of the local economy, involving the former belligerents.

In short, the disarmament and demobilization process must be conducted together with the implementation of the humanitarian aid and social reemployment programmes, since the latter are the necessary and indispensable conditions for the fulfillment of the former.

What was done in Mozambique, where the Chairman of the "Cease-Fire Commission" and "Demobilization Process" was also responsible for the implementation of the "Humanitarian Development Programme", is certainly a valid example, to be considered in future operations.

□

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
THE NEW DOCTRINE OF THE ARMY

by Domenico Zucaro *

The issue of the publications "Doctrine of the Italian Army" and "Land Military Operations" marked the alignment of the national norms with the NATO ones (ATP 35/B-'95 ed.).

This action was necessary in order that the contribution of our land instrument in the various national and especially international scenarios of employment be kept effective and up to date.

This article illustrates the essential contents of the two valuable publications edited by the Doctrine, Training and Regulations Office of the Army General Staff.





THE DOCTRINE

The present doctrinal body presents a "tree" structure, which permits to rapidly update the publications already issued, and to amplify them, as well as to probe deeper into the problems, applying the lessons learned "on the field", also with the purpose of making use of the lessons in the shortest possible time.

The first two publications fill an obvious "conceptual" gap in the previous regulations, since the 900/A series of publications limited the employment of the

military instrument up to the Corps (tactical level), without defining the aspects connected with the employment of the forces at operational level.

In particular, the publication "Land Military Operations" determines the elements which must guide the operational and tactical commanders in planning and conducting any military operation.

Another important characteristic of the present doctrine is the flexibility of the expressed principles, whose value can be extended to all organization levels

(certainly to Brigades and Major Units to which they are subordinate) and it is not excessive to affirm their extensibility to combat-group and minor-complex level.

THE INSTRUMENT

Together with the change of doctrine, the Service is undergoing a radical transformation, determined by several "external" factors, but anyhow connected with the configuration of an instrument really capable of



applying the new doctrine.

Of particular importance is the availability of forces qualitatively able to operate in multinational contexts, according to the "modularity" and "categorization" principles, as well as to integrate in such contexts through "capability packages" suitable for performing specific operational functions (1).

MILITARY OPERATIONS

In the new doctrine, military operations have been divided into "War Operations" - the so-called

"classic" operations - and "Military Operations Other Than War" (MOOTW).


In particular, to the War Operations belong both the offensive and defensive operations, that are planned and conducted at operational and tactical level, as well as the "Delay Operations", planned and conducted at tactical level only.

Other activities carried out to functionally connect offensive, defensive and delay operations are the transition phases (movement for contact, encounter combat, rejoining, withdrawal, rotation of

units in contact) which in every respect can be considered tactical-level operations.

MOOTWs include "Peace Support Operations" (PSOs) and those in support of national and/or international Civil Authorities.

The term "operation" deserves a reflection, in that the previous doctrine fixed a rigid correspondence between the organization level and the expression describing the activity it performed: for instance, "Operation" was associated with "Theatre", and "Battle" with "Corps".



Training of a mechanized-infantry unit.

the mentality of the "formal compliance" - is no longer applicable, since "Operation" is the only term used to describe the military activities to be carried out at the various levels.

This simplification, which is not purely semantic, gives the new doctrine a further characteristic of flexibility and simplicity: what is important is not what term to use but, on the contrary, the level of the responsibility in charge of the planning and conduct of the operation, and the objective to be reached. This means that any Corps, Division, Brigade or combat group can carry out an "Operation", whose importance is exclusively based on the responsibility given to the Commander.

THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The Operational Framework is the whole of Deep Operations, Close Operations and Rear Operations that the Commander must plan in his Area of Responsibility (AOR) in order to successfully conduct a "War" operation.

Deep, Close and Rear operations must always carry out the basic "Discover", "Fix" and "Strike" functions, and must be connected

with each other in an operational "continuum". They are not carried out necessarily in a rigid chronological sequence and, furthermore, are not adjacent to each other. The Commander must synchronize them, in order to exert the highest concentration of his Combat Power (2) on the surface and in the third dimension, striking the enemy everywhere in his AOR, depriving him of his freedom of action.

The Commander coordinates and synchronizes Deep, Close and Rear Operations in such a way as to concentrate his Combat Power in order for him to reach the decisive points (3) and then the centre of gravity (4) of the enemy.

The Operational Framework must be planned at all organizational levels, for all phases/times of the manoeuvre; the coordination of its component operations must take place among all the units and pursued in any circumstance.

Deep Operations

The term "deep" immediately expresses the basic aspect of these operations, wide-ranging and generally conducted for long periods of time, in all phases of a War Operation.

The functions of Deep Operations are to "Discover", "Fix" and "Strike" the enemy forces before they are introduced in combat, in order to create the conditions for the successive Close operations. They must be


In the NATO doctrine and in the present national norms, one can see very clearly that the old rigid schematism - which could produce

ACTIVITY

- In-depth Surveillance and Target Acquisition
- Air Interdiction (AINT)
- Offensive Air Support (OAS)
- Land Forces Fire and Manoeuvre
- Deceit

FUNCTIONS

- Discover
- Discover and Strike
- Discover and Strike
- Strike
- Operational Function



Activities/Functions of an Operational-level Division in a Defensive Operation.

A: RSTA and INTERDICTION

B: OAS

C: FIX

D: STRIKE

E: MONITOR

F: DECEIVE

Deep operations of Operational level in Offensive or Defensive Operations are preceded by RSTA activities.

They are carried out beyond the RIPL, with air missions (AINT-A) for the achievement of certain Decisive Points (elimination of air defences, command and control systems, energy sources, logistic and communication systems, etc...) as a prerequisite for the destruction of the enemy Centre of Gravity, and in the sector of the Area of Responsibility between FSCL and FEBA, in order to reach decisive points, such as:

- destruction of some communication lines;
- elimination of some enemy combat-components;
- neutralization of some operational functions of the enemy units (Command and Control system, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Combat units).

Between FSCL and FEBA, the Division intervenes first against the 1st echelon and subsequently against the 2nd echelon of the enemy units, employing the Offensive Air Support (B) and the manoeuvre of its operational functions: long-range artillery to strike (D), helicopters to fix and/or strike (C and D), infiltrated tanks to strike (D), but also to deceive (F) and the recce component to monitor (E) and survey (A).

conducted against C3 systems, Combat Support, Logistic Centres, elements of the air defence, Combat forces of the 1st echelon and, later, against those of the 2nd echelon. Other purposes of Deep operations are to undermine the morale and to quash the fighting will of the enemy to reduce his Combat Power, his cohesion and

the rhythm of his action, as well as to interdict his lines of communication. The main characteristic of Deep Operations is that they always have an offensive nature, even when they are conducted within defence or delay operations. They take concrete form, as described in the chart below, through the

employment of air fire (5) (RECCE, Air Interdiction, TAC RECCE, BAI, CAS), land fire - expressed with Combat Support (long-range artillery, helicopters, special forces) - and through the manoeuvre of high-mobility Combat forces (attack helicopters, armoured and special units), capable of conducting psychologic actions.

The planning and conduct of a Deep Operation requires, besides an adequate Command and Control system, an efficient RSTA function (6) developed both at operational and tactical level, and possibly other operational functions.

The definition of the reference lines, such as RIPL, FSCL, FLOT and FEBA (7) is extremely important for the conduct of the operation, in that they permit to coordinate the air and land fire with the operations carried out by the Combat forces of the operational and tactical Commanders.

The Deep Operations conducted by the various units must be integrated and synchronized with each other.

For instance, the Deeps of a Corps must be coordinated with those conducted by Divisions and Brigades.

The realization of a Deep planned by Commanders at operational level must necessarily be preceded by the RSTA function, which envisages an initial Air Interdiction (AINT) (8), with missions conducted beyond the FSCL (9), in order to acquire information, but mostly to destroy a part of the enemy's Combat Power even before its employment. Furthermore, the Deep must wear out and slow down the rhythm and cohesion of the manoeuvre of the enemy, strike enemy targets/elements capable of logistic, such as command lines, logistic resources and other operational functions.

The Commander must fix, for

the AINT missions, the objectives that are to be destroyed and their priority, the phases of the operations, the results to be obtained (percentage of reduction of the enemy's Combat Power).

The AINT missions are therefore an important and fundamental element of a Deep Operation, in order to reach particular decisive points and, consequently, to destroy the enemy centre of gravity. At times, according to the situations, the Commander can consider AINTs to be the main activity for the destruction of the centre of gravity.

Deep Operations always envisage OAS (Office Automatic System), TAC RECCE, BAI and CAS missions, as well as land operations between FSCL and FEBA, or HL(10), in case of defensive operations. In this case, the missions are conducted by the air potential in support to the land forces.


TAC RECCE missions are carried out between FLOT and RIPL, before in -depth land operations, in order to gather information about the enemy, are included in the wider RSTA activity, and are normally conducted from FLOT to RIPL.

BAI missions are conducted astride the FSCL, against enemy units and operational functions not directly in contact with the friendly land forces.

CAS are air missions against enemy targets in contact with friendly forces.

Deep Operations are also conducted with Combat Support units, such as missile systems, long-range artillery, helicopters, special forces, electronic and psychological warfare units and, as already mentioned, with high-mobility and high-firepower Combat forces, such as attack helicopters and armoured units.

The examples at Figures 1 and 2 show the Deep of an operational-level Division engaged in a defensive operation, and that of a tactical-level



Activities/Functions of a tactical-level Brigade subordinate to a Division:

A: OAS, BAI, TAC RECCE

B: FIX

C: STRIKE

D: MONITOR

E: DECEIVE

The Brigade's Deep Operations shown are carried out in the forward zone of the Area of Responsibility against 2nd-echelon Regiments, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and other operational functions of the 1st-echelon enemy Division. Deeps are carried out through BAI air missions (A), Direct and Possible SG Support (C), attack helicopters (C and B), high-mobility Combat units (D) in a monitoring role, and with other operational functions employed in order to achieve the Decisive Points (elimination of the Command and Control System, land and A/A artillery, mechanized, armoured and A/T units, logistic units and communication lines etc...).

Evidently in a preceding phase the Brigade's Deeps were carried out against the 1st-echelon Regiments.

Brigade of the same Division.

Figure 3 shows the aspects of the Deep conducted by a Division in an offensive operation.


As regards Delay Operations, the aspects of the Deeps are similar to the ones described above, but limited to the tactical level since these operations are conducted at that level only.

Close Operations

Close Operations decide the outcome of offensive, defensive

and delay operations. They are aimed at destroying the significant part of the enemy Combat Power at close contact, and are conducted in rapid succession, with "less dynamic" actions aimed at fixing, canalizing and delaying the enemy progression with sharply offensive striking actions (counterattacks). The results on the enemy forces must be immediate and tangible.

Closes are conducted with the manoeuvre of Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service units, and with other



The Deep operations carried out by an operational-level Division in an Offensive Operation are also preceded by RSTA activities; they are developed beyond the RIPL through AINT and RECCE air missions, OAS missions and employ specific operational functions astride the FSCL, in order to achieve certain Decisive Points for the destruction of the Centre of Gravity. The tactical-level Deep operations, conducted in this case by a Brigade, are carried out against the 2nd echelons of the in-contact enemy unit. The concepts on Decisive Points, Centres of Gravity and operational functions are like those described at Figures 1 and 2.

place in an AOR where, in their turn, the subordinate units - in the respective AORs - conduct Deep, Close and Rear operation at their level (fig.4).

For example, in a defensive operation conducted by a multinational Corps, the Close is carried out in the Main Battle Area, according to the procedures of mobile or areal defence, or combining the two forms of defence.


Figure 5 shows in detail a possible organization of an AOR in a defensive operation, applying the mobile-defence procedures.

In **mobile defence**, approximately one third of the forces is employed to manage (canalize, wear out, delay) the manoeuvre of the enemy, in order to drive him to a special sector of the AOR, where the remaining two thirds of the forces are employed in decisive offensive actions (conclusive counterattack at the desired place and time, conducted by an ad hoc force, quite distinct from the reserve) whose main purpose is the destruction of the enemy.

In **areal defence**, about two thirds of the forces are used to absorb the impact of the enemy, strengthening and integrating the obstacles or "constructing" them, while the other forces conduct local counterattacks, with the main objective of preventing the enemy from gaining ground, depriving him of his freedom of manoeuvre.

The concepts expressed above will be discussed more in detail in successive articles about the various forms of defensive operations.

As regards Closes in offensive operations, it must be stressed that they include a number of actions conducted from the FEBA to the FSCL, which moves according to the progress of the attack. It is important to underline that the objective of the whole offensive operation is the destruction of the enemy forces in



units performing the remaining operational functions.

In general, Closes are the basic component of the defensive, offensive and delay operations,

since they are the only ones which permit to achieve the decisive points necessary for destroying the enemy centre of gravity.

In War operations, Closes take

The subordinate units, in their turn, conduct their Deep, Close and Rear Operations, consisting in preliminary activities of combat reconnaissance before the attack and, finally, in attacks of different kinds (systematic, expeditious, simulated, demonstrative) (11).

The aspects described above keep their validity also when the operation is conducted by a Division or a Brigade.

The purpose of Rear Operations is to ensure freedom of action to the forces conducting "Deeps" and "Closes", preventing the destruction of their C4 system, combat support, counterattack force, reserves, logistic support and units conducting other operational functions.

Rear Operations essentially aim at contrasting deep enemy operations and are realized by monitoring interest areas, by "protecting" operational and logistic bases, communication lines and routes, itineraries, depots, convoys, sensitive materials, civilians and the support elements provided by the Host Nation.

Rear Operations are carried out in the back part of the AOR of the unit which conducts the operation.

For instance, in defensive operations (fig.7) the Rear Operation takes place from the rear edge of the Main Battle Area to the rear edge of the AOR of the units conducting the entire operation, in this case a multinational Corps.


In general, the extent of the rear area compels the Commander to entrust the Rear Operation to a subordinate Commander; responsible



The CLOSE shown refers to an Offensive Operation conducted by a multinational Corps; nevertheless, in case of a similar operation conducted by a Division, the conceptual aspects keep their full validity, once the organizational level of the represented units is appropriately adjusted.

for the surveillance, protection and monitoring activities. He can avail himself of surveillance and control units, as well as of forces for close defence and mobile reaction to protect of the deployment areas of logistic units.

Command Posts, and Combat Support elements. Furthermore, the Commander in charge of a Rear Operation must have at his disposal an intervention force adequate to his level of responsibility. He controls these



1. Group of Deployment zones
2. Mobile Force of Deployment Zone
3. Intervention Force
4. "Surveillance and Target Acquisition" (SORAO) subsystem
5. Monitoring activity

The REAR operations shown refer to a Defensive Operation conducted by a multinational Corps; nevertheless, if the operation were carried out by a Division or a Brigade, the concepts expressed would remain fully valid, once the level of the forces were appropriately adjusted.

forces through a Rear Area Operational Centre.

Deep operations conducted by the enemy can affect the operation with different levels of danger, which must be quashed with specific actions carried out by the Rear Forces: the first level (sabotage, terrorism, etc.) is confronted by the close-defence units; the second level (regular units), by close-defence units and the mobile reaction-forces of the deployment areas; the third level (airmobile, airborne and amphibious units) is eliminated by employing the intervention force and the support of the mobile reaction-forces. It must be noted that these principles apply also in case of offensive and delay operations (fig. 8).

The principles expressed above will be discussed more in detail in the successive articles

on War Operations.

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

The flexible application of the general scheme of operations is one of the many changes presented by the ATP 35/B and adopted by the doctrine of the Italian Army.

This flexibility, on the other hand, makes it necessary to consider the type of training necessary for Cadres and units coming from at least thirty years of experience with norms directed towards instrumental implementation rather than towards the assumption of responsibility by Commanders at all levels.

In particular, the main characteristic of Deep, Close and Rear Operations is the establishment of the precise

objectives the various Commanders want to achieve; furthermore, these objectives must be perfectly integrated with each other, in order to reach the decisive points and destroy the enemy centre of gravity. This is very different from the almost bureaucratic positioning on the ground (as envisaged by Publication 900A, Vol.1) of a series of strong points which, on the other hand, were not all manned and/or activated.

With the new norms, operations are aimed at the "active" destruction of the enemy forces. This compels the Commander to envisage, in his concept of action, the synchronization, coordination and simultaneity of Deep, Close and Rear Operations which compose a War Operation. Furthermore, the Commander must plan the logical succession/synchronization of activities, operational functions and air support. This is very different from the defence of the ground as an end in itself, i.e. waiting passively for the enemy's initiative and defending the ground, "counterreacting" to the last man and the last "bullet".

In order to overcome the formality of the strong point, the scheme of the operation should be considered a restraint; it is not always necessary to conduct all three operations, because if a Commander can eliminate the enemy centre of gravity with a Deep, he can suspend the planned Close and Rear. Besides, the scheme is not applied only by the Commander of the unit responsible for the War Operations, but also by all subordinate commands.

Obviously, in planning and carrying out Deep, Close and Rear Operations simultaneously, is no more possible to use planning sequences with activities where the first one is a prerequisite for the development of the second and so on (the "perfect plan"), but it is indispensable to use planning


It is also evident that the need to plan and develop three operations makes it necessary for the unit to command operational functions adequate - as regards their characteristics and levels of capability - to the operation to be planned and conducted. Therefore, the new doctrine could turn out to be practically inapplicable for minor combat-groups, if these units do not have, for example in case of Deep Operations, sufficient offensive BAI air-support, or fire granted and realized by long and medium-range weapons; or if the Commanders are not in a position to manage further "reinforcements". Nevertheless, this does not exempt a company Commander from employing, in terms of Deep, the long-range weapons at his disposal - even if they are only mortars - because he must have a *forma mentis* aimed at the Operational Framework.

NOTES

2. "Combat Power" is the whole of the operational functions (Combat, Combat Support, C.S.S., C 4, morale, fighting will, intelligence...)

fig. 8

11. Other types of attacks, such as counterattack and disturbance, take place mainly in defensive situations.




ROMAN
EMPERORS

GAIUS JULIUS CAESAR

by Carmine Fiore *

This article is the first of a series illustrating the lives of the great Roman Emperors. The stories, spanning over five centuries, will remind the readers of the unique destiny of a City which was capable of expanding its power all over the world Known at that time. Caesar was the first great Emperor. His life went down in history as a myth and his death did not change the course of Rome's glorious path.



Gaius Julius Caesar, unlike his successor Augustus, was never formally nominated Emperor of Rome, but is commonly considered as the first Roman Emperor. The third phase of the history of Rome begins with him.

The monarchy of the Seven Kings lasted 244 years, each king holding power for 35 years on average, and was followed by the Republic. Caesar came to power four centuries later initiating the Imperial phase in the history of Rome.

Caesar's life too can be divided into three phases.

The first long phase was marked both by reproachable personal events

(adultery and homosexuality) and by his stubborn will to get well trained and ready for the future.

Only when he was 42, he became the Great General who

conquered Gaul and eventually Britain, after a fatiguing war which had lasted nine years. Thus he became a leader who succeeded in eliminating his opponents. The short final phase of his triumph began when he was 55.

It lasted less than a year but it was long enough to let him frame the Empire, the new form of government which would outlive him for five centuries.

Just like Napoleon, 18 centuries later, Caesar was a patrician turned into a popularis (a democrat) who fought for the commons to win their support. While Napoleon's opponent was the late 18th century frivolous monarchy in France, Caesar's opponent was the selfish and voracious senatorial oligarchy.

But, unlike Napoleon, Caesar had also to fight widespread and deeply-rooted republican feelings, which eventually defeated him. The more exciting were his victories,

the more painful were his defeats.


The triumph at Alesia avenged the defeat at Gergovia, as that at Pharsalus wiped out the memory of Dyrrhachium.

He was versatile and had outstanding positive and negative qualities. We are lured by his being a genius, elegant, fearless and merciful. But there are some who regard him as an adulterer, a homosexual, an epileptic, a tyrant, a cruel person.

He had always been very determined to bend the stream of history to his wishes, but when he became a life-dictator, he was apparently overwhelmed by a sort of fatalistic attitude. Was it mere presumption or an unconscious desire to put an end to an extraordinary life with 23 stabs?

He was born in 100 B.C. This was a strange coincidence: not only it was the beginning of a new century, but also of a new era in the history of Rome and of

Cavalryman - Early Roman Imperial Age (reconstruction).



through a tough and constant training. He had four wives (Cossutia, Cornelia, Pompeia and Calpurnia) whom he married because of their dowries or for political reasons.

In 86 B.C. when his uncle Marius died, his name was put on the list of proscribed persons made by Sulla, the dictator, and he had to flee Rome just because of his being Marius' kin. But thanks to some friends of his (the habit of signalling people was also common at that time), Sulla erased his name from the list and saved Caesar's life exclaiming "your will be done...you can keep him..You'll regret it... I can see many would-be Mariuses but only one Caesar". How could he foresee all this in a 14 year-old boy?

There was much gossip about his boyhood, as when he was given the task of carrying the King of Bithynia a request for a fleet. His mission was successful but gossip had it that he had become the "Queen of Bithynia" (which he had been blamed for his whole life).

But other episodes showed his determination and his strength, as when he was captured by a group of pirates during a journey by sea and held hostage for 2 months until a ransom was paid. Once freed, he managed to raise a fleet and, acting as an Admiral, captured his captors in their hideouts and had all of them hanged. He was only 22. Though his family was of patrician origin, he took up the cause of the "populares" and this is another reason why it took him such a long time to rise from the ranks.

His political choice could not be different. He was born in the Suburra, the working class suburbs, the slum of the wonderful City, the ghetto where poor and sly populace lived, the origin of all popular riots.

the world.

THE LONG PHASE OF HIS EDUCATION (100 B.C. - 58 -B.C.)

He was born in Rome. His hypothetical "personal reports" could be as follows : *"Tall, thin but strong, even too much elegant, dark eyes, broad forehead, fierce glance, noble manners and vibrant voice . His memory is extraordinary and his turn of speech uncommon. Determined and self-possessed even*

when he is filled with anger".

He quickly learned Greek, which became his second language.

Just like Napoleon, he was keen on astronomy, maths and science.

Poetry was his great passion, but it could not keep him away from military exercises. His uncle Marius, who was elected General and Consul six times and was holding power in Rome in those years, was his mentor.

He strengthened his frail body

Roman gladius and German sword (reconstruction).

He was blamed for his opportunistic and demagogic political choice, which he always stuck to even at a time when a volte-face was not as sensational as nowadays.

At 31, he reached the first rung on the Roman political ladder. He was elected Quaestor and sent to Farther Spain. There he saw the statue of Alexander the Great, at Cadiz.

He burned with rage and burst into tears. At 31, Alexander had already enlarged his dominion over the whole Eastern world. Caesar decided to make up for lost time and kept his promise. He was then elected Aedile and, at 37, Pontifex Maximus, the highest seat of the principal college of priests and a lifelong post.

In 61 B.C., he went back to Spain as Propraetor, that is a



Governor acting as military commander.

He fought against and defeated peoples living in the mountainous regions of Lusitania and Galicia, who used to make sudden raids and pillages in the neighbouring Roman province. He was successful as he performed rapid and bold manoeuvres also by sea.

Roman soldiers were sailing the Atlantic Ocean for the first time and that news excited the whole City. Having signed an alliance (known as the first triumvirate) with General Pompey and Crassus, the richest man in Rome, he became Consul for the year 59 B.C.

He was 41, less than ten years after he had decided to speed up his career.

From then on, all his actions aimed at fighting oligarchy and win the support of the populares. One of his first steps was to let public opinion know what happened in the Senate and everywhere else within the boundaries of the Roman dominion. He set up two publications, the Acta

Diurna and the Acta Senatus, the forerunners of modern Official Journals. In a way, they marked the origin of journalism because they contained news about death, birth, wedding, divorce of Roman citizens.

They were published daily and it is easy to understand how they pleased Roman people.


He then introduced an agrarian reform law envisaging the distribution of plots of land to urban poor people having at least three children, also through compulsory expropriation.

The Senate fiercely opposed this law which was all the same approved by the Popular Assembly. Caesar had won the first round with the Senate!

But the Senate, the highest institution of the Roman State, immediately tried to win the second round. As Consules were traditionally assigned a Propraetura a year after their Consulship, the Senate proposed to give Caesar the Propraetura for state property, parks and forests. But, thanks to the effectiveness of his actions, not only he was given the most prestigious command post: the Governorship of Cisalpine Gaul



Roman Legionary - 1st century B.C.



Bridge on the river Rhine built by Caesar's troops in about 10 days (1:30 scale model).

and Illyria with three Legions (Cisalpine Gaul included the entire valley of the river Po and the northern part of Italy) but it was also established that his term of duty would last 5 years instead of the usual 1. He was later given Narbonensis Gaul which was considered the province par excellence and this is why this region is now called Provence.

THE PHASE OF THE WARRIOR (58 - 45 B.C.)

He was Governor of a region in the northern part of the Roman dominion neighbouring riotous tribes like the Gauls, the Germans and the Belgians. It was the same northern border that had been crossed by those Gauls who had almost conquered the Capitolium, centuries before.

Those provinces gave him the opportunity to show his military skills while carrying out eight campaigns which lasted 9 years and also a four-year long civil war against Pompey.

It would take too long to analyse in details each campaign.

The most important aspects of his military skills together with major events will be summarised.

He found a wonderful way to relate to his soldiers which can be considered an example of perfect personnel management and command capability.

Adherence to prescribed forms and imitation of examples were of major importance to him. He paid great attention to military uniforms as he considered elegance a means of showing power. He obliged his soldiers to wear finely chased armours. Today, he could be considered as a perfect formalist but he repeatedly showed, even in difficult situations, what great significance was hidden behind his adherence to forms. In fact

this formalism was also enhanced by the example he set.

For example, during the battle of Bibracte, Caesar chose not to use his horse and obliged his Tribunes to do the same convinced as he was that both soldiers and officers had to run the same risks.

He always spoke to his soldiers before a battle or a momentous event to encourage them and explain the details of the impending battle. When he decided to give way to the civil war against Pompey, he made this decision only after "knowing his soldiers' will".

He was very generous with his soldiers but he expected much from them. He won their loyalty and devotion in long years of uninterrupted engagement.

His famous Veterans used to grumble while marching, just as good and well-disciplined soldiers always do and as Napoleon's grognards will do, centuries later.

How different he was from his

War machine used during sieges (1:10 scale model).

enemy Pompey the Great, the General who lived in an aristocratic Olympus where he lost touch with reality.

He always cared for the lives of his soldiers though engaged them in heroic and risky ventures. He said "It is a chief's duty to win using both his sword and his wisdom"


The limited number of casualties among his soldiers, even in the most difficult battles is striking. At Pharsalus, his most bitter victory, he counted 200 casualties versus 15000 casualties and 24000 prisoners among Pompey's troops. At Munda, in Spain, his last victory, he counted 100 casualties versus 30000 casualties among Pompey's troops.

The rapidity of his thinking and actions was absolutely striking. This, together with the constant search for surprising moves, disoriented his opponents.

At a time when wars were mainly conducted during the day and certainly in spring and summer, he crossed the Mediterranean Sea, the snow-covered Alps and the Channel many times in winter. Sometimes, as it happened at Munda, Spain, he engaged the enemy forces even before they knew he had left Rome.

He coupled his constant effort to surprise the enemy with his lively imagination as when Roman soldiers, using long sickles, cut the sails of the ships of the Veneti (a tribe in Brittany) to stop and assault them.

His deep insight and eye always enabled him to find the focal point where to attack. He always tried to carry the enemy to a site of his choice. This was the very trap Caesar set for Vercingetorix when he locked him up in Alesia, after the retreat from Gergovia. And, again, after raising the siege of Dyrrachium,



he made Pompey follow him to the plain of Pharsalus and annihilated him.

According to the Caesarian war concept, the strategic target was the destruction of the enemy and not the conquest of the enemy's territory. This latter option might be advisable only when demonstrative actions were to be carried out.

The two expeditions to Britannia and the two raids across the river Rhine are to be understood accordingly.

He constantly focused his attention on his troops' training.


Roman Legionaries had to be excellent walkers and extraordinary sappers. This is why they could move twice as quick as their enemies and build field

fortifications which are similar to military engineering works.

Pontoneers should appoint him honorary member of their speciality. Caesar was the first to build a fixed wooden bridge on the river Rhine. It was an incredible work finished in 10 days only. It was more than half a kilometer long and frightened the Germans into thinking that Rome was so powerful as to tame even that great river.

When he couldn't throw a bridge, he diverted rivers or dug canals to lower the water-level and allow for water-fording.

Sailors too should pay him a tribute. He was the first Roman ever to conduct a naval battle on the Atlantic ocean and the first to



Left.

A drawing of the siege of Alesia.

Below.

Fascine bridge built by Caesar's troops during his campaign against the Bellovaces in 51 B.C. to ford marsh areas (scale 1:30 model).

constant inferiority in number of his troops.

The ultimate reason for his victories lies in the personal capabilities and imagination of this gifted soldier. And this will almost always be true for Napoleon.

His vivid imagination, his ingenious sapper and pontoneer works, his dexterity as skilled fencer and charisma over the crowd are all keys to his victories.

Among the numerous battles he fought, Alesia, his most glorious victory, and Pharsalus, his most bitter victory are worth mentioning.

The Battle of Alesia took place in 52 B.C. during Caesar's campaigns in Gaul.

It followed the unsuccessful siege of Gergovia when Caesar, for the first and only time, made the mistake of dividing his Army in two parts.

The anti-Roman league had


lead a fleet beyond the Channel to carry out a deterrent action against some tribes in Britannia.

Caesar is then truly modern in that he attributed extreme importance to propaganda and to his image.

During the short and busy stays of a campaign, he managed to write or dictate to one of his

freedmen the report of the operations and he made those reports quickly get to Rome. Therefore his Commentaries were, in a way, "a life report" of those events. Actually, he was the first war correspondent, the correspondent of "his own" war.

Finally, what strikes us most in Caesar's battles is the almost





*Detail of circumvallation works
(siege of Alesia, 52 B.C.).
(1:35 scale model).*

30,000 men and was led by Vercingetorix. The latter, emboldened by the success gained in Gergovia shifted his technique from guerrilla fighting to close combat in the field. This was what Caesar hoped for. In fact the Romans defeated and routed Vercingetorix once again. As Caesar had predicted, he took refuge in the near-by fortified citadel of Alesia, where he hoped to renew the success gained in Gergovia.

On the contrary, the conquest of that almost unconquerable stronghold highlighted Caesar's military genius. He employed a new strategy and surrounded the citadel with two lines of circumvallation and countervallation, each 20 km long and 20 m apart, preceded by several rows of booby-traps and guarded by towers dispersed every 30 m and 23 fortified redoubts. Even the course of a river was diverted so that it could flow within one of the entrenchments and supply water to the Legionaries. Thus a double front was established, one to siege the city and the other to withstand external attacks. The works were completed in 40 days under

constant enemy assaults. Those huge field fortifications accommodated 75,000 Legionaries and 6,000 Cavalry men. The two lines of fortification were linked by connecting junctions allowing for the necessary troop movements. In this way the concept of manoeuvre, exploiting internal lines, was fully applied to a mainly static situation, such as a siege. To relax the enemy's hold, Vercingetorix made several attempts to break through the siege. Large reinforcement troops with about 250,000 men came from abroad to relieve him. He also tried to wage several joint attacks, from inside and outside, against the Romans. But Caesar was able to move his men with perfect timeliness, exploiting his ingenious works, accomplished with a rare knowledge of topography. At last Vercingetorix had to surrender.

Following Caesar's victories, the Gaul province fell under Roman influence. Thanks to Rome and Caesar, France became part of the Mediterranean civilisation area, but was allowed to safeguard and keep its Celtic traditions.

A great effort was being made to give Western Europe an everlasting Latin cultural heritage, which would set the course of its concepts and actions in the centuries unfolding.

The battle of Pharsalus took

place in 48 B.C., as part of the civil war, and for that reason was Caesar's sourest victory. In fact a defeat was once again followed by a success. Caesar had surrounded Pompey's troops entrenched at Durazzo, but they succeeded in raising the siege. Also on that occasion Caesar let his enemy follow him to a point of his choice, selected for the final outcome of the battle. He could rely on 22,000 Infantry and 1,000 Cavalry men, against Pompey's 45,000 Infantry and 7,000 Cavalry men. The balance of forces was in Pompey's favour, two to one for the Infantry and seven to one for the Cavalry. Caesar immediately understood that Pompey would exploit his Cavalry superiority and devised a completely new deployment. To counter a foreseeable Cavalry attack, he deployed his 1,000 Cavalry men, mingled hundreds of Infantry men among their lines and, what is more important, deployed 6 selected cohorts - about 3,000 men - to avoid being encircled by enemy Cavalry. The battle developed exactly as Caesar had predicted. After the central bulk of Infantry troops engaged in a close combat, Pompey's Cavalry tried an outflanking manoeuvre.

But at that point he clashed with the limited Roman Cavalry forces and the deployed

Bust of Pompey the Great (Hadrian period).



cohorts, which held out bravely; then the Roman Cavalry staged a counterattack. Pompey's Cavalry was routed and the 6 cohorts could outflank and attack Pompey's Infantry from the rear. Enemy troops were disrupted and fled disorderly, Pompey ran away. Thanks to his brilliantly conceived and perfectly performed manoeuvre, Caesar had only 200 casualties, against Pompey's 15,000 casualties and 24,000 prisoners. Pompey's army was disbanded after fighting a few hours only.

Caesar fought his last battle at Munda, Spain, in 45 B.C. By coincidence this place was near Cadiz, where 24 years earlier he had wept in front of the statue of Alexander the Great and promised he would start a new life. In fact he kept his promise.

During the 4 years of civil war (49-45 B.C.) Caesar, though constantly engaged in war operations, had also to deal with State affairs. During those 4 years he came to Rome only 2 or 3 times, for not more than 10-15 days, to make very important provisions. Roman citizenship was extended to Cisalpine Gaul. It was the first time that all the inhabitants of the Italian Peninsula had been under a common rule of law. Thus it can be said that not only Caesar was a great Roman, but also the first Italian citizen. He took a series of organisational steps, among which the reform of the Senate, where the number of members was increased, to include representatives from Gaul and Spain. That provision clearly

showed that Caesar had a far-reaching vision of Rome's international and imperial role. Structural provisions were also required to heal economic and social conditions. In Rome free wheat rations were handed out to a certain number of dispossessed and indolent citizens. About 360,000 people were entitled to receive these frumentaciones. Caesar ordered an investigation into the matter and it turned out that not all the recipients needed such State allowances (evidently "false pensioners" date back to those times!) The number of wheat ration recipients was then reduced to 150,000. He assigned plots of land in conquered provinces to the most needy people, to free Rome from their presence. He also tried to curb the greediness of provincial governors, by limiting their tenure of office to a two-year period. To foster birth-rate growth, he assigned special bonuses to large family owners. The real nature of the new Caesarean order was clearly shown by two provisions: the property of those who attempted to put State security at risk was seized and politically oriented associations were disbanded. The new rules governing administrative activities were evidence of a changing and more permissive attitude. There was the trend to equalise the rights of Roman and provincial citizens, ruling out old Republican criteria, which gave more privileges to a limited circle of selected people. This way Caesar was trying to lay the foundations of a new State organisation. The political structure envisaged by the Roman Republicans had been inspired by and established around the principle of divide et impera. On the contrary, Caesar's new imperial vision turned that

Statue of Julius Caesar wearing a military uniform (Trajan period).

concept into "unite, do not divide". This was the motto on which to build a new imperial society. Caesar adopted a new calendar which lasted until 1582, when it was modified by Gregory XIII. In fact, he considered the calendar as a further sign of his power. That reform was based on scientific grounds, as it integrated both lunar and solar cycles. The previous calendar dated back to the king Numa Pompilius and was based on 355 days, plus an additional month, which followed no established rules. Caesar adopted the present year of 365 days and introduced it into all Roman domains, to replace the several and sometimes odd local calendar systems. There is no doubt that that provision had a unifying effect, which was further enhanced by the reorganisation of the monetary system. Gold coins were minted on a systematic basis, and not occasionally as in the past. A fixed exchange rate between the gold coin (aureo) and the silver coin (denaro) was established. Both coins were gradually circulated all over the Empire and slowly replaced all other monetary systems. Allied sovereign States were allowed to mint silver coins, but only Rome had the right to coin gold money. It is note-worthy that Caesar was a precursor also in this sector. In fact he clearly understood the importance of a single currency, both at social and economic level. There is a telling similarity, both functional and phonetical, between the words Euro and Aureo. Thanks to Caesar, another new system was adopted. In those times papyrus scrolls were wrapped around ivory or wooden sticks and had different lengths, depending on their written texts. Caesar introduced a new method employing papyrus sheets of equal dimensions, which were heaped up




and bound together. A book was born! He may have conceived that idea during one of his several campaigns. He moved on foot or horse-back and was followed by carts packed with a large number of blank papyrus scrolls, to write his commentaries, verses, poems, and other papyri containing Greek and Latin works. Papyrus scrolls were certainly cumbersome. The

idea of a book was perhaps inspired by the requirement to gain space and reduce their volume.

A FLEETING MOMENT OF GLORY

At the beginning of October 45 B.C., Caesar came back to Rome,



Caesar's Forum (1:250 scale model).

glory and victories, blinded by cajolery and flattery, was not able to evaluate the danger of that little black mole which, in a few months, would grow into a cancerous lump.

He also received the title of Emperor, only to give more lustre to his glorious actions in war, but was not conferred full powers as in the case of his successor, Augustus.


Caesar's same name became a synonym for imperial power and the words Kaiser and Czar etymologically derive from it.

The definition of "Caesarism" equally indicates any illegitimate monarchy based on weapons and people's support. Caesar's personal power deeply hurt Republican feelings which, though being on decline in a moribund Republic, could still aggregate his citizens' consensus. Caesar, who had never betrayed his democratic ideals during his political career, started behaving as an absolute monarch.

where the civil war was over, and eagerly threw himself into putting into effect the several projects in his mind. He was extremely anxious to carry out his plans, as if he had some misgivings. In fact, his life would last 6 more months, the only period during which he was able to exert his sole power over Rome. As he cumulated other assignments, he always managed to place his men in key public positions.

But a hidden conspiracy against him was taking shape. Pompey's supporters and Republicans started fuelling a latent and wide-spread hostility against dictatorship. Caesar, unlike Napoleon, had not been defeated in the battlefield, but his real enemy was embodied in that Republican vision, which slowly

emerged from the events that occurred during the previous 5 centuries of Roman history. Caesar instead, dazzled by his



Map of Caesar's campaigns in Gaul, referring to operations against Vercingetorix.

Testudo formation (from the Trajan column).

Therefore those who could not accept a Government where power was in the hands of a single man, were increasingly hurt. Every day there was evidence of Caesar's intolerant behaviour, which was both unpleasant and humiliating. From being generous, humane and extremely kind, once the most outstanding aspects of his character, he became irritable, vain and rude. Perhaps this was due to the fact that his sporadic epileptic fits were worsening over the years. Caesar was also envisaging a new war expedition. It was a grand project, beyond all imagination, even greater than Alexander's ambitious schemes. He had in mind to wage a war against the Parthians to avenge the defeat at Carre, where Crassus was killed. After overcoming the Parthians, he would cross the Caucasus and reach the German territories from the East, to subdue them definitely. It was a wide-range manoeuvre, spanning over tens of thousands of miles, which could have overshadowed Alexander's glorious deeds. The same operation was mainly attempted by Hitler, from an opposite direction, invading Russia during World War II. But on the ides of March in 44 B.C. a handful of conspirators and stabbed him to death 23 times. He was fated to die at the feet of Pompey's effigy, the man he had to deal with during his whole life.

Caesar's overarching political vision, the structure to which he could only lay the foundations, was not doomed to die with its creator, but was built up by the man chosen by Caesar to succeed him: Octavius Augustus. Caesar singled him out as his heir, despite his young age. In fact he recognised that that young,



fragile and sickly lad had exceptional but still unnoticed qualities. As Sulla read in Caesar's eyes that he would become a Dictator, Caesar was equally able to foresee Augustus' future as an Emperor in his eyes. Caesar was killed under the accusation of exerting a dictatorial power. He became a Dictator after 55 years of political and military battles, but had not acquired a full-fledged title yet. What a different fate from that of his nephew and successor, Augustus, who suddenly came to power when he was still very young, and was able stay in power, though unscrupulously and very skilfully, for 44 years. Caesar, the would-be Dictator, was killed by 23 stabs. On the

contrary, Augustus, who became a real Emperor, almost without making the Romans notice it, died of old age in his quiet country-house. The empire, initiated by Caesar and built up by Augustus, lasted 5 centuries in the West and 14 in the East. In that respect Caesar surpassed Alexander. On the ides of March a human life was put to an end. It was the best script ever written by History, to exemplify the glorious but also perishable nature of man's life. That, however, was the life of a great man.

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
** Major General,
Chief, 4th Division,
D G S*

ROMAN
EMPERORS

OCTAVIAN AUGUSTUS

by Carmine Fiore *

Emperor Octavian Augustus was a commander of mediocre ability. His military genius was not as high as Caesar's but he managed to bring peace to the Roman people and to reorganise the State with the compliance, and some times the support, of its enemies. His ruling has been considered the happiest time Rome has ever had and during which arts and economy were healthy flourishing.



We can only look at Augustus by comparing him with Caesar. They were very different from each other: their they were physically different, their characters were different, they grew up differently and their lives followed different paths. The history of the Roman Empire celebrates them equally.

It never happened that a man from the same family succeeded his predecessor at the head of a State implementing very different principles while carrying out the greatest project in the world's history.

Caesar's genial intuition was followed by Augustus' sagacity, perseverance, flexibility and balance. Notwithstanding the differences both of them worked for Rome's sake and eternity.

Morality and mysticism are the pillars supporting their actions and they only focused on the wrongs within the State. They understood the same but acted very differently.

Caesar used to work alone, on the other Augustus firmly believed in team play. History does not tell any thing of any Caesar's lieutenants. On the contrary Augustus was supported by skilled and absolutely faithful partners.

Caesar ruled only few months and was tragically assassinated. Augustus ruled for 57 years, had a peaceful old age and died clasped in his wife's arms.

THE SITUATION AFTER CAESAR'S ASSASSINATION

After Caesar had been assassinated on the 15th of March of the year 44 BC the political struggle seemed to take place only within Caesar's party, now headed by Antonius and other conspirators.

The Senate had to repudiate either Caesar or the conspirators. Finally it found a solution and said that Caesar had not been a dictator and had not tried to seize the power; but at the same time the conspirators were not accused



because they did not act in their own interests but for the sake of the State and were granted amnesty. Seemingly the situation was back to normality.

Surprisingly Caesar disposed by will Caius Octavian to be his successor. Who was Caius Octavian?

Caius Octavian was born in Velletri, a village near Rome in 63 BC and was almost 18 years old at that time. It seemed he was destined to loose when compared with Antonius and the conspirators. He was Caesar's grand-nephew (the nephew of Caesar's sister) and Caesar had loved him and wanted him to take part in the expedition to Spain against Pompey's followers.

Caius Octavian had been sent to Epirus by Caesar for the military training and to prepare himself to fight against the Parthians. He was in Apollonia when he was told of his uncle's assassination. His friends pushed him to take the command of the legions in Epirus and march against Rome. On the contrary,

Statue of Augustus at Prima Porta: body armour detail representing the return of the symbols taken from the Romans.

his relatives implored him to stay there and not to join politics. Finally he did not accept any of the suggestions and took a firm decision: he went to Italy alone without threatening any body but did claim his rights.

Caius Octavian arrived in Rome at the beginning of the month of May in the year 44 BC and met with Antonius and called for the comitia curiata in order to have Caesar's will carried out and also asked to have all the money that had been found in Caesar's home.

AUGUSTUS IS APPOINTED AS CONSUL

The political struggle between the conspirators and those supporting Caesar got worst. Octavian realised that there were two focal points. First, there was no way to avoid



Triumphal Arch in Orange, the ancient Arausio, rich in images representing the conquest of Gaul (Augustus Age).

AND THE CIVIL WAR

Octavian had the situation under his control in Rome and had a bill passed condemning the assassination of Caesar and those who had assassinated him. Not even Antonius had dared to take that decision fearing to trigger another civil war. It was necessary that Octavian and Antonius made peace in order to reorganise Caesar's party and to finally defeat the conspirators.

He met with Antonius and Marcus Lepidus near Bologna and signed the agreement known as the Second Triumvirate. They agreed that in order to reorganise the State the Triumvir's special power would be above the Senate. In the month of November 43 BC the Senate which was adrift ratified that agreement.

The political adversaries had been put aside and their names included in the proscription lists. Now it was the time to fight against Cassius and Brutus in the East.

The battle took place in Filippi. Brutus fought against Octavian and won. On the contrary, Cassius was defeated by Antonius and committed suicide. Some days later another battle took place; this time Brutus was defeated and, abandoned by his troops, committed suicide. Antonius has to take the credit for this success. It was the month of October, 42 BC.

After 30 months Caesar's assassination was completely avenged.

THE HARD LIFE IN COMMON WITH ANTONIUS AND THE AZIO BATTLE

At this point the triumviri agreed to different tasks: Antonius was responsible for the East, where military skills were most needed. Octavian was sent to Rome, where

contrasts with Antonius; second, at the moment he was not in the strongest position. So he had to gain people's consensus. And he did it awkwardly and demagogically.

Was Antonius refusing to return him Caesar's money? Then properties were sold and money borrowed in order to carry out Caesar's will and give 300 sesterces as a gift to each Roman. This donation won him the people's support and Octavian became very popular. Antonius realised that the Octavian could not be underrated any more: Octavian, although young and in poor health, was as strong a leader as Caesar.

Octavian thought that he could reinforce his position only by means of an army. So he was helped by some veterans and his adoptive father and daringly managed to enrol a few thousands of soldiers to finally have an army. This was an absolutely new decision allowing him to enforce his power.

The political struggle turned into a military battle and the Senate was then forced to justify Octavian's decisions by entitling him to act as praetor. In the meanwhile Antonius was marching

against Decimo Brutus who had organised the defence of Modena. The Senate tried to mediate but Antonius rejected all the proposals. The Senate ordained that a riot was going on and asked the two new consuls and Octavian himself to restore order.

The battle took place in Modena. Antonius was defeated and his troops withdrew to the Narbonese Gaul while being pursued by Decimo Brutus (April 43 BC).

Both the consuls died during the battles. Octavian cooperated with Caesar's enemies only to tactically reduce Antonius's power. Now he was in the best position but did not decide to pursue Antonius. The consuls had been killed and Octavian could now be appointed as consul!

Some days later he arrived in Rome along with his legions in order to support his appointment as consul. The Senate was bewildered and frightened and Octavian was elected consul on the 10th of August, 43 BC. Seventeen months after the Ides of March Octavian was not even twenty years old! He could now start his life as an adult.

THE SECOND TRIUMVIRATE

L. Munazio Planco Mausoleum in Gaeta (first Augustus Age): Triglyph and metope with crossed lances.

political requirements were of basic importance and Lepidus was given Africa.

From 42 to 31 BC Antonius had a hard life in common with Octavian. They were completely different in their culture, style of life and feelings for the state. Within such a framework Cleopatra weakened Antonius' energy and personality.

In Azio, Greece, took place the unavoidable battle between the two triumviri.

Although Antonius' sea- and ground-strength was superior, he did not take advantage of that because of an increasing state of apathy. He had no more the decision-making skills he had learned from Caesar.

Antonius finally decided to fight a sea-battle, also being suggested by Cleopatra. In any case he made a lot of mistakes. For example, he had 500 warships but all of them were anchored in a gulf whose opening to the sea was very narrow.

On the 2nd of September of the year 31 BC the warships exited the gulf where the battle took place. The situation remained uncertain until noon when Cleopatra left the area of the battle and sailed southwards. Cleopatra took with



her 60 Egyptian warships. Moreover, Antonius absurdly followed Cleopatra and this caused disheartenment among Antonius' soldiers. At the end of the day Antonius was defeated and the soldiers surrendered. Antonius committed suicide in Alexandria and after some time Cleopatra did the same.

The threats posed by the conspirators and Antonius did not exist any more. It was time for peace, it was time to close the Janus Temple (after the religious rituals it used to be opened during war times) which had been closed only twice since the foundation of Rome.

THE REORGANISATION OF THE STATE

Octavian was 33 and had a very

difficult task: to reorganise a large state wasted by 20 years of civil war.

First he had to reorganise the Senate now composed of about 1000 members. Many of them were suggested to resign from the post and he then singled out 30 senators of great integrity. These 30 senators were then charged to single out 30 more senators of great integrity and so on until the number of 600 was reached.

New functional rules were set for the Senate, including charges for those not attending the seats, the compulsory monthly seats were reduced to two and it was decided that the less important businesses had to be carried out by a council made up of a number senators selected by lot (*Consilium Principes*).

In 29 BC the Senate awarded

Arch of Orange (Augustus Age): Images representing Romans fighting against Gauls.





The Julian Mausoleum in Saint-Remy, Provence (Augustus Age): Images representing Romans fighting against Gauls.

Octavian with the title of Emperor which he could pass on to his heirs.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Until that moment Octavian had maintained the old republican constitution and made his best to have it more functional.

Now he realised the state needed a new constitution.

The boundaries of the Roman state had enlarged and were not those of a city-state but of an Empire. So many different peoples could not be ruled by Roman magistrates who were replaced by new ones yearly.

This state required institutions based on regularity, continuity and stability. But this goal was to be reached gradually, without taking drastic actions.

First of all the state of emergency had to come to an end. And Octavian made this step during a meeting on the 13th of

June, 27 BC when he said: "I am thoroughly laying down the power, the arms and all the subject peoples".

This decision brought the constitution back to its original form. From this point on it could be reviewed politically and not with force. The Senate asked Augustus to go on ruling the provinces which could cause some problems. Augustus accepted to do that for the next 10 years.

Because of this decision there were two kinds of provinces:

- the first, controlled by the Senate which appointed ex-consuls or ex-praetors as governors yearly;
- the second (provinces along the boundaries and troubled ones) controlled by Augustus who appointed lieutenants for as long as needed.

This paved the way to a new kind of official who were not Magistrates but high-level officials paid on a regular basis. As a matter of fact the legions committed to these provinces belonged directly

to Augustus.

Augustus managed to keep and reinforce his power by means of another action: in 23 BC, when he renounced his formal powers, he renounced the appointment as consul and was given the *tribunicia potestas* which actually gave him more power as he could veto any decision taken by the Senate.

As a final result Augustus had an absolute power within a constitution which had been brought back to its basic original form. There was a sort of diarchy (the sovereignty was shared between Augustus and the Senate).

THE EMPIRE ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL SERVANTS

Caesar had fought against and humiliated the officials working for the state. On the contrary, Augustus welcomed the aristocracy's support in order to restore an ancient system and tried to involve it even in the ruling of the provinces.

But the aristocracy had been weakened by a comfortable life and Augustus got no feedback from aristocrats. The importance of aristocracy begins to decline and will be finally erased by the French revolution 18 centuries later.

Since aristocracy was indifferent to reforms, officials and civil servants necessary to operate such a complex organisation were chosen among plebeians (e.g. Agrippa) and those belonging to the equestrian order (e.g. Maccenas). The new organisation of the state favoured commerce and helped the equestrian order which will later turned into bourgeoisie.

Now the empire was operated by permanent officials who will

create the civil servant class in the future.

THE REORGANISATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

Augustus also focused on the reorganisation of the armed forces (army and navy) and took outstanding decisions in this respect.

The legions were reduced from 50 to 28 and finally to 18 (as you see reductions were also made in the past) but in this way and for the first time the army became a permanent organisation. Before that soldiers (conscripts and volunteers) had been called up upon need. Augustus realised that a permanent army would have prevented the boundary territories from being invaded and attacked.

The army was then given clear tasks, ideals and moral rules which were appealed to by commanders instead of promising money and war booty. These principles were at the base of the army reorganised by Augustus and which managed to drive back barbaric peoples for four centuries.

The legionaries served for 16 and later for 20 years. They were well paid and at the end of their career they received a number of benefits. Under these conditions there were enough volunteers and only rarely it was necessary to turn to conscription.

The first boundary line was controlled by means of *castella* placed at a distance of not more than one day walking from each other. Within said *castella* there were a number of smaller detachments.

On the back and in a barycentric position there were the *castra* with one or more legions.

The legions were posted to the provinces of the Empire and belonged directly to the governor in order to have military and civil power in the same hands.

Augustus set the rules for recruiting reserve soldiers who were posted near the legions along the



boundaries of the Empire and naturalised at the end of their service.

Also the navy was reorganised on a permanent basis and made up of two fleets. The Headquarters were in Ravenna and Miseno. The navy was also to patrol in the Mediterranean sea for protecting the commerce. The service in the navy lasted 28 years.

Augustus also introduced the praetorian cohorts into the state organisation. There were 9 of them: 3 in Rome and 6 in the others residences of the emperor.

The praetorians served for 16 years and were paid more than double compared with the legionaries who served for 20 years.

The money for running the army in the different provinces came from the provinces themselves and this fell within the competence of the *procuratores Augusti*.

PROPAGANDA AND CULTURE CONTROL

Caesar and Augustus had the

Trajan Column: Images representing Slingsmen.

same kind of insight for propaganda. Caesar did every thing by himself. In fact, for example, during the Gaul campaigns he used to write commentaries which were then released and circulated.

Augustus was more successful because of a subtle propaganda spread through a controlled culture (today we would rather say that he had his control over the intelligentsia). Augustus did it with the support of an exceptional and faithful aide whose name was Maecenas. Maecenas was Augustus' minister for propaganda and culture who subsidised all the cultural happenings, in particular the literary ones.

This allowed the flourishing of writers and immortal poets (Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Lucretius, Propertius, Catullus, Titus, Livy). It was the golden age of the Latin literature. Notwithstanding the printing had not been invented



Praetorium, the Headquarters at the camp of the Legion III Augusta at Lambaesis, Algeria, (Imperial Age).

yet there were publishers and the books were hand written by slaves who managed to write 5,000 to 10,000 copies of them which were sold out within few months. The uncultured and warlike Roman society became an educated and refined one.

ROME , ITALY AND THE ROMAN EMPIRE

While reorganising the Empire Augustus wanted to maintain a privileged position for Italy which had been equalled to Rome and not considered as if it was a province. Contrary to Caesar who had naturalised all the subjects, Augustus was more sparing of naturalising the subjects living in the provinces.

Moreover Augustus thought it was the time for Roman citizens to share the expenses of the Empire. You can easily imagine the reactions prompted by this decision at a time when the Roman citizens had not been paying taxes for centuries.

A very big project of public works was then started in order to make Rome more beautiful and also to reduce unemployment.

Rome, as it is happening for today's Jubilee, became a road yard. The Ara Pacis mausoleum and the Marcel Theatre and also the Julia and Emily basilicas within the Roman Forum were built. The works for Augustus' Forum started at that time. Private investors were asked to step in the projects as it happened, for example, for the Pantheon which was supported by Agrippa.

THE LAWS PROTECTING MORALS

In Rome there was a low birth rate and Augustus considered this trend as a threat to Roman virtues.

The Romans, especially the upper class, had shifted from the old morals to an immoderate life. Men preferred to be single instead of getting married and be in charge of a family.

In order to fight such an antisocial phenomenon Augustus had two bills approved: the *de adulteris et de pudicitia* bill and the *de maritandis ordinibus* one. The former condemned adultery ad crime while the latter reduced

the freedom of the Roman citizen. In fact the citizens of the upper classes were forced to get married with their equals and the families were asked to have more children. The singles were not entitled to come into an inheritance, were not allowed to attend public happenings and could not be appointed as officials within the public administration. Benefits were given to those who were married and depending on the number of children they had.

These steps curbed widespread bad habits taken over from the Eastern society.

THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

During his Empire Augustus conquered Mesiae, the territory of today's Hungary and Rhaetia, the Alps and the area comprised between the Rhine and the Elba rivers. He did it in order to better defend the Empire. Augustus believed the Roman Empire would be strong until it remained within the Mediterranean area and he also thought the German and the Eastern worlds would bring along with them the seeds of disintegration.

So he stabilised the eastern boundaries by means of friendly political relationships with the Parthians who had been fighting against Crassus and Antonius.

On the contrary along the Northern border (Cisalpine Gaul) the security could only be achieved by conquering the territories up to the Danube, including the Northern part of the Tyrol, Bavaria and the Eastern part of Switzerland.

Tiberius, who was 26, and Druse, who was 22, (Augustus' stepsons)

were given the command of the operation. They made a daring enveloping manoeuvre: Druse moved from south to north along the Adige river valley while Tiberius moved from Gaul to attack the side and the back of the enemy. This was done in 16 to 15 BC and secured the Romans the possession of the Eastern part of the Alps. After that they conquered Pannoniae.

In order to have a stronger northern boundary it was thought necessary to push away the threat posed by the Germans and have the boundary line along the Elba river, also because there was a shorter distance between the Elba river and the Danube.

Also on this occasion an enveloping manoeuvre was made and it was made both by the army and the navy:

- the army moved northward from the Rhine to the Elba river;
- the navy outflanked the enemy by sailing along the North sea.

It took three years to Drusus to carry out the task, from 12 to 10 BC. Unfortunately he died in that year.


The northern boundary was always unstable and was only safe thanks to Tiberius' diplomatic skills.

Notwithstanding the services rendered to his country and to the Emperor, Tiberius knew the Emperor did not like him because of his wife's (Augustus's daughter) behaviour.

Tiberius went into a 7-year voluntary exile to Rhodes although Augustus had not agreed. This happened in 6 BC and Octavian was remaining alone. Maecenas had died and he was getting older. It was necessary for him to choose his successor, also because he had no male heir.

SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE

It seemed that all the potential



Praetorian (reproduction).

successors were under a curse: in fact Marcellus, his sister's son, Marcus Vespasian Agrippa, his best friend, and Drusus, Tiberius' younger brother died under mysterious circumstances.

During Tiberius' exile Lucius and Caius, Octavian's nephews, also died. But Augustus' problems were not to an end. After Tiberius had gone into exile Julia behaved even more foolish and Octavian's political adversaries took advantage of that, especially because of the passed morals campaign. Augustus was informed of his daughter's behaviour and exiled her to the Ventotene Island, along the Lazio region coast. Since Augustus' adoptive sons had died and Julia had been sent into exile Tiberius was destined to succeed

to the throne and adopted as son by Augustus with whom he led the Empire.

THE LAST YEARS

Tiberius was respectful of his role and acted on behalf of Augustus. He was politically and militarily skilled, in particular referred to German and Danube situations. Nonetheless he was respected by the soldiers.

In 10 BC a rumour went around and the Emperor was told that three legions had been destroyed during a battle in the Teutoburg forest. The legions were under Varus' command, the Emperor's envoy. Varus' trust had been betrayed by Arminius, a Germanic Commander.

This latest news had a striking effect on Rome and Tiberius was ordered to go and help reinforce the defence organisation and keep up morale.

In the summer 14 AD Augustus went south of Rome and to the islands along the coast of the Campania region which were the places he liked most to take a rest. Then he went to Benevento, a city near Naples, in order to take leave from Tiberius who was about to leave for Illyria. On the way back Augustus' illness got worst and he stopped off at Nola where he was joined by Tiberius. They had a day-long talk, the so called Augustus' oral will, as they had never had before. The next day, the 19th of August 14 AD, Augustus died near his wife. He was 76 years old and finished the job his great-uncle had begun. He managed to give a stable base to a State which, starting with Tiberius, will be referred to as Empire and that will last 4 centuries.

When Augustus was alive Jesus Christ was born in Bethlehem where Joseph and Mary went because Augustus had ordered a census of the population. What a coincidence! At a time when the



A Vinea, war machine used by the Roman soldiers as protection during sieges (1:10 model).

Emperor consolidated the foundations of an mundane Empire which will last the next four centuries the spiritual Emperor was born thanks to whom, although because of different reasons, Rome will be one of the most beautiful reference points for the human civilisation.

CONCLUSIONS

Augustus cannot be considered as the "Emperor of the Peace". Augustus made a piece of Rome's golden history.

Caesar made outlined the project of an Empire and only a very skilled man could finish the job. Augustus did it although he was not a General at first sight but he was a great politician. And when we focus on Octavian's analysis capability and flexibility we shall realised how important

they were, how useful they were to the Empire compared to Caesar's skills and geniality.

Augustus was Emperor for 44 years and, if we take into account also the period when he had been acting as consul, he was Rome's leader for 57 years. Only Ramses II and Fransis Joseph II of Austria reigned more than he did.

He was particularly open minded and built a perfect political system relying on a good economy.

Augustus' driving force was not as good as Caesar's but he was politically more intelligent. He started his political career in a

chaotic uncertain period and 57 years later he died after having built a thoroughly stable Empire.

Augustus took Rome's political, social and cultural history to its highest point. The old republican constitution seemed to be the same but in fact it was radically changed. This is Rome's last part of history which in the future will never be as beautiful as it had been at the beginning.



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** Major General,
Chief, 4th Division,
D G S*

A helmet and a bronze shield umbo of the Legio VIII Augusta.



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Hongrie. La nouvelle Armée de Terre. Entrevue au Chef d'État Major, Général Ambrus Preininger, par Enrico Magnani (p. 10).

L'adhésion de l'Hongrie à l'OTAN a poussé les Forces Armées à entreprendre une profonde restructuration pour les adapter aux nouvelles exigences. En particulier la réorganisation de l'Armée de Terre a touché l'État-Major et les Unités opérationnelles. On a fait une grande attention à la formation linguistique du personnel, à l'échange d'informations, à l'amélioration du Commandement et Contrôle, à la constitution de forces de terre de prompt intervention. L'Armée de Terre de l'Hongrie a déjà prouvé une pleine garantie opérationnelle, pleinement reconnue par les alliés, et en particulier par l'Italie, dans le cadre de l'activité d'instruction militaire parmi notre Pays, la Slovaquie et l'Hongrie.

Les organisations internationales non-gouvernementales. Une réalité qui doit être approfondie, par Massimo Panizzi (p. 22).

Dans les missions de soutien à la paix, les relations parmi les Commandements militaires, et les organisations internationales, régionales, gouvernementales et non-gouvernementales, ont une importance déterminante pour le succès. Cet article illustre les caractéristiques de cette collaboration et trace les relations entre les Forces Armées et les organisations, en formulant des propositions pour un mieux coordination. Il souligne, enfin, l'importance d'une préparation particulier des Cadres destinés à

opérer dans un milieu de pleine interconnexion civile et militaire.

Les «Bersaglieri» en Kosovo (p. 38).

Le décembre passé, la Brigade «Garibaldi» a été appelée, dans le cadre de l'opération «Joint Guarantor», en Macédoine, par protéger les observateurs OSCE en Kosovo. Après les bombardements et les nombreux tentatives diplomatiques, la Serbie a finalement décidé de négocier avec l'OTAN. À la suite des accords stipulés, les «Bersaglieri», l'Infanterie mécanisée, les «Alpini», les Unités du Génie, des Transmissions et NBC sont arrivés à Pec.

Après la chute du Mur de Berlin. Les guerres dans le monde, par Ornella Rota (p. 44).

Les actuelles tendances à la globalisation et à la «balcanisation» sont la cause de la plupart des guerres qu'il y a maintenant dans le monde entier. L'expulsion des minorités et la déportation des groupes ethniques, qui caractérisent ces conflits sont causées par des raisons économiques plus qu'idéologiques et souvent s'entrelacent avec les intérêts de la criminalité organisée. Il est donc nécessaire une action multilatérale qui se concrétise avec une réelle collaboration parmi les États.

«Modules opérationnels» des forces de manœuvre. Fonction «Combat», par Claudio Graziano (p. 54).

Ce travail est centré sur l'idée d'organisation, sur la base de laquelle ont été définis les modules et, pour agrégations suivantes, la structure organique des différentes Unités, et particulièrement le nouveau Régiment d'Infanterie.

Les opérations de «Peacebuilding». Idées, considérations et leçons apprises, par Pier Giorgio Segala (p. 70).

Les opérations de construction de la

paix (peacebuilding) ne sont pas simples. Pour avoir du succès, les forces militaires doivent tenir en compte les organisations non-gouvernementales internationales présentes sur le terrain, en réalisant avec elles des unités de propositions, de stratégie et d'action aussi à travers l'instruction liée, la diffusion des idées et le monitoring de chaque activité.

La nouvelle doctrine de l'Armée de Terre, par Domenico Zucaro (p. 78).


Selon l'actuelle normative, les opérations en profondeur, à contact et arrières doivent être insérées dans un plan général des opérations (Operational Framework), qui prévoit la réalisation des «Points décisifs» et la destruction du «Centre de gravité» ennemi. Ça comporte une profonde réflexion sur l'instruction militaire à laquelle soumettre les Cadres, à fin qu'ils acquièrent une «forma mentis» calibrée aux nouvelles exigences opérationnelles.

Les Empereurs romains. Caius Jules César, par Carmine Fiore (p. 88).

César, Consul en 59 a.C., devient depuis Gouverneur de la Gaule Cisalpine, de l'Illyrie et de la Gaule Narbonnaise. Son génie militaire se manifeste dans les campagnes qui lui ont permis de conquérir la Gaule, de débarquer en Bretagne et de gagner contre Pompée. La réforme agraire et la réorganisation du très grand territoire de l'Empire témoignent aussi ses aptitudes politiques. Sa mort, à cause des sicaire et inspirée des Sénateurs liés aux Institutions de la République, n'a pas arrêté le chemin de l'Empire romain destiné à durer 5 siècles en Occident et 14 en Orient.

Les Empereurs romains: Octavien Auguste, par Carmine Fiore (p. 100).

L'Empire voulu par César vient



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pleinement réalisé avec son successeur, Octavien Auguste, lequel, nommé consul en 43 a.C., constitue avec Antoine et Lépide le deuxième triumvirat en anéantissant Brutus et Cassius à Philippi. Après, il affronte Antoine et lui bat à Anzio en 31 a.C.. Éliminés ses ennemis, Auguste met à effet la réforme constitutionnelle: centre sur soi-même tous les pouvoirs sans abattre les institutions républicaines et introduit les «equites» dans l'apparat administratif de l'Empire. Avec Lui, Rome connaît une période de paix, de promotion culturelle, de restauration des anciens «mores», de développement urbain et d'expansion du territoire.



Ungarn: das neue Heer: Interview mit dem ungarischen Heeresstabschef, General Ambrus Preininger, durchgeführt, von Enrico Magnani (S. 10).

Der NATO-Beitritt Ungarns hat die Streitkräfte des Landes bewogen, eine grundsätzliche Umstrukturierung vorzunehmen, um sie den neuen Bedürfnissen anzupassen. Insbesondere hat die Umgestaltung des Heeres den Heeresstab und die verschiedenen Einsatzeinheiten beschäftigt. Große Beachtung hat die sprachliche Ausbildung des Personals, der Informationsaustausch, die Verbesserung von Befehl und Überwachung, sowie die Schaffung von jederzeit einsatzbereiten Landstreitkräften gefunden. Die ungarischen Streitkräfte haben bereits Zeugnis von ihrer vollen operativen Zuverlässigkeit abgelegt,

die ihnen im großem Ausmaß von den Alliierten, vor allem von Italien, im Rahmen der italo-slowenisch-ungarischen Ausbildungstätigkeit, anerkannt worden sind.

Die internationalen Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGO's). Eine Erscheinung, die beobachtet zu werden verdient, von Massimo Panizzi (S. 22).

In den Missionen der Friedensunterstützung kommt den Beziehungen zwischen militärischer Führung und internationalen, nationalen, regionalen, von Regierungen und nicht von Regierungen bestellten Organisationen, eine entscheidende Bedeutung für den Erfolg der Mission zu.

Der Artikel illustriert die charakteristischen Züge dieser Zusammenarbeit, und umreißt die Beziehungen zwischen den Streitkräften und den Organisationen, wobei Vorschläge zu einer besseren Koordination formuliert werden. Er unterstreicht schließlich die Bedeutung einer spezifischen Ausbildung des militärischen Führungspersonals, das in einer Umgebung vollständiger militärischer und ziviler Vernetzung wirken soll.

Die Bersaglieri im Kosovo (S. 38).

Im vergangenen Dezember wurde die Brigade «Garibaldi» im Rahmen der Operation «Joint Guarantor» nach Mazedonien geschickt, um die OSZE-Beobachter im Kosovo zu beschützen. Nach den Bombardierungen und den verschiedenen Versuchen seitens der Diplomatie, hat Serbien sich endlich dazu durchgerungen, mit der NATO zu verhandeln. Infolge der erreichten Übereinkünfte sind Bersaglieri, Motorisierte Infanterie, Gebirgsjäger, Pioniereinheiten, des Fernmeldewesens und der NBC in Pec angelangt. In diesem Gebiet, einvernehmlich als das gefährlichste

eingeschätzt, ist das italienische Kontingent mit der Entminung, der Wiederherstellung von Straßen und mit der Entwaffnung beider Seiten beauftragt, damit die notwendigen Bedingungen geschaffen werden für die Rückkehr der ethnisch albanischen Flüchtlinge. Eine schwierige Aufgabe, die unsere Soldaten in hervorragender Weise erfüllen, wofür ihnen von der örtlichen Bevölkerung, und auch seitens der internationalen Beobachter, Wertschätzung entgegengebracht wird.

Nach dem Fall der Berliner Mauer: Die Konflikte in der Welt, von Ornella Rota (S. 44).

Die derzeitigen Tendenzen zur Globalisierung und zur «Balkanisierung» sind Grund für einen großen Teil der Konflikte in der Welt.

Die Vertreibung von Minderheiten und die Deportation ethnischer Gruppen, die solche Konflikte charakterisieren, sind von wirtschaftlichen, mehr als von ideologischen Gründen bestimmt, und oft verquickten sie sich mit den Interessen der organisierten Kriminalität.


Es ist daher in Zukunft unbedingt multilaterales Handeln nötig, das sich in einer wirklichen Zusammenarbeit der Staaten konkretisieren sollte.

«Operative Module» der Manöverstreitkräfte: Die Combat-Funktion, von Claudio Graziano (S. 54).

Die Arbeit hebt auf das Organisationskonzept ab, auf dessen Grundlage die Bestandteile (Module) und durch spätere Angliederungen, die Personalstruktur der verschiedenen Einheiten, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des neuen Infanterieregiments, definiert worden sind.

Die Peacebuilding-Operationen: Konzepte, Überlegungen und gelernte

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Lektionen, von Pier Giorgio Segala (S. 70).

Die friedensschaffenden Operationen (peacebuilding operations) sind nicht einfach.

Das Militär muß, um erfolgreich zu sein, die Präsenz der internationalen Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen mit in seine Planung einbeziehen, und mit diesen gleiche Ziele, Strategien und Aktionen verfolgen, auch durch gemeinsame Ausbildung, und die Überwachung (Monitorierung) der einzelnen Aktivitäten.

Die neue Doktrin des Heeres, von Domenico Zucaro (S. 78).

Die bestehenden Gesetze und Verordnungen sehen vor, daß sowohl die Operationen in der Tiefe des Raums, diejenigen mit Feindkontakt, als auch die im Hintergrund, in einen allgemeinen Operationsplan (Operational Framework) eingebaut werden, der die Realisierung der «entscheidenden Punkte» und die Zerstörung des «Schwerpunktes» des Gegners vorsehen.

Dieses wirft viele Fragen bezüglich der Ausbildung des Führungspersonals auf, damit die Vorgesetzten eine geistige Haltung einnehmen, die den neuen operativen Bedürfnissen entspricht.

Die Römischen Kaiser. Caius Julius Cäsar, von Carmine Fiore (s. 88).

Cäsar, Konsul im Jahre 59 v. Chr., wird dann Verwalter der Gallia Cisalpina, Illyriens und der Gallia Narbonensis. Sein militärisches Genie zeigt sich in den Kampagnen, die zur Eroberung Galliens, zum Einmarsch in Britannien und zum Sieg über Pompeius führen. Die Agrarreform und die Umorganisation des riesigen Reiches zeugen auch von seinen politischen Fähigkeiten. Sein Tod von Mörderhand, bewaffnet von Senatoren, die den alten republikanischen Institutionen anhängen, konnte den Weg des

Reiches nicht aufhalten, das noch 5 Jahrhunderte im Westen, und 14 im Osten überdauern sollte.

Die Römischen Kaiser: Octavian Augustus, von Carmine Fiore (S. 100).

Das Reich, das Cäsar wollte, wird unter seinem Nachfolger, Octavian Augustus, vollständig realisiert, der, 43 v.Chr. zum Konsuln ernannt, mit Antonius und Lepidus das zweite Triumvirat bildet, wobei er Brutus und Cassius bei Philippi vernichtend schlägt. Im folgenden nimmt er es mit Antonius auf und schlägt ihn 31 v. Chr. bei Actium.

Nachdem er die Rivalen und Gegner ausgeschaltet hat, setzt Augustus seine Verfassungsreform durch: er zentralisiert alle Macht auf sich, ohne formell die republikanischen Institutionen abzuschaffen, und integriert den Ritterstand in den Verwaltungsapparat des Imperium.



Ungar. El nuevo Ejército. Entrevista al Jefe de Estado Mayor, General Ambrus Preininger, de Enrico Magnani (p. 10).

La adhesión de Ungar. a OTAN ha traído las Fuerzas Armadas a entraprender una profunda restructuración para adheguarlas a las nuevas exigencias. En particular la reorganización del Ejército ha interesado el Estado Mayor y las Unidades operativas. Grande atención se ha dado a la formación linguística del personale, a las informaciones, al mejoramiento del «Mando» y «Control», a la constitución de fuerzas terrestres de


pronta intervención. El Ejército unguerés ya ha dado prueba de plena afidabilidad operativa, totalmente reconocida por los aliados, y por Italia, en el cuadro de actividad adiestrativa italo-sloveno-unguerés.

Las organizaciones internacionales no gubernativas. Una realidad a profundizar, de Massimo Panizzi (p. 22).

En las misiones de soporte a la paz, las relaciones entre los Comandos militares y las organizaciones internacionales, regionales, gubernativas y no gubernativas, asumen una importancia fundamental para garantizar el bueno éxito. El artículo ilustra las características de esta colaboración y presenta las relaciones entre las Fuerzas Armadas y las organizaciones, formulando propuestas por un mejor coordinación. Este artículo subraya, en fin, la importancia de una específica preparación de los Cuadros destinados a obrar en un ambiente de plena interconexión civil y militar.

Los «Bersaglieri» en Kosovo, (p. 38).

En el diciembre pasado la Brigada «Garibaldi» ha sido llamada, en el ámbito de la operación «Joint Guarantor», en Macedonia, para proteger los observadores OSCE en Kosovo. Después los bombardeos y las numerosas tentativas diplomáticas, la Serbia ha finalmente llegado a negociar con la OTAN. A consecuencia de los acuerdos, los «Bersaglieri», los infantes mecanizados, los alpinos, las Unidades del Genio, de las Transmisiones y NBC han llegado a Pec. En esta área, unánimemente considerada la más peligrosa, el contingente italiano es ocupado en las actividades de bonificación, de restablecimiento de la viabilidad y del desarme de las facciones en campo, para crear las condiciones necesarias por el regreso de los prófugos albaneses. Un encargo difícil que



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nuestros soldados están desarrollando egregiamente y en efecto ellos han merecido la aprobación y la apreciación de la comunidad local y de los observadores internacionales.

Después de la caída del Muro de Berlín. Los conflictos en el mundo, de Ornella Rota (p. 44).

Las actuales tendencias para la globalización y la «balcanización» son causa de la mayoría de los conflictos en el mundo. La expulsión de las minorancias y la deportación de los grupos étnicos, que caracterizan estos conflictos, son dictadas por razones económicas más que por las ideológicas y muchas veces se entrelazan con los intereses de la criminalidad organizada. Se impone, pues, la necesidad de una acción multilateral que se concretiza en una real colaboración entre los Estados.

«Módulos operativos» de las fuerzas de manobra. Función «Combat», de Claudio Graziano (p. 54).

El trabajo está basado en el concepto organizativo para el que han sido definidos los módulos, y para agregaciones sucesivas, la estructura orgánica de las varias unidades, con particular interés al módulo Regimiento de Fantería.

Las operaciones de «Peacebuilding». Conceptos, consideraciones y lecciones aprendidas, de Pier Giorgio Segala (p. 70).

Las operaciones de construcción de la paz (peacebuilding) no son simples. Las fuerzas militares para tener buen éxito, tienen que acordarse de las organizaciones no gubernamentales internacionales en el campo, realizando con ellas Unidades de propósitos, de estrategia y acción también con el adiestramiento unido, el traspaso de experiencias y el monitoreo de las singulares actividades.

La nueva doctrina del Ejército,

de Domenico Zucaro (p. 78).

Para lo que ha previsto la ley actual, las operaciones en profundidad, en contacto y pasadas tienen que ser puestas en un esquema general de las operaciones (Operational Framework), que prevea el consiguimiento de los «Puntos decisivos» y la destrucción del «Centro de gravedad» enemigos. Esto trae una profunda reflexión sobre el adiestramiento al que suponen los Cuadros, para que adquieran una «forma mentis» calibradas a las nuevas exigencias operativas.

Los Emperadores romanos. Caio Giulio Cesare, de Carmine Fiore (p. 88).

Cesare, Consul en 59 a.C. llega a ser Gobernador de la Gallia Cisalpina, de Illiria y de la Gallia Narbonense. Su genio militar se ve en las campañas que llevan a la conquista de la Gallia, al desembarque en Britania, a la victoria sobre Pompeio. La reforma agraria y la reorganización del vasto territorio del Emperador testimonian también sus usancias políticas. Su muerte, por sicarios y inspirada por senadores quedados atados a las Instituciones republicanas, no quedó el camino del Emperador destinado a durar por 5 siglos en Occidente y 14 siglos en Oriente.

Los Emperadores romanos: Octaviano Augusto, de Carmine Fiore (p. 100).

El Imperio que ha querido Cesar es plenamente realizado por su sucesor, Octaviano Augusto, que, elegido consul en 43 a.C., constituye con Antonio y Lepido el segundo triumvirato ganando Bruto y Cassio en Filippi. Pues lucha con Antonio y lo gana en Anzio en 31 a.C.. Vencidos los enemigos, Augusto empieza la reforma constitucional: centra en sí mismo todos los poderes sin abater las instituciones republicanas y pone los «equites» en la administración del Imperio. Bajo su Imperio, Roma conoce un periodo de paz, de promoción cultural, de restauración






de los antiguos «mores», de desarrollo urbanístico y expansión territorial.

LA RESISTENZA DEI MILITARI ITALIANI ALL'ESTERO



JUGOSLAVIA CENTRO STEREOGRAFICO

CONVEGNO NAZIONALE DI STUDI CINQUE SECOLI DI STORIA NELL'ALTA PROVINCIA DI TERRA DI LAVORO

ATTI



THE EDITORIAL STYLE OF RIVISTA MILITARE



RIVISTA MILITARE

JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856

